FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Connolly v Mills Oakley Lawyers (a Partnership) [2019] FCA 950
Appeal from: Mills Oakley Lawyers (a Partnership) v Connolly [2018] FCCA 1647 File number: VID 849 of 2018 Judge: STEWARD J Date of judgment: 19 June 2019 Catchwords: COSTS – appeal from the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – whether primary judge erred in exercising discretion as to costs – where bankruptcy notice issued –where sum paid purportedly to settle the debt – where a creditor’s petition was subsequently issued – whether the primary judge erred in law by not addressing a sufficiently articulated argument regarding accord and satisfaction – whether primary judge took into account an irrelevant consideration Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 44, 52
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 37M
Cases cited: Foakes v Beer (1884) 9 App Cas 605
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499
JP Morgan Australia Ltd v Consolidated Minerals Ltd [2010] NSWSC 100
Kazar (Liquidator) v Kargarian (2011) 197 FCR 113
Pinnel’s Case (1602) 5 Co Rep 117a
Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton (2017) 261 CLR 132
Tenser v Quigley [2016] FCAFC 178
Troutfarms Australia Pty Ltd v Perpetual Nominees Ltd [2013] VSC 228
Date of hearing: 17 April 2019 Registry: Victoria Division: General Division National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations Sub-area: General and Personal Insolvency Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 46 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr M D Tehan Solicitor for the Appellant: Hall & Wilcox Counsel for the Respondent: Mr M T LaPirow Solicitor for the Respondent: Davies Moloney ORDERS
VID 849 of 2018 BETWEEN: DAVID CONNOLLY
Appellant
AND: MILLS OAKLEY LAWYERS
Respondent
JUDGE:
STEWARD J
DATE OF ORDER:
19 JUNE 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be allowed with no order as to costs.
2.The orders of Judge Hartnett dated 22 June 2018 be set aside and in lieu thereof:
(a)Each party bear their own costs of the application for review dated 28 September 2017.
(b)The costs and expenses of the trustee in bankruptcy, being $38,565.09, be borne equally by the parties.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
STEWARD J:
Introduction
By an application filed in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 28 September 2017, the appellant, Mr David Connolly, sought review of a sequestration order made on a creditor’s petition presented by the respondent, Mills Oakley Lawyers, against the appellant. On 12 December 2017, the primary judge set aside the sequestration order and reserved the question of costs. On 22 June 2018, the primary judge ordered that the appellant pay: (i) the respondent’s costs of the application for review as agreed or taxed; and (ii) the costs and expenses of the trustee in bankruptcy in the sum of $38,565.09. The appellant seeks to appeal the primary judge’s order as to costs.
Background
The dispute before me is a product of a series of events…
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 950
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue in this appeal revolves around whether the primary judge erred in exercising their discretion regarding the costs order. This involves examining whether the primary judge considered irrelevant factors or failed to take into account material considerations, such as the argument of accord and satisfaction, which the appellant claims was not adequately addressed. The appellant contends that the debt under the bankruptcy notice was compromised when FeeSynergy advanced the settlement amount on his behalf, thus arguing that there was no proper debt on which the creditor's petition could be based.
The court's reasoning focuses on the established principles for reviewing an appeal against a discretionary decision, emphasizing that the primary judge must not act upon a wrong principle, allow irrelevant matters to affect them, or fail to consider material considerations. The court must determine if the primary judge's decision was unreasonable or plainly unjust. In this case, the court found that the primary judge did not commit any error warranting interference with the discretion exercised in the costs order. The appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs, and the original costs orders were set aside. Instead, the court ordered that each party bear their own costs of the application for review, and the costs and expenses of the trustee in bankruptcy be borne equally by both parties.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed with no order as to costs.
2. The orders of Judge Hartnett dated 22 June 2018 be set aside and in lieu thereof:
(a) Each party bear their own costs of the application for review dated 28 September 2017.
(b) The costs and expenses of the trustee in bankruptcy, being $38,565.09, be borne equally by the parties.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Given the amount at stake and the history of this matter, it is most regrettable that this appeal has been pursued. The parties would have been better off with an agreed but compromised outcome. Consideration Relevant Legal Principles It was not in dispute that it falls on the appellant to establish that the primary judge committed an error of the kind identified in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 in the exercise of the discretion as to costs. As Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ stated in House v The King at 504‑505:The manner in which an appeal against an exercise of discretion should be determined is governed by established principles. It is not enough that the judges composing the appellate court consider that, if they had been in the position of the primary judge, they would have taken a different course. It must appear that some error has been made in exercising the discretion. If the judge acts upon a wrong principle, if he allows extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect him, if he mistakes the facts, if he does not take into account some material consideration, then his determination should be reviewed and the appellate court may exercise its own discretion in substitution for his if it has the materials for doing so. It may not appear how the primary judge has reached the result embodied in his order, but, if upon the facts it is unreasonable or plainly unjust, the appellate court may infer that in some way there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion which the law reposes in the court of first instance. Further, the respondent highlighted the following observation made by Foster J in Kazar (Liquidator) v Kargarian (2011) 197 FCR 113 at [52]:In later cases, justices of the High Court have said that, in respect of appeals against decisions involving discretionary judgment, there is a strong presumption in favour of the correctness of the decision appealed from and that that decision should be affirmed unless the appeal court is satisfied that it is clearly wrong (see Australian Coal and Shale Employees’ Federation v Commonwealth (1953) 94 CLR 621 at 627 per Kitto J; and Mallet v Mallet (1984) 156 CLR 605 at 634 per Wilson J).Ground One The first ground of appeal complained that the primary judge erred in finding that “Mills Oakley was entitled to issue a Creditor’s Petition against Mr Connolly”. Counsel for the appellant submitted that this conclusion appeared to be based, in part, on her Honour’s finding that “Mr Connolly had made a part payment of the judgment debt which did not discharge the judgment itself”. It was said that those findings were based on an error of legal principle, and thus constituted an error of law. In essence, the appellant submitted that upon entering into the agreement with FeeSynergy and FeeSynergy advancing the sum of $25,000 to the respondent on his behalf on 27 January 2017, the debt owing under the Bankruptcy Notice was compromised and therefore ceased to exist. It followed, it was said, that there was no proper debt on which the Creditor’s Petition could be based for the purposes of s 44 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (the “Bankruptcy Act”). Relevantly, s 44(1) provides:(1) A creditor’s petition shall not be presented against a debtor unless:(a)there is owing by the debtor to the petitioning creditor a debt that amounts to $5,000 or 2 or more debts that amount in the aggregate to $5,000, or, where 2 or more creditors join in the petition, there is owing by the debtor to the several petitioning creditors debts that amount in the aggregate to $5,000;(b)that debt, or each of those debts, as the case may be:(i)is a liquidated sum due at law or in equity or partly at law and partly in equity; and(ii)is payable either immediately or at a certain future time; and(c)the act of bankruptcy on which the petition is founded was committed within 6 months before the presentation of the petition.