Connolly v Mills Oakley Lawyers (a Partnership)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Connolly v Mills Oakley Lawyers (a Partnership) [2019] FCA 950

Appeal from: Mills Oakley Lawyers (a Partnership) v Connolly [2018] FCCA 1647
File number: VID 849 of 2018
Judge: STEWARD J
Date of judgment: 19 June 2019
Catchwords: COSTS – appeal from the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – whether primary judge erred in exercising discretion as to costs – where bankruptcy notice issued –where sum paid purportedly to settle the debt – where a creditor’s petition was subsequently issued – whether the primary judge erred in law by not addressing a sufficiently articulated argument regarding accord and satisfaction – whether primary judge took into account an irrelevant consideration
Legislation:

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 44, 52

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 37M

Cases cited:

Foakes v Beer (1884) 9 App Cas 605

House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499

JP Morgan Australia Ltd v Consolidated Minerals Ltd [2010] NSWSC 100

Kazar (Liquidator) v Kargarian (2011) 197 FCR 113

Pinnel’s Case (1602) 5 Co Rep 117a

Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton (2017) 261 CLR 132

Tenser v Quigley [2016] FCAFC 178

Troutfarms Australia Pty Ltd v Perpetual Nominees Ltd [2013] VSC 228

Zreika v Royal [2019] FCAFC 82

Date of hearing: 17 April 2019
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: General and Personal Insolvency
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 46
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr M D Tehan
Solicitor for the Appellant: Hall & Wilcox
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr M T LaPirow
Solicitor for the Respondent: Davies Moloney

ORDERS

VID 849 of 2018
BETWEEN:

DAVID CONNOLLY

Appellant

AND:

MILLS OAKLEY LAWYERS

Respondent

JUDGE:

STEWARD J

DATE OF ORDER:

19 JUNE 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be allowed with no order as to costs.

2.The orders of Judge Hartnett dated 22 June 2018 be set aside and in lieu thereof:

(a)Each party bear their own costs of the application for review dated 28 September 2017.

(b)The costs and expenses of the trustee in bankruptcy, being $38,565.09, be borne equally by the parties. 

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

STEWARD J:

Introduction

  1. By an application filed in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 28 September 2017, the appellant, Mr David Connolly, sought review of a sequestration order made on a creditor’s petition presented by the respondent, Mills Oakley Lawyers, against the appellant.  On 12 December 2017, the primary judge set aside the sequestration order and reserved the question of costs.  On 22 June 2018, the primary judge ordered that the appellant pay: (i) the respondent’s costs of the application for review as agreed or taxed; and (ii) the costs and expenses of the trustee in bankruptcy in the sum of $38,565.09.  The appellant seeks to appeal the primary judge’s order as to costs.

    Background

  2. The dispute before me is a product of a series of events…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 950
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In this case, David Connolly, the appellant, has appealed against the costs order made by the primary judge in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia concerning a dispute with Mills Oakley Lawyers, the respondent. The primary judge had set aside a sequestration order and reserved the question of costs, ultimately ordering that the appellant pay the respondent's costs and the trustee's costs and expenses. The appellant challenges this decision, arguing that the primary judge erred in exercising their discretion regarding costs, specifically by not addressing an argument about accord and satisfaction and by considering irrelevant matters.

The central legal issue in this appeal revolves around whether the primary judge erred in exercising their discretion regarding the costs order. This involves examining whether the primary judge considered irrelevant factors or failed to take into account material considerations, such as the argument of accord and satisfaction, which the appellant claims was not adequately addressed. The appellant contends that the debt under the bankruptcy notice was compromised when FeeSynergy advanced the settlement amount on his behalf, thus arguing that there was no proper debt on which the creditor's petition could be based.

The court's reasoning focuses on the established principles for reviewing an appeal against a discretionary decision, emphasizing that the primary judge must not act upon a wrong principle, allow irrelevant matters to affect them, or fail to consider material considerations. The court must determine if the primary judge's decision was unreasonable or plainly unjust. In this case, the court found that the primary judge did not commit any error warranting interference with the discretion exercised in the costs order. The appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs, and the original costs orders were set aside. Instead, the court ordered that each party bear their own costs of the application for review, and the costs and expenses of the trustee in bankruptcy be borne equally by both parties.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed with no order as to costs.

2. The orders of Judge Hartnett dated 22 June 2018 be set aside and in lieu thereof:

(a) Each party bear their own costs of the application for review dated 28 September 2017.

(b) The costs and expenses of the trustee in bankruptcy, being $38,565.09, be borne equally by the parties.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

By an application filed in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 28 September 2017, the appellant, Mr David Connolly, sought review of a sequestration order made on a creditor’s petition presented by the respondent, Mills Oakley Lawyers, against the appellant. On 12 December 2017, the primary judge set aside the sequestration order and reserved the question of costs. On 22 June 2018, the primary judge ordered that the appellant pay: (i) the respondent’s costs of the application for review as agreed or taxed; and (ii) the costs and expenses of the trustee in bankruptcy in the sum of $38,565.09. The appellant seeks to appeal the primary judge’s order as to costs.Background The dispute before me is a product of a series of events that commenced in about 2015. For reasons that will become apparent, it is necessary to set out some of the history between the parties. The narrative began when the appellant engaged the respondent to act for him in a proceeding in the Supreme Court of Victoria. The respondent accordingly billed the appellant $138,389.55 for the services rendered. By November 2015, $25,997.58 of the billed amount remained outstanding. The respondent pursued the debt in the Magistrates’ Court of Victoria, and on 3 October 2016 obtained a judgment in default. On 10 November 2016, the respondent caused a bankruptcy notice to be issued to the appellant based on the judgment debt and accrued interest, totalling $33,441.08 (“Bankruptcy Notice”). In late November 2016, the appellant and the respondent engaged in settlement discussions. The appellant made an offer of $17,500 to settle all outstanding accounts with the respondent. The respondent made a counteroffer in the amount of $25,000; the counteroffer was accepted by the appellant in principle. Of that settlement amount, $17,500 was to be paid by the appellant and the balance of $7,500 was to be borrowed from a third party, FeeSynergy Finance Pty Ltd (“FeeSynergy”) (“Initial Settlement Understanding”). At the relevant time, the respondent and FeeSynergy had an agreement in place which allowed the respondent to offer its clients an option to partially or wholly fund fees owed to it through a funding facility provided by FeeSynergy (“FeeSynergy and Mills Oakley Finance Agreement”). I interpolate here that the appellant was not a party to the FeeSynergy and Mills Oakley Finance Agreement. Mr Colman Moloney, principal of Davies Moloney (the respondent’s solicitors), deposed in his affidavit sworn on 24 October 2017 that “[t]here are terms of confidentiality between the parties contained in the agreement. I sought and have received consent from [FeeSynergy] to disclose this document for the purposes of this litigation”. I therefore draw the natural inference that the appellant did not have knowledge of the terms of the FeeSynergy and Mills Oakley Finance Agreement prior to October 2017. On 20 December 2016, for the purpose of giving effect to the Initial Settlement Understanding, the respondent’s solicitors emailed to the appellant a covering letter, terms of settlement and a FeeSynergy application for finance said to be from Mr Jeff Logan of FeeSynergy. Relevantly, the cover letter stated, “[u]nless this matter is dealt with within the next two days, we are instructed to proceed with the Bankruptcy Notice and will do so without further notice”. The appellant did not act within that two-day window: the terms of settlement and application for finance were not signed.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Given the amount at stake and the history of this matter, it is most regrettable that this appeal has been pursued. The parties would have been better off with an agreed but compromised outcome. Consideration Relevant Legal Principles It was not in dispute that it falls on the appellant to establish that the primary judge committed an error of the kind identified in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 in the exercise of the discretion as to costs. As Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ stated in House v The King at 504‑505:The manner in which an appeal against an exercise of discretion should be determined is governed by established principles. It is not enough that the judges composing the appellate court consider that, if they had been in the position of the primary judge, they would have taken a different course. It must appear that some error has been made in exercising the discretion. If the judge acts upon a wrong principle, if he allows extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect him, if he mistakes the facts, if he does not take into account some material consideration, then his determination should be reviewed and the appellate court may exercise its own discretion in substitution for his if it has the materials for doing so. It may not appear how the primary judge has reached the result embodied in his order, but, if upon the facts it is unreasonable or plainly unjust, the appellate court may infer that in some way there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion which the law reposes in the court of first instance. Further, the respondent highlighted the following observation made by Foster J in Kazar (Liquidator) v Kargarian (2011) 197 FCR 113 at [52]:In later cases, justices of the High Court have said that, in respect of appeals against decisions involving discretionary judgment, there is a strong presumption in favour of the correctness of the decision appealed from and that that decision should be affirmed unless the appeal court is satisfied that it is clearly wrong (see Australian Coal and Shale Employees’ Federation v Commonwealth (1953) 94 CLR 621 at 627 per Kitto J; and Mallet v Mallet (1984) 156 CLR 605 at 634 per Wilson J).Ground One The first ground of appeal complained that the primary judge erred in finding that “Mills Oakley was entitled to issue a Creditor’s Petition against Mr Connolly”. Counsel for the appellant submitted that this conclusion appeared to be based, in part, on her Honour’s finding that “Mr Connolly had made a part payment of the judgment debt which did not discharge the judgment itself”. It was said that those findings were based on an error of legal principle, and thus constituted an error of law. In essence, the appellant submitted that upon entering into the agreement with FeeSynergy and FeeSynergy advancing the sum of $25,000 to the respondent on his behalf on 27 January 2017, the debt owing under the Bankruptcy Notice was compromised and therefore ceased to exist. It followed, it was said, that there was no proper debt on which the Creditor’s Petition could be based for the purposes of s 44 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (the “Bankruptcy Act”). Relevantly, s 44(1) provides:(1) A creditor’s petition shall not be presented against a debtor unless:(a)there is owing by the debtor to the petitioning creditor a debt that amounts to $5,000 or 2 or more debts that amount in the aggregate to $5,000, or, where 2 or more creditors join in the petition, there is owing by the debtor to the several petitioning creditors debts that amount in the aggregate to $5,000;(b)that debt, or each of those debts, as the case may be:(i)is a liquidated sum due at law or in equity or partly at law and partly in equity; and(ii)is payable either immediately or at a certain future time; and(c)the act of bankruptcy on which the petition is founded was committed within 6 months before the presentation of the petition.