Conga Foods Pty Ltd v Boundary Bend Olives Pty Ltd

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TRADE MARKS ACT 1995



DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS WITH REASONS

Re:Opposition by Conga Foods Pty Ltd to registration of trade mark application 1645105 (29) – THE GREAT ALL ROUNDER - in the name of Boundary Bend Olives Pty Ltd

Delegate: Nicholas Smith
Decision on the Written Record
Decision: 2017 ATMO 114
Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) - Section 52 opposition: s 41 considered – ground established – registration refused

Background

1. This is an opposition brought by Conga Foods Pty Ltd (‘Opponent’) pursuant to s 52 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) (‘Act’) to the registration of the trade mark subject of the application detailed below in the name of Boundary Bend Olives Pty Ltd (‘Applicant’): 

Application Number:

1645105

Filing Date:

4 September 2014

Goods: Class 29: Extra-virgin olive oil; Olive oil; Olive oil dip; Olive oil for food; Olives, preserved; Prepared olives; Processed olives
(collectively ‘Applicant’s Goods’)

Trade Mark:

THE GREAT ALL ROUNDER   (‘Trade Mark’)

2. On 27 November 2014 IP Australia issued a first adverse examination report, identifying a ground for rejection pursuant to s 41 of the Act (‘First Report’). 

3. The Applicant responded to the First Report on 27 January 2016, by way of submissions and a statutory declaration Following the provision of evidence a clear report was issued, accepting the Trade Mark on the basis of the provisions of s41(4).

4. Following the advertisement on 18 February 2016 in the Australian Official Journal of Trade Marks of the application’s acceptance for possible registration, the Opponent filed a Notice of Intention to Oppose on 23 March 2016 and a Statement of Grounds and Particulars (‘SGP’) on 19 April 2016. The SGP was assessed by this office as adequate. The Applicant filed a Notice of Intention to Defend on 16 May 2016. The SGP raised grounds of opposition under s 41 and s 62(b) of the Act.

Evidence

5. The Opponent filed Evidence in Support of the opposition (‘EIS’) on 10 August 2016. This evidence consists of a declaration made on 4 August 2016 by Ian Kingwell Keck, the Administrative Officer of the Opponent, with Exhibits IKK-1 to IKK-4 (‘Keck Declaration’) and a declaration made on 10 August 2016 by Russell Waters, Partner at Phillips Ormonde Fitzpatrick and legal representative of the Opponent, with Exhibits RJW-1 to RJW-8 (‘Waters Declaration’).  The Waters Declaration includes as an exhibit the entirety  of the declaration by Timothy Francis Smith, Director of the Applicant, dated 20 January 2016 (‘Smith Declaration’) which was provided by the Applicant during the examination stage.

6. The Applicant chose not to file Evidence in Answer. As a result, the time allowed for filing evidence had ended, and the parties were given an opportunity to request a hearing or to file written submissions.  The Opponent, by letter on 5 January 2017 indicated that it did not wish to request a…

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Details
Case
[2017] ATMO 114
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an opposition by Conga Foods Pty Ltd against the registration of a trade mark by Boundary Bend Olives Pty Ltd. The dispute centred on whether the proposed trade mark was sufficiently adapted to distinguish the applicant's goods and services, as required by section 41(3) of the relevant legislation. The decision was made by Hearing Officer Nicholas Smith.

The primary legal issue before the court was to determine the extent to which the proposed trade mark was inherently adapted to distinguish the applicant's goods and services from those of other traders. This involved considering the "ordinary signification" of the word or words forming the trade mark and assessing the likelihood that other traders, acting honestly, would need to use the word in connection with similar goods.

The Hearing Officer applied established legal principles, drawing on the reasoning of Branson J and the High Court's judgments in *Clark Equipment Company v Registrar of Trade Marks* and *Cantarella Bros Pty Limited v Modena Trading Pty Limited*. The court affirmed that the onus rests on the opponent to establish that a mark is not sufficiently adapted to distinguish. However, if the mark is considered under specific subsections of section 41(3), the applicant must demonstrate that the criteria within those subsections are met. The court emphasised that the "ordinary signification" of the mark to persons concerned with the goods is crucial. If a word has a directly descriptive meaning in relation to the goods, a monopoly is generally not warranted, whereas words that are prima facie entitled to a monopoly are considered inherently adapted to distinguish.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Paraphrasing what the same Hearing Officer said in Pacific Magazines Pty Ltd v Bauer Consumer Media Ltd[6](with emphasis being that of the Hearing Officer in that decision) : As mentioned in paragraph [7] above the Opponent bears the onus of establishing its s 41 ground of opposition. However, its onus is effectively limited to satisfying me that the [Trade] Mark is not sufficiently adapted to distinguish the Applicant’s Goods and Services as to qualify for registration on that basis alone, being the issue addressed in particular by s 41(3) [as it stood prior to the Amending Act.][7] In this regard both parties agreed that, as Mr Rubetzki put it:When assessing whether a mark is sufficiently adapted to distinguish the Applicant’s Goods and Services, it should be presumed that the mark is sufficiently adapted to distinguish unless the Registrar is satisfied otherwise. However, if it is necessary to consider the mark under ss 41(3)(b) or (4)(b) (as they now stand), the Applicant must demonstrate that the criteria referred to in those sub-sections are made out.[6] [2015] ATMO 69 at [16]-[18]. I have in the main also retained the Hearing Officer’s original footnotes.[7] See Sports Warehouse, Inc v Fry Consulting Pty Ltd (2010) 87 IPR 300, [26]-[29], [40] for a full discussion on this point, Consideration of the Opposed Mark under section 41(3)In accordance with Branson J’s analysis then, the first issue which arises for consideration is “the extent to which the trade mark is inherently adapted to distinguish the designated goods or services from the goods or services of other persons.” Justice Kitto in Clark Equipment Company v Registrar of Trade Marks stated that:[T]he question whether a mark is adapted to distinguish [is to] be tested by reference to the likelihood that other persons, trading in goods of the relevant kind and being actuated only by proper motives - in the exercise, that is to say, of the common right of the public to make honest use of words forming part of the common heritage, for the sake of the signification which they ordinarily possess - will think of the word and want to use it in connexion with similar goods in any manner which would infringe a registered trade mark granted in respect of it. [8]More recently, the High Court in Cantarella Bros Pty Limited v Modena Trading Pty Limited considered the former s 41(3) and in particular the question of whether a trade mark is inherently adapted to distinguish in some detail. In a joint judgment the majority of the Court explicitly approved Kitto J’s above-quoted words and went on to say at [70]-[71] (with original footnotes omitted and my emphasis added in bold):Interpretation of s 41(3)[70] In accordance with the principles established in [Mark Foy’s Ltd v Davies Coop & Co Ltd[9]] and restated in [Clark], [FH Faulding & Co Ltd v Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd[10]] and [Burger King Corporation v Registrar of Trade Marks[11]], determining whether a trade mark is “inherently adapted to distinguish”, as required by s 41(3), requires consideration of the “ordinary signification” of the words proposed as trade marks to any person in Australia concerned with the goods to which the proposed trade mark is to be applied.[71] As shown by the authorities in this court, the consideration of the “ordinary signification” of any word or words (English or foreign) which constitute a trade mark is crucial, whether (as here) a trade mark consisting of such a word or words is alleged not to be registrable because it is not an invented word and it has “direct” reference to the character and quality of goods, or because it is a laudatory epithet or a geographical name, or because it is a surname, or because it has lost its distinctiveness, or because it never had the requisite distinctiveness to start with. Once the “ordinary signification” of a word, English or foreign, is established an inquiry can then be made into whether other traders might legitimately need to use the word in respect of their goods. If a foreign word contains an allusive reference to the relevant goods it is prima facie qualified for the grant of a monopoly. However, if the foreign word is understood by the target audience as having a directly descriptive meaning in relation to the relevant goods, then prima facie the proprietor is not entitled to a monopoly of it. Speaking generally, words which are prima facie entitled to a monopoly secured by registration are inherently adapted to distinguish. [12][8] (1964) 111 CLR 511, 514. The case concerned possible registration of the claimed trade mark MICHIGAN in Part B of the then two part Register as a mark ‘capable of becoming distinctive’ under s 25(1) of the now repealed Trade Marks Act 1955. Under s 26 of that Act a trade mark could not be considered distinctive unless it was ‘adapted to distinguish’ the relevant goods or services.[9] (1956) 95 CLR 190.[10] (1965) 112 CLR 537.[11] (1973) 128 CLR 417.[12] (2014) 254 CLR 337, [70]-[71].