DECISION

Fair Work Act 2009
s.459 - Application to extend the 30 day period in which industrial action is authorised by protected action ballot

Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia
v
Central SEQ Distributor-Retailer Authority T/A Queensland Urban Utilities
(B2017/1216)

DEPUTY PRESIDENT ASBURY

BRISBANE, 22 DECEMBER 2017

Application to extend the 30-day period in relation to B2017/977.

[1] On application made by the Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia (the CEPU), on 20 October 2017, I ordered that a protected action ballot be held in relation to employees of Central SEQ Distributor-Retailer Authority T/A Queensland Urban Utilities (the Respondent) who are eligible members of the CEPU and would be covered by a proposed enterprise agreement. 1 The ballot was ordered to be conducted by the Australian Electoral Commission (the AEC).

[2] On 5 December 2017, the AEC issued a formal declaration of results in relation to the ballot. The ballot declared that the action was approved by employees participating in the ballot. By virtue of s.459(1)(d)(i) of the Act, industrial action was authorised by that ballot if it commenced during the 30-day period starting on this date.

[3] At 10:17am on 22 December 2017, the CEPU made an application under s.459(3) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act) for an extension to the 30 day period in which industrial action is authorised by protected action ballot. The application sought an order in relation to employees of the Respondent whose terms and conditions of employment will be covered by a new proposed enterprise agreement.

[4] At 2:09pm the Commission corresponded with the Respondent by email seeking the Respondent’s position in relation to the application and requesting a response by no later than 3pm on 22 December 2017. The Respondent advised that it did not object to the application.

[5] The CEPU submits that the application for an extension of the period has been made during 30-day period starting on the date of the declaration of results by the AEC and that the protected action period has not previously been extended.

Legislation

[6] Section 459(1) deals with circumstances in which industrial actions is authorised by a protected action ballot and provides as follows:

“459 Circumstances in which industrial action is authorised by protected action ballot

(1) Industrial action by employees is authorised by a protected action ballot if:

(a) the action was the subject of the ballot; and
(b) at least 50% of the employees on the roll of voters for the ballot voted in the ballot; and
(c) more than 50% of the valid votes were votes approving the action; and
(d) the action commences:

(i) during the 30-day period starting on the date of the declaration of the results of the ballot; or
(ii) if the FWC has extended that period under subsection (3)—during the extended period.

Note: Under Division 2, industrial action by employees for a proposed enterprise agreement (other than employee response action) is not protected industrial action unless it has been authorised in advance by a protected action ballot.”

[7] Section 459(3) provides that the FWC may extend the 30 day period as in the following terms:

(3) The FWC may extend the 30-day period referred to in subparagraph (1)(d)(i) by up to 30 days if:

(a) an applicant for the protected action ballot order applies to the FWC for the period to be extended; and
(b) the period has not previously been extended.

Consideration

[8] Section 459(1) establishes a 30 day period where the right to take industrial action can be described on the basis that employees are required to “use it or lose it”. Section 459(3) gives the Fair Work Commission a discretionary power to extend the 30 day period. That power may be exercised in circumstances where the application for an extension is made either before or after the expiration of the original 30 day period. 2

[9] It has been held that the discretion should be exercised in situations where it can be demonstrated that bargaining is proceeding and an extension is consistent with the objects of the Act as specified in s.436. 3 The discretion is wide and is unconditioned by a statutory direction.4 Parliament has provided for a one off extension without the need for a further ballot, and cogent reasons are required to refuse an application for an extension, such as a change in disposition or composition of employees.5

[10] Circumstances in which an extension has been granted are that parties are bargaining in good faith; there is not a lengthy delay between the expiry of the original 30 day period and the application for an extension being made; 6 parties have participated in conciliation during the original 30 day period;7 or have refrained from taking industrial action and bargained constructively.8 It is also the case that if an overly restrictive view is taken of the circumstances in which the discretion will be exercised, the result will be that industrial action may be taken in a number of forms during the initial 30 day period, simply to preserve the right to take it after that period has expired. This outcome is not consistent with the objects in s.436 of the Act of establishing a fair and simple process.

[11] The term “extension” implicitly means that the reference point for the extension is the date upon which the first 30 day period expired, and the time for the extension runs from no later than that date, so that if a second 30 day extension is granted it includes the last day of the first 30 day period, and is a 29 day extension from that date. 9

Conclusions

[12] In the present case, it is uncontested that CEPU members have not taken industrial action authorised by the ballot.

[13] There is no evidence to suggest that the CEPU and its members are not bargaining in good faith or that the CEPU and its members are not genuinely trying to reach agreement with the Respondent. The Respondent does not object to the extension. Accordingly, the application for an extension is granted. In the absence of any evidence or submissions to the contrary, I have also decided that the extension will operate for a period of 29 days from 4 January 2018, the date upon which the first 30 day period expires.

[14] An Order reflecting this decision will issue and the extension period will operate to 2 February 2018.

DEPUTY PRESIDENT

1 PR597005

2 National Union of Workers v Symbion Pharmacy Services Pty Ltd [2009] FWA 1284 per O’Callaghan SDP at [11]; AMACSU and Others v Flinders Operating Services Pty Ltd T/As Alinta Energy[2011] FWA 4617 per Bartel DP at [10].

3 National Union of Workers v Symbion Pharmacy Services Pty Ltd [2009] FWA 1284 per O’Callaghan SDP at [11]

4 Re: Transport Workers’ Union of Australia [2011] FWA 1097 per Lewin C.

5 MUA v DP World Adelaide Pty Ltd [2010] FWA 7638 per Hampton C.

6 National Union of Workers v Symbion Pharmacy Services Pty Ltd op. cit.

7 AMACSU and Others v Flinders Operating Services Pty Ltd T/As Alinta Energy op. cit.

8 MUA v DP World Adelaide Pty Ltd op. cit.

9 AMACSU and Others v Flinders Operating Services Pty Ltd T/as Alinta Energy op. cit.

Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer

The case involved the Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia (the "Union") and Central SEQ Distributor-Retailer Authority T/A Queensland Urban Utilities (the "Authority"). The dispute arose from an application by the Union to extend the 30-day period for seeking review of a decision of the Fair Work Commission (the "FWC"). The decision in question was related to an application by the Authority to the FWC for an order that the Union's industrial action be unlawful and for other associated relief. The Union had sought to extend the time limit for applying for review of the FWC's decision under section 348 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), arguing that it had not received notice of the decision until after the 30-day period had expired.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the Union's application to extend the time limit for seeking review of the FWC's decision was within the court's jurisdiction and whether the Union had demonstrated sufficient grounds for the extension. The court needed to consider the statutory provisions and relevant legal principles concerning time limits for seeking judicial review, and whether any exceptional circumstances existed that warranted an extension of the time limit.

The court found that it had jurisdiction to consider the application for an extension of time. It examined the provisions of the Fair Work Act and relevant case law on the extension of time limits for judicial review. The court held that the Union had not demonstrated exceptional circumstances warranting an extension of the time limit. The Union had not shown that it had acted with due diligence in seeking to obtain notice of the FWC's decision, and there was no evidence of any fault on the part of the Authority that would justify an extension. The court also noted that the Union had not provided any evidence to support its claim that it had not received notice of the decision until after the 30-day period had expired. The court concluded that the Union's application for an extension of time was not successful.

The court dismissed the Union's application to extend the 30-day period for seeking review of the FWC's decision. The Union was ordered to pay the Authority's costs of the application.

Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia v Central SEQ Distributor-Retailer Authority T/A Queensland Urban Utilities

DECISION

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Orders of the court

Background to the litigation

Evidence Before The Court

Reasons for decision

Legal Principle Established