Commonwealth v Wright

This case concerned an appeal to the High Court of Australia from a decision of the District Court of New South Wales. The appeal arose from a claim for workers' compensation brought by the respondent, the mother of a deceased soldier, against the appellant, the Commonwealth. The soldier, a member of the permanent military forces, was killed on a highway while walking towards the Bandiana Military Camp in Victoria, where he lived and served. His mother's claim for compensation under the Commonwealth Employees' Compensation Act 1930-1954 had initially been disallowed by the commissioner's delegate but was subsequently allowed by the District Court, which awarded her £750.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the deceased soldier was "travelling to his employment" at the time of his death, as contemplated by section 9A of the Commonwealth Employees' Compensation Act 1930-1954. This required the court to interpret the meaning of "travelling to his employment" in the context of a member of the armed forces, particularly when off-duty and not rostered for specific duties, and to consider the impact of amendments to the Act that had removed references to the "place of abode" and "place of employment" as termini for such journeys. The court also considered whether the appeal to the High Court was properly brought as of right.

A majority of the High Court, comprising Webb, Fullagar, and Kitto JJ., held that the deceased soldier was not proved to have been "travelling to his employment" at the time of the accident. The majority reasoned that while the soldier was travelling towards the military camp where he resided and was subject to military discipline, his journey was undertaken during a period of leave and was not sufficiently connected to his employment to satisfy the statutory requirement. They emphasised that the amendments to the Act had removed the certainty of a fixed starting or ending point for the journey, leaving the concept of "employment" as the sole terminus, which, in the context of a soldier off-duty, was too abstract to establish the necessary link. Dixon C.J. and McTiernan J. dissented, finding that the soldier's liability to military discipline and his general status as a member of the armed forces meant that his return to the camp, even when off-duty, constituted travelling to his employment.

The High Court, by majority, reversed the decision of the District Court and ordered that the appeal be allowed. The majority also noted, without deciding, that there were procedural doubts regarding the District Court's jurisdiction to hear the appeal and the High Court's jurisdiction to hear the appeal as of right.