IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M27 of 1996
B e t w e e n -
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Applicant
and
WESTERN MINING CORPORATION
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
DAWSON J
McHUGH J
KIRBY J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT MELBOURNE ON MONDAY, 5 AUGUST 1996, AT 10.05 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR J.J. SPIGELMAN, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friends, MR H.C. BURMESTER and MR S.J. GAGELER, for the applicant. (instructed by the Australian Government Solicitor)
MR G.A.A. NETTLE, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friend, MR P.J. HANKS, for the respondent. (instructed by Arthur Robinson & Hedderwicks)
DAWSON J: Mr Nettle, we thought we might confer on you the doubtful honour of beginning.
MR NETTLE: May it please your Honour. If the Court please, it is submitted that special leave ought be refused because the case raises no question of principle which has not been decided previously by the Court. The applicant has put forward four questions which it says raises questions of principle but none of them do. The first of them, the so-called question of whether a statutory right is inherently defeasible because it is a statutory right is not a question of principle but, it is submitted, clearly from the authorities which go before, a question of application. Georgiadis and Peverill make it clear, it is submitted, that in order to decide whether a right created by statute is intended to be inherently defeasible it is necessary to look at the terms of the statute by which the right is created.
Thus, for example, it is clear enough when one looks at a Medibank refund right that the terms contemplated that it be inherently defeasible but, on the other hand, if one looks at a petroleum production licence of the kind, say, under which Woodside operate on the north‑west shelf and pursuant to which they invest literally billions of dollars, it cannot be contemplated that the Parliament intended that the right be revocable at will without notice and without compensation. And one can see it from the terms of the statute that no such thing was contemplated.
DAWSON J: Where is the acquisition?
MR NETTLE: It is a different point. The acquisition he submitted inheres in this. The rights which are granted to the permit holder are granted by the Commonwealth in exercise of its sovereignty over the area to which the right pertains. Those sovereign rights are analogous to the rights which the sovereign enjoyed over the territorial sea at common law which were recognised as amounting to, in effect, ownership, not only of the surface of the sea but the land below it and the right to exploit most of the resources including the minerals and things such as royal fish. By analogy when the Seas and Submerged Lands Act extended the sovereignty of the Commonwealth to the…
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- Case
- [1996] HCATrans 204
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court was required to determine whether the *Minerals (Acquisition) Regulations* were validly made under the *Minerals (Acquisition) Act*. This involved considering whether the regulations were for the purpose of the Act and whether they were for the purpose of the defence of the Commonwealth, as required by the *Defence Act* (Cth) which provided the ultimate source of legislative power for the acquisition of minerals in the context of defence. A key question was whether the regulations, in their breadth and scope, could be characterised as being for the defence of the Commonwealth.
The Court's reasoning focused on the principle of statutory interpretation that subordinate legislation must be authorised by the enabling Act and must not exceed the scope of the power conferred. Dawson and McHugh JJ found that the regulations were not for the purpose of the *Minerals (Acquisition) Act* and, more importantly, were not for the purpose of the defence of the Commonwealth. They held that the regulations were too broad and did not sufficiently demonstrate a connection to defence needs, thus exceeding the power granted by the *Defence Act*. Kirby J, dissenting, took a different view on the connection to defence.
Ultimately, the High Court held that the *Minerals (Acquisition) Regulations* were invalid. The orders made reflected this finding, quashing the regulations.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi