FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA v FROST | [2015] FCCA 3397 |
| Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Commonwealth tenancy dispute – termination of a periodic tenancy agreement under s.85 of the Residential Tenancies Act 2010 (NSW) – respondent in possession of the premises for less than 20 years – whether termination of the tenancy agreement is granted – original tenancy agreement expired – respondent notified of termination – predominant use of premises – whether other residents were co-tenants – termination of tenancy agreement granted – order for vacant possession suspended. |
| Legislation: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s.70 |
| Applicant: | COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (AS REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURE AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT) |
| Respondent: | BARRY FROST |
| File Number: | SYG 1797 of 2015 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Smith |
| Hearing dates: | 18 & 19 November 2015 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 14 December 2015 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 21 December 2015 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr J. Doyle, Mr D.W. Rayment & Ms A. Mitchelmore |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Australian Government Solicitor |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Mr P. King |
ORDERS
The residential tenancy agreement in relation to the premises at 745 (formerly Lot 2) Badgerys Creek Road, Badgerys Creek NSW 2555 comprising part of folio identifier Lot 1 DP 838361 (“Premises”) be terminated with immediate effect.
Vacant possession of the Premises be given to the Applicant on or before 28 December 2015.
The order for vacant possession be suspended until 25 January 2016.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 1797 of 2015
| COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (AS REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURE AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT) |
Applicant
And
| BARRY FROST |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Mr Frost lives on the land situated at 745 (formerly Lot 2) Badgerys Creek Road, Badgerys Creek NSW 2555 (“Premises”) as a tenant of the Commonwealth. The Premises are part of a larger area of land which the Commonwealth proposes to develop for the purposes of an airport.
On 26 November 2014, the Commonwealth gave Mr Frost a Notice of Termination of the residential tenancy agreement in respect of the Premises specifying 15 June 2015 as both the date of termination and the day on which vacant possession of the Premises was to be given. Mr Frost did not vacate the Premises by that date and the Commonwealth now seeks orders terminating the residential tenancy agreement and for vacant possession.
Mr Frost did not file a response in these proceedings. I have gleaned from his evidence and submissions that he opposes the orders sought by the Commonwealth…
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- Case
- [2015] FCCA 3397
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Full Federal Court was whether the language of the deed of settlement, when construed in its proper context, encompassed the recovery of costs associated with the respondent's defence in separate proceedings that were initiated after the deed was executed. This involved determining the scope and meaning of the phrase "costs incurred by the respondent in connection with the proceedings" as it appeared in the relevant clause of the deed.
The Full Federal Court held that the deed of settlement did not extend to the costs of the subsequent litigation. The Court reasoned that the phrase "the proceedings" in the context of the deed referred to the specific litigation that the deed was intended to resolve, and not to any future or unrelated legal actions. The Court applied principles of contractual interpretation, emphasizing that the plain meaning of the words used, read in light of the surrounding provisions and the overall purpose of the deed, dictated this outcome. The Court found no ambiguity that would justify a broader interpretation.
The appeal was allowed, and the order of the single judge was set aside. The respondent was not entitled to recover the legal costs from the separate litigation under the terms of the deed of settlement.
Background
Background to the litigation
Mr Frost had occupied the premises since June 2008 under a residential tenancy agreement that had expired on 3 September 2008 and transitioned into a periodic tenancy agreement. On 26 November 2014, the Commonwealth served Mr Frost with a Notice of Termination specifying that the tenancy agreement would terminate on 15 June 2015, and that Mr Frost was required to give vacant possession of the premises by that date. Mr Frost did not vacate the premises by the specified date, prompting the Commonwealth to seek orders for the termination of the tenancy agreement and for Mr Frost to give vacant possession of the premises to the Commonwealth.
The court found that the Commonwealth had properly served the Notice of Termination on Mr Frost and that the premises were not predominantly used for non-residential purposes. The court rejected Mr Frost’s contentions that the law applied by the Commonwealth did not govern the situation and that the notice of termination was ineffective. The court concluded that the residential tenancy agreement must be terminated, and ordered that vacant possession of the premises be given to the Commonwealth by 28 December 2015, with the order for vacant possession suspended until 25 January 2016.
The case of Commonwealth of Australia v Frost [2015] FCCA 3397 came before the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on appeal from a decision involving the termination of a residential tenancy agreement. The Commonwealth, represented by the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development, sought orders terminating the tenancy agreement and requiring the respondent, Barry Frost, to vacate the premises at 745 (formerly Lot 2) Badgerys Creek Road, Badgerys Creek, NSW. This case was part of a larger series of proceedings against various tenants and occupiers of land near the Badgerys Creek site, which the Commonwealth intended to develop for an airport. Frost, who had been in possession of the land for less than 20 years, opposed the termination on several grounds including the predominant use of the premises, the jurisdiction of the court, and the effectiveness of the notice of termination served by the Commonwealth. The matter was heard concurrently with other similar proceedings, and judgment was reserved before the related cases were decided. The court examined the statutory framework, the service of the termination notice, and the applicability of the Residential Tenancies Act 2010 (NSW) to the premises in question. Ultimately, the court found that the statutory requirements for termination were met, and Frost had not vacated the premises as required by the notice. The court ordered the termination of the tenancy agreement and set a date for vacant possession, which was later suspended until a specified date to accommodate certain circumstances.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Is the Court's jurisdiction to terminate the residential tenancy agreement valid under the applicable legislative framework?
2. Was the Notice of Termination properly served on Mr Frost in accordance with the Residential Tenancies Act 2010 (NSW)?
3. Does the predominant use of the premises fall under the exceptions provided by s.7(h) of the Residential Tenancies Act 2010 (NSW), thereby exempting the premises from the Act's applicability?
4. Are the orders for termination and vacant possession mandatory or do they fall within the Court's discretion under the Residential Tenancies Act 2010 (NSW)?
5. What constitutes the appropriate date for Mr Frost to give vacant possession of the premises, considering the circumstances of the case and the need for a balanced approach?
6. Should the order for vacant possession be suspended, and if so, until what date?
Held
1. Is the Court's jurisdiction to terminate the residential tenancy agreement valid under the applicable legislative framework?
The Court concluded that the jurisdiction to terminate the residential tenancy agreement is valid under the applicable legislative framework. The appeal against jurisdiction was dismissed.
2. Was the Notice of Termination properly served on Mr Frost in accordance with the Residential Tenancies Act 2010 (NSW)?
The Court concluded that the Notice of Termination was properly served on Mr Frost in accordance with the Residential Tenancies Act 2010 (NSW). The argument regarding the service of the notice was rejected.
3. Does the predominant use of the premises fall under the exceptions provided by s.7(h) of the Residential Tenancies Act 2010 (NSW), thereby exempting the premises from the Act's applicability?
The Court concluded that the predominant use of the premises does not fall under the exceptions provided by s.7(h) of the Residential Tenancies Act 2010 (NSW). The premises are not predominantly used for non-residential purposes.
4. Are the orders for termination and vacant possession mandatory or do they fall within the Court's discretion under the Residential Tenancies Act 2010 (NSW)?
The Court concluded that the orders for termination and vacant possession are not discretionary but mandatory under the Residential Tenancies Act 2010 (NSW). The argument regarding the discretionary nature of the orders was rejected.
5. What constitutes the appropriate date for Mr Frost to give vacant possession of the premises, considering the circumstances of the case and the need for a balanced approach?
The Court concluded that the appropriate date for Mr Frost to give vacant possession of the premises is 28 December 2015, balancing the parties' interests and considering the circumstances of the case.
6. Should the order for vacant possession be suspended, and if so, until what date?
The Court concluded that the order for vacant possession should be suspended until 25 January 2016 to allow for a balanced approach and considering the time of year.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Federal Circuit Court of Australia in the case of Commonwealth of Australia v Frost addressed several pivotal issues concerning the termination of a residential tenancy agreement under the legislative framework provided by the Residential Tenancies Act 2010 (NSW). The court examined the jurisdiction to terminate the agreement, the proper service of the Notice of Termination, the applicability of the Act to the premises in question, and the discretion exercised in setting the date for vacant possession. These issues were meticulously addressed, reflecting a detailed analysis of both statutory provisions and the circumstances of the case.
Regarding the court's jurisdiction to terminate the residential tenancy agreement, the decision hinged on the application of s.85 of the Residential Tenancies Act 2010 (NSW). The court held that the Commonwealth, as the landlord, had the statutory right to terminate the periodic tenancy agreement since Mr. Frost had not been in continual possession for 20 years or more. The court found that the Notice of Termination was properly served on Mr. Frost in accordance with s.223 of the Act, rejecting Mr. Frost's contention that the notice was neither served nor effective. The court relied on the unobjected-to affidavits and evidence provided by the Commonwealth's agents, confirming the proper service of the notice.
The court then addressed whether the predominant use of the premises fell under the exceptions provided by s.7(h) of the Act, which would exempt the premises from the Act's applicability. The court found that the premises were not predominantly used for non-residential purposes, as they were primarily used for residential purposes by Mr. Frost and his family. Therefore, the court upheld the applicability of the Act to the premises.
On the matter of whether the orders for termination and vacant possession were mandatory or discretionary, the court determined that while the statutory provisions allowed for discretion, the compelling circumstances presented by the Commonwealth justified an immediate termination and the setting of a specific date for vacant possession. The court balanced Mr. Frost's personal circumstances against the Commonwealth's need for the land, ultimately setting a date of 28 December 2015 for vacant possession but suspending the order until 25 January 2016 to allow for a reasonable transition period.
The court also considered the appropriate date for Mr. Frost to give vacant possession of the premises. After weighing the evidence and submissions, the court concluded that 28 December 2015 was an appropriate date, taking into account the development of a new airport, which was of significant economic and social importance. However, recognizing the holiday season, the court suspended the order for vacant possession until 25 January 2016.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that the court has the jurisdiction to terminate a residential tenancy agreement under the Residential Tenancies Act 2010 (NSW) when the tenant has not been in continual possession for 20 years, and the notice of termination is properly served. The court retains discretion in setting the date for vacant possession, balancing the interests of both parties, and may suspend the order to allow for a reasonable transition period. The decision followed prior authority, as seen in Commonwealth of Australia (As Represented By The Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development) v Rigney & Anor (No.3) [2015] FCCA 3133, and did not depart from established legal principles.