Commonwealth of Australia (as represented by the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development) v Uren & Ors (No.2) - [2017] FCCA 1014

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (AS REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURE AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT) v UREN & ORS (No.2)

[2017] FCCA 1014

Catchwords:
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Commonwealth tenancy dispute – termination of long term tenancy agreement – application for extension of time within which to apply for a warrant of possession – extension necessitated by respondents’ appeal and stay of orders previously made – consideration of circumstances of respondents – discretion under s.121 of the Residential Tenancies Act 2010 (NSW) – application for extension of time granted.

Legislation:
Residential Tenancies Act 2010 (NSW), ss.80, 94, 121

Cases cited:
King v New South Wales Land & Housing Corporation (1992) 26 ALD 684

Applicant:

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (AS REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURE AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT)

First Respondent:

ALEXANDER UREN

Second Respondent:

MARYANN UREN

Third Respondent:

SANDRA UREN

File Number:

SYG 653 of 2015

Judgment of:

Judge Smith

Hearing date:

12 May 2017

Date of Last Submission:

12 May 2017

Delivered at:

Sydney

Delivered on:

18 May 2017

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant:

Mr J. Doyle and Mr D.W. Rayment

Solicitors for the Applicant:

Australian Government Solicitor

Counsel for the Respondent:

Mr P. King

Solicitors for the Respondent:

The People’s Solicitor Pty Ltd

ORDERS

The time within which the applicant may apply for a warrant for possession is extended to 30 days from the date of this order.
The respondents are to pay the applicant’s costs in the application in a case.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 653 of 2015

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (AS REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURE AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT)

Applicant

And

ALEXANDER UREN

First Respondent

MARYANN UREN

Second Respondent

SANDRA UREN

Third Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

The Commonwealth is the registered proprietor of the land known as and situated at 404806, 5 Vicar Park Lane, Luddenham, NSW 2745 and 404810, 15 Vicar Park Lane, Luddenham, NSW 2745 (“Premises”). The respondents lived on the Premises for over 22 years as tenants.
In March 2015, the Commonwealth commenced proceedings seeking orders terminating the residential tenancy agreement between it and the respondents in respect of the Premises and for possession of the Premises.
Those proceedings were contested and after a number of hearings, I made the following orders on 11 December 2015:
1.The residential tenancy agreement between the applicant and the respondents in relation to the property situated at 404806, 5 Vicar Park Lane, (Formerly 420 Willowdene Rd) Luddenham, NSW 2745 and 404810, 15 Vicar Park Lane, (Formerly Lot 32) Luddenham, NSW 2745 comprising part of folio identifiers Lot 32 DP 259698 and Lot 33 DP 259698 (“Premises”) be terminated forthwith.
2.Vacant possession of the Premises be given to the applicant on or before 18 December 2015.
3.The order for vacant possession be suspended until 10 March 2016.
The respondents appealed from that judgment and, on 22 January 2016 Robertson J stayed Orders 2 and 3.
On 2 March 2017, the Full Court of the Federal Court (Kenny, Robertson and Griffiths JJ) dismissed the appeal. On the same day, Griffiths J ordered that Orders 2 and 3 made by me and the Orders of the Full Court of the Federal Court be stayed for a period of 28 days to enable the third respondent, Ms Uren, to decide whether or not to apply for special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia.
On 30 March 2017, Ms Uren filed an application for special leave to appeal to the High Court. On the same day, the stay ordered by Griffiths J on 2 March 2017 lapsed.
There has been no further stay of Orders 2 and 3 made by me on 11 December 2015.
The Commonwealth now seeks an extension of time within which to apply for a warrant for possession.
For the reasons explained by the Full Court of the Federal Court, the law to be applied to the dispute between the parties was the Residential Tenancies Act 2010 (NSW) (the Act). Section 121 of the Act relevantly provides:
121 Enforcement of orders for possession
(1)The principal registrar of the Tribunal may, on the application of a person in whose favour an order for possession was made, issue a warrant for possession of the residential premises concerned if the principal registrar is satisfied that the order or a condition of suspension of the order has not been complied with.
(2)An application for a warrant for possession may be made immediately, if the order for possession so provides, or not more than 30 days after the date by which vacant possession was required or within such further period as the Tribunal may permit.
(3)Without limiting subsection (2), the Tribunal may permit an application to be made within a further period if the delay in making the application is attributable to genuine attempts by the applicant to reach agreement with the tenant for reinstatement of the tenancy.
…
(Emphasis in original)
The reference to “Tribunal” is taken to be a reference to the Court.
The “date by which vacant possession was required” referred to in s.121(2) was originally 10 March 2016; however, that changed because of orders staying the orders made on 11 December 2015. In effect, Order 3 made on that day has been overcome by the stay ordered by Robertson J on 22 January 2016. The consequence is that the order for immediate possession took effect only on 30 March 2017.
The Commonwealth argues that the Court ought to allow a further period under s.121(3) for the following reasons:
(i)Order 1 made on 11 December 2015 operated to immediately terminate the residential tenancy. The Order has never been stayed and so the respondents have had no legal right to possession since 11 December 2015;
(ii)the respondents are in breach of Order 2 requiring them to give vacant possession;
(iii)the only reason why the Commonwealth has not moved more quickly to apply for a warrant is that the relevant orders were stayed until very recently; and
(iv)to refuse the grant of an additional period within which a warrant may be applied for would defeat the purposes for which the orders were made.
The respondents first argued that, in light of s.121(3), the fact that the Commonwealth has given no assistance to them to move, weighs against any extension of time. The argument is based on the purpose of s.121(3) which is to encourage genuine attempts to resolve difficulties between the parties. The difficulty with this submission is that it ignores the opening words of s 121(3) “without limiting subsection (2)”. While it may be accepted that s.121(3) encourages negotiation between the parties, it does nothing to limit the power of the Court to extend time under s 121(2), even if such negotiations do not take place. Certainly, it does not, in my view, make the existence of negotiations a prerequisite, or even necessarily relevant to the exercise of the power in s.121(2).
The respondents then argued that there was no evidence that the Commonwealth had approached the Registrar for the issue of a warrant, or that the orders made on 11 December 2015 had been served on the respondents. I do not accept that either of those matters makes any difference.
First, there is no express or implicit limitation on the power to extend the time within which to apply for a warrant connected with an application to the Registrar or the service of the relevant orders. Counsel for the respondents referred to a decision of the New South Wales Residential Tenancies Tribunal[1] (RTT) in which, he said, the Tribunal held that there was no power in the Registrar to make an order for the issue of a warrant in the absence of proof of service of the orders. That however, addressed a different question to the one I am asked to consider. I am not determining whether to issue a warrant, but only to extend the time within which the Commonwealth might ask for a warrant to be issued. In any event, although the Registrar may properly refuse to exercise the power to issue a warrant for possession in the absence of satisfaction that a former tenant is on notice of the order for possession, I do not accept that he or she has no power to issue a warrant in those circumstances.
[1] As it was then known. On 1 January 2014, it became the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, also known as “NCAT”.
Secondly, and in any event, the respondents were clearly aware of the orders made on 11 December 2015: they both appealed from them and sought a stay of them.
The respondents next argued that any extension of time ought to be subject to conditions, namely, that the warrant not be applied for within 90 days. In support of this, the respondents relied on the broad protective provisions in Pt.5 of the Act commencing with s.80 and, in particular, s.94. They also relied on the decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in King v New South Wales Land & Housing Corporation (1992) 26 ALD 684 (King).
In support of this contention, Ms Uren gave evidence of the difficulty that she faces in moving and of injuries sustained by one of her horses resulting in its death that has occurred since the residential tenancy agreement was terminated.
Part 5 of the Act deals with the termination of residential tenancy agreements. The residential tenancy agreement between the respondents and the Commonwealth was terminated in accordance with those provisions by Order 1 made on 11 December 2015. I do not accept that those provisions have any impact once an order for possession has been made and, as in this case, not complied with. It may be that those provisions were intended to address the imbalance of power between landlords and tenants, but that does not appear to be the purpose of the provisions in Pt.6 of the Act, such as s.121, which concern the recovery of possession of residential premises.
The decision in King does not assist the respondents. That case was an appeal by leave from the refusal by a judge of the Supreme Court of New South Wales to grant interlocutory relief pending the determination of a summons seeking judicial review of the decision of the RTT. The RTT had made an order for possession in respect of premises occupied by Mr King but had suspended that order subject to a number of conditions. It also ordered that, if Mr King did not comply with certain of those conditions, the respondent could apply for the issue of a warrant of possession without further notice to Mr King. The case did not involve an extension of time under s.121(2) and gives no support to the proposition that such an extension can be made subject to conditions.
In my view, the evidence of Ms Uren is not relevant to the discretion to be exercised under s.121(2). It does not deal with the impact of the delay in the Commonwealth obtaining possession of its land, and only seeks to support further delay. However, even if it were relevant, and I did have the power to impose conditions on the extension of time under s.121(2), I would not impose any condition on that extension.
First, there is no question that the delay has not been caused by the Commonwealth. Rather, the extension of time has been necessitated by the respondents’ appeal and the orders staying the orders of 11 December 2015 for possession. Although the respondents seem to have pursued their appeal with all due expedition, the appeal was ultimately unsuccessful.
Secondly, the respondents have no right to remain on the Premises and have known for many months of the possibility that they would have to leave with little or no notice.
Thirdly, the respondents have known since 30 March 2017 that the Commonwealth has had the right to immediate possession. Any delay in taking all necessary steps to vacate the Premises falls on them as does any difficulty created by their failure to do so.
The delay in seeking the issue of a warrant has not been caused by anything other than the appeals brought by the respondents. The Commonwealth expeditiously applied for an order extending the time for applying for a warrant. It is entitled to immediate possession and the respondents are not acting in accordance with the orders of this Court.
In those circumstances the only reasonable decision is to extend the time to apply for a warrant. An extension of 30 days reflects the original limit in s.121 of the Act and provides for a sufficient opportunity to enforce the judgment obtained on 11 December 2015. The respondents should pay the costs of the application.

I certify that the preceding twenty-six (26) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Smith

Date: 18 May 2017