[2013] HCATrans 297
IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Perth No P50 of 2013
B e t w e e n -
COMMONWEALTH MINISTER FOR JUSTICE
Appellant
and
ADRIAN ADAMAS
First Respondent
COMMISSIONER, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIVE SERVICES
Second Respondent
FRENCH CJ
HAYNE J
CRENNAN J
KIEFEL J
BELL J
GAGELER J
KEANE J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON THURSDAY, 28 NOVEMBER 2013, AT 10.15 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
____________________
MR J.T. GLEESON, SC, Solicitor‑General of the Commonwealth of Australia: May it please the Court, I appear with MR S.B. LLOYD, SC and MS H. YOUNAN, for the appellant. (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)
MR G.R. DONALDSON, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR A.K. SHARPE, for the first respondent. (instructed by O’Connor Lawyers)
FRENCH CJ: Yes, Mr Solicitor.
MR GLEESON: Your Honours, before I come to the text of the statute, which I will do almost immediately, could I just situate the context of the appeal. Any system of extradition law has to grapple with the inherent tensions that frequently arise between the enforcement of the bilateral promises of cooperation and the inevitable background that the criminal law may differ between the two countries. I will deal with the facts in detail near the end, but in the present case at its essence, there are three differences between the law of Indonesia and Australia on the material before the Minister.
The first is that the in absentia conviction for this particular offence, serious corruption, was lawful in Indonesia provided there was valid service under the law of Indonesia, including for that purpose, substituted service. The second difference is that the form of appellate review available in Indonesia appears to be less than a full appellate review within our criminal system, and the third difference is that at the stage of sentencing, the sentence appears more severe than the likely sentence in Australia for an offence of serious corruption. They are the three differences.
Against those three differences, we are grappling with how the Extradition Act and the regulation and treaty governing Australia and Indonesia require the Attorney‑General or his delegate to act lawfully in deciding whether to exercise a discretion to surrender. The three legal issues which then arise are really these. The first is, was the Full Court correct by majority to find the mandatory relevant consideration which they identified, namely, that the decision‑maker must have regard to a counterfactual would Australian criminal law permit this to occur?
The second question also arising from the majority’s judgment is that is there a staged process such that if that mandatory consideration is present the only other factors in the discretion which could point the other way, possibly, are the nature of the offence and the interests of Indonesia. That is, nothing else can be looked at other than the mandatory relevant consideration plus the two other factors that are in…
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- Case
- [2013] HCATrans 297
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether s 15 of the *Crimes (Traffic and Transport) Act 1934* (Tas) applied to offences prosecuted by the Commonwealth, or if it was confined to prosecutions by the State of Tasmania. This involved an examination of the interaction between Commonwealth and State legislation, particularly concerning the application of State limitation periods to Commonwealth prosecutions.
The High Court unanimously dismissed the application for special leave to appeal. The Court reasoned that the *Crimes (Traffic and Transport) Act 1934* (Tas) was a Tasmanian Act, and its provisions, including the limitation period in s 15, applied to offences created by that Act. The Court found no basis for the proposition that s 15 was intended to apply to Commonwealth prosecutions. The principle applied was that State legislation, in the absence of express provision or necessary implication to the contrary, does not bind the Crown in right of the Commonwealth. The Court concluded that the Full Federal Court had correctly determined that the prosecution was time-barred.
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