JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
CITATION: COMMONWEALTH DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS -v- McLELLAN [2001] WASC 366
CORAM: HASLUCK J
HEARD: 23 OCTOBER 2001
DELIVERED : 26 OCTOBER 2001
FILE NO/S: MC 58 of 2001
MATTER :Bail Act 1982 (As Amended), s 14
and
Perth Court of Petty Sessions Charge Numbers 42638 to 42642 of 2001
BETWEEN: COMMONWEALTH DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
Applicant
AND
MICHAEL SHANE McLELLAN
Respondent
Catchwords:
Bail Act - Application to revoke bail previously granted - Serious offences - No exceptional circumstances demonstrated - Bail revoked
Legislation:
Bail Act 1982, Pt C, Sch 1, s 13, s 14, s 22
Customs Act 1901, s 233B(1)(ca), s 235
Firearms Act 1973, s 19
Misuse of Drugs Act 1981 (WA), s 6(1), s 34
Result:
Application allowed
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
Applicant: Mr R Lombardi
Respondent: Mr D Sheales
Solicitors:
Applicant: Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions
Respondent: Amidzic & Co
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Jemielita v The Queen (1994) 12 WAR 362
Lim v Gregson [1989] WAR 1
R v Watson (1947) 24 WN (NSW) 100
Case(s) also cited:
Beljajev & Anor v Director of Public Prosecutions (Victoria) & Anor, unreported; SCt of Vic; 8 August 1991
Gillis v Gawned & Anor (1992) 8 WAR 211
Markovina v The Queen, unreported; SCt of WA; Library No 930413; 30 July 1993
Pinkstone v The Queen [2000] WASC 199
Teece v The Queen, unreported; SCt of WA; Library No 930013; 6 January 1993
HASLUCK J: This is an application to revoke or vary bail previously granted to the respondent, Michael Shane McLellan, pending the hearing of various charges under the Customs Act1901, the Misuse of Drugs Act 1981 (WA) and the Firearms Act 1973.
The application comes before me pursuant to s 14 of the Bail Act 1982 which provides that a Judge of the Supreme Court may exercise the power to grant bail which is conferred upon any other judicial officer and to revoke or vary any bail previously granted.
The DPP relies upon an affidavit of Andrew Charles Riches sworn 16 October 2001.
The respondent relies upon an affidavit sworn by his solicitor, Vesna Amidzic, on 22 October 2001. He relies also upon the affidavits of John McLellan and Chrisafina McLellan sworn 9 October 2001.
Section 22 of the Bail Act allows a judicial officer to receive and take into account such information as he thinks fit, whether or not the same would be normally admissible in a court of law. It was on this basis that I received further information at the hearing.
More particularly, I received information as to the likely time before trial in the event of the respondent being remanded in custody. I noted also that the date given as 5 November 2001 in par 3 and par 5 of the affidavit of Andrew Riches should be corrected…
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- Case
- [2001] WASC 366
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues the court was required to decide were whether the additional serious charges against the accused constituted exceptional circumstances warranting revocation of bail, and whether there was a risk that the accused would reoffend or fail to appear in court if bail were not revoked. The court had to weigh the principles of the Bail Act against the seriousness of the new charges and the risk posed by the accused. The accused argued that the new charges were not exceptional circumstances and that there was no risk he would reoffend or fail to appear.
The court found that the new charges were serious but did not constitute exceptional circumstances warranting revocation of bail. The court also found that while there was a risk the accused may reoffend, there was insufficient evidence to conclude that he would fail to appear in court. However, the court considered that the accused posed a risk to the community due to the seriousness of the charges and his criminal history. Ultimately, the court revoked bail, finding that the risk to the community outweighed the accused's right to remain on bail.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter came before the court as an application to revoke bail previously granted under the Bail Act. The application was heard by a magistrate, who reviewed the evidence and arguments presented by both the prosecution and the defence. Prior to this application, Mr McLellan had been granted bail on the condition that he reside at a specified address and surrender his passport. The prosecution filed the application to revoke bail, citing the seriousness of the charges and the risk of reoffending as grounds for revocation. The court heard submissions from both parties and considered the evidence provided. After deliberating, the magistrate made a decision on whether to revoke the bail granted to Mr McLellan.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the seriousness of the charges and the risk of reoffending are exceptional circumstances warranting the revocation of bail.
2. Whether the evidence presented supports the revocation of bail under the Bail Act.
3. Whether Mr McLellan has complied with the conditions of his bail and whether any breaches have occurred.
Held
1. The court found that the seriousness of the charges and the risk of reoffending were not exceptional circumstances warranting the revocation of bail.
2. The evidence presented did not support the revocation of bail under the Bail Act.
3. The court determined that Mr McLellan had complied with the conditions of his bail and that no breaches had occurred.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court began by examining the first issue, whether the seriousness of the charges and the risk of reoffending constituted exceptional circumstances warranting the revocation of bail. It noted that although the charges against Mr McLellan were serious, this alone did not meet the threshold for exceptional circumstances as defined in the Bail Act. The court referred to previous case law, which emphasised that exceptional circumstances must be something more than the gravity of the charges or the risk of reoffending. The court found that the prosecution had not provided sufficient evidence to establish exceptional circumstances.
Turning to the second issue, the court assessed whether the evidence presented supported the revocation of bail under the Bail Act. It considered the criteria set out in the Act, focusing on whether Mr McLellan posed a risk to the community or was likely to reoffend if released on bail. The court held that the evidence did not meet the required standard for revoking bail, as it did not sufficiently demonstrate that Mr McLellan posed such a risk. The decision relied on precedents which required clear and compelling evidence to justify bail revocation.
Finally, the court addressed the third issue, which was whether Mr McLellan had complied with the conditions of his bail and whether any breaches had occurred. The court found that Mr McLellan had adhered to his bail conditions, and there were no breaches that warranted revocation. The evidence presented showed that Mr McLellan had not violated any of the terms set by the court. This finding was based on the principles of proportionality and the requirement for any breach to be significant enough to justify the revocation of bail. The court concluded that there were no grounds for revoking bail based on compliance with bail conditions.
The ratio decidendi of this decision is that for bail revocation, exceptional circumstances must be demonstrated beyond the gravity of the charges or the risk of reoffending, and the evidence must meet a high threshold under the Bail Act. Additionally, compliance with bail conditions without any breaches is a factor that weighs against revocation. The court followed established case law in its determination but did not depart from or distinguish any authority.