IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF QUEENSLAND
No 3868 of 1996
Brisbane
[Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Cooke]
BETWEEN:
COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA
(ACN 123 123 124)
Plaintiff
AND:DR ROBERT JOHN COOKE
Defendant
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - WILLIAMS J
Judgment delivered 29 January 1999
CATCHWORDS: Legal professional privilege - copy of affidavit in possession of maker - privilege vested in defendant not waived.
Attorney-General (N.T.) V Maurice (1986) 161 CLR 475.
Hartogen Energy Limited v The Australian Gas Light Company (1992) 36 FCR 557.
Carbone v National Crime Authority (1994) 52 FCR 516.
Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (1988) 14 NSWLR 132
Newcastle Wallsend Coal Co Pty Ltd v Court of Coal Mines Regulations (1997) 42 NSWLR 351.
Counsel:McMurdo Q.C. for applicant.
Solicitor for respondent.
Clothier for defendant.
Solicitors:Minter Ellison for applicant.
Craig Ray & Associates for respondent.
James Conomos for defendant.
Hearing Date: 23 November 1998.
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF QUEENSLAND
No 3868 of 1996
Brisbane
[Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Cooke]
BETWEEN:
COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA
(ACN 123 123 124)
Plaintiff
AND:DR ROBERT JOHN COOKE
Defendant
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - WILLIAMS J
Judgment delivered 29 January 1999
The plaintiff in the action, Commonwealth Bank of Australia, has applied by summons for an order that the respondent, EWR Howard, produce for inspection and copying by the plaintiff’s solicitors his copy of an affidavit sworn by him in the action. The application is resisted by the respondent, and by the defendant in the action, Dr Cooke, on the ground that the affidavit in question is subject to a claim of legal professional privilege by the defendant.
The circumstances in which the affidavit in question came to be prepared and a copy provided to the respondent are as follows. The plaintiff’s action was commenced by specially endorsed writ issued 10 May 1996. The defendant entered an appearance on 20 May 1996. Then on 21 June 1996 the plaintiff filed a summons seeking summary judgment in the amount of $2,747,521 with interest and costs. The summons was initially returnable on 9 July 1996, but it was adjourned on a number of occasions. The hearing took place before Helman J on 12 and 19 September 1996. The defendant changed solicitors on 1 July 1996; from that date James Conomos was his solicitor on the record.
Conomos took instructions in July specifically in response to the plaintiff’s summary judgment application. On 13 August 1996 the solicitors for the plaintiff served eight affidavits on Conomos in support of the summary judgment application. Conomos then began preparing material in response. In consequence of instructions given by the defendant he contacted the respondent to ascertain whether he was willing to provide a statement dealing with events material to the plaintiff’s claim. The respondent agreed to do that and made an appointment to see Conomos.
I am satisfied that the communications between Conomos and the respondent were solely for the purpose of obtaining a…
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- Case
- [1999] QSC 13
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the copy affidavit in the possession of the respondent Howard had been waived of privilege. The court needed to determine whether the privilege attached to the original affidavit also applied to the copy in Howard’s possession. The court also had to consider whether the defendant, Cooke, had waived the privilege by allowing the affidavit to be in Howard’s possession.
Justice Santow concluded that the copy affidavit in Howard’s possession was subject to the same privilege as the original affidavit prepared by Cooke’s solicitor. The affidavit was prepared for use in the litigation, and the copy in Howard’s possession was not given to him for his own purposes. The court found that the defendant, her solicitor, and the respondent all believed the copy affidavit was privileged at all material times. The court held that there was no evidence of a waiver of privilege and applied the Maurice test to determine whether it would be unfair to compel disclosure. Justice Santow concluded that it would be unfair to compel disclosure, as it would hamper the preparation of the case and prolong the litigation. Therefore, the court found that there had been no waiver of legal professional privilege, and the summons was dismissed with costs.
The court ordered that the applicant/plaintiff, the Commonwealth Bank of Australia, pay the costs of and incidental to the summons of both the respondent Howard and the defendant Cooke. The court's decision emphasised the importance of maintaining the confidentiality of lawyer-client communications in litigation to ensure fair and efficient legal proceedings.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In the course of argument some reference was made to the unreported decision of the Court of Appeal in Grosvenor Hill (Queensland) v Interchase Corporation Limited (No. 9424 of 1996, judgment delivered 19 December 1997). In the course of that judgment reference is made to what Pincus JA described as witness’ document privilege, but there is nothing therein which, in my view, impacts on the specific point for determination in this case. There is nothing therein, however, which is contrary to my approach. Here the affidavit in question was prepared for use in pending litigation, and it is in the course of that very litigation that production of the copy is sought. The defendant, the defendant’s solicitor, and the respondent all believed at all material times that the copy affidavit was privileged, and I am not satisfied on the material before me that the plaintiff has established a waiver of privilege. Applying the Maurice test there is no unfairness in permitting the defendant to maintain a claim of privilege with respect to the material in the possession of the respondent. The copy affidavit was not given to the respondent for his own purposes; the document was prepared for use by the defendant in the litigation and the copy in the respondent’s possession was subject to the privilege which attached to the original. It is important to bear in mind the observation of Mason J in Baker v Campbell at 75: “It is one thing to say that the privacy or secrecy of lawyer-client communications made in aid of litigation, especially in aid of the litigation in which the privileges claimed, shall prevail over an obligation to produce or disclose all materials relevant to the issues in the litigation. To take but one example: to compel the parties to disclose such communications made in the conduct of that litigation would be unfair to them, hamper the preparation of their cases and protract the determination of the litigation.” Those remarks are very apposite to the position here. Given all that I have said I conclude that there has been no waiver of legal professional privilege with respect to the copy affidavit the subject of the application. The summons should be dismissed with costs. The applicant/plaintiff should pay the costs of and incidental to the summons of both the respondent Howard and the defendant Cooke.