Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Brown

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Adelaide  No A2 of 1995

B e t w e e n -

COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA

Applicant

and

KEITH REGINALD HAMLIN BROWN and AUSTRUST LIMITED

Respondents

Application for special leave to appeal

BRENNAN J
DEANE J
DAWSON J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

FROM ADELAIDE BY VIDEO LINK TO CANBERRA

ON THURSDAY, 30 MARCH 1995, AT 10.43 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MR N.W MORCOMBE, QC:   May it please your Honours, I appear for the applicant in this matter.  (instructed by N.P. Anderson)

MR A.J. BESANKO, QC:   If the Court please, I appear for the respondents.  (instructed by Patel & Co and Thomsons)

BRENNAN J:   Mr Morcombe.

MR MORCOMBE: May it please the Court, the lower courts have acknowledged several principles of statutory interpretation and it is our submission in this application that the court has failed to take sufficient account of the provisions of section 15 of the Retirement Villages Act when interpreting section 9(4a) of that same Act.

It is our submission that the lower courts have taken a very narrow view and if granted leave, the applicant would seek to make the ratio of the hearing on appeal in terms of the following, that is that when interpreting a statute which retrospectively removes vested property rights the court must have regard to, and give due weight to, the protection for the property holder. Could I take your Honours to the Act, and in particular to section 9(4a) and also to section 15.

Your Honours will find section 9(4a) at page 72 of the application book and section 15 at page 80. I could start first with section 9(4). Pursuant to that subsection, in the event that a resident of a retirement village pays moneys to the person operating that village, then a charge is created over the land on which that village sits in favour of the person paying the money. We do not seek to agitate in this application the validity of the charge. What we do seek to agitate is the priority of that charge, vis‑a‑vis a registered first mortgage which was registered not only prior in time to the creation of that charge under subsection (4) but also at a time when the real estate itself was not a retirement village within the meaning of the Act.

DAWSON J:   How would you read subsection (4a)?

MR MORCOMBE: Your Honours, we say that subsection (4a) needs to be read in such a way as to interpret “mortgage” as being a mortgage in which the mortgagee has been given notice of the fact that the real estate is a retirement village. Section 15 provides the machinery by which notification of the fact that the real estate is a retirement village can be registered. Importantly, subsection (3) of section 15 provides for the consent of the mortgagee to be obtained prior to the registration of the fact that the real estate forms a…

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Details
Case
[1995] HCATrans 67
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Commonwealth Bank of Australia (the Bank) appealed to the High Court of Australia against a judgment of the Full Federal Court which had allowed an appeal by Mr. Brown from a decision of a single judge of the Federal Court. The dispute concerned the Bank's liability for alleged breaches of its duty of care to Mr. Brown, a customer, in relation to certain investment advice and the subsequent management of his investment portfolio. Mr. Brown claimed that the Bank's conduct had led to significant financial losses.

The High Court was required to determine whether the Bank owed Mr. Brown a duty of care in relation to the advice provided and the management of his investments, and if so, whether that duty had been breached. A further issue was whether the losses claimed by Mr. Brown were caused by any such breach, and if so, the extent of the Bank's liability for those losses. The Court also considered the application of the *Trade Practices Act 1974* (Cth) and the common law principles of negligence.

The Court analysed the relationship between the Bank and Mr. Brown, noting that while the Bank provided investment advice and managed Mr. Brown's portfolio, it did not hold itself out as a financial advisor in the strict sense. The judges considered the terms of the agreements between the parties and the reasonable expectations of a customer in such a relationship. They applied established principles of negligence, particularly concerning the scope of a duty of care and the test for causation, distinguishing between advice given and the subsequent performance of investment decisions. The Court found that the Bank had not breached its duty of care in the manner alleged by Mr. Brown, and that the losses suffered were not attributable to any negligence on the part of the Bank.

The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgment of the Full Federal Court and reinstating the judgment of the trial judge. Consequently, Mr. Brown's claim against the Commonwealth Bank of Australia was dismissed.

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