Commissioner of the AFP v Vilayur

[2024] ACTSC 406

SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY

Case Title:

Commissioner of the AFP v Vilayur

Citation: 

[2024] ACTSC 406

Hearing Date: 

13 December 2024

Decision Date: 

18 December 2024

Before:

Mossop J

Decision: 

See [61]

Catchwords: 

CRIMINAL LAW – CONFISCATION OF CRIMINAL ASSETS – Application for examination orders under Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth) – application made by Commissioner in response to application made by defendants for exclusion of property from restraint and forfeiture – hearing of applications to exclude property statutorily required to occur after responsible authority has had a reasonable opportunity to conduct examinations – no statutory basis for opposition by defendants as to scope of examination orders being limited to facts underlying criminal convictions – examination orders granted

Legislation Cited: 

Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth), ss 18, 29, 30, 31, 39, 92, 94, 180, 329, 330, 338, Pts 2-1, 2-2, 2-3, 2-4

Criminal Code (Cth), s 135.4(1)

Cases Cited: 

Commissioner of theAustralian Federal Police v Chen (No 4) [2022] NSWSC 1719

Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police v El-Debel [2021] ACTSC 286

Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police v Bahmad [2021] NSWSC 954; 359 FLR 271

R v El-Debel; R v Kahlon (No 7) [2022] ACTSC 313

R v Vilayur (No 3) [2024] ACTSC 132

R v Vilayur [2023] ACTSC 59; 383 FLR 366

R v Vilayur; R v Kahlon; R v El-Debel [2022] ACTSC 110

Parties: 

Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police ( Plaintiff)

Abdul Aziz El-Debel (First Defendant)

Cigdem El-Debel ( Second Defendant)

Gopalakrishnan Suryanarayanan Vilayur (Third Defendant)

Kavitha Gopalakrishnan ( Fourth Defendant)

Raminder Singh Kahlon ( Fifth Defendant)

Algoram Business Solutions Pty Ltd (Sixth Defendant)

New Horizons Business Solutions Pty Ltd ( Seventh Defendant)

Representation: 

Counsel

D Habashy ( Plaintiff)

No appearance (First Defendant)

No appearance (Second Defendant)

S Tierney (Third and Fourth Defendants)

No appearance (Fifth Defendant)

No appearance (Sixth Defendant)

No appearance (Seventh Defendant)

Solicitors

H Pope, Criminal Assets Litigation, Australian Federal Police ( Plaintiff)

No appearance (First Defendant)

No appearance (Second Defendant)

Ken Cush and Associates (Third and Fourth Defendants)

No appearance (Fifth Defendant)

No appearance (Sixth Defendant)

No appearance (Seventh Defendant)

File Number:

SC 220 of 2020

MOSSOP J:

Introduction

1․This is an application by the Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police for examination orders under s 180 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth). The application was filed more than two years ago on 14 July 2022 but had not been determined because of the pendency of associated criminal proceedings.

2․The examination orders that are sought relate to the third and fourth defendants in the proceedings, Mr Vilayur and his wife Ms Gopalakrishnan.

3․Before outlining the statutory context in which the application is brought, it is useful to outline the history of the proceedings, which provides the factual context in which the current application must be determined, and which gives rise to some of the arguments as to the scope of any orders under s 180 that are advanced on behalf of the defendants.

History of proceedings

4․On 22 June 2020, the Supreme Court made restraining orders pursuant to s 18 of the Act. Those orders included orders restraining all the property of Mr Vilayur and specified property of Ms Gopalakrishnan.

5․The factual circumstances that enlivened the power to make the restraining orders were that there were reasonable grounds for the relevant police officer to suspect that the first defendant (Mr El-Debel), Mr Vilayur and the fifth defendant (Mr Kahlon) committed an offence contrary to s 135.4(1) of the Criminal Code (Cth). That section creates an offence of conspiring with another person with the intention of dishonestly obtaining a gain from a Commonwealth entity.

6․On 8 June 2021, Mr Vilayur and Ms Gopalakrishnan filed an application in proceeding seeking orders pursuant to ss 29 and 31 of the Act excluding certain property from the restraining orders.

7․On 30 September 2021, the Commissioner filed an application for orders under s 180 of the Act for examination of various persons about the affairs of Mr Vilayur and Ms Gopalakrishnan. That application was heard by Elkaim J on 2 November 2021. At that stage, the criminal trials of Mr El-Debel, Mr Vilayur and Mr Kahlon were set down to commence on 30 May 2022. On 5 November 2021, Elkaim J dismissed the Commissioner’s application because of the prejudice that such examinations may cause to the defendants, but his Honour recognised the entitlement of the Commissioner to bring a fresh application: Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police v El-Debel [2021] ACTSC 286 at [40].

8․On 20 May 2022, Mr Vilayur’s criminal trial was severed from that of Mr El-Debel and Mr Kahlon: R v Vilayur; R v Kahlon; R v El-Debel [2022] ACTSC 110.

9․On 7 July 2022, Mr El-Debel and Mr Kahlon were found guilty by a jury of an offence under s 135.4(1) of the Criminal Code. They were sentenced by Elkaim J on 15 November 2022: R v El-Debel; R v Kahlon (No 7) [2022] ACTSC 313.

10․On 14 July 2022, following the conclusion of the trial of Mr El-Debel and Mr Kahlon, the Commissioner filed the present application, which sought orders under s 180 in relation to various persons about the affairs of Mr Vilayur and Ms Gopalakrishnan.

11․On 16 September 2022, Mr Vilayur filed an application to quash his indictment and stay his criminal proceedings.

12․On 21 September 2022, Elkaim J adjourned the current application on the basis that it should await the outcome of Mr Vilayur’s criminal trial.

13․On 24 March 2023, Baker J dismissed Mr Vilayur’s application to quash his indictment and stay his criminal proceedings: R v Vilayur [2023] ACTSC 59; 383 FLR 366. The current examination application was then adjourned pending Mr Vilayur’s criminal trial.

14․On 5 March 2024, Mr Vilayur pleaded guilty to the offence of conspiracy to dishonestly obtain a gain from a Commonwealth entity contrary to s 135.4(1) of the Criminal Code. I sentenced Mr Vilayur on 2 May 2024: R v Vilayur (No 3) [2024] ACTSC 132.

15․On 13 September 2024, Mr Vilayur, Ms Gopalakrishnan and the sixth defendant, Algoram Business Solutions Pty Ltd, filed an amended application seeking orders excluding all of the restrained property from restraint (ss 29, 31 and 39 of the Act) and orders excluding all of the restrained property from forfeiture (s 94 of the Act).

16․Thus, the applications in proceeding presently on foot are the Commissioner’s application for examination orders dated 11 July 2022 (filed 14 July 2022) and the defendants’ amended application in proceeding dated 2 September 2024 (filed 13 September 2024). I am determining only the Commissioner’s application.

Relevant statutory provisions and the statutory context

17․The Proceeds of Crime Act establishes a confiscation scheme which includes processes for:

(a)the making of orders restraining the disposal of or dealing with property (Pt 2‑1);

(b)the making of forfeiture orders (Pt 2-2);

(c)automatic forfeiture of restrained property following a conviction for a serious offence (Pt 2-3); and

(d)the making of pecuniary penalty orders (Pt 2-4).

18․In Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police v Bahmad [2021] NSWSC 954; 359 FLR 271 at [53], Button J accurately described the scheme as “a remarkably rigorous and intrusive regime that alters the rights of citizens in significant ways”.

19․For present purposes, it is useful to briefly explain the regime for restraining orders and automatic forfeiture upon conviction. In the present case, the restraining order was made pursuant to s 18, which requires the making of an order restraining the disposal or dealing with restrained property where certain requirements are met. The most significant requirement is that the “authorised officer” who made the affidavit in support of the application holds the suspicion or suspicions stated in the affidavit on reasonable grounds. Where the person whose property is restrained is the suspect, then the authorised officer must hold the suspicion that the suspect committed the offence. If the application is to restrain property of a person other than the suspect, then the authorised officer must hold the suspicion that the property is under the effective control of the suspect, “proceeds” of the offence, or an “instrument” of the offence. There is potential under ss 29 and 31 of the Act to make an application to have property that is subject to a restraining order excluded from the scope of that order.

20․In addition to preventing disposal of, or other dealings with, restrained property, significant consequences flow from the property being subject to restraint under an order made pursuant to s 18. For present purposes, the most significant is that property subject of a restraining order will be automatically forfeited to the Commonwealth at the end of a defined period, generally six months but subject to extension, after the date of conviction on the charge that formed the basis for the restraining order or a related offence: s 92. However, property will not be excluded if an order has been made under s 94 of the Act excluding the property from forfeiture.

21․Therefore, so far as a person whose property has been restrained is concerned, the two critical questions will be whether the property can be excluded from the scope of the restraining order and whether it is possible to have the property excluded from automatic forfeiture.

22․In order to exclude property from a restraining order made under s 18, it is necessary under s 29(2)(c) for the person whose property is restrained to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that:

(c)… the interest is neither:

(i)   in any case – proceeds of unlawful activity; nor

(ii)     if an offence to which the order relates is a serious offence – an *instrument of any serious offence…

23․“Proceeds” is defined broadly so that property will be proceeds of an offence if it is wholly or partly derived or realised, directly or indirectly, from the commission of the offence: s 329. “Unlawful activity” is defined in s 338 as meaning an act or omission that constitutes an offence against a law of the Commonwealth, a law of a State or Territory, or a law of a foreign country. An “instrument” of an offence is defined in ss 329 and 330 and covers property which is used or intended to be used in connection with the commission of an offence. What is most significant is the burden upon the applicant to prove on the balance of probabilities that the property was not the proceeds of “unlawful activity”.

24․The position is similar in relation to an exclusion order under s 94. In order to have property excluded from forfeiture, two of the requirements are:

(e)the court is satisfied that the applicant’s interest in the property is neither *proceeds of *unlawful activity nor an *instrument of unlawful activity; and

(f)the court is satisfied that the applicant’s interest in the property was lawfully acquired.

25․In other words, the applicant bears the burden of proving that the property was lawfully acquired and is neither the proceeds, nor the instrument of, unlawful activity.

26․The power to get an examination order is contained within Ch 3 of the Act, which is entitled “Information gathering”. Section 180 provides:

180 Examination orders relating to restraining orders

(1)If a *restraining order is in force, the court that made the restraining order, or any other court that could have made the restraining order, may make an order (an examination order) for the *examination of any person, including:

(a)a person whose property is, or a person who has or claims an *interest in property that is, the subject of the restraining order; or

(b)a person who is a *suspect in relation to the restraining order; or

(c)the spouse or *de facto partner of a person referred to in paragraph (a) or (b);

about the *affairs of a person referred to in paragraph (a), (b) or (c).

(2)The *examination order ceases to have effect if the *restraining order to which it relates ceases to have effect.

27․The word “affairs” is defined in the Dictionary to the Act contained in s 338 as follows:

affairs of a person includes, but is not limited to:

(a)the nature and location of property of the person or property in which the person has an interest; and

(b)any activities of the person that are, or may be, relevant to whether or not the person has engaged in unlawful activity of a kind relevant to the making of an order under this Act.

28․The provisions of Ch 3 provide for the enforcement of examination orders and the conduct of examinations.

29․The relationship between the conduct of examinations and applications to exclude property from restraint or forfeiture is made clear by the statute.

30․Where an application is made for the exclusion of property from a restraining order, the “responsible authority”, in this case the Commissioner, is required to give notice of the grounds on which it proposes to contest the application. However, the authority does not have to do that until it has had a reasonable opportunity to conduct examinations under Pt 3 in relation to the application. Section 31(6) provides:

(6)The *responsible authority must give the person notice of any grounds on which it proposes to contest the application. However, the authority need not do so until it has had a reasonable opportunity to conduct *examinations in relation to the application.

31․Section 32 provides that the court must not hear an application to exclude specified property from a restraining order if the restraining order is in force and the responsible authority has not been given a reasonable opportunity to conduct examinations in relation to the application.

32․The position is the same in relation to applications to exclude property from forfeiture. Subsections 94(5)-(6) provide:

(5)The *responsible authority must give the applicant notice of any grounds on which it proposes to contest the application. However, the authority need not do so until it has had a reasonable opportunity to conduct *examinations in relation to the application.

(6)The application must not be heard until the *responsible authority has had a reasonable opportunity to conduct *examinations in relation to the application.

33․The provisions relating to examination orders, and those which require that the Commissioner be allowed to conduct examinations prior to the hearing of any application to exclude property from a restraining order or to exclude property from forfeiture, make it clear that the Act contemplates that examinations pursuant to examination orders will be used to gather evidence relevant to decisions on those types of applications. In particular, the terms of the Act contemplate that information gathered during those examinations will provide grounds upon which the responsible authority may resist the court finding that the requirements of s 29(2)(c) or ss 94(1)(e) and (f) are satisfied in the circumstances of the case. Put more succinctly, the Act contemplates that examination orders will be used to obtain evidence relevant to whether or not property sought to be excluded from a restraining order is the proceeds of unlawful activity or the instrument of “any serious offence”. It should be noted that, for the purposes of both exclusion from restraint under s 29(2)(c) and exclusion from forfeiture under s 94(1)(e), the references to “unlawful activity” and “any serious offence” (the latter term only contained within s 29(2)(c)) are not limited to the serious offence which formed the basis upon which the restraining order was originally granted.

34․Where the application is for exclusion from forfeiture, examination orders will be used to obtain evidence relevant to whether the property was lawfully acquired, the proceeds of unlawful activity or an instrument of unlawful activity.

Submissions of the defendants

35․Mr Vilayur and Ms Gopalakrishnan, the third and fourth defendants respectively, concede that it is appropriate for the court to make examination orders directing that they be examined. However, they put in issue the proper scope for the examination orders that should be made. They submit that the appropriate scope for the examination orders is as follows:

The third and fourth defendants are to be examined in relation to their affairs in respect of payments received from the Commonwealth Department of Finance in relation to two Work Orders, SST-44 and SST-45 issued by the Commonwealth Department of Finance to the sixth defendant.

36․In order to understand the proposed limitation on the scope of the examination orders, it is necessary to make reference to two passages from my sentencing decision in relation to Mr Vilayur upon which the defendants place reliance. They are [12] and [58] which provide as follows:

12․     In November 2019, Mr Kahlon and Mr Vilayur discussed having accrued profits of about $500,000 and Mr Kahlon’s plans to pay Mr Vilayur $50,000. Mr Vilayur acknowledged that he had received about $200,000 in cash from Mr Kahlon as “referral fees” for New Horizon candidates that Mr Vilayur had proposed. However, this amount is not proved beyond reasonable doubt to arise from the unlawful conduct. On 23 November 2019, Mr Kahlon told Mr Vilayur that he had received $30,000 for Mr Vilayur, which was given to Mr Vilayur the next day. In March 2020, Mr Kahlon and Mr Vilayur travelled to Sydney to collect a further payment of $33,000 for Mr Vilayur. Once again, it was not established beyond reasonable doubt that this payment arose by operation of the conspiracy.

…

58․     Elkaim J described the conspiracy in a manner similar to that outlined in the agreed facts in the present case. His Honour found that the seriousness of the conduct was tempered by five matters:

(a)The Department did not suffer a loss because it would have paid the same rates to a contractor in any event.

(b)The Crown could not say how much money was the product of the unlawful activity or how much money was paid to Mr El-Debel as a result of the conspiracy.

(c)There was no suggestion that the candidates were not competent to do the jobs for which they were retained.

(d)Although the charged conspiracy operated from 22 March 2019, when Algoram was incorporated, until the arrest of the conspirators on 10 June 2020, it was not operating constantly over that period. The high point of the evidence applied to two contracts, SST-044 and SST-045, limiting the relevant period to 28 March 2020 until 10 June 2020.

(e)There were occasions when candidates put forward by competing companies were favoured over those put forward by New Horizons or Algoram. This may have occurred to maintain an appearance of legitimacy, but strengthened the conclusion that the conspiracy was acting on a part-time basis.

37․The defendants place emphasis upon the conclusion in paragraph 12 that the amounts there referred to were not proven beyond reasonable doubt to have arisen from the charged conduct. Similarly, in relation to the passage at paragraph 58, the defendants place emphasis upon the matter at (d) that the high point of the prosecution evidence related to two contracts, SST-044 and SST-045. The evidence led by the plaintiffs indicates that between 19 March 2020 (when the two Requests for Quotation which led to SST-044 and SST-045 were issued) and the arrest of Mr Vilayur on 10 June 2023, payments were made by the Department.

38․The third and fourth defendants contend that the court should not make an unconstrained examination order in those circumstances. That submission was made for seven reasons.

39․First, the sentencing court placed a temporal limitation on the period of the criminal offending and a similar time limited approach should be adopted.

40․Second, there has never been any allegation of criminal offending by the fourth defendant and an unconstrained order for her examination should not be made.

41․Third, Elkaim J found that the high point of the evidence related to the two specific contracts and no additional evidence has been filed in the present proceedings to suggest the need for examination beyond those two work orders.

42․Fourth, the court should also have regard to the Statement of Agreed Facts in the criminal proceedings, which indicates that despite a long history of investigation by the Department and the AFP, the only criminal offending which was ultimately established was in relation to SST-44 and SST-45. While the third and fourth defendants do not contend that a res judicata or issue estoppel arises, they do say that for the Commissioner to contend for different facts in these proceedings after the criminal proceedings have been finalised would be inappropriate and likely to constitute an abuse of the court’s processes.

43․Fifth, the sentencing court recognised that the precise gain made by the sixth defendant from the two contracts could not be precisely determined and it was not possible to say that any loss arose because the workers engaged were required in any event. The third and fourth defendants point to the much broader allegations of criminal offending that formed the basis for the application for the restraining orders that were imposed. They submitted that notwithstanding the passage of five years, the criminal proceedings only allowed a conviction in relation to SST-44 and SST-45 during the limited time periods identified.

44․Sixth, the Commissioner having filed no evidence to indicate what investigations would inform applications under the Act, the mere assertion that the making of an exclusion application would warrant the making of unconstrained examination orders is insufficient.

45․Seventh, the objects of the Act do not authorise the Commissioner to use proceedings to conduct unnecessary and intrusive enquiries into personal financial dealings which are not the subject of criminal complaint or conviction.

46․Ultimately, the third and fourth defendants contend that the orders sought by the Commissioner “vastly exceed any legitimate purpose” because they would permit “an unfettered examination of any and all financial and other affairs of the third and fourth defendants”.

Objection to evidence

47․Associated with their submissions as to the scope of the proceedings, the defendants objected to certain evidence led by the Commissioner. That was the affidavit of Samuel James Hansen dated 6 December 2024, which was filed in reply to evidence filed by the defendants, and said by the defendants not to be evidence truly in reply. The defendants also objected on the basis of relevance because the annexures to the affidavit contained a record of interview conducted with Mr Vilayur prior to the laying of charges, which were submitted as having been overtaken by the Statement of Agreed Facts presented to the court as part of his sentencing. Similarly, extracted telephone conversations were subject of the Statement of Agreed Facts presented to the court as part of the sentencing exercise of Mr Vilayur on 2 May 2024. In summary, they submitted that the material had been overtaken such that the facts regarding the criminal offending relevant to s 180 have been resolved and put within the context of agreed facts. Such a submission on relevance depended on the merits of the defendants’ submissions with respect to the scope of the examination orders. The Commissioner submitted that the affidavit and exhibits were in reply because they were responsive to the submission of the defendants that any examination was confined by the scope of the criminal proceedings, and was evidence designed to show that those earlier proceedings involved broader evidence of money laundering.

48․In my view, for the reasons that follow, the Commissioner is not required to establish that the earlier criminal proceedings extended beyond SST-44 and SST-45 in order to justify an examination order that goes beyond those two contracts and is not confined to the Statement of Agreed Facts relied upon for the purposes of sentencing. However, the evidence was legitimately served in reply to the contentions, disclosed in the evidence served by the defendants, that examination orders should be limited by reference to the criminal proceedings. The affidavit and its exhibit book will both be admitted into evidence.

Consideration and decision

49․The proposition underlying the submissions made on behalf of the third and fourth defendants is that, in circumstances where a person has been convicted of a serious offence, the legitimate scope of any examination order is tied, in some way, to the facts underlying that conviction. If that proposition is accepted, then the defendants contend that it is inappropriate to make an examination order which would permit examination of issues going beyond the facts underlying the conviction.

50․No statutory foundation was established for this proposition. No statutory foundation exists that would support this proposition. Whether or not to make an examination order must be determined based upon the issues that arise pursuant to the provisions of the Act rather than by reference to facts relating to the conviction of the third defendant, which are not given statutory significance for the purposes of s 180.

51․The fact of fundamental importance in the present case is that the restraining order made under s 18 relates to all of the property of the third defendant and listed property of the fourth defendant. As pointed out earlier in these reasons, in order to establish that an exclusion order should be made, the burden is upon the third and fourth defendants to establish the matters required by s 29(2)(c) (see [23]-[26] above).

52․The reference in s 29(2)(c)(i) to proceeds of “unlawful activity” is not confined to unlawful activity that was alleged in the application for the restraining order or proved in the criminal proceedings. That is illustrated by the decision in Commissioner of theAustralian Federal Police v Chen (No 4) [2022] NSWSC 1719 at [36], in which the owner of property failed to satisfy Campbell J that she had lawfully acquired funds that enabled her to purchase the property because of misrepresentations made to a bank about her income. Any unlawfulness was unrelated to the alleged crime that provided the basis for the making of the restraining order, namely illegal transactions in relation to cigarettes.

53․Similarly, the reference to being an instrument of “any serious offence” in s 29(2)(c)(ii) is not limited to the “serious offence” which formed the basis for the restraining order under s 18 or any subsequent conviction.

54․Because of the scope of the property covered by the restraining order and the nature of the burden imposed upon the third and fourth defendants under s 29(2)(c), the subject matters that may, consistently with the Act, be examined for the purposes of deciding the grounds, if any, on which the Commissioner proposes to contest the application for the exclusion order are not confined to matters that have been proved in separate criminal proceedings. They extend to the examination of matters relevant to that which must be proved in the exclusion order application. Necessarily, that includes matters relevant to whether the interest in property is “proceeds” of “unlawful activity” as very broadly defined in the Act.

55․The same can be said in relation to applications for exclusion from forfeiture by reference to the matters that may be put in issue in resisting the conclusions set out in s 94(1)(e) and (f).

56․Once the defendants’ underlying proposition has been rejected, it is clearly appropriate to make an examination order in the terms sought by the Commissioner. That is for the following reasons:

(a)the statutory preconditions to the making of examination orders are satisfied;

(b)there is a statutory entitlement under ss 31(6), 32 and 94(5)-(6) to give the Commissioner a reasonable opportunity to have an examination conducted prior to identifying its grounds of opposition;

(c)there is a close connection between the conduct of the examination and the statutory processes that have been enlivened because in each case the examinee is the owner of the property which is sought to be excluded from restraint or forfeiture; and

(d)the third defendant’s criminal proceedings are now concluded, and as a consequence, that previously existent source of potential prejudice no longer remains.

57․It is appropriate to make the orders sought by the Commissioner.

Costs

58․The Commissioner submitted that he had previously on 17 July 2024 given notice to the third and fourth defendants that he would seek his costs if they resisted the making of those orders and the orders were made. Having had orders made over the opposition of the third and fourth defendants, he submitted that they should pay the Commissioner’s costs of and incidental to the application.

59․Although the third and fourth defendants indicated that they were content to rely upon their written submissions in relation to costs, those submissions did not include submissions on costs. I infer that they would oppose an order for costs against them.

60․The Commissioner has been successful on a contested application in circumstances where notice was given of an intention to seek costs in the event that the application was unsuccessfully opposed. I have concluded in these reasons that the proposition underlying the defendant’s submissions concerning the scope of orders that should be made did not have a basis in the statute and was inconsistent with the terms of the statute. In those circumstances, it is appropriate that costs follow the event. Given that the application in proceeding dated 11 July 2022 related to a broader range of examinees than ultimately pursued, I will confine the order for costs so that it is limited to the costs that relate to the examination of the third and fourth defendants. I will order that the third and fourth defendants pay the plaintiff’s costs of the application in proceeding dated 11 July 2022 so far as that application relates to the third and fourth defendants.

Orders

61․The orders of the court are:

(1)The affidavit of Samuel James Hansen dated 6 December 2024 and Exhibit SJH-1 to that affidavit are admitted into evidence.

(2)Pursuant to s 180 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth), Gopalakrishnan Vilayur is to be examined about the affairs of:

(a)himself; and

(b)Kavitha Gopalakrishnan.

(3)Pursuant to s 180 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth), Kavitha Gopalakrishnan is to be examined about the affairs of:

(a)herself; and

(b)Gopalakrishnan Vilayur.

(4)The third and fourth defendants are to pay the plaintiff’s costs of the application in proceeding dated 11 July 2022 so far as that application relates to the third and fourth defendants.

I certify that the preceding sixty-one [61] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of his Honour Justice Mossop.

Associate:

Date: 18 December 2024