IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Brisbane No B15 of 2019
B e t w e e n -
COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
Applicant
and
GLENN GERALD HARDING
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
KEANE J
GORDON J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 13 SEPTEMBER 2019, AT 11.56 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR S.B. LLOYD, SC: May it please the Court, I appear in this matter with MR D.J. BUTLER, for the Commissioner. (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)
MR B.J. SULLIVAN, SC: If it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR C.J. PEADON, for the respondent. (instructed by PricewaterhouseCoopers)
KEANE J: Mr Lloyd.
MR LLOYD: The application concerns the statutory definition of “resident of Australia” for income tax purposes, for Australians working overseas. The definition dictates whether or not they will have to pay tax on their overseas income. For those working in Australia, it will determine the rates of tax at which they will have to pay. We say that the matter is of general or public importance, and a grant of special leave should be granted.
Indeed, it is all the more important for a provision that was enacted prior to the advent of commercial air travel. Nowadays one sees many more people travelling to Australia and from Australia, giving rise to the issues arising more. As our affidavit and the book indicates, it is an increasingly important issue.
GORDON J: Can I ask one question about that submission ‑ and that is what appears on pages 78 to 79 of application book – and that is, is that this is a very odd way in which this matter has come up through the lower courts. Odd in this sense, that there has been, in effect, a putting to one side of the very statutory provision which has given rise to it, ignored, and it has been argued on a different basis.
Now, the reason why that is important, as you know, is that the way in which the Court looks at it is not by reference to the statute which requires you to consider whether or not the Commissioner’s satisfaction was the relevant test, but a different question.
MR LLOYD: I think at least the Full Court did look at it correctly from that, noting that it turns on the Commissioner’s satisfaction. It is true that that court and the court below made the assessments for itself. What we would say about that is there are four possible scenarios that could happen if special leave were granted.
If special leave were granted and the Court accepted that the Full Court wrongly construed “place of abode”, or “permanent place of abode”, and that Justice Derrington had correctly construed them, then the Court could properly, exercising its jurisdiction as a court hearing appeals in the strict sense, allow the appeal and dismiss the appeal to the court below, and…
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- Case
- [2019] HCATrans 191
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was the meaning of "permanent place of abode" as it appears in the definition of a resident of Australia. This phrase is an exception to the "domicile test," which generally deems individuals domiciled in Australia to be residents for tax purposes. The Commissioner contended that the Full Court had erred in its construction of "place of abode," arguing it should refer to a specific dwelling or home with a character of permanence, rather than a broader concept such as a "country of abode." This interpretation was crucial for the proper operation of both the domicile test and the "183-day test" for residency.
The Commissioner's argument focused on the legislative purpose of the exception, which was to exclude individuals who had definitively abandoned their Australian residence and established a permanent home overseas. They submitted that interpreting "place of abode" as "country of abode" would undermine the 183-day test by creating a circular definition where a person spending more than half the year in Australia would be deemed to have Australia as their usual country of abode. The Commissioner advocated for a construction that maintained the ordinary meaning of "place of abode" as a dwelling, coupled with the requirement of permanence, to ensure the exception operated as intended and provided a workable test for the Commissioner's satisfaction.
The High Court refused the Commissioner's application for special leave to appeal, finding that the proposed appeal did not have sufficient prospects of success. Consequently, the application was dismissed with costs.
Orders
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Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
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Ratio Decidendi