Commissioner of Taxation v Grimaldi (No. 9)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Commissioner of Taxation v Grimaldi (No. 9) [2009] FCA 1404

TAXATION – whether judgments may be obtained against more than one party where concurrent or alternative notices of assessment have been issued to two parties

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 s 31A
Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) Parts IIA and IVC, ss 14ZL-14ZZS, ss 255-1, 255-5, 255-45, 260-5 and 298-25 of Schedule 1
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) ss 166, 174, 175, 175A, 177(1), 201 and 204
Income Tax Act 1986 (Cth) ss 5(1) and 7
Income Tax Rates Act 1986 (Cth) s 12(1)
Income Tax Regulations 1936 (Cth) Reg 172(2)

Commissioner of Taxation v Grimaldi (No. 5) [2009] FCA 765 referred to
Chamberlain v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 164 CLR 502 referred to
The Deputy Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia v Moorebank Proprietary Limited (1988) 165 CLR 55 cited
Blair v Curran (1939) 62 CLR 464 cited
In re Waring. Westminster Bank v Burton-Butler [1948] Ch 221 referred to
Berkeley v Berkeley [1946] A.C. 555 referred to
Ramsay v Pigram (1968) 118 CLR 271 considered
Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Proprietary Limited (1981) 147 CLR 589 cited
Wong v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 204 ALR 722 cited
Wong v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 146 FCR 10 cited
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (Vic) v Held (1988) 19 ATR 852 considered and distinguished
Held v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (Vic) (1988) 19 ATR 1213 referred to
Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Mackey (1982) 82 ATC 4571 cited
Trustee of the Balmain Trust v FC of T (1998) 99 ATC 5334 cited
McAndrew v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1956) 98 CLR 263 cited
F. J. Bloemen Proprietary Limited v The Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia (1981) 147 CLR 360 referred to
Webb v Commissioner of Taxation (No 2) (1993) 47 FCR 394 referred to
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia v Richard Walter Pty Limited (1995) 183 CLR 168 cited
Syngenta Crop Protection Pty Ltd (ACN 002 933 717) v Commissioner of Taxation (2005) 61 ATR 186 referred to
Commission of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia v Futuris Corporation Limited (2008) 237 CLR 146 cited
Richardson v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1932) 48 CLR 192 referred to

Handley, Honourable Mr Justice KR, Spencer Bower, Turner and Handley: The Doctrine of Res Judicata (3rd Ed, Butterworths, 1996)
Handley, Honourable Mr Justice KR, “Res Judicata: General Principles and Recent Developments” (1999) 18 Australian Bar Review 214
Pagone, GT, “The Significance of Assessments” (1990) Australian Tax Review 88  

COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION v PHILLIP GRIMALDI, GARRY BONACCORSO, IFTC BROKING SERVICES LTD, MGG CAPITAL PTY LIMITED AS TRUSTEE FOR WEBTEL MANAGEMENT SUPER FUND, JAMES DARROCH WALLACE and JOSEPHINE MARY WALLACE

NSD 407 of 2009

GRAHAM J
27 NOVEMBER 2009
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 407 of 2009

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Details
Case
[2009] FCA 1404
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Commissioner of Taxation, acting through the applicant, sought summary judgment against the fourth respondent for the amount of $25,909,612.54. The dispute arose out of outstanding liabilities that had accumulated as a result of various assessments. The application for summary judgment was brought before the Court on 25 November 2009, with an affidavit sworn by Mr Aris Zafiriou, an Acting Director in the Australian Public Service, stating the exact amount owed by the fourth respondent as of 22 November 2009. The only issue to be determined was whether the applicant was entitled to judgment against the fourth respondent given that there was already a judgment against the first respondent for a similar amount.

The court examined whether the applicant's right to claim against the fourth respondent constituted a different right or cause of action from the one adjudicated against the first respondent. It was noted that while the right or cause of action claimed against the first respondent had passed into judgment and thus lost its independent existence, the same could not be said for the claim against the fourth respondent. The court found that the applicant's right against the fourth respondent remained independent and had not been destroyed. While double recovery by the Commissioner would indeed be oppressive, the court found that this was not the case here, as the applicant had not sought to enforce payment of the full amount due under several notices of assessment. Instead, the court concluded that the Commissioner was entitled to secure separate judgments against different taxpayers for the same income, provided that enforcing payment of the full amount under the various judgments would not result in oppressive double recovery.

The Court granted the application for summary judgment. It ordered that judgment be given in favour of the applicant against the fourth respondent for the sum of $25,909,612.54. Additionally, the fourth respondent was directed to pay the applicant’s costs in respect of the specific prayer for relief in the amended notice of motion.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Judgment be given for the applicant against the fourth respondent in the sum of $25,909,612.54.

2. The fourth respondent pay the applicant’s costs in respect of prayer for relief 6 in the applicant’s amended notice of motion filed 6 October 2009.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

GRAHAM J
Pursuant to an order made on 21 September 2009, an Amended Notice of Motion was filed by the applicant on 6 October 2009 which sought summary judgment for the applicant against the fourth respondent in the amount of $25,561,078.93 together with further general interest charged pursuant to s 204 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) (‘the 1936 Act’), s 298-25 and Part IIA of the Administration Act from 6 October 2009 to payment or judgment. That prayer for relief in the Amended Notice of Motion came before the Court on 25 November 2009. An Acting Director in the Australian Public Service employed in the Debt section of the Australian Taxation Office at Melbourne in the State of Victoria, Mr Aris Zafiriou swore an affidavit on 24 November 2009 in which he deposed to the fourth respondent’s outstanding liabilities totalling $25,909,612.54 at close of business on 22 November 2009. It is in respect of the applicant’s claim against the fourth respondent for that amount that summary judgment is presently sought.The right of the applicant to judgments founded upon concurrent or alternative assessments The quantum of the applicant’s claim is not disputed by the fourth respondent. The only issue tendered for consideration on the present application is whether the applicant is entitled to judgment for the said amount in circumstances where he already has judgment against the first respondent for $36,341,461.73. Whilst the very right or cause of action claimed or put in suit in the claim against the first respondent may have passed into judgment, so that it is merged and no longer has an independent existence, the right or cause of action claimed or put in suit in the applicant’s claim against the fourth respondent is a different right or cause of action. Its independent existence has not been destroyed (cf Chamberlain v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 164 CLR 502 at 510-511). The applicant’s right or cause of action against the fourth respondent has not passed into judgment. It retains its independent existence. Whilst there will inevitably be cases in which it would be oppressive for the Commissioner to seek to enforce payment of the full amount due under a number of notices of assessment issued by the Commissioner on an alternative basis to different taxpayers in respect of the same income, such a possibility does not preclude the Commissioner from securing judgments against different taxpayers in respect of the same income. What would be oppressive would be for the Commissioner to seek to execute such judgments so as to enforce payment of the full amount due under the several judgment debts. Double recovery by the Commissioner would be oppressive (see The Deputy Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia v Moorebank Proprietary Limited (1988) 165 CLR 55 (‘Moorebank’) at 67). A judicial determination directly involving an issue of fact or of law disposes once for all of the issue, so that it cannot afterwards be raised between the same parties or their privies (per Dixon J, as his Honour then was, in Blair v Curran (1939) 62 CLR 464 at 531).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GRAHAM J