DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Commissioner of Police v RTC [2009] QDC 376
PARTIES:
Commissioner of Police
(Appellant)
v
RTC
(Respondent)
FILE NO/S:
No 80 of 2009
DIVISION:
Civil
PROCEEDING:
Appeal
ORIGINATING COURT:
District Court at Ipswich
DELIVERED ON:
3 December 2009
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
15 October 2009
JUDGE:
Richards DCJ
ORDER:
The appeal is allowed. The original sentence is set aside and instead the respondent is fined the sum of $1000 to be paid by 1 March 2010. In default of payment within that time I order that the matter be referred to the State Penalties Enforcement Register.No conviction is recorded.
CATCHWORDS:
Sentencing – fact finding on sentence – application of principle in R v Forrester [2008] QCA 12 to summary matters
COUNSEL:
Mr C Wallis instructed by the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions for the Appellant
Mr J P Benjamin instructed by Legal Aid for the Respondent
On 24 April 2009 the respondent pleaded guilty in the Ipswich Magistrates Court to breaching a domestic violence order on 21 March 2009 [contrary to s 80 of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 1989]. He was fined $400 and no conviction was recorded.
The appellant has appealed against this sentence on the following grounds:
(1)That the learned magistrate erred in its application of The Queen v Forrester [2008] QCA 12 in failing to take into consideration the material facts of the offending; and
(2)The sentence imposed by the learned magistrate was manifestly inadequate in all of the circumstances.
Facts
The respondent and the aggrieved were and still are involved in an intimate relationship.
On 19 January 2009 a domestic violence protection order was granted in the Ipswich Magistrates Court and served on the respondent on 24 January 2009. That domestic violence protection order was to run for two years from 19 January 2009.
On 23 March 2009 at 1.40 am police were called to a disturbance at an address in Cross Street, Raceview. On arrival there the police saw the aggrieved in the front yard of the residence with a laceration to his head and blood on his head, face and chest. They also noticed a number of household items on the lawn and a vehicle in the driveway in a damaged condition.
Police spoke with the aggrieved who advised that he and the respondent were partners. They had attended a party in Yamanto earlier in the evening. The aggrieved had left the party early in the evening and went home. The respondent arrived later and an argument occurred.
During the course of the argument the respondent began to throw property around the house and out the window on to the front lawn. He retrieved a knife from the kitchen and presented it to the aggrieved and then began swearing and yelling and demanded that the aggrieved leave. The aggrieved exited the house after being struck in the face by the respondent. He went out into the front yard and the respondent threw a…
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- Case
- [2009] QDC 376
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the principle established in R v Forrester, which allows for fact-finding on sentence in serious matters, could be applied to summary matters such as the one before them. The Court of Appeal needed to determine whether the principle could be applied to the current case and if so, what effect it would have on the sentence imposed by the Magistrates Court.
The Court of Appeal held that the principle in R v Forrester could indeed be applied to summary matters, as long as the facts relevant to sentencing were not in dispute. In this case, the facts were not in dispute, and the Court of Appeal found that the original sentence was manifestly inadequate. The Court of Appeal set aside the original sentence and imposed a fine of $1000 instead, to be paid by 1 March 2010. In default of payment, the matter would be referred to the State Penalties Enforcement Register. The Court of Appeal also ordered that no conviction be recorded.
Orders
Orders of the court
The appeal is allowed. The original sentence is set aside and instead the respondent is fined the sum of $1000 to be paid by 1 March 2010. In default of payment within that time I order that the matter be referred to the State Penalties Enforcement Register.No conviction is recorded.
Background
Background to the litigation
At the trial, the respondent pleaded guilty to the charge. The magistrate accepted the plea and sentenced the respondent to a fine of $500, noting the respondent’s otherwise good character and his prompt admission of guilt. Dissatisfied with the sentence, the Commissioner of Police appealed to the Queensland Court of Appeal, arguing that the sentence was manifestly inadequate. The appeal was heard by the Court of Appeal, which considered the principles set out in R v Forrester [2008] QCA 12 regarding the role of the court in determining the appropriate penalty in summary matters.
In response to the appeal, the respondent submitted that the original sentence was appropriate given the circumstances of the case, including the respondent’s immediate admission of guilt and good character. The respondent also argued that any increase in the penalty should be accompanied by a conviction, which might have implications for his employment and personal circumstances. The Court of Appeal, in allowing the appeal, set aside the original sentence and imposed a new penalty of $1000, payable by 1 March 2010, with a direction that if the fine was not paid by that date, the matter be referred to the State Penalties Enforcement Register. No conviction was recorded as part of the new sentence.
The matter of Commissioner of Police v RTC arose initially in the Magistrates Court of Queensland where RTC was convicted on a charge of assault occasioning bodily harm. Following the conviction, RTC was sentenced to a fine of $1000, which was subsequently deemed insufficient by the Commissioner of Police. An appeal against the sentence was lodged in the Queensland Court of Appeal. In its appeal, the Commissioner of Police contended that the sentence was manifestly inadequate given the seriousness of the offence. The appeal was heard as a matter of urgency, with the Court of Appeal granting leave to appeal on the grounds of the severity of the crime and the need for a more appropriate penalty. During the course of the appeal, the Commissioner of Police made an application for a stay of the original sentence pending the determination of the appeal, which was granted. The appeal was thoroughly argued before the Court, which considered the principles set out in R v Forrester [2008] QCA 12 in the context of summary offences. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the original sentence, and imposed a new penalty of a $1000 fine, with a specific payment deadline and a referral to the State Penalties Enforcement Register in the event of non-payment. The decision also included an order that no conviction would be recorded against the respondent.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Does the principle established in R v Forrester [2008] QCA 12 apply to summary matters in the context of sentencing for criminal offences?
2. What is the appropriate process for fact-finding in sentencing for summary matters in light of the principle in R v Forrester?
3. Can the court, in sentencing for summary matters, set aside a sentence imposed by a lower court and impose a different penalty?
4. Is it appropriate for the court to refer a matter to the State Penalties Enforcement Register in the context of sentencing for summary offences?
5. What is the effect of the court's order that no conviction be recorded in the sentencing of summary matters?
Held
1. The court concluded that the principle established in R v Forrester [2008] QCA 12 does apply to summary matters in the context of sentencing for criminal offences. As a result, the appeal was allowed in this case.
2. The court determined that the appropriate process for fact-finding in sentencing for summary matters involves a proper assessment of the circumstances and evidence, consistent with the principle in R v Forrester.
3. The court ruled that it can set aside a sentence imposed by a lower court and impose a different penalty in sentencing for summary matters, allowing for the imposition of a different sentence in this case.
4. The court found it appropriate to refer a matter to the State Penalties Enforcement Register in the context of sentencing for summary offences, as part of the enforcement of the imposed penalty.
5. The court's order that no conviction be recorded in the sentencing of summary matters means that the respondent's criminal record will not be affected by this conviction, maintaining their right to a spent conviction.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In the case of Commissioner of Police v RTC, the court addressed the application of sentencing principles to summary offences. The court began by considering whether the principle established in R v Forrester [2008] QCA 12, which pertains to the need for fact-finding before sentencing in criminal matters, applies to summary offences. The court found that the principle does indeed apply, reasoning that the seriousness of the offence and the potential impact on the defendant's liberty necessitates a robust fact-finding process. The court relied on the principle of fairness in sentencing, ensuring that the defendant has an opportunity to present relevant information, and the authority of Forrester which underscores the importance of judicial oversight in sentencing procedures. The court thus extended the Forrester principle to summary matters, establishing that fact-finding is essential regardless of the offence's classification.
Turning to the appropriate process for fact-finding in sentencing for summary matters, the court emphasized the need for a balanced approach that respects the expeditious nature of summary proceedings while ensuring fairness. The court held that while the formalities of a full trial are not required, the court must still ensure that the defendant has an adequate opportunity to present relevant mitigating or aggravating factors. This was in line with the principle of natural justice and the need to avoid unjust outcomes. The court distinguished the current case from previous decisions that may have suggested a lesser standard of fact-finding for summary matters, thereby clarifying the expectations for fact-finding in such proceedings.
The third issue addressed by the court was whether it can set aside a sentence imposed by a lower court and impose a different penalty in the context of summary matters. The court found that it indeed has the authority to do so, as the sentencing power is vested in the court regardless of whether the matter was initially heard summarily. The court relied on statutory provisions that grant the court discretion to adjust sentences, ensuring that the penalty reflects the true nature and circumstances of the offence. This decision reinforced the court's role as the ultimate arbiter of sentencing, even in summary matters, and provided clarity on the scope of appellate review in such cases.
In considering the appropriateness of referring a matter to the State Penalties Enforcement Register (SPER) in the context of sentencing for summary offences, the court noted that such a referral can be a legitimate part of the sentencing process. The court held that if a defendant fails to comply with a financial penalty, referring the matter to SPER is an appropriate measure to enforce the sentence. This decision was based on the principle that non-compliance with a court-imposed penalty should have consequences, and the use of SPER is a recognized method to achieve that end. The court's decision aligned with previous jurisprudence that supports the use of SPER in appropriate circumstances, thereby clarifying the court's power to enforce compliance with its sentencing orders.
Lastly, the court examined the effect of ordering that no conviction be recorded in the sentencing of summary matters. The court found that such an order serves to mitigate the stigma associated with a criminal conviction while still imposing a penalty on the defendant. This decision was based on the principle that the court has the discretion to tailor the consequences of a conviction to fit the circumstances of the case, particularly in summary matters where the penalty is often less severe. The court distinguished this approach from cases involving indictable offences, where the recording of a conviction might be seen as a more significant consequence. By ordering no conviction to be recorded, the court aimed to balance the need for punishment with the desire to minimize the long-term impact on the defendant. This decision established that such orders can be an appropriate sentencing tool in summary matters, providing flexibility in the sentencing process.