[2004] HCATrans 409
IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Perth No P31 of 2004
B e t w e e n -
COMMISSIONER OF MAIN ROADS
Appellant
and
LLOYD RUSSELL JONES
Respondent
GLEESON CJ
McHUGH J
GUMMOW J
HAYNE J
CALLINAN J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT PERTH ON TUESDAY, 26 OCTOBER 2004, AT 10.00 AM
(Continued from 25/10/04)
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
GLEESON CJ: Yes, Mr Walker.
MR WALKER: Your Honours, can I answer some matters raised yesterday. Your Honour Justice Callinan asked about the provisions regulating the appeal. We have put together a further book of authorities, which has been supplied this morning. I can go through it quickly. In the District Court of Western Australia Act 1969 (WA), section 79 permits an appeal. Section 79(2) assimilates that to the position of an appeal from a judge of the Supreme Court to the Full Court of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA) in section 58 grants what is called jurisdiction to hear an appeal in 58(1)(b) “from a Judge”.
There is a somewhat tantalising reference in section 59(4) which assimilates the power upon the hearing of an application for a new trial to the position in relation to the powers possessed by the Full Court to those which are possessed upon the hearing of an appeal. It then goes on to give specific powers which certainly are suggestive of an appeal by way of rehearing. On the other hand, it is tantalising because those are given in a phrase introduced by the word “and”. It is not clear whether that is meant to be cumulative or repetitive. But the matter is put beyond any doubt by the Rules of the Supreme Court, Order 63, rule 10(1) and (2) make it clear that what has become known as an appeal by way of rehearing as opposed to an appeal in the strict sense is the nature of the procedure in the Full Court, with the consequences that we conceded at the outset of our address yesterday.
Your Honour the Chief Justice asked a question which, in one sense, is based upon or raises, I should say, for consideration the nature of the evidence referred to by Justice Steytler in paragraph 106 at page 623, volume 3 of the appeal book, where the sentence reads:
On the evidence of the local residents, a speed limit of 110 kilometres per hour was far too high in the area between Rocky Creek and Mabel Spring Creek and one of 80 kilometres per hour should, in my opinion, have been imposed in that area.
That conflates a number of matters, but principally the value judgment of Justice Steytler himself. The evidence of the local residents does not include any specific animadversion to the question of a sign, in particular, the evidence in volume 1 of the appeal book from Mr Chulung at 67, line 39 to 68, line 7; Mr Hobbs 97, lines 6…
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- Case
- [2004] HCATrans 409
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court was required to determine whether the Commissioner owed a duty of care to road users in relation to the design and construction of roads, and if so, whether that duty had been breached in the circumstances of this case. Specifically, the court considered whether the median strip constituted a dangerous or hazardous feature of the road, and whether the Commissioner had taken reasonable steps to mitigate any foreseeable risks associated with its presence.
The court held that the Commissioner, as the authority responsible for the construction and maintenance of public roads, owed a duty of care to road users to ensure that roads were designed and constructed with reasonable safety. However, the court found that the median strip, in this instance, was not inherently dangerous and that its design and construction were not negligent. The court reasoned that the Commissioner was entitled to construct roads with median strips for traffic management purposes, and that the presence of such a feature did not automatically render the road unsafe. The court applied the principles of negligence, focusing on the foreseeability of harm and the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct in the circumstances.
The appeal was allowed, and the judgment of the Supreme Court of Queensland was set aside.
Orders
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Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
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