HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Barwick C.J., McTiernan, Kitto, Menzies and Windeyer JJ.
COMMISSIONER FOR MOTOR TRANSPORT v. TERRY
8 March 1968
Small Debts Courts (N.S.W.)
Small Debts Courts (N.S.W.)—Jurisdiction—Exclusion of matter relating to "taking of any duty to Her Majesty"—Charges payable as condition of public motor vehicle licence—Non-payment—Action to recover—Jurisdiction to entertain—State Transport (Co-ordination) Act, 1931-1956 (N.S.W.), ss. 18(5), 37, 39 (1)*—Small Debts Recovery Act, 1912-1961 (N.S.W.), s. 11 (1).**
Decisions
1968, March 8.
The following written judgments were delivered : -
BARWICK C.J. During the months of February and March 1963, according to the particulars of claim filed by the appellant in the Small Debts Court at Redfern, New South Wales, the first-named respondent to this appeal was the licensee under the provisions of the State Transport (Co-ordination) Act, 1931-1956 (N.S.W.) (the Act) of a public motor vehicle which he operated from Brookvale to Muswellbrook in that State carrying goods for more than fifty miles of the journey in competition with the government railways. A condition of his licence to operate such vehicle was claimed to be that he should pay to the appellant the sum of threepence per ton, or part thereof, of the aggregate of the weight of the vehicle unladen, and of the weight of loading the vehicle is capable of carrying for each and every mile, or part thereof, travelled by the vehicle along a public street on a journey wholly or partly competitive with the railways. (at p276)
2. The appellant issued out of the said Small Debts Court a default summons claiming that the respondent was indebted to him in the sum of sixty-five pounds and threepence (65 Pounds 0s. 3d.) in accordance with the said condition of the licence, being an amount calculated at the said rate per ton mile in respect of journeys by the said vehicle during the said months of February and March. (at p276)
3. The respondent challenged the jurisdiction of the Small Debts Court to entertain an action for recovery of the amounts payable to the Commissioner under the terms of the licence, upon the ground that the exaction of such amouns under the licence constituted the taking of a duty to the Crown within the meaning of s. 11 (1) of the Small Debts Recovery Act, 1912-1961 (N.S.W.), and that therefore the action commenced by the default summons related to such taking. The magistrate decided that he had jurisdiction to hear the action, whereupon the respondent sought of the Supreme Court of New South Wales a writ of prohibition to restrain the magistrate from proceeding upon the default summons. The Supreme Court, Court of Appeal Division, by majority granted the writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court was unanimous in the view that the amounts payable under the condition of the licence were duties due to the Crown within the meaning of the Small Debts Recovery Act. A majority of that Court further held that the provision of s. 39 (1) of the…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Commissioner for Railways v Bain and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [1968] HCA 5
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the damages awarded to Mr Bain were demonstrably excessive, thereby warranting appellate intervention. This required the court to consider the principles governing the assessment of damages for personal injury, particularly in the context of a jury's verdict, and to determine if the jury had applied an erroneous principle or awarded an amount that no reasonable jury, properly instructed, could have reached.
The High Court, in dismissing the appeal, affirmed that an appellate court should be slow to interfere with a jury's assessment of damages unless it is clear that the jury has acted on a wrong principle or that the amount awarded is so unreasonable as to be wholly unsupported by the evidence. The court found no evidence that the jury had misdirected themselves or that their award was so disproportionate to the injuries sustained and their consequences as to be perverse. The principles of assessing damages for pain and suffering, loss of amenity, and economic loss were considered, and the court concluded that the jury's findings on these matters were within the bounds of reasonable assessment.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Full text does not contain this section.