Commissioner for Consumer Affairs v Piantadosi

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Full Court: Civil)

COMMISSIONER FOR CONSUMER AFFAIRS v PIANTADOSI & ANOR

[2018] SASCFC 109

Judgment of The Full Court

(The Honourable Justice Peek, The Honourable Justice Stanley and The Honourable Justice Hinton)

23 October 2018

TRADE AND COMMERCE - COMPETITION, FAIR TRADING AND CONSUMER PROTECTION LEGISLATION

PROFESSIONS AND TRADES - AUCTIONEERS AND AGENTS - CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTORY PROVISIONS - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - CONTROL OF MONEY

Appeal against a judgment of a District Court judge reversing a determination by the Commissioner for Consumer Affairs (the Commissioner) to reject a claim for $200,000 compensation from the agents’ indemnity fund under s 30 of the Land Agents Act 1984 (SA) (the Act).

The respondents were advised by officers and employees of the Charterhill Group to invest in residential real estate and determined to purchase a property in Melbourne. The purchase price of the property was $545,000. The respondents were directed to pay $54,500 to Nova by way of a holding deposit.  The respondents elected to make the payment to an interest bearing account which was in the name of LSI.  It was proposed by Charterhill that the respondents would contribute a further $200,000 from their superannuation fund to meet the purchase price. The respondents were advised the interest earned would be applied to the property.  Acting on this advice, the respondents paid the sum of $200,000 to the LSI account. The respondents executed the land sale contract. Subsequently, the $254,500 was misappropriated. The respondents made a claim on the indemnity fund for their loss. 

The Commissioner allowed the respondents’ claim in respect of the $54,500 paid as a holding deposit, but rejected their claim in respect of the $200,000 on the ground that the payment of $200,000 was made so the respondents could earn interest on that money. The payment was voluntary not mandatory. The $200,000 was not received by Nova / LSI while acting as an agent and, therefore, was not trust money as defined by s 12 of the Act.

The judge allowed the appeal on the ground that the $200,000 was received by the putative agent on trust for the purchase of real estate. Central to the reasoning of the Commissioner and the judge was the Full Court’s judgment in Commissioner for Consumer Affairs v McMurray (2017) 128 SASR 1.

The Commissioner appeals against the judge’s allowance of the appeal.

Held, per Stanley J (Peek and Hinton JJ concurring): Appeal dismissed.

1.  The $200,000 was received pursuant to the only contractual relationship that existed between the respondents and Nova/LSI which was solely concerned with the purchase of the property.

2. There is nothing in the text, context or purpose of s 30 and the relevant definitional provisions in the Act which requires that to satisfy the definition of trust money the money must be received by an agent acting as an agent pursuant to some mandatory obligation.

3.  The $200,000 was being held by Nova/LSI on trust awaiting settlement of that contemplated purchase. That…

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Details
Case
[2018] SASCFC 109
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia heard an appeal concerning a claim for compensation by the respondents against the Commissioner for Consumer Affairs. The dispute arose from the respondents' loss of $200,000, which they alleged was due to the fiduciary default of an agent. The Commissioner had initially rejected the claim, but following a relevant court decision, the claim was re-determined and again rejected, leading to the appeal.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the $200,000 was received by Nova/LSI while acting as an agent within the meaning of the relevant Act. This required the court to determine if the funds were received in the course of a business that involved selling or purchasing land on behalf of others, or conducting negotiations for that purpose, and if the agent was not wholly entitled to the money. The court also had to consider the distinction between the facts of this case and a previous decision in *McMurray*.

The court reasoned that the definition of an agent under the Act should be construed broadly, consistent with the beneficial purpose of the indemnity scheme. The touchstone for being an agent was whether money was received in the course of a business that involved dealing with land or conducting negotiations for that purpose, and the agent was not wholly entitled to the money. The court distinguished the present case from *McMurray*, noting the absence of a specific "Deposit Investment letter" unequivocally assigning the $200,000 as a loan for a fixed term or for security purposes. Unlike in *McMurray*, there was no fixed term for the advance or an option for renewal, and it was not established that the respondents could have requested the return of the funds for alternative investment. The court concluded that the $200,000 deposit was impressed with a trust, earmarking it for the purchase of the subject property, and was not designated as a loan.

The court allowed the appeal, finding that the $200,000 was received by the agent in the course of carrying on a business that involved dealing with land on behalf of others. The circumstances amounted to a fiduciary default by an agent, as the money was applied in part performance of the covenant to purchase and settle the property.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

PEEK J (dissent) STANLEY J (dissent)
The proceedings before the judge in this case took an unusual course. After the Commissioner had determined to reject the respondents’ claim for compensation for its loss of the $200,000, the Full Court delivered judgment in McMurray. In response, the Commissioner sought to re-determine the claim. On re-determination, he confirmed the rejection of the respondents’ claim. The parties proceeded before the judge on the basis that the appeal was against the re‑determination. The judge allowed the appeal, distinguishing the facts of this case from McMurray. The judge reasoned:[9][9] Piantadosi v Commissioner for Consumer Affairs [2018] SADC 9 at [29]-[35].As Blue J explains, whether an agent is ‘dealing with land on behalf of others’ turns ‘on the construction of the contracts between the parties’. The relevant contracts in McMurray were comprised or evidenced by the Expression of Interest, the Deposit Instrument letter, a Certificate of Deposit and a Receipt for the deposit of $38,900. The Expression of Interest was characterised in McMurray as ‘exclusively a land transaction’, limited to a ‘holding deposit of $38,900. In the result the court concluded:[69]The Judge erred in holding that there was a single transaction involving a single sum of $145,000 received by Nova in its capacity as a land agent as a deposit on a contract for the purchase of land. On the true construction of the contracts between the parties, there were two separate transactions: $38,900 was received by Nova in the capacity as a land agent as a deposit on a contract for the purchase of land and $106,100 was received by LSI as a loan by way of term deposit by the Superannuation Fund. The Court in McMurray further held the ‘that balance of the purchase price at settlement’ was not ‘money received by an agent when acting as an agent i.e. dealing with the land on behalf of others.’The situation here is not on all fours with McMurray. Most importantly, there was no ‘Deposit Investment letter’ unequivocally assigning the $200,000 advance as a loan for a fixed term, and there was no ‘Certificate of Deposit’ designating it was for ‘security purposes’. Although this deposit attracted a favourable interest rate, the same rate applied equally to the deposit of $54,500, which as observed earlier was the situation in McMurray. Unlike McMurray there was no fixed term for the advance and no option for renewal. It is not established that the Piantadosis could have requested the return of the $200,000 for ‘an alternative investment with a financial institution of their choosing …’ as it was in McMurray. On the other hand it appears clear enough that this sum would become refundable to them on the contingency that the contract did not proceed.Otherwise the circumstances coincide: ‘the two components … were payable at two different times’; ‘the initial deposit was “mandatory” whereas the “deposit” of $200,000 was “voluntary” under the contracts of sale, and the Piantadosis understood the $200,000 would be applied to the “Travancore Property”’, a consideration of itself ‘incapable of leading to a different construction of the contract(s)’.Conclusion and ordersThe position here is that the $200,000 deposit was impressed with a trust earmarking it as money to be applied solely to the purchase of the subject property for so long as it remained deposited into the agent’s account. It was not designated as a loan either for a fixed period or for security purposes. On that view of matters the circumstances amount to ‘fiduciary default’ by an agent carrying on business dealing with land, because the $200,000 was applied in part performance of the covenant to purchase and settle contained in the agreement of sale and because that payment is only referable to the contract of sale itself. In McMurray the advance was referable to a separate loan agreement. Nevertheless McMurray remains binding authority for the proposition that when the contractual arrangements between the parties for the payment of monies are properly understood as amounting to loans or investments, that situation does not amount to dealing with land on behalf of others by an agent when acting as an agent. That was not the situation here for the reasons articulated above.[Footnotes omitted.]Submissions on appeal

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by:

The respondent submits that the principal issue in the case was whether the $200,000 was received by Nova/LSI when acting as an agent. The respondent submits that this question is to be answered by reference to the broad definition of agent in s 4 of the Act which relevantly provides that a person is an agent if a person carries on a business that consists of or involves selling or purchasing or otherwise dealing with land on behalf of others or conducting negotiations for that purpose. In this case the only basis upon which the $200,000 was received by Nova was for the purpose of Nova carrying on a business that consisted of or involved the purchasing of the Travancore property on behalf of the respondents. Accordingly, the respondents’ claim for compensation for the fiduciary default of the $200,000 had to be allowed under the Act. The judge was correct on the distinction between the facts of this case and McMurray. Further, the passage in the judge’s reasons where he observed that it was not established that the respondents could have requested the return of the $200,000 for an alternative investment with a financial institution of their choosing, as was the case in McMurray, did not involve reversing the onus of proof. Consideration The right to compensation for pecuniary loss as a result of a fiduciary default by a land agent is statutory. Claims can only be made on the indemnity fund for the misappropriation of “trust money”. “Trust money” in relation to an agent means money that is received by the agent when acting as an agent and to which the agent is not wholly entitled in law and in equity. A person is an agent if he or she carries on a business that consists of or involves selling or purchasing or otherwise dealing with land on behalf of others, or conducting negotiations for that purpose. The relevant provisions of the Act are to be construed in accordance with their text, context and purpose. The purpose of s 30 is beneficial. It should be afforded a broad, liberal construction.[10] The definition of an agent is in wide terms reflecting the beneficial purpose of the indemnity scheme established by the Act. At issue is whether the putative agent has received the money in the course of carrying on a business that consists of or involves selling or purchasing or otherwise dealing with land on behalf of others, or conducting negotiations for that purpose, and the agent is not wholly entitled to the money in law and in equity. The touchstone of the definition of an agent is whether the person receives money in the course of a business that either consists of or involves dealing with land or conducting negotiations for that purpose. It can be seen that a person can be an agent notwithstanding he or she is not conducting a business solely for the purpose of selling or purchasing or otherwise dealing with land, so long as the business being conducted merely involves dealing with land or conducting negotiations for the purpose of selling, purchasing or otherwise dealing with land on behalf of others. [10] IW v City of Perth [1997] HCA 30, (1997) 191 CLR 1 at 12.