SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Comgroup Supplies Pty Ltd v Products for Industry Pty Ltd & Anor [2016] QCA 88
PARTIES:
COMGROUP SUPPLIES PTY LIMITED
ACN 008 732 465
(applicant)v
PRODUCTS FOR INDUSTRY PTY LTD
ACN 111 733 576
(first respondent)GAVIN DUNWOODIE
(second respondent)FILE NO/S:
Appeal No 1983 of 2015
DC No 3538 of 2012DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
Application for Leave s 118 DCA (Civil)
Application for Extension of Time s 118 DCA (Civil)ORIGINATING COURT:
District Court at Brisbane – [2014] QDC 293DELIVERED ON:
8 April 2016
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
24 August 2015
JUDGES:
Margaret McMurdo P and Atkinson and Mullins JJ
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the orders madeORDERS:
1. Application for leave to appeal the decision made by the District Court on 19 December 2014 refused.
2. Application for an extension of time to appeal refused.
3. Application for leave to amend the application for leave to appeal refused.
4. Unless the applicant files submissions on costs in accordance with paragraph 52(4) of Practice Direction 3 of 2013 within 14 days, with any response by the respondents with seven days of receipt of those submissions, the applicant is to pay the respondents’ costs of the applications.
CATCHWORDS:
EQUITY – TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES – IMPLIED TRUSTS – CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS – KNOWING RECEIPT – where an employee of the applicant induced the first respondent, through its managing director, the second respondent, to invoice the applicant for work done by a company owned and controlled by the employee – where in fact no such work had been performed by the employee’s company and the invoices were a fabrication – where the applicant submitted that the issue of the fictitious invoices by the respondents constituted knowing assistance of the employee – where the applicant submitted that the respondents knowingly received the proceeds of payment of the invoices – whether the respondents’ held the kind of knowledge necessary to be found accessorily liable for the employee’s breach of fiduciary duty
EQUITY – GENERAL PRINCIPLES – MISTAKE RECOVERY OF MONEY PAID OR EXPENDED – MONEY PAID BY MISTAKE – MISTAKE OF FACT – where the applicant paid money to the first respondent under an operative mistake of fact – where the respondents entered into the arrangement with the applicant’s employee in good faith – where the respondents would be placed in a worse position if ordered to make restitution of payments that it had passed on to the employee’s company than if it had not received payments from the applicant at all – whether the respondents could rely on a change of position defence to a claim by the applicant for restitution
APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – PROCEDURE – QUEENSLAND – WHEN APPEAL LIES – FROM DISTRICT COURT – BY LEAVE OF COURT – where the proposed appeal does not raise any significant questions of law but rather the application of well-established principles of law…
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- Case
- [2016] QCA 88
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the Court of Appeal were whether Products for Industry and Mr Dunwoodie were liable for knowing receipt, whether they could rely on a change of position defence to a claim for restitution, and whether leave to appeal should be granted. The Court of Appeal found that Products for Industry and Mr Dunwoodie were not liable for knowing receipt as there was no evidence that they had the requisite knowledge to be found accessorily liable for Soldini's breach of fiduciary duty. The court also held that Products for Industry and Mr Dunwoodie could rely on a change of position defence to a claim for restitution as they had entered into the arrangement with Soldini in good faith and would be placed in a worse position if ordered to make restitution of payments that they had passed on to Soldini's company than if they had not received payments from Comgroup at all. The Court of Appeal held that leave to appeal should not be granted as the proposed appeal did not raise any significant questions of law but rather the application of well-established principles of law to the facts.
The Court of Appeal refused Comgroup's application for leave to appeal the decision made by the District Court on 19 December 2014, as well as its application for an extension of time to appeal and its application for leave to amend the application for leave to appeal. The Court of Appeal ordered that unless Comgroup filed submissions on costs in accordance with Practice Direction 3 of 2013 within 14 days, it was to pay the respondents' costs of the applications.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Application for leave to appeal the decision made by the District Court on 19 December 2014 refused.
2. Application for an extension of time to appeal refused.
3. Application for leave to amend the application for leave to appeal refused.
4. Unless the applicant files submissions on costs in accordance with paragraph 52(4) of Practice Direction 3 of 2013 within 14 days, with any response by the respondents with seven days of receipt of those submissions, the applicant is to pay the respondents’ costs of the applications.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court addressed the issue of whether the respondents knowingly received the proceeds of payment of the invoices and held the kind of knowledge necessary to be found accessorily liable for the employee’s breach of fiduciary duty. The court found that the trial judge was not persuaded on the evidence that Mr Dunwoodie ought to have known that Mr Soldini’s conduct was in breach of his fiduciary duty to Comgroup or that a reasonable person would conclude that there was impropriety in Mr Soldini’s conduct. The court considered the evidence and the trial judge’s findings of fact and concluded that the respondents were not knowingly involved in Mr Soldini’s fraud. Therefore, the court dismissed the claim for knowing assistance/knowing receipt.
The court then addressed the issue of whether the respondents could rely on a change of position defence to a claim by the applicant for restitution. The court found that the respondents would be placed in a worse position if ordered to make restitution of payments that it had passed on to the employee’s company than if it had not received payments from the applicant at all. The court held that the respondents could not rely on a change of position defence and dismissed the claim for restitution.
Lastly, the court addressed the issue of whether leave to appeal should be granted from the District Court by leave of court. The court considered the nature of the appeal and the application of well-established principles of law to the facts. The court concluded that the proposed appeal did not raise any significant questions of law and that leave to appeal should not be granted. The court referred to prior authority and distinguished the case from other decisions where leave to appeal had been granted.
In summary, the court applied the legal principles of knowing receipt and change of position defence to the facts of the case and concluded that the respondents were not accessorily liable for the employee’s breach of fiduciary duty and could not rely on a change of position defence. The ratio decidendi of the decision is that a party cannot be found accessorily liable for the breach of fiduciary duty of another party if they did not have the necessary knowledge of the breach and cannot rely on a change of position defence if they would be placed in a worse position if ordered to make restitution.