[2005] HCATrans 633
IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No S359 of 2005
B e t w e e n -
GREG COMBET
First Plaintiff
NICOLA ROXON MP
Second Plaintiff
and
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
First Defendant
THE HONOURABLE KEVIN ANDREWS MP
Second Defendant
SENATOR THE HONOURABLE NICHOLAS MINCHIN
Third Defendant
GLEESON CJ
McHUGH J
GUMMOW J
KIRBY J
HAYNE J
CALLINAN J
HEYDON J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON MONDAY, 29 AUGUST 2005, AT 10.17 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
__________________
MR S.J. GAGELER, SC: If the Court pleases, I appear with MR J.K. KIRK for the plaintiffs. (instructed by Maurice Blackburn Cashman)
MR D.M.J. BENNETT, QC, Solicitor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia: If your Honours please, I appear with my learned friends, MR S.B. LLOYD and MS K.J. GRAHAM, for the defendants. (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)
MR R.J. MEADOWS, QC, Solicitor-General for the State of Western Australia: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MS J.C. PRITCHARD, for the Attorney‑General for Western Australia intervening. (instructed by Crown Solicitor’s Office Western Australia)
GLEESON CJ: Mr Gageler.
MR GAGELER: Your Honours, we propose to deal with three matters of context before turning to the relevant provisions of the Appropriation Act (No 1) and the portfolio budget statement.
KIRBY J: Will you show us that Act at an early stage. I do not think I have ever looked at an Appropriation Act before.
MR GAGELER: If your Honour can trust me, it is better if I do not and if I give your Honour the context before I come to that Act. It will mean I do it once rather than twice.
KIRBY J: I trust you then, Mr Gageler.
MR GAGELER: Yes, your Honour, thank you.
KIRBY J: So far.
MR GAGELER: I hope I continue to warrant your Honour’s trust. The first matter of context is the constitutional context. The second is the statutory context created by two Acts. One is the Charter of Budget Honesty Act 1998; the other is the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997. The third matter of context is Commonwealth parliamentary practice. Going first to the Constitution, the centrally relevant provisions are of course ‑ ‑ ‑
KIRBY J: By Commonwealth practice do you mean the practice of the
Federal Parliament or practice throughout the Commonwealth of Nations?
MR GAGELER: I meant Commonwealth parliamentary practice, that is, the practice of the Federal Commonwealth Parliament.
KIRBY J: It appears in section 1 or 2 of the Constitution as to the Federal Parliament.
MR GAGELER: Yes. I will note that, your Honour. Section 81, on one view creates, and on another view mandates the existence of the consolidated revenue fund which is to be appropriated for the purposes of the Commonwealth in the manner imposed by this Constitution. Section 83 then, in language borrowed from Article 1, section 9, clause 7 of the United States Constitution provides that:
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- Case
- [2005] HCATrans 633
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the Minister's decisions to refuse the visa applications were vitiated by apprehended bias. This required the Court to consider the test for apprehended bias in Australian administrative law, specifically whether a reasonable apprehension could arise that the Minister might not have brought an impartial mind to the decision-making process, given his previous public pronouncements on the issue of asylum seekers. The Court also had to determine whether the Minister's conduct, as alleged by the applicants, demonstrated such bias as to render the decisions legally invalid.
The High Court, by majority, dismissed the applicants' claims. The majority of the Court held that the test for apprehended bias requires an examination of whether a fair-minded lay observer, possessing all the relevant information, would apprehend that the decision-maker might not bring an impartial mind to the particular question. The Court found that while the Minister had made strong public statements regarding asylum seekers, these statements did not demonstrate that he had prejudged the specific cases before him or that he would be unable to consider the applications impartially. The statements were considered to be expressions of government policy and general views, rather than a predetermination of the individual merits of the applicants' cases. The Court emphasised that a decision-maker is not disqualified from hearing a matter simply because they hold strong views on the general subject matter, provided they remain open to considering the evidence and arguments presented in the specific case.
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