[2005] HCATrans 650
IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No S359 of 2005
B e t w e e n -
GREG COMBET
First Plaintiff
NICOLA ROXON MP
Second Plaintiff
and
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
First Defendant
THE HONOURABLE KEVIN ANDREWS MP
Second Defendant
SENATOR THE HONOURABLE NICHOLAS MINCHIN
Third Defendant
GLEESON CJ
McHUGH J
GUMMOW J
KIRBY J
HAYNE J
CALLINAN J
HEYDON J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON TUESDAY, 30 AUGUST 2005, AT 10.16 AM
(Continued from 29/8/05)
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
__________________
GLEESON CJ: Yes, Mr Solicitor.
MR BENNETT: If the Court pleases. Your Honours, the balance of my submissions today will be divided into a number of sections. There are three major areas. The first is finishing my submissions that the expenditure is within the appropriation. The second area is the constitutional framework, particularly the particular reference to the judgment of Justice Jacobs in Victoria v The Commonwealth and to section 97 of the Constitution and that leads into submissions about relief, of the impracticality of granting relief in this type of case and then the third, much shorter area will be standing.
In relation to the first of those areas, my submissions will be divided into three subsections. The first deals with the Appropriation Act, the second deals with the portfolio budget statement and the third deals with the balance of my arguments that I started yesterday in the supplementary submissions as to why this type of expenditure falls squarely within the proposed outcome and, indeed, some of the outputs.
I start then with the Appropriation Act which is set out at page 393 of volume 2 of the special case book. The starting point is the definitions of “administered items” and “departmental items” because that becomes crucial when one examines the effect
of the Act. Your Honours will see, on page 451, a part of Schedule 1 setting out the outcomes in relation to the Department of Employment and Workplace Relations and your Honours see there are two headings, “Departmental Outputs” and “Administered Expenses”.
“administered item” is defined in section 3 at page 394 as:
an amount set out in Schedule 1 opposite an outcome . . . under the heading “administered Expenses”.
So, turning back to page 451, the relevant administered item is the amount of 90,559, $90.5 million.
KIRBY J: Where is “administered item” referred to on 451?
MR BENNETT: It is not, your Honour. If your Honour goes to the definition on page 394 ‑ ‑ ‑
KIRBY J: Yes, I have that but what does the definition refer to?
MR BENNETT: It refers to Schedule 1. Page 451 is part of Schedule 1 and it is an amount set out in that schedule opposite an outcome under the heading, “Administered Expenses”. So the three administered items ‑ ‑ ‑
KIRBY J: But where is the heading, “Administered Expenses”?
MR BENNETT: If your Honour sees at 451 at line 12, two-thirds of the…
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- Case
- [2005] HCATrans 650
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the impugned provisions of the *Migration Act* and *Migration Regulations* were invalid for impermissibly encroaching upon the implied constitutional freedom of political communication. Specifically, the applicants argued that these provisions, by limiting their ability to make certain claims and present evidence in support of their protection visa applications, unduly burdened their capacity to engage in political communication concerning government policy and administration, particularly in relation to immigration and refugee matters.
The High Court, by majority, dismissed the applicants' challenge. The majority reasoned that the provisions in question did not impose an impermissible burden on the implied freedom of political communication. They found that the limitations imposed by the legislation were reasonably appropriate and adapted to the legitimate purpose of regulating the migration system and ensuring the efficient processing of visa applications. The Court applied the established test for determining whether legislation infringes the implied freedom, which requires an assessment of whether the law is reasonably appropriate and adapted to the protection or promotion of a legitimate end, and whether the means chosen are compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed system of representative and responsible government. The Court distinguished the present case from previous decisions where the implied freedom had been found to be infringed, noting that the limitations here were directed at the process of making claims rather than prohibiting communication altogether.
The applications were dismissed.
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