COLLINS & FRAWLEY

[2015] FamCA 434

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

COLLINS & FRAWLEY [2015] FamCA 434

FAMILY LAW – CHILDREN – Relocation – Best interests – Where it is agreed that the children should live with the mother – where it is agreed that the parents should have equal shared parental responsibility for the children – where the mother was born in New Zealand and is not an Australian citizen – where the father is an Australian – where the mother moved to Australia in 2006 where she met the father and has lived here since – where the mother now wishes to return to New Zealand with the children– where the father and the ICL oppose the relocation –  where it is in the best interests of the children to relocate to New Zealand with their mother – application for relocation granted.

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)

U v U (2002) 211 CLR 238

APPLICANT: Ms Collins

RESPONDENT: Mr Frawley

INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: Judy Stewart

FILE NUMBER: BRC 7145 of 2013

DATE DELIVERED: 11 June 2015

PLACE DELIVERED: Brisbane

PLACE HEARD: Brisbane

JUDGMENT OF: Forrest J

HEARING DATE: 4 June 2015

REPRESENTATION

COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: Ms Walker-Munro

SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: Legal Aid Queensland

COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: Ms S.F. Downes

SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: Richardson McGhie

COUNSEL FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: Mr Bunning

SOLICITOR FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: Stewart Family Law

Orders

1. That all previous parenting orders are discharged and, if the children’s names have been entered on the Family Law Watch List, the names of the children, B born … 2008 and C born … 2009, (“the children”) be removed from that list.

2. That the Father and the Mother have equal shared parental responsibility for the children such that s 65DAC of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) applies whenever the exercise of that parental responsibility involves making a decision about a major long-term issue in relation to the children or either of them (as that term “major long-term issue” is defined in s 4 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)).

3. That each parent has responsibility for the daily decisions to be made about the care, welfare and development of the children whilst they are in his or her care.

4. That the children live with the Mother.

5. That notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 2 of these Orders, the Mother is permitted to relocate the children to live with her in D Town, New Zealand at any time after midnight on Tuesday night 14 July 2015.

6. That the children shall spend time with the Father at all times as may be agreed between the Mother and the Father but failing agreement, then as follows:

   (a)Each alternate weekend from 6:00 pm Friday until 4:00 pm Sunday until the end of the current Queensland State School term such that these weekends fall into line with the alternate weekends the father was enjoying pursuant to the previous orders;

   (b)       From 6:00 pm Friday 26 June 2015 until 6:00 pm Friday 3 July 2015;

   (c)       From 6:00 pm Monday 6 July 2015 until 6:00 pm Monday 13 July 2015;

   then from when the children are living in New Zealand:

   (d)For one week in the New Zealand April school holidays each year with those weeks to alternate on a year about basis such that the children spend the first week with the Father in odd numbered years and second week in even numbered years;

   (e)For the whole of the New Zealand school holiday periods in July and September;

   (f)For the first two weeks of the December/January school holiday period in odd numbered years with this time to include the Christmas period.

   (g)For the first two weeks in January in even numbered years with this time not to include the Christmas period;

   (h)At any time that the Father wishes to visit New Zealand on the giving of fourteen (14) days’ notice in writing to the Mother and in the event that that is in school term time, the children are still to attend school and such time shall not occur in the time that the children spend with the Mother during school holidays, unless otherwise agreed.

7. (i)       The parents shall equally share all costs associated with the children’s return air travel to spend time with the Father under these orders.

   (ii)The Father shall be responsible for the children’s flights from D Town, New Zealand to Brisbane, Australia and the Mother shall be responsible for the return flights from Brisbane, Australia to D Town, New Zealand.

8. The parents shall provide to each other an accurate itinerary to include the departure and return dates of the children no less than two weeks before travel is to occur.

9. The parents shall provide copies of itineraries in relation to travel, including return flights booked to each other. 

10. The Father shall provide the Mother with no less than 28 days’ notice by email transmission of his intention to spend time with the children during school holiday periods as set out in Orders 6(d), (e), (f) and (g) and, so that there is no doubt, the time the children spend with the father during those school holiday periods can be in Australia or New Zealand, at the Father’s sole discretion.

11. Upon receiving the Father’s notice the mother shall within seven (7) days confirm by return email that she shall facilitate the children’s time with the father as stipulated in these orders.

12. That the children shall communicate with the parent they are not spending time with during school holidays each Monday at 5 pm (using the local time of where the children are at the time) with the children to initiate the call.

13. That the children communicate with the Father at all times as agreed between the parents and failing agreement as follows: 

    (i)by telephone at all reasonable times with the father to initiate the call;

    (ii)by e-mail at all reasonable times;

    (iii)by webcam or Skype at all reasonable times, including on each of the children’s birthdays, the Father’s birthday, Father’s Day, Easter Sunday and Christmas Day (if they are not otherwise with the Father on those days);

    (iv)by post.

14. When the children are communicating with the other parent each parent shall:

    (i)Ensure that the children are available to receive the telephone call;

    (ii)Ensure that the children have privacy during their communication with the other parent.

15. That each parent shall inform the children that they are at liberty to call the other parent at all reasonable times and the parent with whom the children are at the time shall assist the children to make any calls they request.

16. That neither parent will denigrate the other or their family to, or in front of, or within the hearing of, the children and shall direct third parties to refrain from denigrating either parent or their family to, or in front of, or within the hearing of, the children, and failing their compliance with such a direction the parent shall remove the children from that environment immediately.

17. That during the time the children are with each parent, that parent shall:

    (a)Respect the privacy of the other parent and not question the children about the personal life of the other parent; and

    (b)Speak of the other parent respectfully; and

    (c)Not denigrate or insult the other parent in the presence or hearing of the children; and

    (d)Use their best endeavours to ensure that others do not denigrate or insult the other parent in the hearing or presence of the children.

18. The parents shall each keep the other parent informed of the names and contact details of the children's doctors, health care and other treatment providers and shall authorise those practitioners to provide the other parent with any information that parent requests that such providers are lawfully able to provide about the children.

19. Each parent shall inform the other parent as soon as reasonably practicable of any medical condition, significant health issue or significant illness suffered by the children from time to time.  

20. The parents shall keep each other informed of the names and contact details of any day-care, school, educational facility or extra-curricular activity provider and each shall authorise those providers to provide the other parent with information that the other parent may request that is lawfully able to be provided about the children, including the option to purchase school photographs if desired.  

21. If there is a cost associated with the provision of any information or documents under these orders from the children's doctors, health care and other treatment providers or day-care, school, educational facility or extra-curricular activity provider the expense shall be borne by the parent requesting the information.

22. That each parent shall keep the other parent informed at all times of their residential address, contact telephone numbers and email address and each shall immediately inform the other of any change to any of those at any time.

23. That the Father shall not take or consume, nor be under the influence of any illicit substances, including, in particular, marijuana, at any time during which the children are in his care.

24. Co-parenting communication between the Mother and the Father will be by way of email.

25. The Independent Children's Lawyer be discharged.

26. Pursuant to s 65DA(2) and 62B of the Family Law Act 1975 (as amended), the particulars of the obligations these Orders create and the particulars of the consequences that may follow if a person contravenes these Orders and details of who can assist parties to adjust to and comply with an order are set out in the Fact Sheet attached hereto and these particulars are included in these Orders.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Collins & Frawley has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BRISBANE

FILE NUMBER: BRC 7145 of 2013

Ms Collins

Applicant

And

Mr Frawley

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1. Seven year old B and five year old C are the children of Ms Collins and Mr Frawley. They are loved dearly by each of their parents. They live with their mother and spend alternate weekends and holiday time with their father. They were born during their parents’ relatively short de facto relationship that commenced in March 2007 and ended in December 2010. It was a fairly volatile relationship in which both parents report they experienced verbal and physical abuse.

2. The mother is a New Zealander of Maori descent. The father is an Australian. The mother only came over to Australia in 2006, as a twenty year old, to explore employment opportunities. Now, the mother wants to return home to where she came from in New Zealand and she wants to take the two children with her. The father does not agree with that. That is the sole reason they are now before this Court – for a decision to be made as to whether the children can be relocated by the mother to live in D Town, on the North Island of New Zealand or whether they should continue to live here in Brisbane.

3. The mother, the father and the Independent Children’s Lawyer have all reached agreement as to the parenting orders that should be put in place in respect of parental responsibility, who the children live with and what time they spend with the father, whether they live in Australia or in New Zealand. Each set of proposed parenting orders is centred around the children living with their mother and spending time with their father.  Clearly, the parties agree that the children’s best interests are met by them living principally with their mother and spending regular time with their father.

4. All that remains for the Court to consider and determine now is the mother’s application to be able to relocate the children with her to D Town. Her position is clear. The mother expresses the view that the children’s best interests are served by her being allowed to take them with her to live in New Zealand, but she accepts that if the Court does not consider that it is in their best interests that she will not go, but rather will stay in Brisbane and continue to provide principal care for them on an ongoing basis.

5. It is, as counsel for the Independent Children’s Lawyer pointed out, a finely balanced case. So many of these cases where the Court’s sanction of international relocation is being sought are. However, I have determined to permit the mother to relocate the children with her to D Town on the basis that I consider permitting that, and making the balance of the parenting Orders the parents and the ICL agree to in that circumstance, is in the best interests of the children. These are my reasons.

Some background to the matter

1. The mother is 29 years old. She was born in 1985 in New Zealand. She is a New Zealand citizen and has not sought a permanent residency visa in Australia since coming here. She said she does not wish to.

2. The father is 28 years old, he was born in 1986 in Australia and has lived here all of his life.

3. The two of them met working the same factory in Brisbane. They started living together in 2007. Separation occurred, nearly four years later, after a particular incident of violence between the two parents. The father moved out of the home they lived in. A two year protection order under Queensland domestic violence legislation was sought in favour of the mother by police and the father consented to it being made by the Magistrates Court without making any admissions. It has since expired and there has been no apparent need for a further one to be taken out.

4. Whilst they had been together, the father had accompanied the mother on two trips over to D Town. At the trial, he said he liked it over there.

5. For a while after their separation in late 2010, the mother and children remained in the home the parties shared when they were together. The father continued to pay the rent for the home for a while, and also bought some groceries for the mother and the children for a while. It is agreed that he also bought a car, registered in his name, and provided it to the mother for her to drive after separation. There was no evidence as to how long those things went on for.

6. After their separation, the parties also quickly reached an agreement that the children would live with the mother and spend alternate weekends with the father. They had no parenting orders in place. The mother asserts there were disagreements about these arrangements as the father was “unreliable” and inconsistent in respect of the time he wanted to have the children with him in his care. The mother asserts that he would cancel arrangements at short notice resulting in her having to cancel shifts at work to look after the children. She asserts that she received abusive text messages from him. They do not even agree as to the usual duration of those visits he did have. The mother asserts the children generally stayed with the father for one night. The father asserts it was two to three nights.

7. The mother gave evidence in her affidavit that the father’s unreliability in respect of the arrangements to have the children spend time with him upset their daughter and, consequently, in mid-2012, the mother stopped the children spending time with the father. Thereafter, in late 2012, there was a time that the children were not spending time with their father. The parents disagree as to the reasons for this but it is not disputed that the mother would not let the children go to spend time with their father for a while.

8. In 2012, the mother was working in catering. She asserts that her financial circumstances and responsibility to provide for the children compelled her to work, in circumstances where, not being an Australian citizen or having a permanent residency visa, she was entitled to little Commonwealth income support. Her evidence is that her eldest child was due to start school in 2013 and that the hours she was working in catering did not fit conveniently around the parenting responsibilities that would arise upon the child starting school. She determined to return to New Zealand to the support of her mother and the commencement of studies towards becoming a teacher.

9. On 20 December 2012, the mother unilaterally took the children with her to New Zealand without the consent of the father and with the intention of staying there in D Town, her hometown, indefinitely. There is no dispute that he was not aware that they were going, or had gone, until sometime after they had been in D Town.

10. Whilst over there in New Zealand, the mother did commence studies towards a primary teaching qualification, something she says she has long wanted to do, and the eldest child started school, having turned five years of age whilst there. There was some telephone communication between the father and the children whilst they were over there, but it seems that it was not much.

11. In early 2013, the father, through the Australian and New Zealand Central Authorities made an Application to the Family Court at D Town pursuant to the  provisions of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. That application was successful, as on 10 April 2013 an order was made there for the children to return to Australia by or on 24 April 2013. On that day, the mother and children flew back to Brisbane and they took up residence in E Town, living in the house of friends of the mother. B then started going to school at nearby F Town.

12. It is common ground that upon the mandated return to Queensland of the mother and the children in April 2013, the children did not spend any time with the father for several months. The parents again disagree as to the reasons for that. The father asserts the mother did not let him have her contact details. The mother asserts that the father did not seek to spend time with the children, although he had her landline telephone number during this time. The father asserts that he tried to arrange family dispute resolution but the mother says she received no notice of anything like that.

13. On 26 August 2013, the mother filed an Initiating Application in the Federal Circuit Court seeking interim and final parenting orders, including an order that she be permitted to relocate with the children to New Zealand.

14. On 10 October 2013, the father filed a Response in the Federal Circuit Court seeking interim orders and final orders that the mother’s application to relocate with the children to New Zealand be dismissed and he sought orders to spend time with the children.

15. On 15 October 2013, the matter came before a Judge in the Federal Circuit Court (“FCC”) and interim orders were made. The mother was not permitted to relocate the children to New Zealand on an interim basis. Orders were made that the mother and father have equal shared parental responsibility of the children and for the children to spend regular weekend time with the father.  An order for the appointment of an ICL was also made. The children began spending time with the father pursuant to those Orders.

16. The next month, November, 2013, the father resigned his relatively long-term employment at the factory, where he had continued working post-separation until then. He had been paying child support to the mother, assessed by the Child Support Agency, at around $300 per month from separation until then. The father’s stated reasons for his resignation include that he was “sick of working there” and that a friend of the mother’s still worked there and was spying on him.

17. The father’s resignation naturally affected the level of child support he paid to the wife. After he gave up work, he could pay no child support and was on unemployment benefits.

18. The ICL, when in place, commissioned a family report from an experienced social worker. That was prepared and filed in January 2014.

19. On 5 February 2014, the mother filed an Amended Initiating Application seeking interim orders and final orders that the parents have equal shared parental responsibility, that the children live with the mother and relocate to New Zealand and spend time with the father in the school holidays with the mother to be responsible for all costs associated with the children’s return air travel.

1. The matter came back before the FCC on 10 February 2014, after the publication of the family report. Further interim orders were made with the consent of the parties who agreed that the children should live with the mother and, pending final determination on the issue of relocation, spend regular time on alternate weekends and in the school holidays with the father.  The Court made a further order that the parties undergo random supervised urine drug screens as required by the ICL. The matter was then transferred to this Court.

2. The mother and the children continued to live in E Town until May 2014. Unable, for some reason, to continue living with the same people there, the mother and children moved to live with one of the mother’s sisters, who also lives in Brisbane, in Suburb G, much closer to where the father lived. That move necessitated another change of schools for the eldest child.

3. The father started working again in June 2014, some seven months after giving up his previous job. He has been working for the same business since that time. He is employed as a garden labourer for a tree and hedge trimming business. His employment is on a full-time basis and he works from around 6:00 am to 2:30 pm Monday to Friday. He has an average net weekly pay of $691 but sometimes he gets a few hours of overtime and has, in recent times earned as much as $750 net and $799 net with this overtime. The father is entitled to four weeks annual leave each year.

4. In August, 2014, unable to continue living with her sister, the mother and children moved again to live with another New Zealand couple at Suburb H, also in Brisbane’s north. The mother says that the father helped them move from her sister’s house to this new place of residence.  The mother kept the eldest child at the Suburb G school until the end of the year. This year she enrolled her at I School, closer to where they now live.

5. On 10 September 2014, the mother filed a Further Amended Initiating Application amending her orders sought to include an order that the parties share equally all costs associated with the children’s return air travel to spend time with the father.

6. In late 2014, the ICL commissioned an updated family report from the social worker who had done the earlier one, in preparation for the trial.

7. In February, 2015, after the youngest child started Prep, the mother, needing more money to support herself and the children, commenced working as a casual factory hand for a large packaging manufacturer. She has been working ever since. She works night shifts, from around 10:00 at night until around 6:00 in the morning and for that she earns $198 per shift. Initially, she was being given 4 to 5 shifts per week, but it has varied depending upon the company’s demands. At the time of the trial she said she was only getting 1 shift per week.

8. The mother principally relies upon the couple whose house she shares to provide care for the two children overnight whilst she works and then she gets the children to school when she comes home from work. Whilst they are at school she sleeps before resuming care for them of an afternoon after school.

9. In April this year, the couple she lives with travelled back to New Zealand for around three weeks for a funeral. During that time, the mother arranged with the father’s mother, the children’s paternal grandmother, for the children to sleep over at her place on the nights she worked. The father slept over there, too, on those nights.  On other occasions when the mother has had to work or do other things and has needed care for the children she has made arrangements for the father to care for the children. These have been occasions in addition to the alternate weekends and holiday time that he has had with the children pursuant to the existing interim orders.

10. On Wednesday 3 June 2015, the day before the trial, the parties participated in a Legal Aid Office convened mediation and agreed on the terms of the drafts of orders they would agree to if the children are permitted to relocate to New Zealand or if they are not.

11. The trial took place before me on 4 June 2015 with each parent represented by solicitor and counsel and the ICL also instructing counsel.

The Competing Proposals

1. The applicant mother seeks final parenting orders that the children live with her in D Town in New Zealand, but agrees with the father that they equally share parental responsibility for the children and share equally the costs of the children returning to spend school holiday time with the father in Brisbane three times each year and for them to spend time with him on other occasions, including up to one week in length, that he might visit them in D Town.

2. The mother advances a number of reasons why she desires to return to D Town. It is where she came from originally, before her move as a twenty year old to Australia. Her mother and her stepfather, one of her two sisters, her grandmother, one of her two brothers, a nephew, nieces, aunties and friends all live there. She says she would have the valuable support of these people if she was living back there.

3. One of her brothers lives in Western Australia, but she is estranged from him. One of her sisters lives here in Brisbane. The mother and the children lived with her for a few months last year but that was unable to continue. The exact nature of their current relationship is not clear but there is no evidence from which the Court can determine that the mother currently is able to draw on support from this sister.

4. The mother proposes, if allowed to take the children with her to New Zealand, to initially move in with her mother in her mother’s residence. She asserts that the children would each have their own bedroom in that home. She says she can live there rent free and that the home is only a short distance from the school that the children would attend; the same school that the eldest child already attended when living over there for the first few months of 2013. Two of the children’s cousins already attend this school. The mother asserts that her mother will be able to help her out by collecting the children from school each day. None of these factual assertions were challenged in any way for the father even though he has been to D Town with the mother twice whilst they were together. I have no reason not to accept them as true.

5. The mother speaks her Maori language and the father agrees that she does. He said that she had even begun teaching the children the alphabet of her language at some time in the past that he is aware of. The mother asserts the school that she would send the children to in D Town offers bilingual and immersion classes in the indigenous language, Te Reo Maori. She exhibits documents downloaded from the school’s internet web site that purport to confirm that. There was no challenge to that and I accept it is correct. She asserts that she would like the children to learn about their Maori culture and history and to become fluent in their indigenous language as well as in English. She asserts that they will also have greater exposure to the Maori culture through their contact with her extended family and friends as well.

6. The mother proposes looking around for suitable accommodation to house herself and the two children once she is back in D Town, if she is permitted to take the children there, but would not envisage moving out from her mother’s home for some months.

7. When the mother was back in New Zealand in early 2013, she asserts that she had commenced a three year Bachelor of Education course to become accredited as a primary school teacher. The particular course she commenced is said to be “underpinned by Maori philosophies, Maori principles and Maori knowledge”. Copies of downloaded internet documents adduced into evidence appear to support that assertion. She said that she had just started it when ordered to return the children to Australia and that she was able to get her acceptance deferred whilst the issue of her return was determined.

8. The mother now proposes returning to that course if she is permitted to relocate the children to D Town. She proposes commencing that at the start of the next calendar year. The mother asserts that she is entitled to a “Maori bursary” to financially assist her to complete that course. She asserts that her hours at university would be between 9:00 am and 3:00 pm, in line with the children’s school attendance hours, but that she would be able to call on her family for assistance if study or work necessitated that.

9. The mother asserts that it will be easier and less costly for her to complete such studies in D Town than to try to do such study here in Australia. She asserts that obtaining teaching qualifications in New Zealand as proposed will enable her to better support herself and the children in a more family friendly career. She also asserts a desire to better herself, including for reasons of wanting to provide a “good role model” to the children.

10. The father proposes that the children not be permitted to go to New Zealand to live. He does not ask the Court for an order that the children live with him, recognising, implicitly, that their best interests are served by them continuing to live with their mother. He seemingly relies on the mother’s clearly expressed position that she will not return to live in New Zealand, as she wants, unless she is permitted to take the children with her, in seeking orders that simply restrain her from taking the children to live in New Zealand and preserve the status quo in respect of the time they spend with him. The father himself asserts, and it is submitted for him by his counsel, that would be in the children’s best interests. Indeed, whilst acknowledging that this is an extremely finely balanced case, that was the ICL’s submission as well.

11. For the father, it was submitted that the mother has now obtained employment again in Brisbane and is earning her own money that she can use for her support and the support of the children. It was submitted that she could and should take out Australian citizenship so that she can qualify for far greater access to Commonwealth Government financial support when and as she needs it. It was submitted, correctly it seems on the evidence, that the mother qualifies as a New Zealand citizen to apply for a Commonwealth Supported Place in a primary teaching undergraduate course at any of the University of Queensland, Queensland University of Technology, University of Southern Queensland and Central Queensland University. As such, like Australian students, she would have to pay some fees for the course, but not the full fees that she believed she would have to pay.

12. It was also submitted for the father that the Court should not give too much weight to the mother’s expressed desire to return to New Zealand to better expose the children to the Maori language and culture as the father’s evidence was that during the time that they were together he did not observe the mother “emphasise with the children the Maori culture”. In that regard, it is relevant to note that at the time of separation, the children were only two years and eight months and just one year old respectively. Further, evidence was adduced by the father’s counsel in cross-examination of the mother of there existing in the northern suburbs of Brisbane a Maori community centre that apparently offers cultural programs for Maori children and adults. That evidence was referred to in support of a submission that the mother could utilise that service to the benefit of the children if they stay in Brisbane, although the mother had said in cross-examination when shown the pages from the relevant internet website that tribal and tribal land specific Maori cultural connection is important to her and she was uncertain if this service offered that.

Some other matters relevant to consideration of the two proposals

1. The father lives with his own 75 year old grandmother in a home at Suburb J in the far northern suburbs of Brisbane. It is a two-storey brick veneer home with three bedrooms. Accordingly, when the children stay with him they must share a bedroom.

2. Where they currently live with their mother at Suburb H they also must share a bedroom with their mother. The mother also gave oral evidence that her current living circumstances are such that she does not expect to be able to continue living in the home of the people who she shares with for much longer and, yet again, will have to start looking around for new accommodation if she is not able to take the children with her to New Zealand.

3. The father’s evidence is that he pays his grandmother $50 per week for full board (food and accommodation), asserting, when questioned by me, that he does not eat very much. He owns a 4WD motor car which he purchased through a personal loan for the deposit and a further finance package for the balance of the purchase price. The repayment for each of those two loans is, he said, $120 per week, a total of $240 per week. He agreed that he must spend at least around $100 per week on fuel, registration and insurance for that motor car.

4. A matter of further relevance is the fact that the father also has a third child of a former relationship that he was in before he lived with the mother in this case. That child is a little girl who was born in 2007 and is, therefore, only eight months older than the eldest child subject to these proceedings. There is not a lot of evidence in these proceedings about this child. The father is reported by the family report writer in the first family report as having told him that he “understands” this child lives with her “step-father” having been placed there by child protection authorities. He is also reported to have told the family report writer that he had parenting orders providing for that child to spend time with him but that the child’s mother was non-compliant and that the last time he saw the child was in January 2013. He was reported by the report writer as telling him that he was attempting to discover that child’s residential address. He is reported by the family report writer in the updated report as telling him that he has not been able to discover the child’s address and is not currently attempting to contact her but that he would resume his efforts when these proceedings are concluded.

5. The father’s evidence for the trial was that he currently intends commencing court proceedings for parenting orders that have that child spending time with him when these proceedings are concluded. There was no other evidence adduced in any form about his relationship with that daughter, about whether the mother ever met this child or whether the two children in these proceedings have ever met that child. Consequently, in my judgment, little can be concluded in respect of this child and her relevance to these proceedings, save for an acknowledgement that it would likely be in the interests of all three children for them to meet and be able to form relationships at some point in the future.

6. Child support issues were focused upon in the trial. The family report writer wrote in the first report that the father had told him that prior to leaving his employment in November 2013 he was paying $93 per week for the two children and $37 per week for his other child. He is reported to have said that was reduced to $5 per week for the two children and to $10 per month for the other child after he stopped work. In the updated report, the writer reports being told by the mother that no child support was payable by the father at the time of that report following a determination by the Child Support Agency (“CSA”) whereas the father had told him that a figure of $30 per month had been determined and that he had begun paying that in June 2014.

7. The evidence is that it was in June 2014 the father started work again for his current employer. Accordingly, he has now worked for nearly twelve months for that employer.

8. At the trial, the mother gave oral evidence that she contacted the Child Support Agency in or around September last year and informed them that the father had started working again. She gave evidence that the CSA officer she spoke with told her that the CSA was not aware that the father had gone back to work. Counsel for the father put to the mother that was not true – that the mother had not been told that. The mother did not accept that and maintained her evidence that she had been told that the CSA did not know that the father had gone back to work.

9. When the father was giving his oral evidence, counsel for the mother showed him a letter from the CSA that was dated in September 2014. The father agreed that it referred to his child support assessment for the period 1 September 2014 to 30 November 2015 and that the stated assessment of his liability to pay child support for the two children was $0 per week for that period. He agreed after being shown that document that any assertion that he was paying any child support for the two children pursuant to an assessment was wrong and that he was not paying any.

10. The father maintained that he had contacted the CSA after he had started work in June last year and told them that he had started work again and about his income. He said that the CSA officer told him he did not have to do anything more as his liability for child support would be reassessed when he lodged his tax return for the 2014-2015 year. Whilst I am not prepared to say that was false evidence, I have grave doubts about the likelihood of that being the outcome of the father informing the CSA that he had started work again in June last year, shortly after he had started, particularly in the light of the mother’s evidence about what a CSA officer told her in September.

11. In any event, whatever the correct circumstances surrounding that, the father has paid little, if any, child support to the mother through the CSA for the two children since he gave up work in November 2013 even though he has been working and earning around $700 per week since June last year. It is not in dispute that the mother has on three to five occasions, in all of that time, asked the father to give her $50 to help her financially with the children and that he has given her money when he was asked. However, he did agree with counsel for the mother that he had not contributed to the children’s school fees (they go to a State school), uniforms or text books but he did say that he had contributed to the cost of school shoes for them and had bought a leotard for their daughter to use for ballet lessons.

12. At two different times during cross-examination the father interestingly refused to acknowledge that the mother would be experiencing financial difficulties. Once, he even asserted that the mother could get money from her mother, who he said he believes is wealthy. He certainly gave no evidence of any intention to immediately start paying regular child support to the mother and that was even more troubling in the light of evidence about his drug use.

13. Evidence was adduced that the father pleaded guilty in 2007 in the local Magistrates Court to a charge of possessing utensils for using drugs. He told the Court that he has been using marijuana, at least, ever since then.

14. In the first family report, the writer reported the father told him that he has used marijuana “every couple of months” over the “past 10 years” (from 2003) with the last time being six months before the report interviews. The report writer wrote that the father reported no use of marijuana by the mother. The report writer wrote that the father denied “current” use at that time.

15. Random urine drug screens at the direction of the ICL were ordered in February 2014 after this information emerged. The evidence is that five tests were done between February 2014 and April 2015. The father agreed that he tested positive for cannabinoids on four out of the five occasions, and that the fifth test gave an unclear outcome. He told the Court that he smokes marijuana through a water pipe, known colloquially as a “bong”, every three or four days. He said he purchases the marijuana in small plastic bags and that this costs him about $25 per week.

1. The father is also reported by the report writer to have told him that he smokes marijuana to help him deal with anxiety. When the father was first seen by the report writer, he is reported to have said that he had been taking an antidepressant prescribed for him by a psychiatrist since early December 2013. He had started seeing the psychiatrist in August 2013, on his GP’s referral, as he was feeling depressed by these proceedings. He also reported previous use of different forms of anti-depressant medication, from as early as 2004 after he had “trouble dealing with the world” after he finished school. He also reported a suicide attempt at age 18. In the update report, the father is reported to have said he was no longer on anti-depressant medication and prefers the use of marijuana as a means of dealing with his “anxiety” as it has “no side-effects”.

2. The report writer wrote that the mother told him she was concerned about the father’s marijuana use but it is clear on the evidence that she does not argue that it is a reason for the children not to spend time with him. However, the terms proposed to be made into orders by the parties, whatever the outcome of the dispute about where the children live, include a restraint on the father using drugs whilst the children are in his care.

3. I observe also that in the first family report, the father is reported to have said that he smokes around 15 cigarettes per day and drinks about “a half a carton of alcoholic drinks per month”. There is no reference to this issue in the second report and I note it simply in the context of observing that the father is clearly spending money on marijuana, cigarettes and alcoholic beverages whilst at the same time contributing in an extremely sparing way to the financial support of his children by their mother, against his own view, misguided as I am satisfied it is, that she would not be struggling financially.

The children and their relationships with their parents

1. At the first interviews in late 2013, when the children had not seen much of their father that year, the report writer noted that he observed them to be presented in a clean, well dressed and well-groomed manner. He observed they were “invariably well behaved and responsive to requests of both parents”. He observed the mother to be encouraging of the children in spending time with the father, including the children going on an outing with the father whilst the mother was interviewed. The writer reported them to be well engaged with the father upon their return and he specifically noted there were no concerns at any time in relation to the interactions between the parents and the children.

2. He reported that the eldest child, when asked whether there was anything she did not like about seeing her dad, said “no, I like seeing him”. Due to the younger child’s age then, the report writer did not interview him separately.

3. The report writer expressed the opinion that the two children sourced their primary security from their mother. That was hardly surprising, given the history. However, he did also report that he assessed them as having “functional attachments to the father”.

4. On the issue of the proposed relocation of the children to New Zealand, the report writer said that if that was allowed the move would cause some significant difficulties in maintaining the children’s attachments to the father. However, he quickly went on to express the opinion that holiday time with the father on four occasions each year may provide a reasonable opportunity for maintenance of the bonds, particularly if supplemented with regular electronic communication.

5. In the updated family report, the writer reported that both of the parents reported to him essentially functional communication and co-operation between them over, at least, the six months preceding the report, including an agreement in respect of a 10 day period during which the children stayed with the father while the mother travelled to New Zealand. He reported that they both reported no conflict between them for that same period of time. They reported consistent and regular time with the father, including additional time to that ordered. As already discussed, the evidence at trial confirmed that has continued since the report writer saw them last, right through until trial.

6. The report writer wrote that his observations of the children for the updated report “were essentially similar to those recorded” in the first report. There were again no concerns recorded in relation to the interactions between the parents and the children.

7. The report writer wrote of his separate interviews with each of the children. With the eldest child, he wrote, they discussed the notion of moving to New Zealand, the child having first raised it as being the reason why she was seeing the report writer. She told him that her mum “wants to go back to New Zealand, she wants to be a Teacher.” When asked what she would think if she did not go back to New Zealand, the child is reported to have responded “I would be sorry for my mum because she really wanted to teach kids”.

8. When asked if she had two wishes what they would be, the child said “I would wish it would snow and to go back to New Zealand”. The child was reported to have spoken spontaneously about going to school in New Zealand with her cousins and speaking the Maori language.

9. The report writer wrote that he asked the child what she would think if her parents both said that it would be best for her to live in New Zealand with her mother, she is reported to have said “I would say yeah but can we visit Australia on holidays because I want to see my grandmas and aunty and we’d see dad.” She was also asked if there was anything that would worry her a lot about living in New Zealand and she reported nothing. When asked if anything would worry her a little bit about living in New Zealand she did say “because when we go to New Zealand that we won’t see our dad”. She is then reported to have referred to the possibility of spending time with her father during school holidays.

10. The report writer wrote of his conversation with the five year old boy next. The content seemed all age appropriate and consistent with the child being principally attached to his mother and enjoying his time with his father. He is reported to have responded to the two wishes question by saying “I would wish I could go back to New Zealand and my other wish is that I could live with my dad and my whole family and with my mum.”

11. The report writer’s concluding evaluation was very positive of the parents’ apparent ability to have quarantined the children from conflict and to have co-operated with parenting arrangements in the time since the last report. The writer expressed the opinion that the children’s attachments to the father have strengthened since the previous report due to the regular and consistent time spent with him but also due to the apparent quality of that time with him.

12. The report writer also recorded his observation that the father’s reported and observed personal presentation had improved from one report to the next. Some reservations were expressed as to the father’s continued dependency on marijuana and his lack of a demonstrated capacity for independent living, as he was still living with his grandmother. He opined that the children remained more secure in the environment of the mother.

13. The writer again expressed the view that regular holiday time with the father, three to four occasions per year, together with regular electronic communication may provide a reasonable opportunity for maintenance of the children’s observed attachments to the father. Of note, the report writer also said that it would be important for the father to “conscientiously consider a reasonable level of child support on a regular basis”. It is of note, in my judgment, that was written in November 2014, and yet the father has done nothing to demonstrate such a “conscientious” consideration of the matter in the time since then, apart from acceding to a couple of requests from the mother to contribute $50 here and there.

The Applicable Principles

1. It is well established that as difficult as international relocation cases are they are just parenting orders disputes that must be determined according to the same law and principles that apply to the determination of all parenting orders disputes. The provisions of Part VII of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“FLA”) apply. Pursuant to those statutory provisions, this Court is empowered and obligated to make such parenting orders as the Court thinks “proper”. In doing so, the Court must regard the best interests of the subject children as the paramount consideration.

2. In determining what is in a particular child’s best interests the Court must consider an extensive list of matters.[1] Those matters include, listed as “primary considerations”, the benefit to the child of having a meaningful relationship with each of its parents, as well as the need to protect the child from physical or psychological harm. Those matters also include a long list of other matters including one as sweepingly broad as “any other fact or circumstance that the court thinks is relevant”.

   [1] That list is set out in s 60CC of the FLA

3. Additionally, in determining the proper parenting orders to make, the Court should also be mindful of the Objects and the Principles underlying those Objects that are expressly set out at the commencement of the Part of the FLA within which the power to make parenting orders is conferred on the Court. However, it is to be remembered, those Objects and Principles are ultimately subordinate to the obligation to make orders that are in the best interests of the subject child having regard to the matters set out within s 60CC of the FLA in so far as they are relevant.

4. The actual weight to be attached to the various components of all the applicable statutory provisions will vary from case to case having regard to the evidence and the Court’s factual findings.  Importantly, the process of determining what are “proper” orders to make is also subject to the application of a presumption that it is in the best interests of the child for the child’s parents to have equal shared parental responsibility for that child, unless there are reasonable grounds to believe that a parent of the child has engaged in family violence or abuse of the child.[2] Even if there are no such reasonable grounds, the Court may still make a different parental responsibility order if persuaded, on the evidence, that the presumption should not apply.

   [2]          Section 61DA(1) and s 61DA(2) of the FLA

5. “Parental responsibility” is defined in s 61B of the FLA. It means, in relation to a child, all the duties, powers, responsibilities and authority which, by law, parents have in relation to children. It seems to matter most when it comes to decisions about what are defined in the Act as “major long-term issues” in relation to a child. That term is defined in s 4 to mean “issues about the care, welfare and development of the child of a long-term nature” and includes (but is not limited to) issues of that nature about the child’s education (eg what school he goes to), the child’s religious and cultural upbringing (eg should he be brought up as a Christian or without taught adherence to a particular faith), the child’s health (eg should he have elective surgery to have his tonsils removed or not), and the child’s name.

6. In this particular case, the parents both agree that parental responsibility should be shared equally whatever the outcome as to where the children should live with their mother. The ICL does not submit otherwise. I am not persuaded by the evidence that the parties are wrong about this. The evidence about the recent past suggests that they can reasonably share parental responsibility. Accordingly, I will make parenting orders that include an order for parental responsibility to be shared equally between the parents.

7. Making such an order then mandates consideration of whether the children spending equal time with each of the parents would be in the best interests of the child and whether the children spending equal time with each of the parents is reasonably practicable (s 65DAA(1) of the FLA).

8. It is clear that the parties do not consider that it is in the children’s best interests to spend equal time with each parent, as none of the parties propose it. In my judgment that is a recognition of the reality of the situation.

9. The FLA (s 65DAA(2)) then requires me to go on and consider whether the children spending substantial and significant time with each of the parents would be in the best interests of the children and whether that is reasonably practicable. “Substantial and significant time” with a parent occurs only if the children spend time with the parent that includes days that fall on weekends and holidays and days that fall on other days (Monday to Friday) and that allows the parent to be involved in the children’s daily routines and occasions and events that are of particular significance to the children and occasions and events that are of special significance to the parent (s 65DAA(3)).

10. The determination of whether it is “reasonably practicable” for the children to spend substantial and significant time with each of their parents requires the Court to have regard to how far apart the parents live from each other, their capacity to implement such an arrangement, their capacity to communicate with each other and resolve difficulties that might arise, the impact the arrangement would have on the children and other matters considered relevant by the Court (s 65DAA(5)).

11. Consideration of the mother’s proposal involves recognition that acceding to it would mean that it would not be reasonably practicable for the children to spend substantial and significant time with the father. Clearly, it is the mother’s case that having regard to all the relevant matters it is not in the children’s best interests for orders to be put in place that would make that reasonably practicable.

12. Consideration of the father’s proposal, involves acknowledgement that the only way by which the children could spend significant and substantial time with their father on an ongoing basis is by subjugating the desire of their primary carer to whom the children are undoubtedly principally attached to return to live in D Town in New Zealand. Such acknowledgment puts in stark focus the requirement to consider all of the other advantages and disadvantages to the children of the counter proposals to determine whether such an imposition on the mother is in the children’s best interests.  This consideration is also to be done against an acknowledgement that there is no requirement for the mother to demonstrate “compelling” reasons that particularly justify permission to relocate to New Zealand being granted.

13. At this point in my reasons I consider it particularly apposite to quote from the reasons for judgment of Hayne J of the High Court in the decision of U v U (2002) 211 CLR 238 which was also an international relocation case. His Honour said at [170] to [177]:

    What have come to be known as "relocation cases" present difficult questions. Much of that difficulty stems from the fact that to take a child from the place where one of the parents lives (and, in some cases, works) to some distant place will, if the other parent does not move, necessarily affect the way in which the child's relationship with that other parent can be maintained and allowed to develop. It follows that the needs and the wishes of each parent and the needs of the child (and, if of sufficient age, the child's wishes) all bear upon the question to be considered by the Family Court. In the end, as the Family Law Act 1975(Cth) ("the Act") makes plain the Family Court "must regard the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration", but that does not deny the fact that there are at least three persons who will be affected by the order that is made: two adults and the child. And very often, of course, there will be other relatives of the child whose contact with the child will be curtailed if the child lives in one place rather than another.

    In these circumstances, it would be quite wrong to treat the decision that is to be made as confined to a choice between whatever may be the particular "proposals" that the parents may make for the residence of, and contact with, the child. So to confine the inquiry would, in this case, have required the Family Court to ignore admittedly relevant evidence that was led about what the mother would do if it were decided that the child should live in Australia rather than India. More fundamentally, it would confine the Court's inquiry to what the parents suggested would be in the best interests of the child, regardless of whether those suggestions were informed, even wholly dictated, by the selfish interests of one or other of the parents. To confine the inquiry in this way would, therefore, disobey the fundamental requirement of the Act that the Court regard the best interests of the child as paramount. Those interests may, or may not, coincide with what one or both of the parents put forward to the Family Court as appropriate arrangements for residence and contact.

    That is not to say that the Family Court is to embark upon some roving inquiry about the matter, unfettered by any regard for the evidence led and the matters which the parties seek to contest. Due account must be taken of the fact that proceedings in the Family Court are conducted in a framework of adversarial procedure familiar to the common law. …

    In this case, there were only three outcomes which were raised by the parties in the proposals which they made and in the way in which the matter was conducted at trial. Put shortly, and incompletely, those three outcomes were that the child would reside with the father in Australia, with the mother in India or with the mother in Australia. All of those outcomes assumed that the father would remain in Australia.

    There may have been some sufficient and compelling reason for the parties to make that assumption and to conduct the litigation on this premise. But neither the premise nor the reasons for adopting it were explored in evidence or in argument in the courts below and therefore these matters could not be tested or examined in this Court. The premise is not one which, in relocation cases, should be accepted as a matter of course.

    When one parent (for whatever reason) wishes a child who is, or is to be, resident with that parent to move to a place distant from the other parent, it should not be assumed that that other parent cannot, or should not, contemplate moving to be near the child. There may be (and for all that is known, in this case there was) compelling reason for that other parent (here, the father) not to move, but it would ordinarily be expected that these reasons would be explored in evidence and the validity of any assumption that the other parent will not move would be examined. Just as, in this case, the mother was asked what she would do, if she could not have the child reside with her in India, so too it might have been expected that the father would be asked what he would do, if the mother were to have the child reside with her in India. Such questions should not be treated as mere forensic tests of parental devotion, to which only one answer is seen as being satisfactory proof of being a loving parent. Rather, they are no more than a prelude to a deeper inquiry about where the best interests of the child may lie and what arrangements will best serve those interests.

    It is now recognised as self-evidently true that, apart from some cases of abusive relationships, children benefit from the development of good relationships with both their parents. The right to know and be cared for by both parents and the right of contact on a regular basis with both parents are said to be principles underlying the objects of Pt VII of the Act. If effect is to be given to those principles, it must not be assumed that one parent (the father) cannot move and that the mother must, in every case, subordinate her ambitions and wishes, not to the needs of the child, but to the wishes of the father to pursue his life in a place of his choosing. It is the interests of the child which are paramount, not the interests or needs of the parents, let alone the interests of one of them.

    Given the way in which the case was conducted, and given that there may be some sound reason for it being conducted as it was, the questions to which I have referred do not arise on the appeal to this Court. Nonetheless, they are issues which may well arise in other cases and I would not wish my agreement that the appeal in this case should be dismissed to be understood as tacitly denying their relevance and importance.

1. These were remarks that did not decide the appeal before the High Court but their Honours Gleeson CJ and McHugh J expressly recorded their agreement with them. Indeed, regard for these remarks caused me to ask some questions of the father himself when he was giving his evidence at trial when counsel for the mother asked the father whether he had ever considered moving to D Town himself if the Court permitted the children to be taken to live there by the mother. The father said he had never considered the possibility of moving to D Town himself. I asked him whether his answer meant he had considered the prospect and ruled it out or whether he had actually never considered the issue. Rather remarkably, I considered in the circumstances of the case, the father replied that he had never considered the issue.

2. I asked the father if he would consider it there and then whilst in the witness box and tell me whether he might move to D Town if the Court permitted the mother to take the children to live with her there. Within about ten seconds, the father responded that he would not. When I asked him why he would not, he firstly responded that he did not consider he had any qualifications that would assist him to find work there. I pointed out to him that he was currently working in a job that seemingly did not require any particular qualifications and that he might be able to obtain employment in D Town on a similar basis. He then offered another reason for his decision that he would not move there. It was that he has no family over there, his mother and grandmother and others all living here. He offered no other reason for his determination not to move there.

3. Of course, that last reason the father gave is a legitimate reason for his wanting to stay here, but it is also one of the principal reasons the mother gives for wanting to return to D Town – wanting to live where she has her own family support. It is no less a legitimate desire for the mother as it is for the father.

4. In my judgment, the Court must be very careful when focusing on a determination of what is in children’s best interests having regard to alternative parenting proposals not to elevate one parent’s desire not to move to a place where he potentially could move to above the other parent’s desire not to stay in a particular place even though strictly she could. That is, in my respectful opinion, the point Hayne J was making in the remarks he made in U v U that the other named Judges of the High Court agreed with. 

5. In this case, the father said he will not move to D Town even though he said that he liked the place and he adduced no evidence to support a finding that he cannot move there. At the same time, he does not seek parenting orders from the Court that the children live with him principally. He clearly values his relationships with the children and the time he currently spends with them and does not want that to reduce, as it necessarily will if they go with their mother to New Zealand. That is understandable.

6. However, the decision I am to make is between keeping the children and their mother here in Brisbane, against her wishes, so that they can keep spending time with their father each second weekend, half school holidays and some other times and letting them go to New Zealand to live, where, I am satisfied, the mother has a far better prospect of bettering her and their lives than she does if she is made to stay here.

7. Whilst the mother’s unilateral action in taking the children to New Zealand in late 2012 demonstrated failing on her part to have sufficient regard for the role of the father in the lives of the children, her motives for wanting to go back to New Zealand were, I am satisfied, generally sound and bona fide and remain so. A few things of particular note about what has happened since she returned to Australia have influenced me significantly in respect of the decision I make.

8. The mother appears to have worked conscientiously with the father, within and outside the parameters of the existing Court Orders, to facilitate and foster the relationships between the children and the father. Further, the relationships between the two children and the father have been assessed by the expert family report writer to have strengthened over the period. There is really no objective sign, on the evidence I have seen, that the mother has been working against that or that the father has not been determined to have ongoing relationships with his children and to make those relationships work for them.

9. Notwithstanding the father’s apparent determination to have good relationships with the children, the level of financial support he has provided for the children can only be described, in the circumstances, as unsatisfactory and it reflects negatively on the father’s attitude to and acceptance of a parent’s obligation to maintain his or her children. Despite this, the mother has demonstrated resilience and industry and a determination to cope in any event. Working night shifts as a factory process worker whilst she is a single mother of two small children is proof of that.

10. Nonetheless, I am satisfied that the mother will have a much better capacity to provide, as she desires to, for the physical, emotional and intellectual needs of the two children who she is the principal carer and provider for, in D Town, where she will be able to go back to studying to become a primary school teacher in a family friendly way with the practical support of her mother and other members of her extended family.  That, I am equally satisfied, is in the children’s best interests.  I am also satisfied that as the agreed principal carer and established principal provider for the two children, her desire to give the two children greater exposure to their Maori language and culture is something that cannot be done to nearly the same extent here in Brisbane as it can be in D Town. I consider that to give them that greater exposure is also in their best interests.

11. I am satisfied, as the family report writer seemingly was, that the terms of the orders the parents agreed the Court should make if it determined the children can be taken to live in D Town should provide a framework for the maintenance of the meaningful relationships the children have with the father, particularly where “both parents are encouraging and positive about the other” and the electronic communication is reasonable, consistent and of good quality. In reaching this determination, I am influenced by my satisfaction that the mother has increasingly facilitated the children’s time with the father and his mother and grandmother over the last twenty months, now clearly satisfied of the benefit that the children are themselves getting from those important relationships in their lives. I do not consider that the mother has just been acting this way in order to “pull the wool over” the Court’s eyes, but that it has been increasingly based on a genuine acceptance of the importance of their relationships with their father and his family in their lives. I am satisfied that she will now continue to promote the children’s relationships with their father and his family in this way after she and the children settle back in New Zealand, such that their meaningful relationships with their father and his family will be able to be maintained.

12. I am satisfied that the children’s best interests are met by making parenting orders that permit the mother to take them with her to live in D Town, New Zealand rather than requiring her to stay here with them in Brisbane. It follows that I therefore do not, in the circumstances that have been presented to the Court, consider that orders that provide for them to spend substantial and significant time with each parent that can only be achieved by keeping the children in Brisbane are orders that are in their best interests.

13. The balance of the Orders that I will make will be based on the draft terms presented to me at the trial by counsel for the ICL with which counsel for each of the parents informed me they were in agreement. The Orders will set the date after which the mother and the children can depart and travel to D Town. That will be Tuesday 14 July 2015. I have selected that date, mindful that government schools in New Zealand start term 3 on Monday 20 July this year and that Queensland State Schools have holidays from Monday 29 June to Friday 10 July this year.  This will, in my judgment allow the children to spend some extra time in holiday time with their father before they travel to New Zealand in sufficient time to settle in over there and to get ready to start school at the commencement of term 3. I will make Orders providing for the children to spend extra time with the father before they depart Australia. As I understand the evidence, the mother will also have the rest of this year to work in D Town with the assistance of her mother, if she can find employment, and to find her own residence before she recommences her studies at the commencement of the 2016 university year.

14. I will make the Orders set out at the commencement of these reasons.

I certify that the preceding one hundred and five (105) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Forrest delivered on 11 June 2015.

Associate:

Date:  11 June 2015