FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Collier v Telstra Corporation Ltd [2018] FCA 1569
Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal: Collier v Telstra Corporation Ltd [2017] FCCA 615 File number(s): NSD 460 of 2017 Judge(s): FARRELL J Date of judgment: 18 October 2018 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to appeal an interlocutory judgment pursuant to s 24(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – FCC Judge refused application to recuse himself on the basis of apprehended bias – whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the FCC Judge might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the dispute – whether the FCC Judge was actually biased – leave to appeal refused Legislation: Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) Sch 2 Chs 2, 3, Pts 3-5, 5-12, ss 18, 21, 22 ,24, 26, 27, 29, 34, 36, 37, 138A, 151, 156, 159, 168, 213, 228,
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) Sch s 474.17
Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act1999 (Cth) s 39
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 24, 32AB
Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) rr 8.02, 8.21, 13.03C
Federal Court Rules 2011 rr 27.11, 27.12
Cases cited: Collier v Telstra Corporation Ltd [2017] FCCA 615
Décor Corporations Pty Ltd v Dart Industries (1991) 33 FCR 397
Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337; [2000] HCA 63
Kennedy v Secretary, Department of Industry (No 2) [2015] FCA 884
Samsung Electronics Co Limited v Apple Inc (2011) 217 FCR 238; [2011] FCAFC 156
Truong Giang Corporation v Quach [2016] FCA 50
Miller RV, Miller's Australian Competition and Consumer Law Annotated (40th ed, Thomson Reuters, 2018)
Date of hearing: 27 October 2017 Date of last submissions: 17 November 2017 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations Sub-area: Regulator and Consumer Protection Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 135 Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms E Bathurst Solicitor for the First Respondent: King & Wood Mallesons Counsel for the Second Respondent: Mr A Zahra Solicitor for the Second Respondent: DLA Piper Australia ORDERS
NSD 460 of 2017 BETWEEN: MARION LOUISE COLLIER
Applicant
AND: TELSTRA CORPORATION LTD ACN 051 775 556
First Respondent
TELECOMMUNICATION INDUSTRY OMBUDSMAN LIMITED ABN 46 057 634 787
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
FARRELL J
DATE OF ORDER:
18 OCTOBER 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Leave to appeal is refused.
2.The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
3.The applicant must pay the costs of the first and second respondent as agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
FARRELL J
INTRODUCTION
This is an application for leave to appeal the whole of a judgment of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCC) delivered on 28 March 2017: see Collier v Telstra Corporation Ltd [2017] FCCA 615. On 28 March 2017,…
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 1569
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the grounds of the application for leave to appeal and the draft notice of appeal, which were largely repetitive of each other. The court found that the applicant had not established that the FCC judge was actually biased, and the grounds did not demonstrate sufficient doubt about the correctness of the FCC judge's decision to warrant consideration on appeal. The court also found that the FCC judge's decision to refuse to adjourn the proceedings was open to him to make, given the circumstances of the case.
Accordingly, the court refused the application for leave to appeal and dismissed the application with costs. The applicant was ordered to pay the costs of the first and second respondent as agreed or taxed. The court's decision was based on the materials before it and the law applicable to the case, and the court found that the grounds of the application for leave and the draft notice of appeal did not provide a basis to doubt the correctness of the FCC judge's decision.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Leave to appeal is refused.
2. The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
3. The applicant must pay the costs of the first and second respondent as agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Although there are 17 grounds stated in the draft notice of appeal, they are, with limited exceptions, virtually word for word the same as the grounds of the application for leave. The third ground in the draft notice of appeal is an allegation that the primary judge showed “Actual and Judicial Bias towards the Applicant whereby he ignored the Applicant's Medical Certificate, of the 18th. November 2016-14th February 2017”, which I take to be the same as the second ground as the application for leave to appeal. The 14th ground in the draft notice of appeal alleges that the primary judge showed “Actual and Judicial Bias towards the Applicant, whereby he ignored the Applicant's Medical Certificate, on the 17th. March 2017”, which I take to raise the same ground as the seventh ground in the application for leave to appeal. The 14th and 16th grounds of the application for leave to appeal are also omitted from the draft notice of appeal. CONSIDERATION OF GROUNDS AND SUBMISSIONS Before addressing the grounds of Mrs Collier’s application for leave, it is important to note that Mrs Collier has not submitted that the primary judge adopted the wrong test in relation to what she has termed “perceived judicial bias”: see J[19]-[20]. The primary judge’s enunciation of the test of apprehended bias accurately reflects the test adopted by the High Court in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337; [2000] HCA 63 at [6]-[8]. Instead, based on materials in her affidavit sworn in September 2017, Mrs Collier has sought to establish that the primary judge was actually biased. That is a different claim and does not disclose error by the primary judge in the decision his Honour made on 28 March 2017 in relation to proposed Order 4, albeit that if Mrs Collier made out the claim that the primary judge was actually biased that would be a basis to grant leave to appeal and to allow the appeal. For the reasons given below, I do not accept that any of the grounds of Mrs Collier's application for leave and in the draft notice of appeal provide a basis to doubt the correctness of the primary judge's decision in his identification and application of the test for apprehended bias, nor do I accept that they disclose actual bias by the primary judge. Second, although none of the grounds of the application for leave or the draft notice of appeal are directed to the primary judge's decision to refuse to adjourn the proceedings on 28 March 2017, it is my view that the primary judge's decision not to adjourn the proceedings was open to him to make for the reasons that he gave. Mrs Collier's affidavit sworn in September 2017 sought to adduce evidence of the truth of the matters set out in her email sent at 5.36 pm on 27 March 2017 (see [76] above). Contrary to Mrs Collier's interpretation of J[3] in her submissions, there is nothing in the primary judge's reasons that indicate that he did not accept that she had been delayed. Rather, in the exercise of his discretion, he took into account that Mrs Collier had been on notice of the need for her to attend the Court in Sydney on 28 March 2017 to prosecute the application in a case that she had made and that the transcript of proceedings before Flick J would indicate that offers had been made to her which appeared to address her issues with the cost of the provision of a telecommunications service. Whether or not the primary judge's assessment that Mrs Collier approached the matter with insufficient seriousness because she did not ensure that she was in attendance was correct in fact, it was a finding open to be made by his Honour in light of Mrs Collier’s correspondence and the fact that she was not in attendance and appeared not to have accepted reasonable offers of settlement. Whether or not his Honour made some error in the amounts which were said to have been offered to her (as submitted by Mrs Collier) does not change that conclusion.