Collier v Telstra Corporation Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Collier v Telstra Corporation Ltd [2018] FCA 1569

Appeal from:  Application for leave to appeal: Collier v Telstra Corporation Ltd [2017] FCCA 615
File number(s): NSD 460 of 2017
Judge(s): FARRELL J
Date of judgment: 18 October 2018
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to appeal an interlocutory judgment pursuant to s 24(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – FCC Judge refused application to recuse himself on the basis of apprehended bias – whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the FCC Judge might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the dispute – whether the FCC Judge was actually biased – leave to appeal refused
Legislation:

Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) Sch 2 Chs 2, 3, Pts 3-5, 5-12, ss 18, 21, 22 ,24, 26, 27, 29, 34, 36, 37, 138A, 151, 156, 159, 168, 213, 228,

Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) Sch s 474.17

Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act1999 (Cth) s 39

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 24, 32AB

Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) rr 8.02, 8.21, 13.03C

Federal Court Rules 2011 rr 27.11, 27.12

Cases cited:

Collier v Telstra Corporation Ltd [2017] FCCA 615

Décor Corporations Pty Ltd v Dart Industries (1991) 33 FCR 397

Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337; [2000] HCA 63

Kennedy v Secretary, Department of Industry (No 2) [2015] FCA 884

Samsung Electronics Co Limited v Apple Inc (2011) 217 FCR 238; [2011] FCAFC 156

Truong Giang Corporation v Quach [2016] FCA 50

Miller RV, Miller's Australian Competition and Consumer Law Annotated (40th ed, Thomson Reuters, 2018)

Date of hearing: 27 October 2017
Date of last submissions: 17 November 2017
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Regulator and Consumer Protection
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 135
Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms E Bathurst
Solicitor for the First Respondent: King & Wood Mallesons
Counsel for the Second Respondent: Mr A Zahra
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: DLA Piper Australia

ORDERS

NSD 460 of 2017
BETWEEN:

MARION LOUISE COLLIER

Applicant

AND:

TELSTRA CORPORATION LTD ACN 051 775 556

First Respondent

TELECOMMUNICATION INDUSTRY OMBUDSMAN LIMITED ABN 46 057 634 787

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

FARRELL J

DATE OF ORDER:

18 OCTOBER 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Leave to appeal is refused.

2.The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.

3.The applicant must pay the costs of the first and second respondent as agreed or taxed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

FARRELL J

INTRODUCTION

  1. This is an application for leave to appeal the whole of a judgment of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCC) delivered on 28 March 2017: see Collier v Telstra Corporation Ltd [2017] FCCA 615. On 28 March 2017,…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 1569
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Collier v Telstra Corporation Ltd, the applicant sought leave to appeal an interlocutory judgment of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCC) pursuant to section 24(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). The applicant, Mrs Collier, alleged that the FCC judge exhibited apprehended bias, which was not adequately addressed by the FCC judge in his decision. The court was required to determine whether the FCC judge was actually biased and whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the FCC judge might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the dispute.

The court considered the grounds of the application for leave to appeal and the draft notice of appeal, which were largely repetitive of each other. The court found that the applicant had not established that the FCC judge was actually biased, and the grounds did not demonstrate sufficient doubt about the correctness of the FCC judge's decision to warrant consideration on appeal. The court also found that the FCC judge's decision to refuse to adjourn the proceedings was open to him to make, given the circumstances of the case.

Accordingly, the court refused the application for leave to appeal and dismissed the application with costs. The applicant was ordered to pay the costs of the first and second respondent as agreed or taxed. The court's decision was based on the materials before it and the law applicable to the case, and the court found that the grounds of the application for leave and the draft notice of appeal did not provide a basis to doubt the correctness of the FCC judge's decision.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Leave to appeal is refused.

2. The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.

3. The applicant must pay the costs of the first and second respondent as agreed or taxed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

I am not satisfied that Mrs Collier has established any matter which raises sufficient doubt about the correctness of the primary judge’s decision to warrant its consideration by an appellate court. The dismissal of the application in a case did not finally determine rights such that substantial injustice would result if leave were refused. Accordingly, for the reasons which follow, leave is refused and the application is dismissed with costs.BACKGROUND This application for leave has its origin in a dispute between Mrs Collier and Telstra over a domestic telecommunications service. Mrs Collier originally applied for relief to this Court (FCA) (the substantive proceedings) by way of an originating application dated 4 October 2016 together with a supporting affidavit sworn by Mrs Collier on the same date. Against Telstra, Mrs Collier sought exemplary damages to be paid to her under Sch 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (Australian Consumer Law), relying on “section 213(a)(i), (ii), (v) and (vi) and a pecuniary penalty be paid to the Commonwealth relying on Part 5-2, sections (1)(a)(i) & (ii). Also refer to sections 156(a); 159(2)(a) & (b); Section 168(1)(a) & (b)(i)”. Against the TIO, Mrs Collier sought a declaration that the TIO’s decision in relation to a complaint which she made in relation to the telecommunications service was null and void. In her affidavit supporting the originating application in the substantive proceedings Mrs Collier claimed that Telstra breached ss 18(1), 20(1), 21(1)(a), 22(1)(a)-(f), (i)(i), (j)(i)-(iv) and (k)(i), 24(1)(a)-(d), 26(2)(a) and (b), 27(1) and (2)(a)-(f), 29(1)(i), 34, 36(1) and (2), 37(2)(a) and 151(1)(b) and (d)(i) of the Australian Consumer Law and that the TIO had “done nothing to rectify or bring to account” Telstra. Exemplary damages were claimed for harassment, coercion, bullying, misleading and misrepresenting, causing financial hardship, stress and strain aggravating an existing illness and causing Mrs Collier further illness. Against Ms Collier’s wishes, Flick J made orders on 16 November 2016 transferring the substantive proceedings to the FCC. The notice of filing of the originating application in the FCC shows the document as being lodged on 16 November 2016 and filed on 18 November 2016. Over the days following the orders transferring proceedings to the FCC being made, Mrs Collier communicated with the Sydney Registry of the FCA, including Registrar Segal, concerning an appeal against Flick J’s decision. Much of the following material is derived from MFI-1 referred to in the primary judge’s reasons and from affidavits sworn by Mrs Collier on 29 March 2017 and 15 September 2017. Please note that a number of Mrs Collier’s communications reproduced below contain serious and immoderate allegations, including that there was deliberate misleading of the Court and lying, harassment of her and other alleged misconduct by parties and their representatives, members of the Registry of the FCC and FCA and the primary judge. In my view, based on the materials referred to in “Background” below, Mrs Collier is not as careful as she should be in making such statements and overstates positions or decisions with which she does not agree and her characterisations should not be accepted. However, I consider it necessary to include some of this material as context having regard to the allegation of “Actual and Judicial Bias” made in the application in a case and the grounds of the application for leave to appeal and draft notice of appeal.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Mrs Collier has not explained what she means when she said that the primary judge exhibited bias by giving “extra credit” to the TIO. From correspondence in “Background” above, it may relate to the filing of the TIO’s application in a case. If so, the claim is not well founded. It appears to be an ongoing theme of Mrs Collier's submissions that Telstra's position will be preferred because it is a large public company and the TIO is subservient to Telstra because it funds it. This appears to be a fear of Mrs Colliers rather than a perception based on any evidence which is currently before the Court.CONCLUSION The grounds of Mrs Collier's application for leave and the grounds set out in her notice of appeal are not made out. Mrs Collier has not established that the orders made on 28 March 2017 for the reasons given by his Honour are attended by sufficient doubt to warrant consideration on appeal. She has not demonstrated actual bias by the primary judge. I will order that leave to appeal be refused and Mrs Collier's application be dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Although there are 17 grounds stated in the draft notice of appeal, they are, with limited exceptions, virtually word for word the same as the grounds of the application for leave. The third ground in the draft notice of appeal is an allegation that the primary judge showed “Actual and Judicial Bias towards the Applicant whereby he ignored the Applicant's Medical Certificate, of the 18th. November 2016-14th February 2017”, which I take to be the same as the second ground as the application for leave to appeal. The 14th ground in the draft notice of appeal alleges that the primary judge showed “Actual and Judicial Bias towards the Applicant, whereby he ignored the Applicant's Medical Certificate, on the 17th. March 2017”, which I take to raise the same ground as the seventh ground in the application for leave to appeal. The 14th and 16th grounds of the application for leave to appeal are also omitted from the draft notice of appeal. CONSIDERATION OF GROUNDS AND SUBMISSIONS Before addressing the grounds of Mrs Collier’s application for leave, it is important to note that Mrs Collier has not submitted that the primary judge adopted the wrong test in relation to what she has termed “perceived judicial bias”: see J[19]-[20]. The primary judge’s enunciation of the test of apprehended bias accurately reflects the test adopted by the High Court in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337; [2000] HCA 63 at [6]-[8]. Instead, based on materials in her affidavit sworn in September 2017, Mrs Collier has sought to establish that the primary judge was actually biased. That is a different claim and does not disclose error by the primary judge in the decision his Honour made on 28 March 2017 in relation to proposed Order 4, albeit that if Mrs Collier made out the claim that the primary judge was actually biased that would be a basis to grant leave to appeal and to allow the appeal. For the reasons given below, I do not accept that any of the grounds of Mrs Collier's application for leave and in the draft notice of appeal provide a basis to doubt the correctness of the primary judge's decision in his identification and application of the test for apprehended bias, nor do I accept that they disclose actual bias by the primary judge. Second, although none of the grounds of the application for leave or the draft notice of appeal are directed to the primary judge's decision to refuse to adjourn the proceedings on 28 March 2017, it is my view that the primary judge's decision not to adjourn the proceedings was open to him to make for the reasons that he gave. Mrs Collier's affidavit sworn in September 2017 sought to adduce evidence of the truth of the matters set out in her email sent at 5.36 pm on 27 March 2017 (see [76] above). Contrary to Mrs Collier's interpretation of J[3] in her submissions, there is nothing in the primary judge's reasons that indicate that he did not accept that she had been delayed. Rather, in the exercise of his discretion, he took into account that Mrs Collier had been on notice of the need for her to attend the Court in Sydney on 28 March 2017 to prosecute the application in a case that she had made and that the transcript of proceedings before Flick J would indicate that offers had been made to her which appeared to address her issues with the cost of the provision of a telecommunications service. Whether or not the primary judge's assessment that Mrs Collier approached the matter with insufficient seriousness because she did not ensure that she was in attendance was correct in fact, it was a finding open to be made by his Honour in light of Mrs Collier’s correspondence and the fact that she was not in attendance and appeared not to have accepted reasonable offers of settlement. Whether or not his Honour made some error in the amounts which were said to have been offered to her (as submitted by Mrs Collier) does not change that conclusion.