Collier v Telstra Corporation Limited & Anor (No.2)
[2018] FCCA 3200
•2 November 2018
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| COLLIER v TELSTRA CORPORATION LIMITED & ANOR (No.2) | [2018] FCCA 3200 |
| Catchwords: PRACTICE & PROCEDURE – Refusal to adjourn or stay proceeding. |
| Case cited: Collier v Telstra Corporation Ltd [2017] FCCA 615 |
| Applicant: | MARION LOUISE COLLIER |
| First Respondent: | TELSTRA CORPORATION LIMITED |
| Second Respondent: | TELECOMMUNICATION INDUSTRY OMBUDSMAN LIMITED |
| File Number: | SYG 3174 of 2016 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Dowdy |
| Hearing date: | 2 November 2018 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 2 November 2018 |
REPRESENTATION
| The Applicant appeared in person via telephone. |
| Counsel for the First Respondent: | Ms A. Munro of Counsel |
| Solicitors for the First Respondent: | DLA Piper Australia |
| Counsel for the Second Respondent: | Mr A. Zahra of Counsel |
| Solicitors for the Second Respondent: | King & Wood Mallesons |
THE ORDERS OF THE COURT ARE AS FOLLOWS:
Refuse to adjourn or stay the proceeding.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 3174 of 2016
| MARION LOUISE COLLIER |
Applicant
And
| TELSTRA CORPORATION LIMITED |
First Respondent
| TELECOMMUNICATION INDUSTRY OMBUDSMAN LIMITED |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
EX TEMPORE
(Revised from Transcript)
On 18 October 2018 Farrell J in the Federal Court of Australia refused Mrs Collier leave to appeal from my judgment of 28 March 2017 in Collier v Telstra Corporation Ltd [2017] FCCA 615.
Since Mrs Collier filed her application for leave to appeal in the Federal Court and judgment on that application has been pending, no step has been taken in this proceeding because part of the subject matter of my judgment was my refusal of Mrs Collier’s recusal application of myself. In these circumstances it would have been inappropriate for me to hear any aspect of the case whilst my decision in that regard was under challenge in the Federal Court.
It is now on its face appropriate that the matter further progress and proceed in this Court. However, from correspondence received from Mrs Collier in the last week and from some things that she has said today I consider it appropriate that I should assume that she may be suggesting that this matter should not further proceed whilst she is at the same time approaching the High Court of Australia, either in relation to the decision of Farrell J or in connection with the original transfer of this proceeding on 16 November 2016 by Flick J from the Federal Court of Australia to this Court.
In my view, the only order or judgment which I could conceive that Mrs Collier might have standing to approach the High Court of Australia is by way of an application for special leave in relation to the decision of Farrell J. I cannot see how she could hope to engage in an attack in the High Court on Flick J’s decision to transfer the proceeding into this Court.
Mrs Collier is at liberty to take any steps that she wants in the High Court of Australia, but I do not consider that it would be in the interests of justice that this case stop or pause in the meantime. Whilst it is invidious for me to attempt to predict the result of any application to the High Court, the simple fact of the matter is that Mrs Collier in a special leave application in relation to the decision of Farrell J would have to persuade the High Court that there was something special or significant that justified the High Court entering upon its jurisdiction with respect to that decision. However, in my view and assessment I do not consider that Mrs Collier has any reasonable prospects in obtaining a grant of special leave from the High Court in this regard.
Accordingly, I should today make orders for the future progress and conduct of the matter. Of course, if on Mrs Collier’s application the High Court of Australia did grant special leave to appeal or otherwise entertained an application from Mrs Collier, then the issue of adjourning or staying this proceeding to abide any order in the High Court can be further considered.
I certify that the preceding six (6) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Dowdy
Date: 6 November 2018
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