Collier v Country Women's Association of New South Wales (No 3)

[2018] NSWCA 184

Court of Appeal

Supreme Court

New South Wales

• Amendment notes

Medium Neutral Citation:	Collier v Country Women’s Association of New South Wales (No 3) [2018] NSWCA 184
Hearing dates:	10 July 2018
Decision date:	20 August 2018
Before:	Beazley P; White JA; Emmett AJA
Decision:	1. The Notice of Appeal, filed on 28 November 2017, be dismissed. 2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the Notice of Appeal. 3. The respondent’s motion of 5 December 2017 be otherwise dismissed. 4. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the motion of 5 December 2017. 5. The appellant’s motion of 12 December 2017 be dismissed to the extent that it has not already been dismissed. 6. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the motion of 12 December 2017. 7. The appellant’s motion of 16 March 2018 be dismissed. 8. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the motion of 16 March 2018. 9. The Notice of Motion filed on 24 October 2017 in proceedings 2016/297965 be dismissed to the extent that it has not already been dismissed. 10. The applicant on the motion of 24 October 2017 pay the costs of the respondent to that motion.
Catchwords:	PROCEDURE – competence of appeal – applicant refused to seek leave to appeal – notice of appeal dismissed
Legislation Cited:	Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW)
Cases Cited:	Collier v Country Women's Association of New South Wales [2016] NSWSC 1361 Collier v Country Women's Association of New South Wales [2017] NSWCA 22 Collier v CWA (No 4) [2017] NSWSC 1411 Collier v Country Women’s Association of NSW [2017] NSWSC 1573 Collier v Country Women's Association of New South Wales (No 2) [2017] NSWSC 1729 Collier v Country Women’s Association of New South Wales [2018] NSWCA 36
Category:	Procedural and other rulings
Parties:	In Matter No 2017/360202 Marion Louise Collier (Appellant/Applicant) Country Women’s Association of New South Wales (Respondent)   In Matter No 2016/297965 Marion Louise Collier (Appellant/Applicant) Country Women’s Association of New South Wales (Respondent)
Representation:	Counsel: Appellant/Applicant in person S Chrysanthou with BD Dean (Respondent)   Solicitors: Mills Oakley (Respondent)
File Number(s):	2017/360202; 2016/297965
Decision under appeal	Court or tribunal: Supreme Court of New South Wales Jurisdiction: Equity Citation: [2018] NSWCA 36; [2017] NSWCA 22 Date of Decision: 9 March 2018; 21 February 2017 Before: Gleeson JA; Ward & Payne JJA File Number(s): 2017/36202; 2016/297965

Judgment

1. THE COURT:

Procedural Background

Four motions are presently before the Court arising out of disputes between Mrs Marion Collier (Mrs Collier) and the Country Women's Association of New South Wales (CWA). The disputes concern the removal of Mrs Collier as a CWA Branch Secretary and expulsion of Mrs Collier as a member of the CWA, and have given rise to somewhat acrimonious litigation between Mrs Collier and the CWA.

2. On 21 April 2016, Mrs Collier commenced proceedings in the Common Law Division (the Defamation Proceedings) [1] claiming damages from the CWA for defamation alleged to have been committed by distributing to delegates of the CWA a letter dated 13 April 2016. The letter was sent in support of a motion for the expulsion of Mrs Collier. At the time of filing her statement of claim in the Defamation Proceedings (the Statement of Claim), Mrs Collier also filed an affidavit sworn by her on 21 April 2016 (the April Affidavit), and the Statement of Claim and the April Affidavit were served on CWA at the same time. The April Affidavit consisted of 26 paragraphs covering some 13 pages. Annexed to the April Affidavit were more than 100 pages of exhibits. The April Affidavit canvassed matters relating to the expulsion of Mrs Collier from the CWA.

   1. Proceedings 2016/122571.

3. The Defamation Proceedings came before McCallum J for the first time on 3 June 2016. On that occasion, Mrs Collier, who appeared in person, indicated to her Honour that she wanted to complain about her removal from the CWA. McCallum J informed Mrs Collier that, to the extent that she sought to prosecute any cause of action other than defamation, the Statement of Claim was not clear and that it was not an answer, as Mrs Collier had suggested, that “it is all in my affidavit”. Her Honour informed Mrs Collier, that ‘the defendants need to be put on notice as to the claim against them right from the outset’. Further, McCallum J informed Mrs Collier that if she wanted to pursue a claim in relation to her removal from the CWA, then that claim would have to be pleaded more clearly. Her Honour recommended to Mrs Collier that she see a lawyer because it was not an uncomplicated legal question.

4. The Defamation Proceedings came before McCallum J again on 16 September 2016,[2] when Mrs Collier propounded a proposed Amended Statement of Claim that simply incorporated, in almost exact terms, the complete content of the April Affidavit as an exhibit to the proposed amended statement of claim, which was otherwise in materially the same terms as the Statement of Claim, but for the correction of a spelling mistake in the name of the CWA. Her Honour observed that that mechanism of the proposed amendment did not address the concerns raised by the CWA and said that the proposed amended statement of claim was not in a form that the Court should allow to be filed. In addition, McCallum J observed that the content of both the April Affidavit and the Statement of Claim did not provide the CWA with the required notice of the issues for trial and would have a tendency, if allowed to stand, to cause prejudice, embarrassment or delay[3] . Her Honour rejected Mrs Collier’s application to file the proposed amended statement of claim and ordered Mrs Collier to pay CWA’s costs of the application to amend.

   2. Collier v Country Women’s Association of New South Wales [2016] NSWSC 1361

   3. [2016] NSWSC 1361 at [10].

5. By summons filed on 6 October 2016, Mrs Collier sought leave to appeal from the orders made by McCallum J on 16 September 2016 (the Leave Application) [4] . On 17 February 2017, for reasons provided on 21 February 2017, Ward and Payne JJA ordered that the summons seeking leave to appeal be dismissed and that Mrs Collier pay CWA's costs of that summons[5] . In their reasons for doing so, their Honours observed that the requirement for particularity of pleading causes of action is not met by the annexation of a lengthy affidavit to a Statement of Claim and that the confusion to which that would be apt to give rise was well illustrated in Mrs Collier’s case[6] . Their Honours observed that there was no error discernible in the exercise by McCallum J of her discretion to reject Mrs Collier's application to amend the Statement of Claim in the way in which she sought to do so and that to have permitted her to do so could only have been productive of confusion[7] .

   4. Proceedings 2016/297965.

   5. See Collier v Country Women's Association of New South Wales [2017] NSWCA 22.

   6. [2017] NSWCA 22 at [34].

   7. [2017] NSWCA 22 at [36].

6. At the same time, Ward and Payne JJA ordered that a Notice of Motion filed by Mrs Collier on 9 December 2016 be dismissed with no order as to costs. That motion sought orders as to the settlement of the index to the books to be filed for the purposes of the application for leave and for a concurrent hearing of the leave application and the appeal in the event that leave were to be granted. Their Honours considered that the subject matter of the motion had become redundant. Further, Mrs Collier accepted that the material that she wished to have included had been included.

7. On 8 March 2017, Mrs Collier commenced proceedings against CWA in the Equity Division (the Equity Proceedings) [8] . By the Equity Proceedings, Mrs Collier sought various orders against CWA, including an order that her removal from the position of secretary of the Wellington Branch of CWA was illegal.

   8. Proceedings 2017/72463.

8. On 3 October 2017, Mrs Collier was served with a costs assessment in relation to orders made by Ward and Payne JJA on 17 February 2017. On 17 October 2017, McCallum J ordered that the Equity proceedings and the defamation proceedings be heard together[9] .

   9. See Collier v CWA (No 4) [2017] NSWSC 1411.

9. On 24 October 2017, Mrs Collier filed a Notice of Motion in the Leave Application proceedings (the Re-opening Motion). Prayer 1 sought a stay of the orders made by Ward and Payne JJA on 17 February 2017 in the Leave Application until the outcome of the Defamation Proceedings. It also sought an order that the Leave Application “be revisited owing to fresh and knew [sic] evidence which disputes the hearing of the appeal”. The Re-opening Motion also sought orders that the Leave Application and the decision of McCallum J were “under Constitutional [sic] and in breech [sic] of sec 109, Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (C’mwlth) [sic]”. The Re-opening Motion is the first of the four motions presently before this Court.

10. The Defamation Proceedings and the Equity Proceedings were heard by Adamson J on 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 November 2017. On 17 November 2017, for reasons published on that day, Adamson J ordered judgment for the CWA in the Defamation Proceedings and dismissed the summons in the Equity Proceedings[10] . In her reasons, Adamson J said that she was not satisfied that the publication of the matter complained of by Mrs Collier caused any substantial hurt to her feelings and that her “unshakeable belief” in both the righteousness of her own conduct and the ineptitude or wrongdoing of others did not appear to have been affected at all by the publication of the matter complained of. Her Honour said that while Mrs Collier’s expulsion from the CWA, of itself, may have caused her distress, that was to be distinguished from the publication of the matter complained of. Her Honour was not prepared to conclude that an award of more than nominal damages would have been justified if the CWA had not established the defences that her Honour found were made good[11] .

    10. See Collier v Country Women’s Association of NSW [2017] NSWSC 1573

    11. See [2017] NSWSC 1573 at [352]-[355].

11. Adamson J reserved the costs of both the Defamation Proceedings and the Equity Proceedings. On 12 December 2017, her Honour ordered Mrs Collier to pay the costs of the hearing on the ordinary basis up to 23 October 2017 and on the indemnity basis from 24 October 2017[12] .

    12. See Collier v Country Women's Association of New South Wales (No 2) [2017] NSWSC 1729.

12. In the meantime, on 22 November 2017, the Re-opening Motion came before Gleeson JA for directions. His Honour gave directions for the filing of written submissions and stood the Re-opening Motion over for mention before the Registrar of the Court of Appeal on 26 February 2018. On 28 November 2017, for reasons published on that day, Gleeson JA ordered that prayer 1 of the Re-opening Application be dismissed and ordered Mrs Collier to pay CWA’s costs of that prayer for relief[13] .

    13. See Collier v Country Women's Association of New South Wales [2017] NSWCA 303

13. Also on 28 November 2017, Mrs Collier filed a Notice of Appeal from the orders made by Adamson J on 17 November 2017 (the Notice of Appeal) [14] . The Notice of Appeal runs for some 43 pages and contains some 109 grounds. At the same time, Mrs Collier filed an affidavit (the Appeal Affidavit) purportedly in support of the Notice of Appeal.

    14. Proceedings 2017/360202.

14. Section 101(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) relevantly provides that an appeal lies to the Court of Appeal from any judgment or order of the Supreme Court in a division. However, under s 101(2), no appeal lies to the Court of Appeal, except by leave of the Court of Appeal, from a final judgment or order in proceedings in the Court other than an appeal that involves a matter at issue amounting to or of the value of $100,000 or more.

15. Rule 51.22 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (UCPR) applies to an appeal as of right that is restricted by reference to a specified amount or value. Under r 51.22(2), if an amount in issue in an appeal to which the rule applies exceeds the specified amount or value, the notice of appeal must include a certificate to the effect that the amount in issue exceeds the specified amount or value, signed, if the appellant is not represented by a legal practitioner, by the appellant. However, under r 51.22(3), the Registrar may direct a party in an appeal to which r 51.22 applies to file and serve on each party an affidavit that sets out the material facts on which the appellant relies to show that the restriction does not apply.

16. In the present appeal, the Notice of Appeal contains a heading “UCPR 51.22 CERTIFICATE”. Under that heading, the following appears:

“The right of appeal is not limited by a monetary sum.”

That does not appear to satisfy the requirements of r 51.22(2), which calls for a certificate in any notice of appeal to the effect that the amount in issue exceeds the sum of $100,000. The Notice of Appeal contains no such certificate. The Appeal Affidavit does not address the question of the amount in issue in the appeal.

17. The Notice of Appeal was listed for directions on 6 December 2017 before the Registrar of the Court of Appeal (the Registrar). In the course of the directions hearing, the Registrar informed Mrs Collier that she did not need to file an affidavit in support of the appeal unless it was an affidavit under r 51.22 which, the Registrar said, went to the amount in issue in the appeal. The Registrar informed Mrs Collier that, for her to have a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal, she must show to the Court that if she is successful on one or more of her grounds then she “will do better than $100,000”.

18. Later in the course of the hearing, the Registrar informed Mrs Collier that, where an appellant is faced with a challenge to the competence of the appeal, the appellant needed to choose whether or not to file an application for leave. Mrs Collier said that she did not wish to file a leave application because she did not need to. Nevertheless, the Registrar suggested to her that she prepare a summons seeking leave to appeal and at the same time keep the Notice of Appeal running. He said that the Court would decide whether Mrs Collier needed leave to appeal or not. Mrs Collier responded that she did not need leave to appeal from a single judge in the Common Law Division sitting in Equity. After several interruptions from Mrs Collier, the Registrar again suggested to Mrs Collier that, rather than have an argument in front of a single judge as to whether her appeal was competent, it was normal for an appellant to file a leave application and both the appeal and the application for leave to appeal could be heard at the same time. Mrs Collier responded that she did not “approve of that”.

19. Later on in the course of the directions hearing, again the Registrar strongly suggested to Mrs Collier that she file a summons for leave to appeal, informing her that filing a summons did not constitute an admission that she did not have a right of appeal but was just a precaution so that, if at the hearing in front of three judges it appeared that she needed leave to appeal, the judges could then consider the question of leave and decide whether to allow her to continue. Mrs Collier responded, “I'll take my chances”. Later still, Mrs Collier said:

Well I am not filing a summons for leave to appeal and I will fight that before three judges and then we'll see who wins because the bottom line is I have requested now four times to have this matter put before a judge and you are not addressed it. [sic]

20. At the end of the hearing, the Registrar ordered that any summons seeking leave to appeal from the orders of Adamson J be filed and served by 31 January 2018, and listed the matter for further directions on 14 February 2018. The Registrar also gave directions for the filing of submissions. No summons seeking leave to appeal was filed by 31 January 2018. None has since been filed.

21. In the meantime, on 5 December 2017, CWA filed a Notice of Motion (the Competence and Security Motion), relevantly, seeking orders:

• that the Notice of Appeal be struck out on the ground that there was no right of appeal except by leave; or, alternatively,

• that Mrs Collier provide security for CWA’s costs of the appeal in the sum of $42,396.

The Competence and Security Motion was supported by an affidavit sworn on 4 December 2017 by Mr Adrian Papaianni, the solicitor for the CWA, which provided evidence of Mrs Collier’s impecuniosity and an estimate of the likely costs of the appeal and of the Re-opening Motion. The Competence and Security Motion is the second motion presently before the Court.

22. On 15 December 2017, Mrs Collier filed another Notice of Motion in the appeal proceedings (the December Motion). The first prayer for relief was that the orders made by the Registrar on 6 December 2017 “be overturned” and that the timetable “issued by” Gleeson JA on 22 November 2017 be reinstated. It is not clear why the timetable issued by Gleeson JA, which related to submissions in respect of the Re-opening Motion, needed to be “reinstated”. It had nothing to do with the Notice of Appeal. The December Motion also sought orders in relation to alleged divulging of private and confidential information, neglect of duty by officers of the Court, allegations of bias on the part of the Registrar of the Court of Appeal and allegations of false swearing of an affidavit by the solicitor for the CWA.

23. On 22 February 2018, Mrs Collier filed another Notice of Motion in the appeal proceedings (the February Motion). By the February Motion, Mrs Collier sought orders that Gleeson JA be disqualified from any further action in relation to the proceedings, an order that the Registrar have no further participation in the proceedings and orders relating to alleged criminal actions on the part of other officers of the Court as well as the Crown solicitor. The latter allegations related to matters that occurred in 2014.

24. The December Motion and the February Motion came on for hearing before Gleeson JA on 6 March 2018. On 9 March 2018, for reasons published on that day, Gleeson JA made orders in relation to both motions[15] . First, his Honour confirmed the orders made by the Registrar on 6 December 2017. Prayer 10 of the December Motion sought an order that the Competence and Security Motion was an abuse of UCPR and that it be dismissed. His Honour directed that that prayer be listed for directions before the Registrar on 28 March 2018. Prayer 10 of the December Motion is the third motion presently before the Court.

    15. Collier v Country Women’s Association of New South Wales [2018] NSWCA 36.

25. Next, Gleeson JA exercised the power conferred on the Registrar under UCPR r 51.22(3) and ordered that Mrs Collier file and serve within 14 days an affidavit in accordance with that rule. His Honour also ordered that the December Motion be otherwise dismissed and that Mrs Collier pay CWA’s costs of the December Motion. Finally, his Honour ordered that the February Motion be dismissed and that Mrs Collier pay CWA's costs of the February Motion.

26. On 16 March 2018, Mrs Collier filed another Notice of Motion (the Review Motion). By the Review Motion, Mrs Collier sought orders that the orders made by Gleeson JA on 9 March 2018 be set aside and that directions given by Gleeson JA on 6 March 2018 be set aside or varied. The Review Motion also sought orders that Gleeson JA had acted with bias towards Mrs Collier. In support of the Review Motion, Mrs Collier filed an affidavit sworn on 15 March 2018, which did little more than refer to submissions of 15 March 2018 filed by Mrs Collier on 16 March 2018. The Review Motion is the fourth motion presently before the Court.

Disposition of the Four Motions

27. When the motions were called on for hearing, Mrs Collier appeared in person. The CWA appeared by counsel. The Court suggested to Mrs Collier that it may be appropriate, as a matter of logic, for certain prayers in the Review Motion to be dealt with before embarking upon the Competence and Security Motion. However, Mrs Collier made clear that, except for one matter, she did not wish to rely on any aspects of the relief sought in the Review Motion in connection with the Competence and Security Motion. That matter was irrelevant to the Competence and Security Motion. The Court therefore heard argument from counsel for the CWA and from Mrs Collier in relation to the prayers for relief sought by the CWA in the Competence and Security Motion.

The Competence and Security Motion

28. Despite the valiant efforts made by the Registrar to persuade Mrs Collier to keep her options open in relation to the question of the competence of the Notice of Appeal, Mrs Collier steadfastly declined to file an affidavit, as directed by Gleeson JA, setting out material facts to show that the restriction in s 101(2)(r) of the Supreme Court Act does not apply to the Notice of Appeal. Having regard to the findings made by Adamson J, albeit that those findings are the subject of the Notice of Appeal, there is nothing before this Court to suggest that there is any prospect that, even if an appeal were upheld, Mrs Collier would be likely to recover damages in an amount in excess of $100,000.

29. Mrs Collier sought to rely on s 101(3) of the Supreme Court Act, which relevantly provides that s 101(2) does not apply to an order for the committal or arrest of any person. Mrs Collier contended that s 101(3) was enlivened because she had asked Adamson J to make an order of committal against two individuals and the Commonwealth Bank of Australia for breaches of s 251 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) (inducing acceptance of false document). No order for committal or arrest was made. Section 101(3) does not apply.

30. In the circumstances, Mrs Collier has no right of appeal except with the leave of the Court. She has expressly declined to seek that leave. It follows that the Notice of Appeal should be dismissed on the basis that the appeal is incompetent and is not authorised by s 101 of the Supreme Court Act.

31. The dismissal of the Notice of Appeal has the consequence that there is no utility in dealing with the Reopening Motion, the Review Motion, the alternate relief sought in the Competence and Security Motion or prayer 10 of the December Motion. However, since questions of costs in relation to those applications may arise, it is desirable to say something about them.

32. In the Competence and Security Motion, the CWA sought, in the alternative, an order that Mrs Collier give security for its costs of the Re-opening Motion and of the appeal. The evidence of Mr Papaianni demonstrates that there are good grounds for concluding that Mrs Collier is impecunious, such that she would not be able to meet an order for costs against her. Indeed, that does not appear to be in issue so far as Mrs Collier is concerned. However, impecuniosity is not, of itself, a basis for ordering security for costs of an appeal against an individual. Under UCPR r 51.50, the Court may order security only in special circumstances, in which event the Court may order that, if an appellant fails to comply with such an order, the appeal be dismissed.

33. Mrs Collier has a history of filing applications in proceedings against the CWA without reasonable prospects of success and of conducting herself in relation to such applications in a manner that inflates legal costs. For example, the application to set aside the orders of 17 February 2017 was not filed until 24 October 2017. No explanation for the delay was given. An inference that might be drawn is that it was prompted by the service on Mrs Collier of particulars of the costs claimed by the CWA coupled with the order that the Equity Proceedings be heard with the Defamation Proceedings. In any event, the Re-opening Motion has no possible prospects of success and is totally misconceived.

34. In the Notice of Appeal, Mrs Collier seeks to agitate all legal and factual issues raised at first instance in both the Defamation Proceedings and the Equity Proceedings. She declined to seek leave to appeal or to comply with the direction given by Gleeson JA to file an affidavit setting out material facts to show that the restriction in s 101(2)(r) of the Supreme Court Act does not apply to the Notice of Appeal.

35. The Notice of Appeal is of inordinate length and is, for the most part, incomprehensible. It includes multiple claims of actual bias on the part of Adamson J. The complaints appear to be based on the fact that contentions advanced by Mrs Collier were rejected.

36. In the Defamation Proceedings, Adamson J accepted that the imputations sued upon by Mrs Collier were substantially true and that the CWA had established defences of qualified privilege both under the general law and under statute. There is nothing in the grounds of appeal or in the submissions filed by Mrs Collier in support of the Notice of Appeal to suggest any basis for interfering with the conclusions reached by Adamson J in that regard.

37. In the circumstances, if the Notice of Appeal were not dismissed as incompetent, it would be appropriate to order Mrs Collier to provide security for costs of the appeal. CWA has already incurred costs in excess of $200,000 in the litigation with Mrs Collier. The affidavit of Mr Papaianni of 4 December 2017 estimates the cost of the appeal at $35,200. While security for costs is not normally required to be for an amount equal to the total costs likely to be ordered against an unsuccessful party, the circumstances of the present case are such that it would have been reasonable to order Mrs Collier to provide security for costs of the appeal in that sum in a form acceptable to the Registrar.

38. For the reasons outlined above, the Competence and Security Motion has considerable substance and merit. It is certainly not within UCPR r 13.4, which deals with frivolous and vexatious proceedings. The remaining prayer for relief of the December Motion (paragraph 10) should be dismissed with costs.

The Re-opening Motion

39. The Re-opening Motion is completely without foundation and misconceived. It has no utility whatsoever, following the final disposition of the Defamation Proceedings. Whether or not the refusal of leave to amend would be a ground of appeal, no such ground is raised in the Notice of Appeal. Clearly, the Re-opening Motion must be dismissed with costs. If it were not dismissed, it would have been appropriate to order Mrs Collier to provide security for CWA’s costs of the Re-opening Motion, which were estimated in the sum of $4,896.

The Review Motion

40. Mrs Collier sought to support the Review Motion with some 40 pages of typed submissions. The submissions make allegations of “defamatory, bullying, harassing and intimidating” conduct on the part of a solicitor for the CWA. The submissions also make allegations of “inaccuracies” in the reasons of Gleeson JA. Complaints are made about the rejection of the Appeal Affidavit of 24 November 2017. Complaints are also made about the failure of the Registry, the Registrar of the Court of Appeal and the Chief Justice “to look into this matter”, as there was, apparently, some delay in emailing the reasons of Adamson J. The submissions also complain about the fact that Gleeson JA dealt with the various motions rather than the Referrals Judge, notwithstanding that Mrs Collier said expressly that she had no objection to Gleeson JA dealing with the motions. Mrs Collier then complains about Gleeson JA’s refusal to recuse himself and makes allegations of actual bias. The allegations of bias appear to be based on conclusions reached by his Honour adverse to the contentions advanced by Mrs Collier. There is no substance whatsoever in the complaints and allegations made by Mrs Collier. The submissions then make various assertions in relation to the orders made by Gleeson JA in dealing with the December Motion and the February Motion.

41. Having regard to the conclusion reached above concerning the incompetence of the Notice of Appeal, it is unnecessary to canvass the assertions made by Mrs Collier in any detail. The Review Motion is completely without substance and no basis has been demonstrated for interfering with the orders made by Gleeson JA on 6 March 2018 and 9 March 2018. The Review Motion should therefore be dismissed with costs.

Conclusion

42. The orders that should be made are as follows:

1.   The Notice of Appeal, filed on 28 November 2017, be dismissed.

2.   The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the Notice of Appeal.

3.   The respondent’s motion of 5 December 2017 be otherwise dismissed.

4.   The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the motion of 5 December 2017.

5.   The appellant’s motion of 12 December 2017 be dismissed to the extent that it has not already been dismissed.

6.   The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the motion of 12 December 2017.

7.   The appellant’s motion of 16 March 2018 be dismissed.

8.   The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the motion of 16 March 2018.

9.   The Notice of Motion filed on 24 October 2017 in proceedings 2016/297965 be dismissed to the extent that it has not already been dismissed.

10.   The applicant on the motion of 24 October 2017 pay the costs of the respondent to that motion.

**********

Endnotes

Amendments

20 August 2018 - [8], line 2, change 21 February 2018 to 17 February 2017

[32], lines 7 and 8, change “costs an appeal against individual” to “costs of an appeal against an individual”

[38], line 3, change “vexations” to “vexatious”

Decision last updated: 20 August 2018