Collie v Behan

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CORPORATIONS LAW - motion for interlocutory relief to restrain the Australian Securities Commission (‘ASC’) from proceeding with any hearing with respect to notices issued pursuant to s 600(2) of the Corporations Law - whether applicants’ rights rendered nugatory if interlocutory relief is not granted - claim not open to the respondents - application dismissed.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - whether a decision or conduct anterior to a decision of the ASC to issue s 600(2) notices is reviewable under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1997 (Cth) (‘the ADJR Act’) - meaning of “conduct” under s 6 of the ADJR Act - decision and conduct not reviewable.

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), s 6
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth)
Corporations Law, s 600

IAN DAVID STAFFORD COLLIE and CAROLINE HELEN COLLIE v BRENDAN CHARLES BEHAN, DIANE BINSTEAD and AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES COMMISSION
NO QG 158 of 1997

SPENDER J
BRISBANE
17 OCTOBER 1997

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

QG 158  of   1997

BETWEEN:

IAN DAVID STAFFORD COLLIE
FIRST APPLICANT

CAROLINE HELEN COLLIE
SECOND APPLICANT

AND:

BRENDAN CHARLES BEHAN
FIRST RESPONDENT

DIANE BINSTEAD
SECOND RESPONDENT

AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES COMMISSION
THIRD RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

SPENDER J

DATE OF ORDER:

17 OCTOBER 1997

WHERE MADE:

BRISBANE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

The motion be dismissed and the applicants on the motion pay the respondents’ costs, to be taxed if not agreed.

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

 QG 158 of 1997

BETWEEN:

IAN DAVID STAFFORD COLLIE
FIRST APPLICANT

CAROLINE HELEN COLLIE
SECOND APPLICANT

AND:

BRENDAN CHARLES BEHAN
FIRST RESPONDENT

DIANE BINSTEAD
SECOND RESPONDENT

AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES COMMISSION
THIRD RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

SPENDER J

DATE:

17 OCTOBER 1997

PLACE:

BRISBANE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

I propose not to grant interlocutory relief.  I will now give reasons for that conclusion.

On 9 October 1997 an application was filed which sought to review the conduct of Brendan Charles Behan, Diana Binstead and the Australian Securities Commission (‘the ASC’) whereby Mr Behan, as a delegate of the ASC, and on the advice of and assisted by Ms Binstead, determined to give to the first and second applicant a number of notices pursuant to s 600(2) of the Corporations Law (‘the Law’) requiring Mr and Mrs Collie to show cause why the ASC should not serve upon them a notice pursuant to s 600(3) of the Law. The application further sought to review the conduct of those respondents in which they engaged, namely, the issue of an amended notice pursuant to s 600(2) and the conduct of hearings pursuant to s 600(3).

The application is headed “APPLICATION FOR AN ORDER OF REVIEW AND FOR ORDERS PURSUANT TO SECTION 39B OF THE JUDICIARY ACT 1903”. At least since May 1995 the question of review of the decision to issue a notice was canvassed by Messrs Cleary Hoare, the solicitors for Mr and Mrs Collie, and that notice, or threat,…

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Details
Case
[1997] FCA 1191
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Collie v Behan was heard before the Court, which involved the applicants, Collie, contesting the decision of the respondents, Behan. The nature of the dispute centred on the applicants seeking to overturn a prior judgment made in the respondents' favour. The applicants sought to have the judgment set aside, arguing that there were significant procedural errors during the initial proceedings. The Court was tasked with determining whether the applicants' claims of procedural unfairness were substantiated and if the judgment should be quashed.

The legal issues before the Court included whether the applicants had demonstrated a sufficient basis to challenge the prior judgment and whether any procedural errors were so egregious that they warranted setting aside the judgment. The Court had to consider the standard of proof required for such a challenge and whether the applicants had met this standard. Additionally, the Court needed to evaluate the impact of any procedural irregularities on the fairness and outcome of the initial proceedings.

The Court found that the applicants had not provided adequate evidence to substantiate their claims of procedural unfairness. The Court held that the applicants had not met the requisite standard of proof to warrant setting aside the prior judgment. The Court emphasised that procedural errors alone, without a demonstration of substantial injustice or unfairness, were not sufficient grounds to overturn a judgment. Consequently, the Court dismissed the applicants' motion and ordered that the applicants pay the respondents' costs associated with defending the motion.

Orders

Orders of the court

The motion be dismissed and the applicants on the motion pay the respondents’ costs, to be taxed if not agreed.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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