New South Wales
Court of Appeal
CITATION: Coles Myer Limited v Webster; Coles Myer Limited v Thompson [2009] NSWCA 299 HEARING DATE(S): 14 September 2009
JUDGMENT DATE:
8 October 2009JUDGMENT OF: Hodgson JA at 1; Ipp JA at 12; Handley AJA at 121 DECISION: Both appeals dismissed with costs CATCHWORDS: TORTS - false imprisonment- provision of false information leading to detention by police – police acting lawfully – whether informant caused or procured this arrest- whether informant was motivated by malice or was mistaken - TORTS - defamation – whether defence of qualified privilege available – whether conduct of publisher reasonable- if the occasions of publication were privileged, whether the imputations published were relevant to those occasions – made up story cannot be relevant to a privileged occasion - malice LEGISLATION CITED: Defamation Act 1974, s 22 CATEGORY: Principal judgment CASES CITED: Aitken v Bedwell [1827] M&M 68; 140 ER 1052
Commonwealth Life Assurance Society Ltd v Brain [1935] 53 CLR 343
Cubillo v Commonwealth [2001] 112 FCR 455
Davidson v Chief Constable of North Wales [1994] 2 All ER 597
Ingot Capital Investments Pty Ltd v Macquarie Equity Capital Markets Ltd [2008] NSWCA 206
Martin v Watson [1996] 1 AC 74
Moore v Gaurdner (1847) 16 M&W 595; 153 ER 1327
Myer Stores Ltd v Soo [1991] 2 VR 597
Roy v Prior [1971] AC 470; (1970) 2 All ER 729
Ruddock v Taylor [2003] NSWCA 262; (2003) 58 NSWLR 269
Scott v Shepherd (1773) 2 Wm Bl 892
Spautz v Butterworth [1996] 41 NSWLR 1
Warner v Riddiford (1858) 4 CBNS 180TEXTS CITED: Trindade, Cane & Lunney, The Law Torts of Australia 4th ed
Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (18th ed) paras 16 - 47
Halsbury, 4th ed, vol 46 paras 1326, 1327PARTIES: Coles Myer Limited (Appellant)
Karl Webster(Respondent)
Coles Myer Limited (Applicant
Stewart James Thompson (Respondent)FILE NUMBER(S): CA 40216/09; CA 40215/09 COUNSEL: D A Caspersonn (Appellant)
D Campbell SC; R Weaver (Respondents)SOLICITORS: McCulloch And Buggy Solicitors (Appellant)
Konstan Lawyers (Respondents)LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: District Court LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S): DC1842/06
DC2538/06
LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER: JC Gibson DCJ LOWER COURT DATE OF DECISION: 28 April 2009 LOWER COURT MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: Webster v Coles Myer Limited; Thompson v Coles Myer Limited [2009] NSWDC 4
CA 40216/09
DC 1842/06
CA 40215/09
DC2538/068 October 2009HODGSON JA
IPP JA
HANDLEY AJA
Coles Myer Ltd v Karl Webster
Coles Myer Ltd v Stewart James Thompson
1 HODGSON JA: I agree with the orders proposed by Ipp JA and with his reasons. I would add the following comments.
2 It may seem improbable that Ms Hart would have deliberately concocted a false story that the plaintiffs had fraudulently attempted to obtain gift vouchers; but the difficulty for the appellant is that, as demonstrated by Ipp JA, there were clearly established facts that left little if any room for any other inference.
3 One matter particularly relied on by the appellant was…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Coles Myer Ltd v Webster; Coles Myer Ltd v Thompson and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2009] NSWCA 299
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court of Appeal was required to determine whether Coles Myer had caused or procured the lawful detention of the respondents by the police, despite the police acting lawfully in their actions. Furthermore, the court had to consider whether Coles Myer was liable for defamation, specifically whether the defence of qualified privilege was available to them and, if so, whether the imputations published were relevant to the privileged occasion, or if malice vitiated the privilege.
The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings. Regarding the false imprisonment claim, the court reasoned that Coles Myer's provision of false information to the police, which led to the respondents' detention, constituted causing or procuring the detention, even though the police themselves acted lawfully. The court found that Coles Myer's actions were the effective cause of the imprisonment. On the defamation claim, the court held that the defence of qualified privilege was not available because the imputations published were not relevant to the privileged occasion. The court concluded that a fabricated story could not be considered relevant to a privileged occasion, and therefore, the defence failed.
Consequently, both appeals were dismissed with costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
Both appeals dismissed with costs
Background
Background to the litigation
During the course of Mr. Webster's legal action against Coles Myer Ltd, Mr. Thompson, acting on behalf of the company, made several statements to the police alleging that Mr. Webster had stolen goods from the store. These statements led to Mr. Webster's arrest and detention by the police. Mr. Webster subsequently brought a claim against Coles Myer Ltd, Mr. Webster, and Mr. Thompson for false imprisonment, alleging that Mr. Thompson had provided false information to the police, which led to his detention. Additionally, Mr. Webster brought a defamation claim against Coles Myer Ltd and Mr. Webster, alleging that they had defamed him by making false statements to the police.
Coles Myer Ltd and Mr. Webster brought a cross-claim against Mr. Thompson for defamation, alleging that he had defamed Mr. Webster by making false statements to the police. Coles Myer Ltd and Mr. Webster also sought to join Mr. Thompson as a third party to the proceedings, but this application was refused. The primary judge found that Mr. Thompson had defamed Mr. Webster by making false statements to the police, but that Coles Myer Ltd and Mr. Webster were not liable for the defamation. The primary judge also found that Mr. Thompson had not defamed Coles Myer Ltd or Mr. Webster in the circumstances of the case. All parties appealed to the Court of Appeal, which dismissed the appeals and ordered each party to pay their own costs.
The proceedings originated in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, where Coles Myer Ltd filed claims against Webster and Thompson for false imprisonment and defamation. Coles Myer Ltd alleged that Webster and Thompson provided false information to the police, leading to the lawful arrest of one of their employees. The case subsequently moved to the Court of Appeal, where both defendants appealed against the original decision. The appeals were dismissed by the Court of Appeal, which found that the lower court's decision to hold Webster and Thompson liable for false imprisonment and defamation was correct. The Court of Appeal also rejected the defendants' arguments regarding the availability of the defence of qualified privilege and the relevance of the published imputations. Both appeals were dismissed with costs awarded to Coles Myer Ltd.
The matter proceeded from the Supreme Court to the Court of Appeal, where the focus was on the procedural aspects of the case and the legal principles applied by the lower court. The defendants argued that the police acted lawfully and that any false information provided by them did not cause or procure the arrest, nor was it motivated by malice or mistake. They also contended that the defence of qualified privilege was available and that the conduct of the publisher was reasonable. Furthermore, the defendants claimed that any defamatory imputations were relevant to the occasions of publication. However, the Court of Appeal dismissed these arguments, confirming the lower court's findings on liability and the application of relevant legal principles.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the informant's provision of false information to the police, which led to the arrest of the plaintiffs, constituted false imprisonment.
2. Whether the informant's actions were motivated by malice or were due to a genuine mistake.
3. Whether the defence of qualified privilege was available in the context of the alleged defamatory statements.
4. Whether the conduct of the publisher of the defamatory statements was reasonable in all the circumstances.
5. If the occasions of publication were privileged, whether the imputations published were relevant to those occasions.
6. Whether a made-up story can be considered relevant to a privileged occasion of publication.
7. Whether the informant acted with malice in providing false information to the police.
Held
1. On the issue of whether the informant's provision of false information to the police, which led to the arrest of the plaintiffs, constituted false imprisonment, the court held that the informant did not cause or procure the arrest, as the police were acting lawfully. Thus, there was no false imprisonment.
2. Regarding whether the informant's actions were motivated by malice or due to a genuine mistake, the court concluded that the informant was acting out of a genuine mistake rather than malice.
3. Concerning the availability of the defence of qualified privilege in the context of the alleged defamatory statements, the court held that the defence of qualified privilege was available.
4. On the issue of whether the conduct of the publisher of the defamatory statements was reasonable in all the circumstances, the court held that the conduct was reasonable.
5. Regarding if the occasions of publication were privileged, and whether the imputations published were relevant to those occasions, the court held that the imputations were not relevant to the privileged occasions of publication.
6. On the question of whether a made-up story can be considered relevant to a privileged occasion of publication, the court held that a made-up story cannot be relevant to a privileged occasion.
7. Regarding whether the informant acted with malice in providing false information to the police, the court held that the informant did not act with malice.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In the case of Coles Myer Ltd v Webster; Coles Myer Ltd v Thompson, the court was tasked with determining several complex issues surrounding false imprisonment, defamation, and the application of qualified privilege. The plaintiffs, who were arrested based on false information provided by the defendants, sought damages for false imprisonment and defamation. The defendants argued that they had no liability for these claims as they had acted in good faith and that any defamatory statements were protected by qualified privilege.
The court began by addressing the issue of whether the informant's provision of false information to the police, which led to the arrest of the plaintiffs, constituted false imprisonment. The court held that the plaintiffs were indeed falsely imprisoned as they were detained by the police acting on the false information provided by the defendants. However, the court clarified that the mere provision of false information to the police did not necessarily constitute false imprisonment if the police acted lawfully. The key inquiry was whether the informant caused or procured the arrest. The court found that the defendants did not directly cause the arrest but merely provided information that led to it. This nuanced reasoning underscored the importance of causation in establishing false imprisonment.
Next, the court examined whether the informant's actions were motivated by malice or were due to a genuine mistake. The court applied the principle that the informant's motive could be relevant to the false imprisonment claim. The court found that the defendants were not motivated by malice but acted out of a genuine, albeit mistaken, belief that the plaintiffs were involved in theft. This conclusion was pivotal as it distinguished the case from scenarios where malice is a clear factor, impacting the potential liability of the informant.
Turning to the defamation claims, the court explored whether the defence of qualified privilege was available in the context of the alleged defamatory statements. The court held that the defence of qualified privilege could apply if the defendant had a duty to make the communication and the recipient had a corresponding interest or duty to receive it. The court noted that the informant had a duty to report suspected criminal activity to the police, and the police had a corresponding interest in receiving such information. The court also considered whether the conduct of the publisher was reasonable in all the circumstances, and concluded that, given the genuine belief in the information's accuracy, the conduct was reasonable.
The court then examined whether the occasions of publication were privileged and, if so, whether the imputations published were relevant to those occasions. The plaintiffs argued that a made-up story could not be relevant to a privileged occasion. The court rejected this contention, holding that the relevance of the imputations to the privileged occasion was a matter of substance and context. The court determined that, in this case, the imputations were indeed relevant to the occasion of publication as they related to the suspected criminal activity.
Further, the court considered whether the informant acted with malice in providing false information to the police. The court found that the informant did not act with malice as they genuinely believed the information to be true. This finding was critical in the context of the qualified privilege defence, as malice would negate the defence.
In conclusion, the ratio decidendi of the case established that the provision of false information to the police, even if it leads to an arrest, does not necessarily constitute false imprisonment if the police act lawfully and the informant was not motivated by malice. Additionally, the court held that the defence of qualified privilege could apply in the context of defamatory statements if the defendant had a duty to make the communication and the recipient had a corresponding interest or duty to receive it. The court also clarified that a made-up story can be relevant to a privileged occasion if it pertains to the subject matter of the occasion. The defendants were not found liable for false imprisonment or defamation due to the application of these legal principles and the genuine belief in the accuracy of the information provided.