Cole (a pseudonym) v The Queen

Case [2015] VSCA 44


SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

COURT OF APPEAL

S APCR 2014 0276

DYLAN ELTON COLE ( a Pseudonym)[1] Appellant
v
THE QUEEN Respondent

[1]To ensure that there is no possibility of identification of the victim of the sexual offending, this judgment has been anonymised by the adoption of a pseudonym in place of the name of the appellant.

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JUDGES: ASHLEY and PRIEST JJA
WHERE HELD: MELBOURNE
DATE OF HEARING: 20 March 2015
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 20 March 2015
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: [2015] VSCA 44
JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: DPP v [Cole] (Unreported, County Court of Victoria, Judge Meredith, 7 November 2014)

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CRIMINAL LAW – Sentence – Indecent act with a child under 16 – Delay – Sentence of 20 months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 12 months – Sentence manifestly excessive – Appeal allowed – Community correction order substituted.

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APPEARANCES: Counsel Solicitors
For the Appellant Ms F Todd Robert Stary Lawyers
For the Crown Mr B Kissane SC Ms V Anscombe, Acting Solicitor for Public Prosecutions

THE COURT:

Introduction

  1. Pursuant to leave granted by Priest JA on 26 February 2015, this appeal is brought against a sentence of one (1) year and eight (8) months’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 12 months, imposed by a judge of the County Court on 7 November 2014.

  1. For the reasons that follow, we would allow the appeal and sentence the appellant to a community correction order (‘CCO’) in the terms we will later set out.

    Sentence and ground of appeal

  2. The impugned sentence was imposed following a contested trial.  On 27 October 2014, a jury found the appellant guilty of three charges of indecent act with a child under 16[2] (charges 2, 3 and 4).[3]  The trial judge sentenced him to be imprisoned for 12 months on each of charges 2 and 4, and for 10 months on charge 3.[4]  Three months of the sentence on charge 3, and five months of the sentence on charge 4, were ordered to be served cumulatively with the sentence on charge 2.  The total effective sentence was thus one (1) year and eight (8) months’ imprisonment, upon which the judge fixed a non-parole period of 12 months

    [2]Crimes Act 1958, s 47(1). The maximum penalty is imprisonment for 10 years.

    [3]Charge 1 on the indictment was also a charge of indecent act with a child under 16.  The jury acquitted the appellant on that charge.

    [4]On charge 4, the appellant was, pursuant to s 6E of the Sentencing Act 1991, sentenced as a serious sexual offender.

  3. The appellant relies on a single ground which asserts that the sentence offended the principle of totality and is manifestly excessive  The ground is expressed as follows:

    1.   The individual sentences, the total effective sentence and the non-parole period are manifestly excessive and offend the principle of totality, particularly in view of the following matters:

    (a) the delay in commencing the proceedings;

    (b) the consequent extended period of uncertainty that was experienced by the…

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Cole (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2015] VSCA 44
Case
[2015] VSCA 44
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Cole v The Queen concerns an appeal against the sentence imposed on the appellant, who was convicted of indecent acts with a child under 16 years. The appellant argues that the sentence, which included 20 months' imprisonment with a non-parole period of 12 months, was manifestly excessive and violated the principle of totality. The appeal focuses on the cumulative effect of various factors, including the significant delay in bringing the charges, the impact on the appellant's life during that period, and the nature and duration of the offences.

The legal issues before the court were whether the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive and whether it violated the principle of totality. This principle requires that the overall sentence, taking into account all aspects of the offender's circumstances and the nature of the offence, must be proportionate and fair. The appellant argued that several factors, particularly the delay in charging and the appellant's rehabilitation during that period, should have been considered more heavily in mitigation.

The court considered the appellant's arguments and examined the sentencing principles applicable to the case. It acknowledged the delay in bringing the charges and the appellant's ongoing rehabilitation as significant factors. The court found that while the offences were serious, the sentence imposed did not adequately reflect the mitigating factors and was, therefore, manifestly excessive. The court substituted a community correction order for the imprisonment sentence, finding it to be a more appropriate response to the appellant's circumstances and the nature of the offences.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

The appellant relies on a single ground which asserts that the sentence offended the principle of totality and is manifestly excessive The ground is expressed as follows:1. The individual sentences, the total effective sentence and the non-parole period are manifestly excessive and offend the principle of totality, particularly in view of the following matters:(a) the delay in commencing the proceedings;(b) the consequent extended period of uncertainty that was experienced by the [appellant];(c) the complainant’s rehabilitation between the offending and the jury’s verdict;(d) the lack of relevant prior or subsequent history;(e) the fact that the term of imprisonment would be more difficult for the application because of his knowledge of the suffering of his partner, son and baby;(f) the short lived and relatively low level of the acts constituting the offences.Background The jury’s verdicts at his trial established that the appellant indecently touched his step-daughter, ‘J’, on several occasions in 2009. J was then aged 12 years, and the appellant was aged 39. Charge 2 related to an occasion when J was seated on a couch in the lounge room. The appellant came from behind J. He pushed her shoulder towards the couch and then put his hand down her top, underneath her bra, and touched her breasts. J ‘sort of’ screamed. She told the appellant to stay away. On another occasion, J was lying on her bed listening to the radio. The appellant came into her bedroom and put his hand up her skirt towards her inner mid-thigh. J kicked his arm off her. These events were the basis of charge 3. Charge 4 also related to an occasion in J’s bedroom. J was sitting on the floor next to her bed when the appellant came in. He put one hand on J’s shoulder and pushed her back, and put his other hand down her top underneath her bra and touched her breast. J complained to police in August 2009, and the appellant was interviewed. The police had decided by early 2010, however, not to charge the appellant. It was not until J’s sister, ‘N’, later made her own allegations against the appellant that he was charged with any offence relating to J. In April 2014 the police charged him with offences involving both N and J. At trial, the indictment was severed, so that there were separate trials respectively of the charges concerning N and J. A jury acquitted the appellant of the charges relating to N. Another jury acquitted the appellant of the first charge involving J, but, as we have mentioned, found him guilty of charges 2, 3 and 4. There had been a five year delay between J first complaining to the police, and the finalisation of the charges relevant to her allegations. That delay, as the judge accepted, was not attributable to the appellant. Moreover, as the judge accepted, the appellant’s rehabilitation had been ongoing during the period of the delay. By the time that he was sentenced, the appellant had formed a new family, had a child — his partner was pregnant with her second child — and had completed a parenting course with his partner. Counsel submitted that the delay should have been treated as a powerful mitigatory feature,[5] but that it must have been devalued in the exercise of the sentencing judge’s discretion.[5]Counsel cited R v Merrett, Piggot and Ferrari (2007) 14 VR 392, 400 [35]–[36].

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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