COLDHAM & REAGER
[2020] FCCA 2559
•11 September 2020
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| COLDHAM & REAGER | [2020] FCCA 2559 |
| Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – Parenting - interim applications - best interests of child - Orders made. |
| Legislation: Family Law Act1975 (Cth) ss.60B, 60CA, 60CC |
| Cases cited: Rice & Asplund (1979) FLC 90-725 |
| Applicant: | MS COLDHAM |
| Respondent: | MR REAGER |
| File Number: | PAC 2234 of 2017 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Newbrun |
| Hearing dates: | 24 July 2020, 10 September 2020 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 10 September 2020 |
| Delivered at: | Parramatta |
| Delivered on: | 11 September 2020 |
REPRESENTATION
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Ms Siu - As Family Lawyers |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Mr Fawcett - Catalyst Family Lawyers |
| Solicitors for the Independent Children’s Lawyer | Mr Holmes - Holmes Donnelly & Co Solicitors |
ORDERS PENDING FURTHER ORDER
All previous Orders relating to specific time that the child spends with the Mother are discharged.
The child shall live with the Father.
The child shall spend time with the Mother as follows:
(a)each alternate weekend, from 5 PM Friday to 6 PM Sunday;
(b)the first 10 days of the shorter school holidays;
(c)alternate weeks during the Christmas school holidays;
(d)at other times as agreed between the parties.
That for the purposes of changeovers, unless otherwise agreed in writing, the parties shall meet at Suburb B McDonald’s.
The Father shall facilitate telephone, FaceTime, Skype, communication between the child and the Mother, when the child is not spending time with the Mother, at the following times: each Monday, Wednesday, Friday and Sunday between 7pm and 7.30pm.
The parties shall both be entitled to attend all events involving the child including:
(a)Sporting fixtures;
(b)Extra-curricular activities that allow for parental attendance;
(c)School functions and events that allow for parental attendance including, but not limited to, concerts, school assemblies, sports days, parent and teacher interviews, canteen duties and social functions.
The parties shall ensure the other is kept informed of:
(a)any medical problems or illnesses suffered by the child while in their care;
(b)any medication that has been prescribed for the child;
(c)any other matter relevant to the child’s welfare.
That each party refrain from making critical or derogatory remarks in relation to the other party in the presence or hearing of the child and that each party do all things necessary to ensure that no third party makes critical comments about the other party in the presence or hearing of the child.
That each party advise the other party and keep the other party advised of their current address and contact telephone numbers (including both landline and mobile phone number if applicable) and advise the other party of any changes to these details within seven days of such change occurring.
Pursuant to section 62G(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 the parties and the children of the relationship shall attend upon a family consultant nominated by the Dispute Resolution Coordinator of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on a date and at time/s to be advised for the purposes of the preparation of a family report, such report to be released by May 2021.
The Family Report shall deal with the following matters:
(a)Any views expressed by the child(ren) the subject of parenting orders sought in this case, provided that the child/ren shall not be required to express a view in relation to any matter.
(b)The nature of the relationships of the child(ren) with each of the child(ren)’s parents and with significant other persons;
(c)The willingness and ability of each of the child(ren)’s parents to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing relationship between the child(ren) and the other parent.
(d)The likely effect of any changes in the child(ren)’s circumstances, including the likely effect on the child(ren) of any separation from:
(i) either of the parents: or
(ii)any other child, or significant person, with whom the child(ren) has/have been living.
(e)The practical difficulty and expense of the child(ren) spending time with and communicating with a parent and whether that difficulty or expense will substantially affect the child(ren)’s right to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular basis.
(f)The capacity of each parent, or another person, to provide for the needs of the child(ren), including emotional and intellectual needs.
(g)The maturity, sex, lifestyle and background (including lifestyle, culture and traditions) other child(ren) and of either of the child(ren)’s parents and any other characteristics of the child(ren) that the reporter thinks are relevant.
(h)Each parent’s attitude to the child(ren) and to the responsibilities of parenthood.
(i)Any family violence involving the child(ren) or a member of the child(ren)’s family.
The parties shall attend all appointments with the Family Consultant and shall ensure the subject child/ren attend all appointments with the Family Consultant, as requested by the Family Consultant.
The Family Consultant may inspect the Court file, and any documents produced on subpoena access to which has been granted to a party or the Independent Children’s Lawyer.
The proceedings are adjourned for mention to 16 July 2021 at 9:30am, following release of the Family Report.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Coldham & Reager is approved pursuant to s.121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT PARRAMATTA |
PAC 2234 of 2017
| MS COLDHAM |
Applicant
And
| MR REAGER |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This is the determination of competing interim parenting proposals relating to the child, X born in 2011.
As to the procedural history of these parenting proceedings, the Court observes that the proceedings came before the Court on 19 December 2019 as a result, in particular, of the Mother filing a recovery order application in relation to the child on 16 December 2019.
The Father shortly prior to 19 December 2019 had retained the child in his primary care; he alleged, the child, when spending time with the Mother in Suburb C, was exposed to the Mother’s new partner, Mr D, who had recently been arrested on drug supply charges. Prior to 19 December 2019, Mr D had been living with the Mother, the child, the Mother’s child from a previous relationship, E, now aged 15, and two children born of the Mother’s relationship with Mr D, F born in 2018, and G born in 2019.
On 19 December 2019, the Court made orders, by consent, on an interim basis, that the child live with the Father; that the child spend time with the Mother on certain occasions, and in Order 6 in Exhibit A of the Court’s Orders of 19 December 2019, ordered that on the commencement of the new school term 2020 the child spend time with the Mother each alternate weekend on both Saturday and Sunday from 10 am to 7 pm or as otherwise agreed between the parties. An interim injunction was made against the Mother restraining her from permitting the child coming into contact with Mr D. The Mother’s interim recovery order application was dismissed.
On 17 March 2020, the Court made interim orders that the child spend time with the Mother, inter alia, upon commencement of the new school term 2020 each alternate weekend on both Saturday and Sunday from 10 am to 7 pm or as otherwise agreed between the parties.
At this interim hearing, the Mother sought interim parenting orders as follows: she sought orders set out in her proposed minute of order attached to her Case Outline filed 17 July 2020; inter alia, she sought orders that the child live with the Mother; that the Father spend time with the child each alternate weekend from Friday 3 pm to Sunday 6 pm, and effectively half of all school holidays. The Mother did not seek an Order discharging the interim injunction relating to Mr D.
Again, the Mother lives in Suburb C and the Father lives up on the Region H. The Mother sought other proposed interim orders as set out in her aforesaid Minute of Order.
The Father and ICL sought the continuation of the existing interim parenting orders.
The Mother relied upon the documents set out in her Case Outline filed 17 July 2020.
The Father relied upon the documents set out in his Case Outline filed 21 July 2020.
The ICL relied upon (as well as the parties) the Child Dispute Conference Memorandum of the Court dated 11 June 2020.
The Court would assess that there probably has been a significant change in circumstances, in terms of the rule in Rice & Asplund (1979) FLC 90-725 since the making of the Court’s Orders of 19 December 2019 and 17 March 2020, in that the Mother’s new partner has been jailed in July 2020 for a non-parole period of 12 months, such as to permit the Mother to seek fresh interim parenting orders relating to the child.
Legal Principles
The relevant principles in relation to parenting proceedings, including interim proceedings, are well settled: see Goode & Goode (2006) FLC 93-286.
In Marvel & Marvel [2010] FamCAFC 101, the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia discussed the problems associated with making findings on disputed evidence as follows:
[120] As has frequently been emphasised interim parenting proceedings, and orders made as a consequence, are a necessary but temporary measure until all the evidence can be tested, evaluated and weighed at a final hearing by the making of final parenting orders. Decisions judicial officers have to make in interim proceedings are difficult and, often for very good reason, a conservative approach, or one which is likely to avoid harm to a child is adopted. This is often to the understandable distress of a party who may not achieve the outcome he or she desires, or thinks to be in the best interests of their child or children. Interim parenting orders are frequently modified or changed after a final hearing, and any allocation of parental responsibility made at an interim hearing is disregarded at the final hearing (s 61DB).
[122] In SS & AH [2010] FamCAFC 13 the majority (Boland and Thackray JJ) discussed at paragraph 88 of their reasons the care necessary to be exercised in making findings in interim parenting proceedings. Their Honours said:
In our view, findings made at an interim hearing should be couched with great circumspection, no matter how firmly a judge’s intuition may suggest that the finding will be borne out after a full testing of the evidence.
[123] Later, at paragraph 100 their Honours amplified their comments and said:
The intuition involved in decision-making concerning children is arguably of even greater importance when a judge is obliged to make interim decisions following a hearing at which time constraints prevent the evidence being tested. Apart from relying upon the uncontroversial or agreed facts, a judge will sometimes have little alternative than to weigh the probabilities of competing claims and the likely impact on children in the event that a controversial assertion is acted upon or rejected. It is not always feasible when dealing with the immediate welfare of children simply to ignore an assertion because its accuracy has been put in issue.
Of this, the Full Court in Eaby & Speelman [2015] FamCAFC 104 said at [19]:
As would be immediately apparent, this approach enables the court to appropriately and carefully deal with contentious issues relevant to the welfare of the child, and for those issues to not be ignored.
The Court also refers to the decision of the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia in Banks & Banks [2015] FamCAFC 36, especially at paragraphs 46 to 52. In that decision, the Full Court stated, inter alia, that (at paragraph 49), “It is also important to stress here that the requirement to “consider” each factor (under s60CC of the Act) does not mean each must be discussed, especially where the evidence leads inexorably to a particular conclusion: SCVG & KLD (2014) FLC 93-582”. Further, it stated, at paragraph 50, “When it is obvious that the findings made as to some of the s 60CC factors will be determinative of the child’s best interests on an interim basis, it is a sterile and unnecessary exercise to address other factors”.
Section 60B of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) sets out the objects of Part VII of the Act relating to children that inform the making of parenting orders.
In deciding whether to make a particular parenting order in relation to a child, a Court must regard the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration: section 60CA of the Act.
Section 60CC of the Act provides that in determining what is in the child’s best interests, the Court must consider the matters set out in subsections (2) and (3). In this context, the Court refers to Banks & Banks [2015] FamCAFC 36 above.
Discussion
The ICL and the Father submitted, inter alia, that it would not be in the best interests of the child for the child’s present stable and well settled arrangement of, inter alia, living with the Father and attending school on the Region H, to be now changed.
It would appear that the child has a meaningful relationship with each parent and would benefit from a continuance of those relationships.
It would appear that during the parties’ relationship, the Mother was the child’s primary carer. The parties separated in about January 2017. It is unclear as to exactly what time each party spent with the child post-separation until about May 2017.
The parties then put in place an equal-time arrangement which commenced in about May 2017 and continued up until about November 2019. By the time the Father retained the child in his primary care at about the end of 2019, following the arrest of Mr D, the child had been the subject of an equal-time arrangement between the parties for about two and a half years.
Again, as referred to previously, the child since about 19 December 2019 has been in the primary care of the Father on the Region H and has been usually spending alternate weekends with the Mother in Suburb C where she lives, in accordance with the Court’s interim orders of 19 December 2019 and 17 March 2020.
There is a significant suggestion on the material before the Court that the child has been in a stable and well settled arrangement living with the father on the Region H since about December 2019, including attending school on the Region H. The Court has a significant concern that should it make the Mother’s proposed interim parenting orders resulting in the child living in the Mother’s primary care in Sydney, there is a real possibility that the child will experience instability in his life with detrimental effects upon him.
In Clarke & Brydon (No 2) [2020] FamCAFC 206, the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia stated:
[66] The case law is replete with discussion of the importance of stability and the need for careful attention being given in interim hearings to the effect of changing well settled arrangements. For example, in Parks & Farmer [2012] FamCAFC 12, the Full Court said at [87]:
We are unable to accept that in an interim hearing such as this, on incomplete and untested evidence, determining the child’s best interests in accordance with the provisions of Part VII would not, or should not be significantly influenced by questions of the comparative stability of the parties’ proposed arrangements for the child. As the authorities, and the terms of Part VII of the Act make clear, whilst the Court does not condone “unilateral relocations”, such actions are but one of the factors which, by reference to the provisions of Part VII, are relevant to determining the child’s best interests on an interim basis after a circumscribed hearing (see Goode & Goode (2006) FLC 93-286).
[67] So too, in Whiteman & Newton [2013] FamCAFC 127, the Full Court observed at [33]:
It need hardly be said that the Court would always take into account the stability of a well settled arrangement and that, where there is controversial evidence about the child’s needs, a decision may well be made to leave the child in that environment. However, in this case the child was not really in a well settled arrangement because she had been living with both her grandmother and mother. The judge also had the benefit of the doctor’s evidence about the child’s state which was compelling.
In this context, the Court has not overlooked that the Father effectively unilaterally relocated the child’s residence to the Region H to take up residence with his new partner, albeit following the Father ascertaining that the Mother’s partner had been arrested on drug supply charges. Nevertheless, the child has now been living in the Father’s primary care on the Region H since about December 2019, and has been attending school there since about February 2020, whilst acknowledging the Covid19 restrictions on school attendance earlier in the year. The child would appear to be progressing satisfactorily in his new school. He plays sport on the Region H. He appears to have made some new friends.
The Court acknowledges that the child grew up in the western suburbs of Sydney; and he attended school at the J School for kindergarten, and Years 1 and 2. The Court further acknowledges that the child grew up with his stepsibling E, now aged 15 years. The child also enjoyed growing up with the Mother’s two new children. The child has close relationships with those siblings as alleged by the mother. The Mother alleges that the child has told her that he misses his siblings. These issues have been anxiously considered by the Court.
On the other hand, addressing this issue of potentially changing an existing well settled arrangement for the child, the child has experienced a number of significant changes in his life since the beginning of 2017, including:
a)the parties’ separation in January 2017,
b)the establishment and facilitation of the parties’ equal time arrangement in about May 2017,
c)the entry of the Mother’s new partner into the family home in about, it would appear, mid 2017,
d)the significant reduction of the child’s time with the Mother from about early December 2019,
e)the Mother being subject to an interim injunction restraining her from bringing the child into contact with Mr D from 19 December 2019,
f)the child moving with the Father to the Region H in about December 2019 and thereafter, inter alia, attending a new school there.
Should the Court order, on an interim basis, that the child now live in the Mother’s primary care in Sydney, the child would have to endure yet another change in his life, in circumstances where there is a significant suggestion, on the material before the Court, that the child is presently well settled on the Region H, where he has been living since about December 2019.
Further, assuming that the child now returns to the Mother’s primary care, and that Mr D is released from jail in mid 2021, there is a real prospect that Mr D will then wish to resume living with the Mother, noting that he and the Mother have borne two children. That in turn may well lead the Mother to seek to discharge the current interim restraining order against her providing that she not bring the child into contact with Mr D. Should that occur, and if such an application is contested by the father and/or the ICL, that may or may not result in the child being returned into the Father’s primary care, subject to the court’s assessment of any relevant risk issues raised before the Court.
In the above context, the mother submitted that any risk issues relating to Mr D have effectively evaporated now that Mr D is in jail. She further submits in this context that Mr D’s affidavit refers to Mr D’s adverse financial circumstances which led to him participating in illegal drug supply activity. However, these assertions of Mr D remain untested and are a matter for trial. It is not unreasonable to suggest that Mr D’s financial circumstances, whether unsatisfactory or otherwise, after being released from jail, may become a risk issue raised before the Court in relation to any application the Mother makes to lift the interim injunction at about that time.
The Court would place significant weight on the above matters relating to the real possibility that the child will experience instability in his life with adverse effects upon him were he to presently live with the Mother in her primary care.
The Court recognises that whilst the Mother’s partner is in jail, any risk of harm posed to the child by the Mother’s partner is minimised.
The ICL and the Father both submit (and also stated by the family consultant which the Court takes into account) that if the Mother was aware of Mr D’s illegal drug supply activities, then she was unable to prioritise the child’s safety and well-being.
There is a suggestion in the Father’s allegations that the Mother may have lied to the Father at about the time of her partner’s arrest by the police in late November 2019 as to the true nature of the police attendance at the family home of the Mother at that time. The Mother denies knowledge of her partner’s illegal activities. The Mother’s partner’s Affidavit refers to financial difficulties experienced by him, prior to his arrest, with the Mother’s apparent knowledge of those difficulties. Whilst the issue of the Mother’s knowledge or lack of knowledge of illegal activities being conducted by her partner is a matter for trial, the Court does have a concern that there is a real possibility that the Mother was aware of Mr D’s illegal drug supply activities. In this context, for example, Mr D was using the mother’s garage as a repository for illegal drugs and related monies.
Should the child remain living in the Father’s primary care, and, during school term times, spend fortnightly weekend time with the Mother, any risk of harm posed to the child by reason of the Mother possibly having knowledge of such illegal activities can be minimised to some not insignificant extent. If the Mother did have such knowledge, then questions might arise such as: was she aware of the identity of any persons involved in Mr D’s illegal drug supply activities; and have any such persons sought to make contact with the Mother.
The Mother has alleged that she has concerns as to the child’s well-being because she has witnessed and the child has told her certain matters indicating that the child is experiencing emotional unwellness whilst living in the Father’s primary care. In this regard the Court refers to paragraphs 3, and 4 of the Mother’s Affidavit filed 13 July 2020. The Mother gives no timeline as to these allegations, albeit that she alleges in paragraph 4 that she spoke to the Father about the child seeing a counsellor “several months ago” but allegedly the Father refused as the Father’s new partner “looked into it and said (the child”) was “fine”. To the best of my knowledge, (the child) has just commenced seeing the school counsellor. (The child) told me this recently.” The Court has some concern as to these allegations of the Mother, and would give some weight to the child’s alleged views. On the other hand, the Mother has provided no account of her full conversations with the child the subject of these allegations as to statements made by the child to her. In this context, the Court takes some comfort in that the child’s school report for semester 1, 2020 at his new school is quite positive (see below), contains no significant negative comments about the child’s emotional state, and the child has commenced to see a counsellor at the new school.
At Annexure A of the Father’s Affidavit filed 21 July 2020, a school report for the subject child for semester 1, 2020 from the K School is attached and which refers very positively on the second page of that report to the child’s development on the school front. It states:
X displays great leadership skills by being a very positive role model for members of the class. His consistent effort and dedication in class is commendable. He is an interested learner who always displays cooperative behaviour. X listens attentively in class, including when others are expressing a viewpoint or idea. He enjoys social interactions in our classroom and has been immersed in all learning activities and themes. X is highly motivated and strives to give of his best at all times. He acts responsibly when using school equipment and resources. X has made sound progress in class this semester. Keep working hard, X!
The Father submits that the material before the Court suggests that the Mother’s present financial position may be unsatisfactory. In that context, he submits, the Court would infer, that should the child be returned to live in the Mother’s primary care, the child may be exposed to the adverse effects of possible financial instability in the Mother’s household. The material before the Court would indicate that the Mother and her partner were experiencing significant financial difficulties in about mid-2019. The Mother’s partner alleges that in about August 2019, he and the Mother were finding it hard to live day-to-day. The Mother’s partner alleges, inter alia, that the family home was sold and the Mother and himself started renting. There is a suggestion on the material before the Court that the Mother was significantly reliant upon Mr D for financial support for the family. The Mother alleges that she has been seeking to maintain Mr D’s business and refers to her alleged efforts to obtain a replacement worker. This issue of the Mother’s financial circumstances is a matter for trial, however, the Court does have some concern as to the Mother’s present financial circumstances within the context of the Mother seeking that the child now primarily live with her. In this context the Court observes that there are 2 young children presently dependent upon the mother (her children to Mr D) in addition to, it would appear, E.
As to the child’s present position living in the Father’s primary care on the Region H, the Court refers to and takes into account the allegations of the Father’s new partner contained in her Affidavit. She alleges that the child has fitted in well at his new school on the Region H. She alleges that the subject child has made new friends and achieving academic results. She alleges that the child’s teacher, Mr L, has not raised any concern with either herself or the Father in respect of the child’s welfare, academic progress or socialisation.
She alleges positive social family activities that the child is a part of in their household on the Region H. She alleges, inter alia, that the child currently plays for a rugby league club and appears to be having a lot of fun. She alleges that the child speaks to the Mother very often and if not daily at least every second day. She alleges that the Father and herself both recognise the importance of ensuring than the child and the Mother maintain their relationship.
She alleges that she is loving having the child around and alleges that the child and herself have developed a close relationship. She alleges that, in fact, the child and her two children have developed a close relationship particularly given that they are of similar age and have similar interests. She alleges that she supports the Father having the child live with herself and the Father, and she is happy for the child to do so as long as he wishes to.
The Court acknowledges the Mother’s allegations that the Father is spending regular overnight time away from home on the Region H attending to his work duties in Sydney. The Father significantly denies that he is regularly spending significant overnight time away from his home on the Region H. On the material before the Court, there is a significant suggestion that the child is well cared for by the Father and his partner on the Region H.
Again, there is an existing interim injunction against the Mother restraining her by injunction from allowing the child to come into contact with Mr D. It will be in the best interests of the child and appropriate that that injunction continue on an interim basis.
On balance, the Court is of the view that it will be in the child’s best interests to remain living with the Father on an interim basis. In these circumstances, in the view of the Court, it is important that the Court endeavour to fashion interim parenting orders that maintain the child’s meaningful relationship with the Mother, and Orders that maintain the child’s close relationships with his step-siblings. Should the Court made interim parenting orders that the child spend time with the Mother:
a)each alternate weekend, from 5 PM Friday to 6 PM Sunday,
b)the first 10 days of the shorter school holidays;
c)alternate weeks during the Christmas school holidays;
d)at other times as agreed between the parties,
there is a significant prospect that the child’s meaningful relationship with the Mother can be maintained, and the child’s close relationships with E, F and G can be maintained. Such time to be spent by the child with the Mother, the Court would observe, is a not insignificant increase in the child’s time with the Mother compared to the current interim parenting orders.
The Court should state that it has considered whether an equal time arrangement could practically operate in the best interests of the child, however, noting the considerable distance between the parties residences, and taking into account the views of the family consultant, inter alia, that an equal time or substantial time arrangement is now impractical, the Court is of the view that an equal time arrangement would not be in the child’s best interests.
Evaluating the above discussed considerations, under section 60CC of the Family Law Act1975 (Cth), it will be in the best interests of the child that the Court make the following interim parenting Orders:
(1)All previous Orders relating to specific time that the child spends with the Mother are discharged.
(2)The child shall live with the Father.
(3)The child shall spend time with the Mother as follows:
(a)each alternate weekend, from 5 PM Friday to 6 PM Sunday;
(b)the first 10 days of the shorter school holidays;
(c)alternate weeks during the Christmas school holidays;
(d)at other times as agreed between the parties.
(4)That for the purposes of changeovers, unless otherwise agreed in writing, the parties shall meet at Suburb B McDonald’s.
(5)The Father shall facilitate telephone, FaceTime, Skype, communication between the child and the Mother, when the child is not spending time with the Mother, at the following times: each Monday, Wednesday, Friday and Sunday between 7pm and 7.30pm.
(6)The parties shall both be entitled to attend all events involving the child including:
(a)Sporting fixtures;
(b)Extra-curricular activities that allow for parental attendance;
(c)School functions and events that allow for parental attendance including, but not limited to, concerts, school assemblies, sports days, parent and teacher interviews, canteen duties and social functions.
(7)The parties shall ensure the other is kept informed of:
(a)any medical problems or illnesses suffered by the child while in their care;
(b)any medication that has been prescribed for the child;
(c)any other matter relevant to the child’s welfare.
(8)That each party refrain from making critical or derogatory remarks in relation to the other party in the presence or hearing of the child and that each party do all things necessary to ensure that no third party makes critical comments about the other party in the presence or hearing of the child.
(9)That each party advise the other party and keep the other party advised of their current address and contact telephone numbers (including both landline and mobile phone number if applicable) and advise the other party of any changes to these details within seven days of such change occurring.
(10)Pursuant to section 62G(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 the parties and the children of the relationship shall attend upon a family consultant nominated by the Dispute Resolution Coordinator of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on a date and at time/s to be advised for the purposes of the preparation of a family report, such report to be released by May 2021.
(11)The Family Report shall deal with the following matters:
(a)Any views expressed by the child(ren) the subject of parenting orders sought in this case, provided that the child/ren shall not be required to express a view in relation to any matter.
(b)The nature of the relationships of the child(ren) with each of the child(ren)’s parents and with significant other persons;
(c)The willingness and ability of each of the child(ren)’s parents to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing relationship between the child(ren) and the other parent.
(d)The likely effect of any changes in the child(ren)’s circumstances, including the likely effect on the child(ren) of any separation from:
(i) either of the parents: or
(ii)any other child, or significant person, with whom the child(ren) has/have been living.
(e)The practical difficulty and expense of the child(ren) spending time with and communicating with a parent and whether that difficulty or expense will substantially affect the child(ren)’s right to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular basis.
(f)The capacity of each parent, or another person, to provide for the needs of the child(ren), including emotional and intellectual needs.
(g)The maturity, sex, lifestyle and background (including lifestyle, culture and traditions) other child(ren) and of either of the child(ren)’s parents and any other characteristics of the child(ren) that the reporter thinks are relevant.
(h)Each parent’s attitude to the child(ren) and to the responsibilities of parenthood.
(i)Any family violence involving the child(ren) or a member of the child(ren)’s family.
(12)The parties shall attend all appointments with the Family Consultant and shall ensure the subject child/ren attend all appointments with the Family Consultant, as requested by the Family Consultant.
(13)The Family Consultant may inspect the Court file, and any documents produced on subpoena access to which has been granted to a party or the Independent Children’s Lawyer.
(14)The proceedings are adjourned for mention to 16 July 2021 at 9:30am, following release of the Family Report.
I certify that the preceding forty eight (48) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Newbrun
Associate:
Date: 11 September 2020
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