Cockrell v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Cockrell v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 1779

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – application for constitutional writs – where Minister cancelled applicant’s visa pursuant to s 501(2) Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – where Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirmed decision – where case involved parental relationship between child and applicant – where direction given under s 499 Migration Act 1958 (Cth) that best interests of child be a primary consideration – where contact orders made by consent in Federal Magistrates Court providing for contact between applicant and child – where Tribunal rejected applicant’s submission that contact orders reflected Federal Magistrates Court’s view of best interests of child – where common ground that Tribunal’s characterisation of contact orders rested on misinterpretation of Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) – whether error of law going to jurisdiction – whether Tribunal misunderstood nature of its discretion – whether Tribunal failed to consider relevant consideration

Held:  Misinterpretation of Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) not error going to jurisdiction conferred by s 501(2) Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and exercised in fact – best interests of child considered in accordance with Minister’s direction – failure to consider a particular item of evidence relevant to best interests of child not a failure to consider best interests of child – application dismissed

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 43, 60CA, 60CC, 60CC(5), 64B, 65AA, 65E, 68E, 68F
Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Act 2006 (Cth) ss 61DA, 61DB
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 476A(1)(b), 499, 499(2A), 501, 501(2)
Criminal Code 1899 (Qld)

Li Shi Ping v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 35 ALD 225 referred to
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 referred to
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 referred to
Rocca v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 87 ALD 529 referred to

MARCUS COCKRELL v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP AND ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
SAD 82 OF 2007

BESANKO J
20 NOVEMBER 2007
ADELAIDE

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

SAD 82 OF 2007

BETWEEN:

MARCUS COCKRELL
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

BESANKO J

DATE OF ORDER:

20 NOVEMBER 2007

WHERE MADE:

ADELAIDE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The application be dismissed.

2.        The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the application.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

SAD 82 OF 2007

BETWEEN:

MARCUS COCKRELL
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

BESANKO J

DATE:

20 NOVEMBER 2007

PLACE:

ADELAIDE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an application by Mr Marcus Cockrell for constitutional writs directed to the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (“the Minister”) and the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the Tribunal”). The applicant claims that a decision made by…

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Details
Case
[2007] FCA 1779
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Cockrell v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship involves the applicant, a United States national, challenging the decision of the Tribunal to affirm the delegate's decision to cancel his visa on the grounds of unsatisfactory character, under section 501 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The applicant's visa was initially cancelled by the delegate, a decision that was upheld by the Tribunal. However, the Federal Court set aside the Tribunal's decision and remitted the matter for reconsideration. Upon the second hearing, the Tribunal again affirmed the cancellation decision, prompting the applicant to argue that the Tribunal had committed a jurisdictional error. The central legal issue revolved around whether the Tribunal correctly interpreted and applied the relevant legal principles in its decision-making process.

The court examined the applicant's contention that the Tribunal failed to properly consider certain aspects, including the orders made by the Federal Magistrates Court that allowed for contact between the applicant and his son. The court held that the Tribunal member was not bound to consider the applicant's personal hardship or the absence of a prior warning, as these were not mandatory considerations. Furthermore, the court found that the Tribunal member did not misunderstand the orders made by the Federal Magistrates Court; instead, the Tribunal member had considered the best interests of the child as required by law. The court concluded that the Tribunal's decision did not contain a jurisdictional error, as the relevant considerations were appropriately addressed.

In light of the above findings, the court dismissed the applicant's application and ordered that the applicant pay the first respondent's costs. The court's decision emphasized the importance of adhering to statutory requirements and correctly applying legal principles in the context of visa cancellation decisions. The case underscores the necessity for tribunals to meticulously consider all relevant factors and statutory mandates in their adjudications.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the application.

Background

Background to the litigation

On 1 June 2005, a delegate of the Minister (at that time, the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs) decided that the applicant had not satisfied him that he passed the character test under s 501 of the Act and the delegate exercised the discretion in s 501(2) of the Act to cancel the applicant’s visa. The applicant made an application for a review of that decision to the Tribunal. On 12 January 2006 the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision. However, that decision was set aside, and by reason of a consent order made by this Court, the application for review was remitted to the Tribunal to be heard and decided again with the hearing of further evidence in accordance with the directions of the Court. The application for review remitted to the Tribunal was heard by it in November 2006 and, on 28 February 2007, the Tribunal affirmed the decision under review. The applicant contends that in making that decision the Tribunal committed a jurisdictional error.The facts The applicant was born in the United States of America on 1 July 1970 and he is a national of that country. He is not a citizen of Australia. The applicant obtained a bachelor of economics degree from the University of Southern California. In 1994 the applicant came to Australia to visit a friend and, for that purpose, he obtained a Tourist (Short Stay) (Sub-class 670) visa. In 1994 or 1995, the applicant met Ms Carolyn Brough, who was an Australian citizen. He commenced a relationship with her and, on 6 September 1999, they were married. As a result of that marriage, the applicant was granted a Spouse (Sub-class 801) visa. The applicant and Ms Brough were divorced on 25 August 2004. The applicant’s father has never been part of his life and he has met him on only two occasions and that was when he was a child. The applicant’s mother and two sisters reside in the United States. In May 1996, the applicant was hospitalised for a period of approximately three days. At about that time, he commenced using cocaine on what the Tribunal member described as “a part-time, casual basis”, which the applicant said was as a result of the people he was associating with at that time. In 1997 the applicant moved from New South Wales to Brisbane to be with Ms Brough. Between 1999 and 27 March 2002, the applicant established and operated a business involving the spraying of concrete over bitumen surfaces and engraving bitumen surfaces. The applicant committed a number of offences between 1998 and 2002. He was arrested on 27 March 2002. The Tribunal member described the offences and the sentences imposed for them in the following terms:The offences involved the establishment and use of different aliases in order to fraudulently claim income tax credits and opening and operating false bank and credit card accounts. The monies obtained from the Commonwealth Government, banks and other institutions totalled $644,390.65. On November 2003, the Queensland District Court convicted the applicant of numerous offences to which he had pleaded guilty. Those offences, as they were detailed in the previous Tribunal hearing, were as follows:(a)three counts of dishonestly obtaining financial advantage from the Commonwealth, for which he was sentenced on each count to three and a half years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of eighteen months;(b)five counts of attempting to obtain financial advantage, for which he was sentenced on each count to three and a half years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of eighteen months;(c)one count of attempting to destroy evidence, for which he was given a cumulative sentence of one month’s imprisonment;(d)one count of opening a false account, for which he was sentenced to one and a half years’ imprisonment; and(e)five counts of operating a false account, for which he was sentenced on each count to one and a half years’ imprisonment.The applicant also pleaded guilty to four counts of dishonestly obtaining credit, contrary to the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld). On the same date, 13 November 2003, he was convicted by the Queensland District Court of those counts, and sentenced to six years’ imprisonment on each count, with a recommendation that he be considered eligible for post-prison community-based release after serving two years.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

BESANKO J
I do not think the Tribunal member was bound to consider hardship to the applicant himself. It is possible that in any event he did so when considering the best interests of Jedi, but even if he did not, he did not err in law in not doing so. Nor do I think the Tribunal member erred in not considering the absence of a prior warning. The fact that prior warning has been given may be relevant (paragraph 2.17(k)), but the absence of a prior warning is either irrelevant or, at most, a consideration of only permissive, not mandatory character.Conclusions For these reasons, the application should be dismissed and the applicant should pay the first respondent’s costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: BESANKO J

At the time the final orders were made, s 43 was in the same terms but the following sections had been introduced by amendment:60CA Child’s best interests paramount consideration in making a parenting orderIn deciding whether to make a particular parenting order in relation to a child, a court must regard the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration.…60CC How a court determines what is in a child’s best interestsDetermining a child’s best interests(1)Subject to subsection (5), in determining what is in the child’s best interests, the court must consider the matters set out in subsections (2) and (3).Primary considerations(2) The primary considerations are:(a)the benefit to the child of having a meaningful relationship with both of the child’s parents; and(b)the need to protect the child from physical or psychological harm from being subjected to, or exposed to, abuse, neglect or family violence.Note: Making these considerations the primary ones is consistent with the objects of this Part set out in paragraphs 60B(1)(a) and (b).Additional considerations(3) Additional considerations are:[There then follows a list of additional considerations which it is not necessary for me to set out.]…(5) Consent ordersIf the court is considering whether to make an order with the consent of all the parties to the proceedings, the court may, but is not required to, have regard to all or any of the matters set out in subsection (2) or (3).65AA Child’s best interests paramount consideration in making a parenting orderSection 60CA provides that in deciding whether to make a particular parenting order in relation to a child, a court must regard the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration. There were two limbs to the applicant’s submission that the Tribunal member misunderstood the orders made by the Federal Magistrates Court, or he did not take them into account. The first limb involves a submission that the Tribunal member did not take into account the fact that those orders allowed for a degree of contact between the applicant and Jedi. It was submitted by the applicant that the Tribunal member could not have concluded as he did that the prospects of the applicant developing a close relationship with his son were doubtful if he had taken proper account of the orders made by the Federal Magistrates Court. The second limb involves a submission that the Tribunal member misunderstood or misinterpreted the provisions of the FLA in rejecting the applicant’s submission that in making the contact orders by consent the Federal Magistrates Court was articulating that the best interests of the child would be served by allowing him to have contact with his father. I refer to the passage of the Tribunal member’s reasons set out in [24] above. The steps in this particular submission were as follows. The Federal Magistrates Court was required by law to regard the best interests of Jedi as the paramount consideration in making a parenting order and a parenting order can include a contact order. That was the case at the time of the interim orders (s 65E) and at the time of the final orders (s 65AA) and it was the case even if the orders were made by consent, although the FLA gave the Court a discretion as to whether it considered certain matters in the case of consent orders (see s 68F at the time of the interim orders and s 60CC(5) at the time of the final orders). Although the Federal Magistrates Court could order that there be contact between the applicant and Jedi, its orders at least allowed for it and it must be taken that the Federal Magistrates Court considered that contact between the applicant and Jedi was in the best interests of Jedi. The Tribunal member was considering the best interests of Jedi and the fact that another court or tribunal had, at least by implication, conveyed a view on that matter was a relevant consideration. Although the Tribunal member did not say why he rejected the applicant’s submission that weight could be placed on the orders made by the Federal Magistrates Court, it must have been because he misunderstood the provisions of the FLA. In any event, he either made an error of law going to jurisdiction or he failed to take into account a relevant consideration giving rise to jurisdictional error. These then are the steps in the applicant’s submission.