[2016] FWC 1222
DECISION
| Fair Work Act 2009 |
| s.394—Unfair dismissal |
| Stephanie Cochrane |
| v |
Neil Leslie Latcham T/A Benowa Mansions Periodontal Practice
(U2015/13628)
| DEPUTY PRESIDENT GOOLEY | MELBOURNE, 26 FEBRUARY 2016 |
| Application for relief from unfair dismissal. |
[1] On 15 October 2015, Ms Stephanie Cochrane made an application for remedy for
unfair dismissal under section 394 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act). Ms Cochrane’s
employment had been terminated by Neil Leslie Latcham T/A Benowa Mansions Periodontal
Practice on 30 September 2015.
[2] The matter was the subject of conciliation on 17 November 2015 where parties
reached an in principle agreement following the conciliation.
[3] On 24 December 2015, Benowa’s representative advised that the Deed of Release had
still not been executed by Ms Cochrane and she had yet to file a Notice of Discontinuance.
[4] On 21 January 2016, Benowa made an application under section 399A of the Act to
dismiss Ms Cochrane’s application on the grounds that Ms Cochrane had unreasonably failed
to discontinue her application after a settlement agreement had been concluded.
[5] On 22 January 2016, Ms Cochrane was sent correspondence informing her of
Benowa’s section 399A application. Ms Cochrane was directed to file submissions and other
documentary material in respect of Benowa’s application by close of business, on 1 February
2016. Ms Cochrane was advised that if she failed to comply with this direction, her
application would be dismissed.
[6] On 9 February 2016, Ms Cochrane was sent email correspondence requesting a
response by 16 February 2016 and advised that if she didn’t respond, a decision would be
made on the papers.
[7] Numerous phone and email messages have been sent to Ms Cochrane requesting she
contact the Commission.
[8] Ms Cochrane has not contacted or filed any material with the Commission.
[2016] FWC 1222
[9] Section 399A of the Act provides as follows:
399A Dismissing applications (1) The FWC may, subject to subsection (2), dismiss an application for an order under Division 4 if the FWC is satisfied that the applicant has unreasonably:
(a) failed to attend a conference conducted by the FWC, or a hearing held by the FWC, in relation to the application; or
(b) failed to comply with a direction or order of the FWC relating to the application; or
(c) failed to discontinue the application after a settlement agreement has been concluded.
....
(2) The FWC may exercise its power under subsection (1) on application by the employer.
(3) This section does not limit when the FWC may dismiss an application. [10] Section 593 of the Act provides that the Commission is not required to hold a hearing
except as provided by the Act. Ms Cochrane did not file any material in opposition to the
application to dismiss.
[11] Before the Commission can exercise its discretion to dismiss under s.399A(c) there
must be a concluded settlement. (my emphasis) Benowa referred to an in principle
agreement being reached. It was required to draw up terms of settlement. It provided those
terms to Ms Cochrane but then provided revised terms. It did not advise whether the changes
reflected the in principle terms reached. I note a third revised deed was sent to Ms Cochrane
but that only changed the date of compliance. I was not provided with a copy of any of the
terms of settlement,
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| [12] | In Masters v Cameron, | the High Court held that where parties who have been in |
negotiation reach agreement upon terms of a contractual nature and also agree that the matter
of their negotiation shall be dealt with by a formal contract, the case may belong to any of
three classes. The three classes are:
1. The parties have reached finality in arranging all the terms of their bargain and
intend to be immediately bound to the performance of those terms, but at the same
time propose to have the terms restated in a form which will be fuller or more
precise but not different in effect.
2. It may be a case in which the parties have completely agreed upon all the terms of
their bargain and intend no departure from or addition to that which their agreed
terms express or imply, but nevertheless have made performance of one or more of
the terms conditional upon the execution of a formal document.
[2016] FWC 1222
3. The case may be one in which the intention of the parties is not to make a
concluded bargain at all, unless and until they execute a formal contract.
[13] It was not put that the agreement reached between the parties was one of the first two
kinds referred to in Masters v Cameron was reached at conciliation. I am therefore not
satisfied that a settlement agreement has been concluded.
[14] Given my earlier decision it is not necessary to determine if a settlement agreement
can be concluded if the parties have not complied with their obligations under the agreement.
[15] In those circumstances I will not dismiss Ms Cochrane’s application. However I note
that Ms Cochrane has not contacted the Commission since the conciliation including failing to
respond to the directions issued in this matter.
[16] I will therefore issue directions for Ms Cochrane to file and serve material in support
of her application by noon on 13 March 2016. Ms Cochrane is advised that a failure to
comply with directions of the Commission can result in an application being dismissed.
DEPUTY PRESIDENT
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- AGLC
- Cochrane v Neil Leslie Latcham [2016] FWC 1222
- Case
- [2016] FWC 1222
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Commission was whether there was a concluded settlement agreement between the applicant and the respondent that would justify the dismissal of Ms. Cochrane's application under section 399A(c) of the Act. This required the Commission to examine the nature of the agreement reached during conciliation and whether it met the criteria for a concluded settlement as outlined in Masters v Cameron. The Commission also needed to consider whether Ms. Cochrane's failure to execute the deed of release and file a notice of discontinuance constituted an unreasonable failure to discontinue her application after a settlement agreement had been concluded.
The Deputy President, Gooley, found that the parties had reached an in principle agreement during conciliation, but this did not necessarily mean a concluded settlement agreement had been reached. The respondent had provided several drafts of the deed of release to Ms. Cochrane, but it was unclear if these reflected the terms agreed upon during conciliation. The Deputy President concluded that the evidence did not support the existence of a concluded settlement agreement, and thus, the dismissal of Ms. Cochrane's application was not warranted under section 399A(c) of the Act. Despite this finding, the Deputy President noted that Ms. Cochrane had not responded to any communications or directions from the Commission since the conciliation. Consequently, the Deputy President issued directions for Ms. Cochrane to file and serve material in support of her application by a specified date, warning that failure to comply could result in her application being dismissed.
The final orders of the Deputy President were that the application to dismiss Ms. Cochrane's application for unfair dismissal would not be granted, and directions were issued for Ms. Cochrane to file and serve material in support of her application by noon on 13 March 2016.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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