Cobb v Queensland Police Service

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DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

 Cobb v Queensland Police Service [2023] QDC 159

PARTIES:

COBB, Peter
(Appellant)

v
QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE

(Respondent)

FILE NO/S:

3075 of 2022

DIVISION:

Appellate

PROCEEDING:

Appeal pursuant to s 222 of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld)

ORIGINATING COURT:

Brisbane Magistrates Court

DELIVERED ON:

8 May 2023

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

8 May 2023

JUDGES:

Dearden DCJ

ORDER:

1.   Appeal dismissed. 

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL – APPEAL AGAINST CONVICTION – where appellant convicted of a single charge of computer hacking and misuse – where appellant was sentenced to 18 months good behaviour and recognisance of $900 – where the appellant submits that the learned magistrate applied an improper construction of s 408E of the Criminal Code to the facts – whether accessing WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger on a personal mobile phone was a restricted computer

COUNSEL:

MJ Jackson for the appellant

BA Reynolds for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

McGinness & Associates for the appellant

Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions for the respondent

Introduction

  1. The appellant, Peter Cobb, was convicted of a charge of computer hacking and misuse, at the Brisbane Magistrates Court on 18 November 2022 after a trial. 

  2. The appellant was released upon entering into a recognisance in the sum of $900, conditional that he must be of good behaviour for a period of 18 months.  No conviction was recorded. [1]

    [1]Sentence Transcript T1-21 ll 32-38.

    Grounds

  3. The notice of appeal identified the following grounds:

    (1)The learned magistrate erred in applying an improper construction of section 408E [Criminal Code] to the facts, namely, that the explanatory memorandum supported the conclusion that accessing WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger on a personal mobile phone was a “restricted computer” for the purpose of s 408E (Computer Hacking and Misuse); and

    (2)The learned magistrate erred in applying the wrong onus of proof to the facts, namely, impermissibly reversing the onus of proof (notice of appeal filed 15 December 2022). 

  4. By consent, a third ground of appeal was added at the hearing, namely:

    (3)The learned magistrate erred in applying an improper construction of section 408E [Criminal Code] to the facts. 

    The law - appeals

  5. I repeat and adopt my exposition of the law in respect of appeals under the Justices Act 1886 (Qld) as set out in Jenkins v Commissioner of Police [2021] QDC 289, [7]-[9]:

    [7]The appeal proceeds pursuant to Justices Act 1886 (Qld) (‘JA’) s.222, and is a rehearing (JA s.223).

    [8]In McDonald v Queensland Police Service [2017] QCA 255, [47], Bowskill J stated:

    “It is well established that, on an appeal under s 222 by way of rehearing, the District Court is required to conduct a real review of the trial, and the magistrate’s reasons, and make its own determination of relevant facts in issue from the evidence, giving due deference and attaching a good deal of weight to the magistrate’s view. Nevertheless, in order to succeed on such an appeal, the appellant must establish some legal, factual or discretionary error.” [citations…

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Details
Case
[2023] QDC 159
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal in Cobb v Queensland Police Service was against the conviction of the appellant, Cobb, for a single charge of computer hacking and misuse, as defined under section 408E of the Criminal Code. The appellant argued that the learned magistrate applied an improper construction of the statute to the facts of the case, particularly concerning whether accessing WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger on a personal mobile phone constituted a "restricted computer" within the meaning of section 408E. Cobb was sentenced to 18 months good behaviour and a recognisance of $900. The central issue before the court was whether the magistrate correctly interpreted the statutory provision in question and whether the complainant's Samsung S7 mobile phone qualified as a "restricted computer."

The court meticulously reviewed the magistrate's interpretation of section 408E, considering the text, context, and heading of the statute. The appellant argued that the term "restricted computer" was intended to apply to computers connected to a system or network, rather than a standalone personal device. The court examined the definitions and the explanatory notes provided with the legislation, and found that the magistrate's reliance on the explanatory notes was not in accordance with statutory interpretation principles. However, the court determined that despite this error, the magistrate's interpretation of the statute aligned with its ordinary meaning and context. The court held that the complainant's phone was indeed a "restricted computer" under the statute, as it was password-protected and the complainant had not given the appellant access or consent to use it.

Given the proper interpretation of the statute and the evidence presented, the court upheld the conviction. The appeal was dismissed, and the original conviction and sentence stood.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

I repeat and adopt my exposition of the law in respect of appeals under the Justices Act 1886 (Qld) as set out in Jenkins v Commissioner of Police [2021] QDC 289, [7]-[9]:[7]The appeal proceeds pursuant to Justices Act 1886 (Qld) (‘JA’) s.222, and is a rehearing (JA s.223).[8]In McDonald v Queensland Police Service [2017] QCA 255, [47], Bowskill J stated:“It is well established that, on an appeal under s 222 by way of rehearing, the District Court is required to conduct a real review of the trial, and the magistrate’s reasons, and make its own determination of relevant facts in issue from the evidence, giving due deference and attaching a good deal of weight to the magistrate’s view. Nevertheless, in order to succeed on such an appeal, the appellant must establish some legal, factual or discretionary error.” [citations omitted][9]In Forrest v Commissioner of Police [2017] QCA 132, Sofronoff P stated:“…an appellate court hearing an appeal by way of rehearing must conduct a real review of the evidence and make up its own mind about the case.”Background Uniquely, this trial proceeded on the basis that the only evidence placed before the learned magistrate was a List of Admissions pursuant to s.644 of the Criminal Code, which are as follows (trial exhibit 1):1.At all material times, the complainant was the defendant's ex-partner and an experienced serving police officer. 2.At all material rimes, the complainant and the defendant had separated but were living together at 8218, Magnolia Drive, Hope Island, Queensland. 3.At all material times, the complainant possessed a Samsung S7 mobile phone, which was the complainant's old mobile phone. 4.Between 4 May 2021 and 2 June 2021, the defendant accessed the complainant's WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger applications, accessing her information on her Samsung S7 mobile phone. 5.At the time that the defendant accessed the complainant's Samsung S7 mobile phone, the mobile was password-protected and the complainant had never provided the password to the defendant. 6.The complainant did not give permission to the defendant to access her Samsung S7 mobile phone in the way outlined above at paragraph [4]. 7.The complainant did not consent to the defendant accessing her Samsung S7 mobile phone in the way outlined [D] above at paragraph [4]. At the conclusion of the prosecution case, the appellant made a "no case" application, which was dismissed. The appellant then chose to neither give nor call evidence, and after submissions, was convicted of the charge. DiscussionGround 1 - The learned magistrate erred in applying an improper construction of section 408E [Criminal Code] to the facts, namely, that the explanatory memorandum supported the conclusion that accessing WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger on a personal mobile phone was a "restricted computer" for the purpose of s.408E (Computer Hacking and Misuse). The appellant's written submissions identify the argument with some particularity in respect of this ground, and are as follows:[2][2]Appellant’s Outline of Submissions [12]-[20]. 12.The source of the error is:"I have come to that conclusion based on the fact that, and the greatest assistance I had was to the legislation was out of the explanatory notes that were handed to me. Essentially, the section that was created under section 408E(1) was indicated as: A person who uses a restricted computer without the consent of the computer's controller commits a simple offence and is liable to imprisonment for two years…"[3][3]Transcript of Decision 1-17 ll 10-16. 13.The error is that the learned magistrate did not find there was "ambiguity" or an "absurd result" or to otherwise confirm the "ordinary meaning" before having recourse to the explanatory memorandum [see s.14D(1) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954]. It was noted that the explanatory note did not provide much guidance in any event [see transcript of hearing T1-6 ll 43-47; T1-14 ll 26-34]. 14.Section 408E(5) defines (relevantly):"Computer means all or part of a computer, computer system or computer network and includes, for example, all external devices connected to the computer in any way or capable of communicating with each other as part of a system or network… …restricted computer means a computer for which - (a) A device, code or a particular sequence of electronic impulses is necessary in order to gain access to or use the computer; and(b) The controller – (i)Withholds or takes steps to withhold access to the device, or knowledge of the code or of the sequence or of the way of producing the code or the sequence, from other persons; or (ii)Restricts access or takes steps to restrict access to the device or knowledge of the code or of the sequence, or to the way of producing the sequence, to a person or a class of persons authorised by the controller…"15.The appellant submits that the complainant's Samsung S7 mobile phone is not a "restricted computer" for the purpose of s.408E of the Code for the following reasons. 16.First, the text (see s.32A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954; see also R v A2 [2019] 269 CLR 507 at [32] per Kiefel CJ and Keane J) of the definition of a "computer" and a "restricted computer" indicate that the provision is directed at a "computer" connected to a "system" or "network" which is restricted by the "controller". In other words, the text of the provision indicates that the "computer" is connected to an intranet or some other similar infrastructure. 17.Second, the context [R v A2 [2019] 269 CLR 507, [33]] supports the construction that the provision is aimed at preventing access to confidential information that is contained on an information technology platform or infrastructure or an external device that is connected to a computer system or network on such a platform. That can be seen from other relevant definitions in subsection (5) include:"Controller means a person who has a right to control the computer's use…Use, of a restricted computer, includes accessing or altering any information stored in, or communicate information directly or indirectly to or from, the restricted computer, or cause a virus to become installed on or to otherwise affect, the computer"…18.And the other context that is relevant is that s.408E is within part 6 [section 14(1) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954] of the Code dealing with "offences relating to property and contracts", division 2 "stealing and like offences". In particular, s 408E is found in Chapter 37 which is the part of the Code that deals with "offences analogous to stealing". 19.Finally, the heading [section 14(1) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954] of s.408E also supports the construction. Section 408E is headed "Computer Hacking and Misuse". The inclusion of s.408E in this part of the Code with that particular heading provides additional support that the mischief [R v A2 [2019] 269 CLR 507, at [33] per Kiefel CJ and Keane J] is the unauthorised hacking of the files and other information on a computerised system. 20.In light of those reasons, the appellant submits that on a rehearing of the evidence, the appellant does not have a case to answer because the preferable construction is that for an offence to have been committed, the relevant device must involve the unauthorised access of date which is otherwise "connected to the computer in any way" or "capable of communicating with each other as part of a system or network".

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established