CNY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

The High Court of Australia heard an appeal concerning the review of a protection visa refusal decision by the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA). The applicant, CNY17, challenged the IAA's decision, alleging jurisdictional error by the Secretary of the Department of Immigration and Border Protection and apprehended bias by the IAA. The core of the dispute involved material provided by the Secretary to the IAA under section 473CB(1)(c) of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth), which the applicant argued was irrelevant and prejudicial, and that the applicant was unaware of its existence.

The legal issues before the High Court were whether the Secretary's provision of irrelevant and prejudicial material to the IAA constituted jurisdictional error, whether such error invalidated the IAA's decision, and whether the IAA's conduct gave rise to an apprehended bias, contrary to section 473FA of the *Migration Act*. The Court was required to consider the proper order for assessing these grounds of appeal and the application of the test for apprehended bias in the context of the IAA's review process.

The High Court allowed the appeal, quashing the IAA's decision and remitting the matter to the IAA for redetermination by a differently constituted body. The Court reasoned that the rule against bias is a fundamental principle of procedural fairness, designed to ensure that a decision-making process is, and appears to be, fair. The test for apprehended bias focuses on whether a fair-minded lay observer might conclude that the decision-maker might be diverted from the merits of the case, and this assessment does not depend on whether the irrelevant material actually influenced the final decision. The Court found that the Secretary's provision of irrelevant and prejudicial material to the IAA, of which the applicant was unaware, created a reasonable apprehension of bias, thereby constituting a jurisdictional error that invalidated the IAA's decision. The Court emphasised that the consideration of apprehended bias should precede other grounds of appeal, as it can render those other grounds unnecessary.