CNY15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CNY15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1456

Appeal from: CNY15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 963
File number: NSD 740 of 2017
Judge: RANGIAH J
Date of judgment: 7 December 2017
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court – refusal to grant protection visa - where Tribunal rejected appellant’s credibility – whether Tribunal required to give particulars of information – whether Tribunal failed to consider a claim – no jurisdictional error – appeal dismissed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36, 424AA and 424A
Cases cited: SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 235 ALR 609
Date of hearing: 22 November 2017
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 27
Counsel for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr J Pinder of Minter Ellison
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice

ORDERS

NSD 740 of 2017
BETWEEN:

CNY15

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

RANGIAH J

DATE OF ORDER:

7 DECEMBER 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

RANGIAH J:

  1. This is an appeal against a judgment of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia delivered on 1 May 2017.  The primary judge dismissed the appellant’s application for judicial review of a decision of the second respondent, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal).  The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent to refuse the appellant the grant of a Protection (Class XA) visa. 

  2. The appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh who first arrived in Australia on 1 June 2010.  On 21 March 2011, he applied for a protection visa.  On 27 May 2011, the first protection visa application was refused by a delegate of the first respondent.  The appellant then sought review of that decision before the Refugee Review Tribunal (the RRT).  The RRT found that it did not have jurisdiction in respect of the application as it was lodged outside the prescribed time.  The appellant unsuccessfully sought review of that decision before the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia, the Federal Court of Australia and the High Court of Australia.  He then made an unsuccessful application for ministerial intervention. 

  3. On 18 September 2013, the appellant made a second application for a protection visa based on a claim for complementary protection pursuant to s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). On 19 August 2014, the delegate refused to grant the appellant a protection visa. He then sought review of the delegate’s decision before the Tribunal. On 2 November 2015, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision.

  4. In his second application form, the appellant…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 1456
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of CNY15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection concerned an appeal against the refusal to grant a protection visa by the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. The appellant, CNY15, had applied for a protection visa, but this was refused by the Tribunal, which found that the appellant's credibility was questionable. The appellant's appeal against this decision was heard by the Federal Circuit Court and subsequently brought to the High Court.

The central legal issues in this case were whether the Tribunal was required to give particulars of any information that would be the reason or a part of the reason for affirming the decision under review, and whether the Tribunal failed to consider the appellant's claim. The appellant argued that the Tribunal had not complied with the procedure outlined in s 424A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and that this failure constituted a jurisdictional error.

The High Court found that the Tribunal had not committed a jurisdictional error. The Court reasoned that s 424A of the Act required the Tribunal to provide particulars of any information that it considered would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision under review. The Court held that the Tribunal was not required to provide particulars of information that was not relevant to the decision, such as inconsistencies in the appellant's evidence or the Tribunal's disbelief of the evidence. The Court also found that the Tribunal had considered the appellant's claim and had made a decision based on the evidence presented.

The High Court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the costs of the appeal. This decision reinforces the importance of ensuring that tribunals follow proper procedures when making decisions, but also highlights the limited scope of the requirement to provide particulars of information under s 424A of the Act.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

In that case, the High Court was concerned with an application where the Tribunal had drawn an appellant’s attention to discrepancies between his oral evidence and his written claims in a statutory declaration and invited him to comment, but there had not been any attempt to comply with the procedure in s 424A. The High Court held:[15]This then requires close attention to the circumstances in which s 424A is engaged. Section 424A does not require notice to be given of every matter the tribunal might think relevant to the decision under review. Rather, the tribunal’s obligation is limited to the written provision of “particulars of any information that the tribunal considers would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision that is under review”. What, then, was the “information” that the appellants say the tribunal should have provided? In their written submissions, the appellants appeared to focus on the requisite “information” as being the “inconsistencies” between their statutory declaration and oral evidence. However, in oral argument they focused on the provision of the relevant passages in the statutory declaration itself, from which the inconsistencies were later said to arise.…[17] Secondly, the appellants assumed, but did not demonstrate, that the statutory declaration “would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision that is under review”...Here, the appropriate criterion was to be found in s 36(1) of the Act, being the provision under which the appellants sought their protection visa. The “reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision that is under review” was therefore that the appellants were not persons to whom Australia owed protection obligations under the Convention. When viewed in that light, it is difficult to see why the relevant passages in the appellants’ statutory declaration would itself be “information that the tribunal considers would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision that is under review”. Those portions of the statutory declaration did not contain in their terms a rejection, denial or undermining of the appellants’ claims to be persons to whom Australia owed protection obligations. Indeed, if their contents were believed, they would, one might have thought, have been a relevant step towards rejecting, not affirming, the decision under review.[18] Thirdly and conversely, if the reason why the tribunal affirmed the decision under review was the tribunal’s disbelief of the appellants’ evidence arising from inconsistencies therein, it is difficult to see how such disbelief could be characterised as constituting “information” within the meaning of para (a) of s 424A(1). Again, if the tribunal affirmed the decision because even the best view of the appellants’ evidence failed to disclose a Convention nexus, it is hard to see how such a failure can constitute “information”. Finn and Stone JJ correctly observed in VAF v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs that the word “information”:… does not encompass the tribunal’s subjective appraisals, thought processes or determinations … nor does it extend to identified gaps, defects or lack of detail or specificity in evidence or to conclusions arrived at by the tribunal in weighing up the evidence by reference to those gaps, etc ……However broadly “information” be defined, its meaning in this context is related to the existence of evidentiary material or documentation, not the existence of doubts, inconsistencies or the absence of evidence. The appellants were thus correct to concede that the relevant “information” was not to be found in inconsistencies or disbelief, as opposed to the text of the statutory declaration itself.…(Citations omitted, underlining added.)

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