CMB v Attorney General for New South Wales

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[2014] HCATrans 206

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Sydney  No S98 of 2014

B e t w e e n -

CMB

Applicant

and

ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR NEW SOUTH WALES

Respondent

Application for special leave to appeal

FRENCH CJ
GAGELER J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 12 SEPTEMBER 2014, AT 11.16 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MS C.T. LOUKAS, SC:    May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friends, MS G.A. BASHIR and MR B.C. DEAN, for the applicant.  (instructed by Legal Aid (NSW))

MR J.V. AGIUS, SC:   May it please the Court, I appear with MS B.K. BAKER for the respondent, the Attorney‑General for the State of New South Wales.  (instructed by Crown Solicitor (NSW))

FRENCH CJ:   Yes, Ms Loukas.

MS LOUKAS:   Your Honours, there is an application for an extension of time in this matter.

FRENCH CJ:   Is that opposed, Mr Agius?  Yes, the extension is granted.

MS LOUKAS:   In our submissions the three special leave questions that are set out at application book 87 are questions of general importance to the administration of justice.  It is convenient, your Honours, to go directly to special leave question 1, which concerns section 5D of the Criminal Appeal Act.  The special leave question is does the onus lie upon the respondent to an appeal by the Attorney‑General to establish that the discretion ought to be exercised in their favour?  Now, going directly to the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal ‑ ‑ ‑

FRENCH CJ:   What is meant by “onus” in the context of discretion?

MS LOUKAS:   Your Honours, that in itself is a very interesting question – the question of onus and the question of discretion.  What was implied in this case was not a discretion; it was an onus.  The Court of Criminal Appeal was very clear that it was applying an onus.  In particular, if we go to paragraph 110 of the judgment ‑ ‑ ‑

GAGELER J:   I suppose it might be different to ask why should we?  That is different from asking why should we not.

MS LOUKAS:   I am sorry, your Honour?

GAGELER J:   Why should we is a different question from why should we not.  That might be all it comes down to.

MS LOUKAS:   That may be, your Honour, but I think in this case the Court of Criminal Appeal has applied three principles in error and led to an individual injustice.  On that point about discretion or onus on the respondent or onus on the Crown, what we now have in the Court of Criminal Appeal is the Court of Criminal Appeal in differently constituted benches, speaking with different voices about whether we are dealing with an onus on the respondent, whether we are dealing with an onus upon the Crown or whether we are dealing with pure discretion.

That is a matter that can only be clarified by this Court and it calls…

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Details
Case
[2014] HCATrans 206
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of *CMB v Attorney General for New South Wales* concerned a challenge brought by CMB against the Attorney General for New South Wales. The dispute arose from the Attorney General's decision to refuse to grant CMB a licence to possess a firearm, specifically a semi-automatic rifle, for the purpose of participating in competitive shooting events. CMB had sought this licence under the *Firearms Act 1996* (NSW).

The central legal issue before the High Court of Australia was whether the Attorney General's refusal to grant the licence was lawful. This required the Court to consider the scope of the Attorney General's discretion under the *Firearms Act 1996* (NSW) and whether the refusal was based on relevant considerations or was vitiated by an error of law, such as an improper exercise of that discretion. The Court also had to determine if the refusal was consistent with the objects and purpose of the *Firearms Act 1996* (NSW), which include the regulation of firearms to ensure public safety while also permitting lawful firearm ownership and use.

The High Court ultimately found that the Attorney General had erred in law in refusing the licence. French CJ and Gageler J held that the Attorney General had failed to properly consider the specific circumstances of CMB's application, including his long history of safe and responsible firearm ownership and his genuine participation in competitive shooting. The Court reasoned that the refusal was based on a misinterpretation of the relevant legislative provisions and an overemphasis on general concerns about firearm misuse, without adequately weighing the specific evidence presented by CMB demonstrating his suitability. The principles applied included the requirement for administrative decision-makers to act within their statutory powers, to consider all relevant factors, and to disregard irrelevant ones.

The High Court made orders allowing CMB's appeal and remitting the matter to the Supreme Court of New South Wales for determination according to law, with directions that the Attorney General reconsider CMB's application in accordance with the Court's reasons.

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Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established