Clyne v Ituau-Puletua

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

Clyne v Ituau-Puletua [2025] FedCFamC2G 1355

File number(s): SYG 488 of 2025
Judgment of: JUDGE KAUR-BAINS
Date of judgment: 21 August 2025
Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW – FAIR WORK – application for default judgment –– consideration of rr 13.04(2) and 13.05(2)(c) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2)(General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) – alleged contraventions of ss 44, 323(1), 405 and 550(2) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) – whether the respondent was involved in the contraventions of the applicant’s employer – upon admissions taken to have been made by reason of the respondent’s default contraventions found and default judgment entered
Legislation:

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), ss 13, 44, 61(1), 61(2)(d), 87(2), 90(2), 323(1), 405, 545(1), 545(2)(b), 546, 546(3), 547, 550(2) and 570

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth), s 223

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth), rr 1.06(3), 6.01, 6.07(1), 13.04(2)(a), 13.04(2)(b), 13.04(2)(b)(i), 13.04(2)(b)(iii), 13.04(2)(b)(iv), 13.05(2)(c) and items 13 and 15 of sch 1

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), rr 16.07 and 16.32

Long Service Leave Act 1955 (NSW), ss 4, 4(1), 4(2)(a)(iii), 10A and 10B

Cases cited:

Bevis v VA Holdings Pty Ltd trading as Granton Homes & Ors [2020] FCCA 2082

iNova Pharmaceuticals (Australia) Pty Ltd v Letos Group Pty Ltd [2022] FedCFamC2G 1052

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 54
Date of hearing: 22 July 2025
Place: Sydney
Solicitor for the Applicant: Mr W Clarke of Marrickville Legal Centre
Solicitor for the Respondent: No appearance

ORDERS

SYG 488 of 2025

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

GAVIN CLYNE

Applicant

AND:

VILLI ROYD ITUAU-PULETUA

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE KAUR-BAINS

DATE OF ORDER:

21 AUGUST 2025

THE COURT DECLARES THAT:

1.Upon admissions taken to have been made by reason of the Respondent’s default, the Respondent was involved in the contraventions of civil remedy provisions by Surelinc Services Pty Ltd ACN 149 844 128 (in liquidation) and pursuant to s 550(1) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FWAct) is taken to have contravened:

(a)section 44 of the FW Act by failing to pay the Applicant his accrued annual leave;

(b)section 323(1) of the FW Act by failing to pay the Applicant his accrued pro-rata long service leave; and

(c)section 405 of the FW Act by contravening the order made by the Fair Work Commission dated 4 July 2024 in its failure to pay the Applicant the amount awarded.

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Default judgment be entered for the Applicant against the Respondent pursuant to r 13.05(2)(c) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) (GFLRules) by reason of its failure to:

(a)give an address for service as required by r 6.01 of the GFL Rules and Order 1 of the Court’s orders dated…

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Details
Case
[2025] FedCFamC2G 1355
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, Clyne, brought a proceeding against the respondent, Ituau-Puletua, seeking a default judgment against the respondent for alleged contraventions of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act) by his employer, Surelinc Services Pty Ltd. The applicant sought declarations, compensation, penalties, and costs against the respondent. The Court was required to determine whether the respondent was in default, whether the application met the criteria for a default judgment under the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) (GFL Rules), and if so, whether to grant the relief sought by the applicant. The Court considered the legal principles surrounding default judgments, including the requirement for a statement of claim, the need for the statement of claim to disclose a reasonable cause of action, and the Court’s discretion not to make an order even if the preconditions were satisfied. The Court found that the respondent was in default and that the application met the criteria for a default judgment. The Court granted the relief sought by the applicant, including declarations, compensation, penalties, and costs.
The Court ordered that the respondent be in default, that declarations be made as sought by the applicant, and that the applicant be paid compensation, penalties, and costs as sought.

Decision

Reasons for decision

By application in a proceeding filed on 20 June 2025 (default judgment application), the applicant seeks default judgment pursuant to subrules 13.04(2)(b) and 13.05(2)(c) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) (GFLRules), including declarations of contraventions, orders for compensation and penalties under the provisions of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FWAct) and costs against the respondent. The applicant’s claims arose in the context of his employment on 24 November 2014 as a full-time air-conditioning technician with Surelinc Services Pty Ltd ACN 149 844 128 (in liquidation) (Surelinc). The applicant claimed that he was not paid:(a)accrued annual leave in the sum of $7,258.87; (b)accrued pro-rata long service leave in the sum of $14,439.96; and (c)compensation pursuant to an order made by the Fair Work Commission dated 4 July 2025 (FWC Order) in the sum of $27,707.66. Surelinc was placed in liquidation on 19 July 2024. The applicant alleged that the respondent, Mr Villi Royd Ituau-Puletua (Mr Ituau-Puletua), was the controlling mind of Surelinc and was involved in its contraventions of the FW Act. Accordingly, the default judgment application was filed against the respondent.PROCEDURAL HISTORY On 20 February 2025, the applicant filed an application in the Fair Work Division of this Court (application), together with a statement of claim. In an affidavit of service affirmed on 24 April 2025 by Mr Juchau Murray (Mr Murray), a licensed process server, stated that on 22 April 2025 at 6:47 pm, he attended at 5 Whitley Close, St Marys. At the time of personal service, Mr Murray had a conversation with someone who identified himself as “Villi Royd Ituau-Puletua”, who is the respondent. Mr Ituau-Puletua confirmed he was the person mentioned in the application and statement of claim and that he would accept service of the said documents. I note that r 6.07(1) of the GFL Rules permits service by hand of a copy of the documents on an individual. First court date – 12 May 2025 The matter came before me for a first court date at 2:15 pm on 12 May 2025. At that time, the matter was called three times outside the courtroom and there was no appearance for the respondent. Mr William Clarke (Mr Clarke), solicitor at the Marrickville Legal Centre (MLC), appeared for the applicant. On 12 May 2025, I made the following orders:1.The Respondent file and serve a Notice of Address for Service pursuant to rule 6.01 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 by 4pm on 26 May 2025.2.The Applicant serve by registered post on the Respondent a copy of these Orders at the address at which the applicant was personally served with the originating process and file an Affidavit of Service as to the service of the Orders.3.The matter be listed for further [hearing at] 2.15pm on 2 June 2025. 2 June 2025 The matter came back before me at 2:15 pm on 2 June 2025. At that time, the matter was called three times outside the courtroom and there was no appearance for the respondent. On that occasion, Ms Genevieve Barry, solicitor at MLC, appeared for the applicant.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

I also find that the respondent failed to file a notice of address for service in accordance with r 6.01 of the GFL Rules and Order 1 made on 12 May 2025 referred to at [7] of this judgment. Further, given the matters set out at [8] and [13] of this judgment, I find that the respondent failed to appear at the directions hearings listed at 2:15 pm on 2 June 2025 and at 10:15 am on 4 July 2025, and at the default judgment hearing listed at 10:15 am on 22 July 2025. The respondent has also failed to appear today despite having been served with notice of today’s hearing. In the circumstances, I am satisfied that the respondent is in default for the purposes of rr 13.04(2)(a), 13.04(2)(b)(i), 13.04(2)(b)(iii) and 13.04(2)(b)(iv) of the GFL Rules. Whether default judgment be entered and declarations be made?Relevant legal principles The relevant legal principles applicable to default judgments are helpfully set out in the decision of his Honour Judge Manousaridis in iNova Pharmaceuticals (Australia) Pty Ltd v Letos Group Pty Ltd [2022] FedCFamC2G 1052 at [109] to [119] as follows (footnotes omitted):Nature and scope of r 13.05(2)(c) of the GFL Rules109Rules 13.04 and 13.05(2)(c) of the GFL Rules were adapted from, and are substantially similar to, the rules contained in O 35A of the now repealed Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth) (old FC Rules); and r 13.05(2)(c) of the GFL Rules is almost identical to O 35A r 3(2). 110Before O 35A was introduced into the old FC Rules in 2004, the Federal Court could enter default judgment against a respondent only if an application for default judgment was supported by admissible evidence that proved the applicant’s claims for relief. In Australian Securities Commission v MacLeod & Ors Drummond J described this limitation in the old FC Rules by reference to the rules of other courts which had as their source the rules of court of the English High Court after the passing of the Judicature Acts: This rule (and other Federal Court Rules which permit the making of the same orders where a respondent is in default in complying with other procedural requirements, eg, O 11, r 23; O 15, r 16 and O 16, r 9) differs from provisions found in the rules of other courts which are derived from the post-Judicature Act rules of the English High Court. In certain classes of action, eg, where the plaintiff's claim was for a liquidated demand, the rules of other courts allowed the plaintiff to enter judgment by the ministerial act of a court official and without the intervention of the court; but the general rule empowered the entry of such judgment in default as the plaintiff appeared entitled to on his statement of claim. Initially there was some uncertainty as to whether on an application under English O 27, r 11 (the rule permitting judgment in default of defence), proof of the facts alleged in the statement of claim was required. It appears that late in the 1880s, a meeting of the judges resolved that, on such an application, the court should not receive evidence but should give judgment on the statement of claim alone: see Smith v Buchan (1888) 58 LT 710. From this time, it was firmly established that, on a motion for judgment in default, the plaintiff was not required (or entitled) to produce any evidence in support of the allegations in the statement of claim: see Young v Thomas [1892] 2 Ch 134, where Bowen LJ identified the justification for the practice: the defendant's failure to plead amounted to an admission of the facts in the statement of claim. The English practice thus proceeded on the basis that evidence was required on a motion for judgment in default of defence, but that that evidence was to be found, and found only, in the defendant's admission of the facts alleged in the statement of claim constituted by his failure to plead to them.111The purpose of the addition to the old FC Rules of O 35A r 3(2)(c), therefore, was to include in the old FC Rules a rule to the effect that had been used in State and Territory courts for years that authorised the entry of default judgment on the assumption that the defaulting respondent has admitted the allegations of fact made in the statement of claim. 112There are a number of matters to note about r 13.05(2)(c) of the GFL Rules. First, and consistently with the purpose for which O 35A r 3(2)(c) was introduced into the old FC Rules, r 13.05(2)(c) “does not require proof of the claim by evidence, but only requires that – on the face of the statement of claim – there is a claim for the relief sought”. 113Second, before the Court may make an order under r 13.05(2)(c) of the GFL Rules it must be satisfied that the document which the applicant has filed with the application is in fact a “statement of claim”. A statement of claim is a pleading, which means it must comply with the rules of pleading. Thus, for example, the purported statement of claim must “state the material facts on which a party relies that are necessary to give the opposing party fair notice of the case to be made against that party at trial, but not the evidence by which the material facts are to be proved”. Here, “material facts” are facts whose existence is “necessary for the purpose of formulating a complete cause of action”. A “cause of action”, in turn, is “a factual situation the existence of which entitles one person to obtain from the court a remedy against another person”. Another example of a rule of pleading is that the statement of claim must not allege “conclusions drawn from unstated facts”. 114Third, it follows from what I have said in the previous paragraph that the statement of claim must plead at least one reasonable cause of action that supports the granting of the relief the applicant seeks in the application. More particularly, “each element of the relevant civil wrong” of which the applicant complains must be “properly and discretely pleaded in the statement of claim”. 115Fourth, although r 13.05(2)(c) of the GFL Rules does not require proof of the claim by evidence, it is permissible for the applicant to adduce evidence that is relevant to the relief sought. That point was made by Lord Woolf MR in Phonographic Performance Ltd v Maitra: It is clear from the terms of O19, r 7 and para 19/7/10 that judgment in default is given upon the facts pleaded in the statement of claim and that affidavit evidence to supplement or support those facts is not appropriate as the pleaded facts are deemed to be admitted. However, that cannot be rigidly applied where the judge has to exercise a discretion whether to grant the relief sought. Where an injunction is sought facts relevant to the grant of that injunction, which are not deemed to be admitted, should be brought to the attention of the judge by way of affidavit or otherwise. Further, if the judge is aware of matters relevant to the exercise of his discretion, he can seek an appropriate explanation before coming to any decision.116It has been confirmed that it is permissible on an application for an order under O 35A r 3(2)(c) of the old FC Rules to adduce evidence relevant to relief. In Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Dataline.Net.Au Pty Limited, Kiefel J (as her Honour then was) said:It may be accepted that some further affidavit material may be accepted by the Court in relation to the relief sought. . . . Evidence which would alter the pleaded case should not be admitted. . . . Regard should not be had to evidence of facts which could have been, but were not, pleaded concerning the conduct of the respondents. 117Fifth, there is the question of the approach that should be taken to construing the statement of claim. The question of construction of a statement of claim was considered by the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in Penthouse Publications Ltd v McWilliam in the different context of an application to strike out a statement of claim. Priestley JA, with whose reasons Meagher JA and Waddell AJA agreed, gave a “liberal construction to the plaintiff’s statement of claim”. His Honour was of the view that a statement of claim would be given a liberal construction by answering the question of what a “demurring” party will be taken to accept when that party claims the statement of claim discloses no reasonable cause of action. His Honour said that a demurring party “is in the position not only of having to accept the truth of all allegations in the statement of claim, but also the truth of the ranges of meaning of the assertions of fact in the statement of claim which those assertions are reasonably capable of bearing”. I will follow this approach in the context of an application for an order under r 13.05(2)(c) of the GFL Rules.118Also relevant to construing a statement of claim is the principle that “[p]articulars control the generality of the pleadings”. That means that the generality of an allegation contained in the statement of claim will be limited by any particulars appended to that allegation.119Finally, the Court retains a discretion not to make an order under r 13.05(2)(c) of the GFL Rules even if the preconditions for making an order are satisfied.