CLP19 v Minister for Immigration

[2020] FCCA 1257

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CLP19 & ANOR v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2020] FCCA 1257

Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Review of Administrative Appeals Tribunal decision – refusal of protection visas – applicants claiming a fear of harm in Fiji – applicants disbelieved in critical respects – whether the Tribunal’s findings were open and whether the Tribunal misunderstood evidence or its functions considered – no jurisdictional error.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.36, 48B, 414, 415

Cases cited:
BQQ15 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 218
Hossain v Minister for Immigration (2018) 92 ALJR 780
SZVAP v Minister for Immigration (2015) 233 FCR 451

First Applicant: CLP19

Second Applicant: CLQ19

First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

Second Respondent: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

File Number: SYG 1549 of 2019

Judgment of: Judge Driver

Hearing date: 20 May 2020

Delivered at: Sydney

Delivered on: 5 June 2020

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr T Silva by telephone

Counsel for the Respondents: Mr G Johnson by telephone

Solicitors for the Respondents: HWL Ebsworth

ORDERS

1. The application as amended on 30 September 2019 is dismissed.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 1549 of 2019

CLP19

First Applicant

CLQ19

Second Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction and background

1. The applicants seek judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) made on 14 June 2019.  The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister (delegate) not to grant the applicants protection visas.  There are two applicants who are a husband (applicant) and his wife (second applicant). 

2. Background facts concerning the applicants’ claims for protection and the decision of the Tribunal on them are set out in the Minister’s outline of submissions filed on 6 May 2020. 

3. The applicants are citizens of Fiji. They arrived in Australia on 7 May 2009 holding visitor visas. On 19 June 2009, each of the applicants applied to the Minister’s Department for a protection visa.[1]  In that application the applicant claimed to fear harm due to his political opinion against military dictators like Commodore Bainimarana.[2] The applicant also asserted human rights and economic reasons as the justification for coming to Australia.[3] The second applicant did not advance her own protection claims, but depended for the grant of the visa on the claims of her husband. On 14 September 2009 the delegate refused the applications.[4] The applicants sought review of the decision by the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) but the RRT found it lacked jurisdiction because the application for review was brought out of time.[5] The applicants unsuccessfully sought Ministerial intervention in 2009, and twice were rejected by the Minister in seeking permission to make a further visa application under s.48B of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Migration Act). The applicants were unlawful non-citizens between 16 November 2010 and 25 August 2013.

   [1] Court Book (CB) 1

   [2] CB 14, 15, 24, 25

   [3] CB 85

   [4] CB 178

   [5] CB 194

4. On 26 August 2013, and following the Full Federal Court’s judgment in SZGIZ v Minister for Immigration,[6] the applicants applied for a second time for the grant of a protection visa.[7] Both applicants advanced claims to fear harm if returned to Fiji. As the applicant had previously been refused a protection visa pursuant to s.36(2)(a) of the Migration Act, his claims were to be considered only against the complementary protection criteria under the Migration Act. The second applicant having not previously advanced any claims for protection sought to meet the criteria under both s.36(2)(a) and s.36(2)(aa).

   [6] (2013) 212 FCR 235

   [7] CB 354

5. In the second protection visa application the applicant claimed to have been arrested for organising a union meeting at his work place, and for having been made to crawl on a dirt road in a cemetery by military officers, and to have been physically mistreated.[8] He claimed that those who tortured him are still in command. He claimed that he and the second applicant were presently involved in Australia in a pro-democracy movement called the Fiji Democracy Freedom Movement (FDFM). He claimed to have been a member of the FDFM since 2010.[9] On 2 May 2014 the Minister’s Department invited the applicants to attend an interview on 5 June 2014.[10] During the delegate interview, the applicant claimed for the first time that he was at risk because he had joined the Social Democratic Liberal (SDL) party in 2000, was in the youth group and was a group leader.

   [8] CB 372

   [9] CB 373-374

   [10] CB 460

6. On 19 December 2014 the delegate refused the applications.[11]  The applicants sought merits review of that decision.  On 23 September 2016 the Tribunal affirmed the decision under review.[12] The applicants challenged the Tribunal’s decision in this Court, and on 19 September 2017 the Court, by consent, ordered that the Tribunal’s decision be set aside and that the matter be remitted for consideration.

   [11] CB 522

   [12] CB 839

7. The Tribunal invited the applicants to appear before it to give evidence and present arguments. Three hearings were convened (22 January 2019, 7 February 2019 and 26 February 2019), although the second was abandoned without evidence being taken due to an interpreter issue.

8. On 14 June 2019 the Tribunal affirmed the decision under review.[13]

   [13] CB 1014

9. The Tribunal found at [44] the applicants not to be credible witnesses and it rejected their claims. It was not satisfied at [179] the applicant was arrested for organising a union meeting at his workplace or whilst attending a union meeting at his workplace.  Further, the Tribunal did not accept:

   a)at [181] that the applicant was arrested or terrorised at a rugby team party in March 2009;

   b)at [183] that the second applicant was pushed and sworn at when she went to the military barracks, or that she was “swung at”, or that objects were thrown at her, or that she was verbally abused, or told to leave and chased away by a guard when she was at the barracks;

   c)at [184] that the applicant was a member of the SDL party or that he was in the SDL youth group and was its leader;

   d)at [187]-[189] that the applicants were at risk of harm in connection with the FDFM or the Fiji Government in Exile, or that they were at risk due to their membership or involvement with Pacific Indigenous Samaritan Association (PISAI);

   e)at [190] that the applicants joined or were involved in Social Democratic Liberal Party (SODELPA) before 2016 or were at risk of harm for this reason.

10. The Tribunal did not accept, at [198], that the applicants’ activities on social media had given them a profile of political activists that had brought them to the attention of the Fijian authorities.

11. The Tribunal concluded that the second applicant did not satisfy s.36(2) of the Migration Act, and that neither of the applicants were owed complementary protection under s.36(2)(aa).

The current proceedings

1. These proceedings began with a show cause application filed on 25 June 2019.  The applicants now rely upon an amended application filed on 30 September 2019.  There are eight grounds in that application but the fourth ground was not pressed.  The remaining grounds are:

   (1)The Tribunal made jurisdictional error in that it made extreme credibility findings which was not open which impeded the Tribunal from carrying out a fair assessment of the applicants’ case

   Particulars

   (a)The Tribunal at [177] made a finding that the applicants were prepared to say or do anything to obtain Protection visas without any regard for the truth.

   (b)It is an extreme finding to say that they will say anything to get the Protection visa implying that they are just liars. There is no basis for the Tribunal to make such an extreme finding.

   (c)It is also an extreme finding to say they will do anything to get the Protection visa. There is no basis at all for this finding.

   (d)With such an extreme frame of mind the Tribunal would have been unable to deal with the applicants’ case in a fair manner.

   (2)The Tribunal made jurisdictional error in that it misapprehended the second applicant’s evidence and held that she was not abused when she went to the military barracks to look for her son and husband on separate occasions or, in the alternative it was not open to make that adverse finding

   Particulars

   (a)    At [183] the Tribunal did not accept that:

   (i)     that the second named applicant was pushed and sworn at when she went to the military barracks to see the first named applicant and their son when they were detained at the military barracks on separate occasions.

   (ii)    in the alternative, that when she went to the military barracks, she was pushed and sworn at or that she was “swung at”, objects were thrown at her, she was verbally abused and told to leave.

   (iii)   that the guard at the gate tried to chase her away

   (b)At [71]-[72] the Tribunal dealt with the evidence about what took place when the second applicant went to the Military barracks.

   (c)The Tribunal refers to the inconsistencies in the evidence of the second applicant while there was none, and she just responded to the questions that were asked of her and expanded on them based on the questions asked. See the first transcript (hearing 22/01/19) pages 34-36.

   (3)The Tribunal made jurisdictional error in that it misapprehended the applicant’s evidence made an adverse finding that were not open about the applicants’ involvement in the SDL in Fiji

   Particulars

   (a)At [101] the Tribunal held that that applicant “he stated he helped to set up a meeting venue and supported them financially” and [106] it held that “His evidence is that he helped set up a venue for a meeting and supported them financially. He stated that he did this on one occasion and that was it”.

   (b)This was used to make credibility finding against the applicant at [106]

   (c) What the applicant stated was as follows – Pg 24 Ln 30-35

   [Member]:   What did you do as a member of this organisation?

   [Applicant] (Through interpreter):   I help in setting up the meeting venues in which I   support them financially in case.

   [Member]:   Anything else?

   [Applicant] (Through interpreter):   That was the only time I was there.

   …

   (5)The Tribunal made jurisdictional error in making findings about the second applicant’s social media posts which were not open

   Particulars

   (a)Firstly, as stated at [196] the second applicant did not open her Facebook account using a pseudonym. She not only used her name she also included her maiden name which would have made it easy to identify her by the Fijian Government even more so.

   (b)She used the name … is her maiden name.

   (6)The Tribunal made jurisdictional error in that it was unreasonable for it to hold that the applicants’ social media posts will not put them at risk

   Particulars

   (a)    At [198] the Tribunal held that:

   In view of the above, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicants’ activities on social media have created for them the profiles of political activists or brought them to the adverse attention of the Fijian authorities. The Tribunal is not satisfied that their activities on social media would put them at risk of serious harm or significant if they return to Fiji now or in the reasonably foreseeable future

   (b)However, the social media posts are directly critical of the Fijian leader and based on the country information will subject the applicants to danger back in Fiji.

   (7)The Tribunal made jurisdictional error in that it misunderstood its function under the Migration Act s414 & s415

   Particulars

   (a)    The Tribunal stated at [172] that:

   The Tribunal has had regard to the submissions dated 1 April 2016 and 16 January 2019 made by the applicants’ migration agent as referred to herein. The Tribunal did not find the submissions in relation to the Department’s decision to be useful as the hearing before the Tribunal is a hearing de novo

   (b)S414 of the Migration Act requires the Tribunal to review the Delegate’s decision and s415 states how to go about doing that.

   (c)Because the Tribunal did not understand that although its decision is de novo it is required to review the Delegate’s decision and thus required to consider the error in the Delegate’s decision highlighted by the Migration Advisor’s submissions which it did not consider because it treated that as not useful.

   (8)The Tribunal made jurisdictional error in that it found that both the applicants opened their face-book account to enhance their chance of gaining the protection visa and that finding was not open

   Particulars

   (a)At [194] and [195] the Tribunal found that the applicants opened their face-book account to enhance their prospects of obtaining the protection visa

   (b)Made a finding contradictory in terms of their intention to use it to contact their family members. At [195] it found that the wife applicant opened it to keep in touch with her family and friends and at [192] it found that the husband applicant did not open it to keep in touch with his family and friends.

2. In addition to the court book filed on 12 September 2019, I have before me as evidence the affidavit of Bonita Cynthia Silva made on 27 September 2019, to which is annexed a transcript of the hearings conducted by the Tribunal on 22 January 2019 and 26 February 2019.

3. Both the applicant and the Minister filed pre-hearing submissions and made oral submissions through their representatives at the trial on 20 May 2020. 

Consideration

1. The applicants have mounted a spirited and wide ranging attack upon the Tribunal decision.  They focus first on the adverse credibility findings made by the Tribunal which they assert are so extreme as to be not open.  Secondly, the applicants contend that the Tribunal misunderstood evidence given by the applicant in relation to his political activities and the second applicant in relation to a visit she made to military barracks to look for her husband and son.  Thirdly, the applicants contend that the Tribunal fell into error in dealing with the second applicant’s use of social media and the significance of her facebook posts.  Finally, the applicants contend that the Tribunal misunderstood the nature of its review function.  In argument the applicants invited the Court to embark upon a detailed deconstruction of the Tribunal’s ratiocinations.  That was neither necessary nor fruitful.   

2. While I accept that these grounds are, for the most part, arguable, I prefer the Minister’s submissions concerning the grounds.

First ground

1. The first ground challenges a remark made by the Tribunal at [177] of its reasons where it stated that it had formed the view that the applicants “were prepared to say or do anything to obtain Protection visas without any regard for the truth”. The applicants submit that this finding constituted an “extreme credibility finding” and was not open to the Tribunal.

2. The Tribunal’s remark at [177] must be read in the context of the paragraph in which it appears, and in the context of the Tribunal’s findings more broadly. The Tribunal’s reasons should also not be read with an eye attuned to the perception of error. Fairly read, it was plain the Tribunal at [177] was setting out its conclusion about its views as to the applicants’ credibility. The Tribunal did not find the applicants to be “liars” in the sense that it rejected everything each of them advanced. Rather, as the Tribunal said in [177] it found that the applicants had fabricated some of their claims, and embellished others.  In essence, the Tribunal found the applicants to be focussed on their desired migration outcome rather than the truth or falsity of their claims.

3. A high degree of caution must be exercised before finding that adverse findings as to credit reveal jurisdictional error, in order to ensure that the Court does not impermissibly embark upon a review of the merits of a visa applicant’s claims.[14] Further, as the Full Federal Court opined in BQQ15 v Minister for Home Affairs[15] at [50]:

   Adverse credibility findings are not immune from judicial review, but to establish jurisdictional error it is ordinarily necessary to show that the findings were legally unreasonable, for example by being based on illogical or irrational findings or inferences of fact: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu [1999] HCA 21; (1999) 197 CLR 611 at 626 per Gleeson CJ and McHugh J and at 657 per Gummow J; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Applicant S20/2002 [2003] HCA 30; (2003) 73 ALD 1 at [5] per Gleeson CJ; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB [2004] HCA 32; (2004) 78 ALD 224 at [37] – [38] per Gummow and Hayne JJ; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; (2010) 240 CLR 611 (SZMDS). However, judicial review does not involve mere merits review – it is not enough for the question of fact to be one on which reasonable minds may differ: SZMDS at [96] and [130] per Crennan and Bell JJ; ARG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 174; (2016) 250 FCR 109 at 122.

   [14] SZVAP v Minister for Immigration (2015) 233 FCR 451 at [14]-[15] (Flick J)

   [15] [2019] FCAFC 218

4. The applicants have not established any error in relation to the Tribunal’s credibility findings.

5. To the extent that the applicants seek to advance a bias claim in the first ground (which was not in fact submitted by them), there is no basis for such a finding.

Second ground

1. In the second ground the applicants contend that the Tribunal erred in misapprehending the second applicant’s evidence concerning an event she described when she went to military barracks to look for her son and husband. Alternatively, it is contended that the Tribunal’s adverse findings at [183] were not open to the Tribunal.

2. As is apparent from the Tribunal’s reasons at [70]-[71] where it sets out the different accounts given by the second applicant at the first and second hearings, the concerns identified by the Tribunal regarding the second applicant’s claims about her treatment at the military barracks was but one of several concerns the Tribunal expressed as to the credibility of the applicants at [44]. The Tribunal described aspects of the second applicant’s evidence to be “contradictory, implausible and unconvincing”. The Tribunal identified differences in the account given by the second applicant between her written protection claims, and the evidence she gave orally at the Tribunal hearing concerning the occasion when she went to see her husband and son at the military barracks. It was open to the Tribunal to be concerned that the second applicant described in different terms what happened when she attended the military barracks. Material differences between accounts given of a particular event are probative of a concern with the veracity of the claimed event. While the Tribunal appears to have accepted that the second applicant visited the barracks, it did not accept her claims to have suffered harm while there.

3. In any event, notwithstanding the Tribunal’s concerns expressed at [70]-[71], which led it to reject as a fact the event described by the second applicant at [183], it is not apparent what impact this finding at [183] had on the Tribunal’s assessment of the second applicant’s claims for protection. The Tribunal considered and gave reasons for rejecting the second applicant’s claims to fear harm in connection with her political opinion and activities in Fiji and Australia, which are entirely unrelated to her claim to have encountered mistreatment when she visited the military barracks. For instance, the Tribunal, whilst accepting at [185] the second applicant supported the SDL party in principle, rejected that she assisted with meetings of the SDL party. The Tribunal accepted at [186] that the second applicant joined the FDFM in June 2009 and attended two protests in Sydney in 2009, but did not accept they were presently associated with the organisation. The Tribunal was not satisfied at [187]-[189] by reference to country information that the applicants’ membership of and participation in activities of the FDFM, or with a named person and the Fiji Native Government in Exile, or with PISAI that they would be at risk of harm. The Tribunal did not accept at [190] that the applicants joined or were involved in SODELPA.

1. In order to establish jurisdictional error, the applicants bear the onus of identifying that the particular error was material to the outcome.[16] The applicants have not established the materiality of the Tribunal’s findings at [183] in not accepting a particular event occurred as described by the second applicant that was not ostensibly related to the second applicant’s protection claims.

   [16] Hossain v Minister for Immigration (2018) 92 ALJR 780

Third ground

1. In the third ground the applicants take issue with the Tribunal’s assessment of the applicant’s claim about his involvement in the SDP in Fiji. At [97] the Tribunal referred to having discussed with the applicant his involvement in any political parties in Fiji, and that he had replied that he had been a member of a “community organisation” called SDL. The applicant’s evidence about what he did as a member of SDL was limited to helping set up meeting venues and financial support. The Tribunal at [99]-[101] recorded that the applicant’s evidence to the Tribunal was not consistent with evidence he had given to the RRT and in his Departmental interview on 19 June 2009 when he described his involvement with SDL.  At [105]-[106] the Tribunal referred to evidence in the nature of two letters from a person who stated he was a former Member of Parliament in Fiji that was also not consistent with the applicant’s evidence he gave to the Tribunal about his activities with the SDP.

2. The applicants contend that the Tribunal misapprehended the applicant’s evidence to the Tribunal (by reference to the transcript) because the applicant referred to having helped set up the meeting “venues”, and yet the Tribunal found that the applicant did this only on one occasion.  It is possible that the applicant was seeking to draw a distinction between setting up venues for meetings, and attending the meetings. The applicants’ argument invites the Court to draw a fine distinction about the oral evidence the applicant gave at the Tribunal hearing. The applicant had apparently stated, as revealed in the transcript, that “that was the only time I was there”. This evidence supported the Tribunal’s finding that the applicant’s own evidence was that he helped set up a meeting venue on only one occasion.  While I accept that that was not the only possible interpretation of what the applicant said, it is within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to make available findings and to draw open inferences from the evidence presented before it. No jurisdictional error is made out.

Fourth ground

1. As noted earlier, the fourth ground was not pressed.

Fifth ground

1. In the fifth ground the applicants assert that the Tribunal erred in making findings about the second applicant’s social media posts that were not open. The Tribunal’s findings the subject of challenge are set out at [196]. The Tribunal referred to the privacy settings on the facebook account limiting access on the account to her family and friends. The Tribunal was not satisfied the second applicant’s activities on facebook gave her the profile of a political activist or had brought her to the adverse attention of the Fijian authorities. The Tribunal’s findings were open to it. The applicants’ contentions appear to be little more than a disagreement with the Tribunal’s conclusions.

2. Further, the Tribunal’s conclusions at [196] must be read in light of the country information the Tribunal cited regarding social media in Fiji.[17] The information cited included reports that the Fijian government did not disrupt or restrict access to the internet or censor online content, and there was no credible information that the government even monitored private accounts without legal authority.[18] The Tribunal put to the applicants at [164] that the country information gave it doubts that they would be at risk of serious harm or significant harm because of their activities on social media.

   [17] CB 1040 at [160]-[163]

   [18] CB 1042 at [163]

3. The ground fails to make out any error.

Sixth ground

1. The applicants contend that the Tribunal made a legally unreasonable finding at [198] in which it found that it was not satisfied that the applicants’ activities on social media had created for them political profiles that would put them at risk if returned to Fiji. The applicants submit that the social media posts are directly critical of the Fijian leader and that having regard to country information the applicants would be subject to danger in Fiji.

2. The assertion invites merits review. It was for the Tribunal to assess the nature of the social media posts and to determine whether it resulted in a finding of a relevant risk of harm. It is not for the Court to assess the evidence before the Tribunal and form a different view about the evidence.

3. Further, the applicants do not address the Tribunal’s detailed findings at [192]-[197] in which it gave a clear and intelligible basis for its conclusions at [198]. In particular the Tribunal:

   a)rejected the applicant’s claim that he opened a facebook account in 2014, but rather found that he had opened the account in late 2016;

   b)rejected the claim that the applicant opened the facebook account to keep in touch with family and friends, or to participate in a worldwide campaign against the military regime in Fiji, or so that other people in Fiji can see it or because he wanted the world to know what was going on in the Bainimarama government;

   c)found that the applicant was not familiar with facebook and was not a regular user of facebook;

   d)found that the applicant’s usage of his facebook account increased in the period immediately prior to the Tribunal hearing on 22 January 2019;

   e)concluded that the applicant opened his facebook account in order to enhance his protection claims; and

   f)in relation to the second applicant, found that she had made some posts concerning the collection of signatures for a petition to the International Court of Justice, but was of the view that she opened the account in order to keep in touch with family and friends. Her privacy settings on the account limited access to the account to her family and friends.

4. The Tribunal’s findings at [149]-[166] regarding the applicants’ social media claims must also be read in light of the Tribunal’s record of the evidence given by the applicants in support of the claims, and the relevant country information.

5. The ground does not identify jurisdictional error.

Seventh ground

1. In the seventh ground the applicants contend that the Tribunal misunderstood its function under ss.414 and 415 of the Migration Act. The challenge concerns the Tribunal’s reasons given for finding that two submissions advanced on the applicants’ behalf addressing the delegate’s decision were not useful. The reason, given by the Tribunal at [172], as to why it did not find the submissions useful was because the Tribunal conducts a review de novo. In other words, the Tribunal was remarking that its task was not concerned with the correction of error by the primary decision maker, but was that it must make a decision itself on its review of the materials before it.

2. There is no error in the Tribunal’s understanding of its statutory task. It was open to the Tribunal to give no weight to the submissions for the reasons it gave.

Eighth ground

1. The applicants lastly assert that the Tribunal erred in finding that both the applicants opened a facebook account in order to enhance their chance of getting a protection visa. The applicants contend this finding was not open. As the applicants recognise, their reliance on their facebook activity in support of their protection claims was not advanced until January 2019 before the presently constituted Tribunal.

2. The point advanced by the applicants is that the Tribunal’s conclusion at [194] and [195] that the applicants opened their respective facebook accounts in order to, or at least in part to, enhance their protection claims was not open because if this were so they would have raised the issue earlier than 2019. Such an argument cannot give rise to jurisdictional error. The argument goes to the merits of the claim. The Tribunal gave reasons as to why it considered the applicants’ opening of facebook accounts was done in aid of their protection claims. In particular, it referred at [193]-[194] to the applicant’s unfamiliarity with how facebook operated and that the facebook activity increased in the period just prior to the Tribunal hearing. The Tribunal was not satisfied the applicant had developed a political profile from his facebook usage. In relation to the second applicant the Tribunal noted at [195]-[196] that she had set privacy settings on her facebook account to limit access to her account to her family members and some friends, and that she had opened the account to keep in touch with family and friends and also to enhance her protection claims.

3. The Tribunal did not expressly find against the applicants in relation to their facebook claims that the claims had been raised late in the piece. However, the fact that the claims were raised late was not supportive of the claims being accepted. In any event, it was a matter for the Tribunal to assess those matters of fact in its assessment of the claims. No jurisdictional error is identified.

Conclusion

1. The applicants have failed to establish that the decision of the Tribunal is affected by any jurisdictional error.  The decision is therefore a privative clause decision and the application must be dismissed.

2. I will so order.

3. I will hear the parties as to costs.

I certify that the preceding forty-four (44) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Driver

Associate: 

Date:  5 June 2020