SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Civil)
CLONE PTY LTD v PLAYERS PTY LTD (No 13)
[2025] SASC 49
Reasons for the Orders of the Honourable Auxiliary Associate Justice Norman
PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - COSTS - INTERLOCUTORY PROCEEDINGS - TAXATION AND OTHER FORMS OF ASSESSMENT, AND PAYMENT
PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - COSTS - INTEREST ON COSTS
Rulings as to the appropriate mechanism to resolve issues on claims for interest on costs and the costs of taxation itself.
Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) rr 187(5), 264(7); Supreme Court Rules 1987 (SA) rr 187, 188; Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA) rr 12.1(m), 132.3; Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) s 114, referred to.
Burford v Allan (1997) 68 SASR 217; Osborne v Kelly & Anor (1999) 75 SASR 392; Burford v Allan [1998] SASC 6693; Chakravarti v Advertiser Newspapers Ltd (1998) 201 LSJS 44; Mason v Mason [1965] 3 All ER 492; Thornton v Swan Hunter Shipbuilders Ltd [1971] 3 All ER 1248, applied.
CLONE PTY LTD v PLAYERS PTY LTD (No 13)
[2025] SASC 49Civil
Auxiliary Associate Justice Norman
Introduction
In these reasons I will refer the applicant as “Clone” and the respondents as “Players”.
This is the continuing taxation of Clone’s costs of the trial before Vanstone J in these proceedings. The taxation itself has largely concluded, and the only remaining issues are Clone’s claims for interest on costs and the costs of the taxation itself. By agreement, the interest issue will be determined first.
However, a dispute has arisen as to the mechanism for this process. The Court has been informed that following the service of Clone’s claim for costs, Players served three offers for those costs, including interest. Players has accordingly sought a “two-stage” process wherein a determination should first be made as to the point in time when Clone’s entitlement to interest was to commence to run (having regard to s 114(2)(b) of the Supreme Court Act 1935), and second, after that determination, and based on the Court’s ruling, a calculation should be made as to Clone’s actual interest on its cost entitlement. This is to be calculated based on the amounts allowed for solicitors’ fees, counsel fees, and disbursements, up to and including the date of the offers. After those determinations, Players contends, a separate hearing should be held to determine two further issues, first whether Players have relevantly “beaten’ any of their three offers, and secondly, if they have, what should be the consequences in relation to the period after the date of these three offers until finalisation.
Clone, on the other hand, has opposed this two-stage process, contending that there is no utility in a splitting of the hearing, and that all matters should be determined together.
As far as can be ascertained, there are no authorities relating to which of these alternative processes should be adopted.
Background
Clone has been awarded the costs of this action and…
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- Case
- [2025] SASC 49
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court began by examining the statutory framework, specifically Section 114 of the Supreme Court Act 1935, which mandates that interest is to be computed from certain specified dates. The court referenced the case of Burford v Allan, where it was held that a taxing officer’s discretion in determining the starting point for interest is not restricted and can consider various factors, including the delay attributable to the party seeking costs. However, the court noted the prohibition in Rule 187(4) which restricts the disclosure of settlement offers to the adjudicating officer unless all relevant questions have been determined. This rule was crucial in deciding that the court should not consider the settlement offers during the current phase of the litigation, as it could unduly influence the court’s discretion on the threshold questions regarding the interest on costs. Consequently, the court ruled that the starting date for interest should be determined based on the date of the certificate issued by the taxing officer, unless there were proper grounds to compute interest from an earlier date.
The court ordered a structured approach to resolve the outstanding issues, setting specific deadlines for the submission of affidavits, written submissions, and scheduling a hearing for argument. The parties were directed to provide a schedule of agreed amounts relating to GST on disbursements, file affidavits regarding interest calculations, and submit written arguments on the scope of the interest on costs issues to be argued. The court also clarified that Players' concerns about the scope of arguments on interest on costs issues would be addressed in a subsequent hearing.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Likewise in Thornton v Swan Hunter Shipbuilders Ltd,[17] Lord Denning MR, with whom Sachs and Stamp L. JJ agreed, the Court of Appeal, although aware that a payment into court had been made, ordered that a discussion in the Court below as to the amount of the payment should be deleted from the papers before it.[17] [1971] 3 All ER 1248.Consideration It is clear from s 114(2) that in the case of adjudicated costs, interest can be awarded either from the date of the certificate of the adjudicating officer or an earlier date specified. The latter includes either the date of judgment or the date of payment or payments by the party recovering costs to his or her solicitor for solicitor’s charges counsel fees and disbursements as the matter has progressed. This is also made clear in the case law, as discussed above. The discretion is wide. It is also clear that an offer of settlement can be considered in respect of an award of interest. In his reasons in Burford v Allan, Doyle CJ referred to the concept of the interests of justice as dictating the exercise of the discretion in respect of s 114(2). The same concept is referred to in his reasons in Osborne v Kelly. It also appears from the reasons of Matheson J in Burford v Allan[18] that in that case it was known to the Court on the taxation and on its review that offers to settle the taxation had been made by both sides. The master had found that in the case of the plaintiff they were somewhat excessive given the final figure, and the defendant’s offers were perceived to be significantly below what could have been considered reasonable. The master saw nothing in the circumstances surrounding those negotiations as having any deleterious impact on the plaintiff’s claim for interest. [18] Burford v Allan (1997) 68 SASR 217 at 224. However, in the present case the situation is different. There is a prohibition set out in r 187(4) from parties disclosing to the adjudicating officer the content of a formal offer of settlement unless all questions to which the offer is relevant have been determined. Although such a provision can be waived by the parties, as appears to have been the case in Burford v Allan, that is not the case here, and Players actively oppose such disclosure. Applying the rule to the present circumstances, the questions which are sought to be “determined” by the Court are those contained in the first threshold question advanced by Players, namely whether interest should run from the date when the Court, as taxing officer, issues a certificate, or alternatively the date of the relevant judgment or costs order made by Vanstone J, or alternatively the date (or dates) when Clone has paid its costs and disbursements to its solicitors prior to the date of judgment. As appears in the correspondence between the parties, and as Mr Whitington has argued, in this phase of the process if the Court knows the form or quantum of the offers, this might subjectively influence its decision making regarding the exercise of its discretion on the two threshold questions, which would be inappropriate, and would breach the terms of r 187(4).