Clinton Lee Foster and TNT Australia Pty Ltd

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[2014] AATA  852

Division GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

File Number

2013/3541

Re

Clinton Lee Foster

APPLICANT

And

TNT Australia Pty Ltd

RESPONDENT

DECISION

Tribunal

G. D. Friedman, Senior Member

Date 14 November 2014
Place Melbourne

(a)        The Tribunal sets aside the decision under review and substitutes a decision that the respondent is liable for compensation to Mr Foster pursuant to s 14 of the Safety Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (the SRC Act) in respect of Chronic Adjustment Disorder with Mixed Anxious and Depressed Mood and Drug Dependency.

(b) The respondent shall pay Mr Foster’s costs and disbursements of the application pursuant to s 67 of the SRC Act.

.............................[Sgd].....................................

G. D. Friedman, Senior Member

CATCHWORDS

COMPENSATION – truck driver – chronic adjustment disorder with mixed anxious and depressed mood, drug dependency – previous left elbow injury – whether psychological condition arose out of or in the course of employment – whether employment contributed to psychological condition to significant degree

LEGISLATION

Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 ss 4(1), 5A(1), 5B, 14(1), 67

CASES

Canute v Comcare [2006] HCA 47

Comcare v Canute [2005] FCAFC 262

Re Commonwealth of Australia v Keith Colville Smith [1989] FCA 189

REASONS FOR DECISION

G. D. Friedman, Senior Member

14 November 2014

  1. Clinton Foster commenced employment with the respondent in April 2010 as a truck driver.  On 5 January 2011 he sustained an injury to his left elbow and on 24 January 2011 the respondent accepted liability for left elbow lateral epicondylitis.  Mr Foster developed psychological symptoms and on 1 October 2012 he sought compensation for his diagnosed psychological condition.  On 21 May 2013 the respondent made a reviewable decision refusing his claim for compensation for his psychological condition on the basis that it was not work-related to a significant degree.  Mr Foster seeks review of the decision.

    LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND

  2. Section 14(1) of the Safety Rehabilitation and Compensation act 1988 (the SRC Act)  provides:

    14 Compensation for injuries

    (1) Subject to this Part, Comcare is liable to pay compensation in accordance with this Act in respect of an injury suffered by an employee if the injury results in death, incapacity for work, or impairment.

    4 Interpretation

    (1)   In this Act, unless the contrary intention appears:

    …

    ailment means any physical or mental ailment, disorder, defect or morbid condition (whether of sudden onset or gradual development).

    ...

    5A Definition of injury

    (1) In this Act:

    injury means:

    (a) a disease suffered by an employee; or

    (b) an injury (other than a disease) suffered by an employee, that is a physical or mental injury arising out of, or in the course of, the employee’s employment; or

    (c) an aggravation of a physical or mental injury (other than a disease) suffered by an employee (whether or not that injury arose out of, or in the course of, the employee’s employment), that is an aggravation that arose out of, or in the course of, that employment;

    …

    5B Definition of disease

    (1) In this Act:

    disease means:

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Details
Case
[2014] AATA 852
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Clinton Lee Foster and TNT Australia Pty Ltd involved a claim by Foster, a truck driver, for compensation for a psychological condition he developed following a left elbow injury sustained during employment. Foster's employer accepted liability for the elbow injury, but contested the psychological condition's compensability. The primary issues before the court were whether Foster's psychological condition constituted an injury under the Safety Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (SRC Act) due to its origin from the employment or whether it constituted a disease contributed to significantly by the employment. The court had to determine whether Foster's psychological condition, specifically chronic adjustment disorder with mixed anxious and depressed mood and drug dependency, arose out of or in the course of his employment or if it was an aggravation of the left elbow injury.

The court concluded that Foster's psychological condition was a mental injury arising from his employment, satisfying the criteria under section 5A(1)(b) of the SRC Act. The Tribunal found that despite Foster's pre-existing vulnerabilities, the psychological condition was triggered by the work-related elbow injury. This finding negated the need to consider whether the psychological condition was a disease under section 5B of the SRC Act, as it was already established as a mental injury due to its origin in employment. The court emphasised that the legal concept of causation in personal injury cases takes the injured person as they are, including any pre-existing conditions, and that the physical injury occurring in compensable circumstances makes the resulting psychological symptoms compensable. Consequently, the Tribunal ruled in Foster's favour, ordering the respondent to compensate Foster and to cover his costs and disbursements.

Background

Background to the litigation

Clinton Foster commenced employment with the respondent in April 2010 as a truck driver. On 5 January 2011 he sustained an injury to his left elbow and on 24 January 2011 the respondent accepted liability for left elbow lateral epicondylitis. Mr Foster developed psychological symptoms and on 1 October 2012 he sought compensation for his diagnosed psychological condition. On 21 May 2013 the respondent made a reviewable decision refusing his claim for compensation for his psychological condition on the basis that it was not work-related to a significant degree. Mr Foster seeks review of the decision.LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND Section 14(1) of the Safety Rehabilitation and Compensation act 1988 (the SRC Act) provides:14 Compensation for injuries(1) Subject to this Part, Comcare is liable to pay compensation in accordance with this Act in respect of an injury suffered by an employee if the injury results in death, incapacity for work, or impairment.4 Interpretation(1) In this Act, unless the contrary intention appears:…ailment means any physical or mental ailment, disorder, defect or morbid condition (whether of sudden onset or gradual development).... 5A Definition of injury(1) In this Act:injury means:(a) a disease suffered by an employee; or(b) an injury (other than a disease) suffered by an employee, that is a physical or mental injury arising out of, or in the course of, the employee’s employment; or(c) an aggravation of a physical or mental injury (other than a disease) suffered by an employee (whether or not that injury arose out of, or in the course of, the employee’s employment), that is an aggravation that arose out of, or in the course of, that employment;…5B Definition of disease(1) In this Act:disease means:(a) an ailment suffered by an employee; …that was contributed to, to a significant degree, by the employee’s employment by the Commonwealth or a licensee.(2) In determining whether an ailment or aggravation was contributed to, to a significant degree, by an employee’s employment by the Commonwealth or a licensee, the following matters may be taken into account:(a) the duration of the employment;(b) the nature of, and particular tasks involved in, the employment;(c) any predisposition of the employee to the ailment or aggravation;(d) any activities of the employee not related to the employment;(e) any other matters affecting the employee’s health.This subsection does not limit the matters that may be taken into account.(3) In this Act:significant degree means a degree that is substantially more than material.ISSUES There was no dispute between the parties that Mr Foster suffers from a psychological condition outside the boundaries of normal mental functioning. The issues before the Tribunal are:·whether the condition was an injury within the meaning of s 5A of the SRC Act (i.e. whether the psychological condition arose out of, or in the course of the employment or as an aggravation of the left elbow injury); if not·whether the condition was a disease within the meaning of s 5B of the SRC Act (i.e. whether the psychological condition was contributed to, to a significant degree, by the employment). DID THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITION ARISE OUT OF, OR IN THE COURSE OF THE EMPLOYMENT OR AS AN AGGRAVATION OF THE LEFT ELBOW INJURY?

Decision

Reasons for decision

In considering the evidence as a whole, the Tribunal is reasonably satisfied that, although Mr Foster had susceptibilities and vulnerabilities, the psychological condition suffered by him following his left elbow/arm condition that had been accepted by the respondent as work-related is a mental injury arising out of, or in the course of, his employment and constitutes an injury (other than a disease) for the purposes of s 5A(1)(b) of the SRC Act. Consequently Mr Foster is entitled to compensation under s 14 of the SRC Act and there is no need to consider whether the psychological condition was contributed to, to a significant degree, by the employment.DECISION (a) The Tribunal sets aside the decision under review and substitutes a decision that the respondent is liable for compensation to Mr Foster pursuant to s 14 of the Safety Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (the SRC Act) in respect of Chronic Adjustment Disorder with Mixed Anxious and Depressed Mood and Drug Dependency.(b)The respondent shall pay Mr Foster’s costs and disbursements of the application pursuant to s 67 of the SRC Act.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Dr M Wyatt, occupational physician, stated in a report dated 2 November 2011 that she conducted an independent assessment and took a history that Mr Foster’s left elbow was generally sore following the injury on 5 January 2011. She said that she was not aware of any non-work-related factors such as social issues, previous medical history and home activities. CONSIDERATION In Comcare v Canute [2005] FCAFC 262 Gyles J held that the definitions of injury and disease in the SRC Act are broad enough to allow the conclusion that a psychological condition resulting from a physical injury may be considered to be either a mental injury or an ailment and therefore an injury for the purposes of the SRC Act. Further, where the physical injury is sustained either arising out of or in the course of employment, any psychological condition caused by that physical injury may also be regarded as having arisen out of the employment or was contributed to by the employment to the required degree to be compensable. He stated at [83]:There is little doubt that the definitions of ‘injury’ and ‘disease’ are wide enough to permit the conclusion that the psychological condition in question here might be regarded either as a mental injury or as an ailment and so an ‘injury’ as defined, which resulted in a permanent impairment quite separate from that resulting from the condition of the back. As the injury to the back was sustained in the course of the employment of the employee, it would be open to conclude that the psychological condition caused by it arose out of the employee’s employment or was contributed to in a material degree by the employee’s employment…In Canute v Comcare [2006] HCA 47 the full bench of the High Court of Australia approved the approach taken by Gyles J (see for example [36]). The relationship between disabling psychological symptoms and a precipitating physical injury was referred to in Re Commonwealth of Australia v Keith Colville Smith [1989] FCA 189. Von Doussa J stated at [16]:Incapacity due to disabling psychological symptoms precipitated by minor physical injury to a person already suffering a neurotic temperament is a well recognised and unfortunately common phenomenon. If the precipitating injury occurs in compensable circumstances, the incapacity caused by the psychological symptoms is compensable even though the physical effects of the injury may resolve quickly…The legal concept of causation when applied to the field of personal injury takes the person injured as it finds him, with all his pre-dispositions and susceptibilities, whatever they may be… The Tribunal accepts the evidence from Mr Foster that although he had a history of illicit drug use he had ceased substance abuse about five years before suffering the left elbow injury in 2011. Despite his relationship issues and family difficulties he appeared to be functioning reasonably well in 2011 and was working full-time as a truck driver. He married in June 2011. Subsequently he became increasingly frustrated by the ongoing pain in his left elbow/arm and he complained to Dr Nettleton about the pain and his worsening psychological state, resulting in a referral to Dr McIntosh and attendance at hospital psychiatric units.