[2014] AATA 852
Division GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION File Number
2013/3541
Re
Clinton Lee Foster
APPLICANT
And
TNT Australia Pty Ltd
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal G. D. Friedman, Senior Member
Date 14 November 2014 Place Melbourne (a) The Tribunal sets aside the decision under review and substitutes a decision that the respondent is liable for compensation to Mr Foster pursuant to s 14 of the Safety Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (the SRC Act) in respect of Chronic Adjustment Disorder with Mixed Anxious and Depressed Mood and Drug Dependency.
(b) The respondent shall pay Mr Foster’s costs and disbursements of the application pursuant to s 67 of the SRC Act.
.............................[Sgd].....................................
G. D. Friedman, Senior Member
CATCHWORDS
COMPENSATION – truck driver – chronic adjustment disorder with mixed anxious and depressed mood, drug dependency – previous left elbow injury – whether psychological condition arose out of or in the course of employment – whether employment contributed to psychological condition to significant degree
LEGISLATION
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 ss 4(1), 5A(1), 5B, 14(1), 67
CASES
Canute v Comcare [2006] HCA 47
Comcare v Canute [2005] FCAFC 262
Re Commonwealth of Australia v Keith Colville Smith [1989] FCA 189
REASONS FOR DECISION
G. D. Friedman, Senior Member
14 November 2014
Clinton Foster commenced employment with the respondent in April 2010 as a truck driver. On 5 January 2011 he sustained an injury to his left elbow and on 24 January 2011 the respondent accepted liability for left elbow lateral epicondylitis. Mr Foster developed psychological symptoms and on 1 October 2012 he sought compensation for his diagnosed psychological condition. On 21 May 2013 the respondent made a reviewable decision refusing his claim for compensation for his psychological condition on the basis that it was not work-related to a significant degree. Mr Foster seeks review of the decision.
LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND
Section 14(1) of the Safety Rehabilitation and Compensation act 1988 (the SRC Act) provides:
14 Compensation for injuries
(1) Subject to this Part, Comcare is liable to pay compensation in accordance with this Act in respect of an injury suffered by an employee if the injury results in death, incapacity for work, or impairment.
4 Interpretation
(1) In this Act, unless the contrary intention appears:
…
ailment means any physical or mental ailment, disorder, defect or morbid condition (whether of sudden onset or gradual development).
...
5A Definition of injury
(1) In this Act:
injury means:
(a) a disease suffered by an employee; or
(b) an injury (other than a disease) suffered by an employee, that is a physical or mental injury arising out of, or in the course of, the employee’s employment; or
(c) an aggravation of a physical or mental injury (other than a disease) suffered by an employee (whether or not that injury arose out of, or in the course of, the employee’s employment), that is an aggravation that arose out of, or in the course of, that employment;
…
5B Definition of disease
(1) In this Act:
disease means:
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Clinton Lee Foster and TNT Australia Pty Ltd and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2014] AATA 852
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court concluded that Foster's psychological condition was a mental injury arising from his employment, satisfying the criteria under section 5A(1)(b) of the SRC Act. The Tribunal found that despite Foster's pre-existing vulnerabilities, the psychological condition was triggered by the work-related elbow injury. This finding negated the need to consider whether the psychological condition was a disease under section 5B of the SRC Act, as it was already established as a mental injury due to its origin in employment. The court emphasised that the legal concept of causation in personal injury cases takes the injured person as they are, including any pre-existing conditions, and that the physical injury occurring in compensable circumstances makes the resulting psychological symptoms compensable. Consequently, the Tribunal ruled in Foster's favour, ordering the respondent to compensate Foster and to cover his costs and disbursements.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Dr M Wyatt, occupational physician, stated in a report dated 2 November 2011 that she conducted an independent assessment and took a history that Mr Foster’s left elbow was generally sore following the injury on 5 January 2011. She said that she was not aware of any non-work-related factors such as social issues, previous medical history and home activities. CONSIDERATION In Comcare v Canute [2005] FCAFC 262 Gyles J held that the definitions of injury and disease in the SRC Act are broad enough to allow the conclusion that a psychological condition resulting from a physical injury may be considered to be either a mental injury or an ailment and therefore an injury for the purposes of the SRC Act. Further, where the physical injury is sustained either arising out of or in the course of employment, any psychological condition caused by that physical injury may also be regarded as having arisen out of the employment or was contributed to by the employment to the required degree to be compensable. He stated at [83]:There is little doubt that the definitions of ‘injury’ and ‘disease’ are wide enough to permit the conclusion that the psychological condition in question here might be regarded either as a mental injury or as an ailment and so an ‘injury’ as defined, which resulted in a permanent impairment quite separate from that resulting from the condition of the back. As the injury to the back was sustained in the course of the employment of the employee, it would be open to conclude that the psychological condition caused by it arose out of the employee’s employment or was contributed to in a material degree by the employee’s employment…In Canute v Comcare [2006] HCA 47 the full bench of the High Court of Australia approved the approach taken by Gyles J (see for example [36]). The relationship between disabling psychological symptoms and a precipitating physical injury was referred to in Re Commonwealth of Australia v Keith Colville Smith [1989] FCA 189. Von Doussa J stated at [16]:Incapacity due to disabling psychological symptoms precipitated by minor physical injury to a person already suffering a neurotic temperament is a well recognised and unfortunately common phenomenon. If the precipitating injury occurs in compensable circumstances, the incapacity caused by the psychological symptoms is compensable even though the physical effects of the injury may resolve quickly…The legal concept of causation when applied to the field of personal injury takes the person injured as it finds him, with all his pre-dispositions and susceptibilities, whatever they may be… The Tribunal accepts the evidence from Mr Foster that although he had a history of illicit drug use he had ceased substance abuse about five years before suffering the left elbow injury in 2011. Despite his relationship issues and family difficulties he appeared to be functioning reasonably well in 2011 and was working full-time as a truck driver. He married in June 2011. Subsequently he became increasingly frustrated by the ongoing pain in his left elbow/arm and he complained to Dr Nettleton about the pain and his worsening psychological state, resulting in a referral to Dr McIntosh and attendance at hospital psychiatric units.