Clinch v The State of Western Australia
[2024] WASCA 92
•31 JULY 2024
JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)
CITATION: CLINCH -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2024] WASCA 92
CORAM: BUSS P
HALL JA
HEARD: 22 JULY 2024
DELIVERED : 31 JULY 2024
FILE NO/S: CACR 29 of 2024
BETWEEN: RODNEY JOHN CLINCH
Appellant
AND
THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram: BARBAGALLO DCJ
File Number : GER 55 of 2023
Catchwords:
Criminal law - Appeal against sentence - Aggravated home burglary - Whether sentencing judge erred as to the length of time over which the assault took place - Whether sentence of 4 years' immediate imprisonment is manifestly excessive
Legislation:
Criminal Code (WA), s 401(2)(a)
Result:
Leave to appeal refused
Appeal dismissed
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
| Appellant | : | P G Giudice |
| Respondent | : | No appearance |
Solicitors:
| Appellant | : | George Giudice Law Chambers |
| Respondent | : | Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Abraham v The State of Western Australia [2014] WASCA 151
Beins v The State of Western Australia [No 2] [2014] WASCA 54
Brindley v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 153
Creusot v The State of Western Australia [2022] WASCA 117
Drage v The State of Western Australia [2021] WASCA 6
Jolly v The State of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 181
Kabambi v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 44
Kelly v The State of Western Australia [2020] WASCA 29
Kickett v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 147
Miller v The State of Western Australia [2022] WASCA 50
NOI v The State of Western Australia [2020] WASCA 84
Page v The State of Western Australia [2018] WASCA 76
Panicciari v The State of Western Australia [2020] WASCA 154
Robson v The State of Western Australia [2020] WASCA 153
Serukai v The State of Western Australia [2020] WASCA 159
The State of Western Australia v Billett [2022] WASCA 158
The State of Western Australia v Chungarai [2021] WASCA 147
The State of Western Australia v Krakouer [2022] WASCA 118
The State of Western Australia v McDonagh [2022] WASCA 108
The State of Western Australia v Quartermaine [2021] WASCA 145
The State of Western Australia v Richards [2020] WASCA 129
Winmar v The State of Western Australia [2018] WASCA 155
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT:
On the afternoon of 2 July 2022, the appellant arrived at the home of the complainant, his former partner. He was angry and yelling because he believed that the complainant was seeing another man. The complainant locked the front door, but the appellant forced entry by kicking in another door. He demanded that the complainant produce the man he believed was there. He then assaulted the complainant by grabbing her around the jaw and squeezing hard, pushing her against a door, punching her on her arm, torso and shoulder and throwing his car keys at her, hitting her on the forehead. The complainant called the police but the appellant left before they arrived. He was arrested and charged some months later. When interviewed, he denied the offence.
The appellant was charged with one count of aggravated home burglary contrary to s 401(2)(a) of the Criminal Code (WA) (the Code). He pleaded guilty to that charge at a trial listing hearing and was sentenced to 4 years' immediate imprisonment. He now seeks leave to appeal against that sentence.
There are two grounds of appeal. The first alleges that the sentencing judge made an error of fact in finding that the appellant had committed a prolonged and persistent series of assaults. The second ground alleges that the sentence of 4 years' immediate imprisonment is manifestly excessive.
For the reasons that follow, neither of the grounds of appeal has a reasonable prospect of success. Leave to appeal should be refused and the appeal dismissed.
Facts
The appellant had been in a relationship with the complainant for about two years, commencing in 2019. The relationship had broken down and by July 2022, the appellant and the complainant had been separated for approximately 12 months.[1]
[1] ts 78.
The complainant obtained a family violence restraining order against the appellant after they separated. About a month before the offence occurred, the complainant sought the removal of the restraining order as she believed that it was preventing the appellant from obtaining employment. The complainant wanted the appellant to be able to get a job to allow him to support his children. The appellant does not have any children with the complainant, but he has children from prior relationships. The complainant also felt that things had improved between them such that a restraining order was no longer necessary.[2]
[2] ts 78.
On 2 July 2022, the complainant was at her home in a suburb of Geraldton. Throughout that day, the appellant sent text messages to and had telephone conversations with the complainant. He had what was described as 'jealousy issues' with the complainant seeing other men and they argued about that subject. The appellant decided to drive to the complainant's house to confront her.[3]
[3] ts 78 - 79.
At around 2.40 pm, the complainant heard yelling and a car door slamming at the front of her house. She looked out a window and saw the appellant shouting. She quickly locked the front door to prevent the appellant from entering. The appellant then went to the back of the house, where the complainant could hear him yelling for her to open the door. He then began kicking the laundry door. After doing this a few times, he managed to force entry to the house through that door. The door was damaged in the process.[4]
[4] ts 79.
On entering the house, the appellant began checking the rooms, demanding, 'Where is he'. He then approached the complainant, grabbed her around the jaw and squeezed hard as he pushed her against a door.[5]
[5] ts 79.
The appellant and the complainant then moved to the lounge room. The State alleged that the appellant dragged the complainant, slung her to the ground and kicked her. This was disputed by the appellant and a trial of issues was listed to determine that matter. The trial of issues did not proceed because the sentencing judge did not find it necessary to resolve this matter as she considered that it would not make any significant difference to the sentence imposed.[6]
[6] ts 79 - 80, 87.
It was, however, accepted that the appellant punched the complainant to her arm, shoulder and torso area whilst she was on the ground in the lounge room. He then threw his car keys at the complainant, hitting her on the forehead and causing an injury to her head.[7]
[7] ts 79.
The appellant told the complainant to call the man that he believed was in the house so that the appellant could fight him. The complainant pretended to do this but then took the opportunity to call the police and ask them to attend as she was frightened that the appellant would continue to hurt her. The appellant and the complainant continued to argue until her parents arrived at the house to drop off the complainant's daughter. The appellant then left the house prior to police arriving a short time later.[8]
[8] ts 79.
The complainant attended the police station on 4 July 2022 and provided a statement. Photographs of bruising to the complainant's head, left arm and chest were taken at this time.[9]
[9] ts 79.
On 6 November 2022, the appellant was arrested by police and taken to the Geraldton Police Station, where he participated in an interview. In the interview, the appellant told police that he could not recall where he was on 2 July 2022. He told them that he was not at the complainant's house, though he knew where that house was. He told police that there was no relationship between him and the complainant but that they used to live together. On being shown a photograph of the complainant's bruises, the appellant said that he did not know how they had been inflicted. He denied attending at the complainant's house or assaulting her.[10]
[10] ts 79 - 80.
The appellant was charged and released on bail. That bail included a protective condition that the appellant was not to contact or attempt to contact the complainant by any means. He breached that bail by communicating with the complainant on 11, 12 and 16 July 2023.[11]
[11] ts 80, 86.
Personal circumstances
The appellant was 38 years old at the time of the offending and 40 years old at the time he was sentenced. He was born in Carnarvon and resided there with his mother until he completed primary school. He then moved to Geraldton to live with his father.[12]
[12] ts 83.
As a child, the appellant witnessed domestic violence between his parents when they were together. He left home when he was 16 years old. His father passed away when he was 18 years old and his mother passed away when he was 28 years old. The appellant is the eldest of four siblings. He is in regular contact with his siblings, particularly a sister who wrote to the court on his behalf attesting to his efforts to be a good father.
The appellant has been in a number of intimate relationships, which have produced five children. At the time of sentencing, three of the children were in his care. Those children were aged 18, 15 and 13 years of age. His 15‑year‑old daughter wrote a letter stating that he had provided the children with a stable home and encouraged them to go to school.[13]
[13] ts 83.
The appellant attended several schools in Western Australian regional centres until year 11. He then went to live at a cattle station for about three years, where he completed a community development program. After this, he worked in the mining industry.
At the time of sentencing, the appellant was unemployed and in receipt of Centrelink benefits, although he had expressed an interest in obtaining employment. This presented him with some financial challenges in raising three children. He was living with the children at a house rented through the Murchison Regional Aboriginal Corporation. He had $22,000 in outstanding fines at the time of sentencing, with a current payment arrangement in place.[14]
[14] ts 83 - 84.
The appellant told the author of the pre‑sentence report that at the time of the offending, he was experiencing poor mental health. He stated that he felt depressed after the breakdown of the relationship with the complainant. He had previously sought assistance regarding his mental health, which he said had led to a diagnosis of depression and associated medication. He reported taking this medication only occasionally.[15]
[15] ts 84.
The appellant began drinking alcohol at age 14 and smoking cannabis at age 17. He first used methylamphetamine when he was in his late 20s or early 30s. He told the author of the pre‑sentence report that he was using methylamphetamine around the time of the offence, including on the day of that offence. In sentencing submissions, it was submitted that the appellant was presently drug free and had been for some time. The sentencing judge said that the veracity of that claim was difficult to assess because there was no independent evidence.[16]
[16] ts 84.
The appellant has a significant prior criminal record. It includes dishonesty, drug and traffic offences. The most relevant of those offences are as follows. The appellant committed a home burglary in 2002, for which he was fined, and an aggravated burglary in 2005, for which he was sentenced to a suspended term of imprisonment. In 2012, the appellant was convicted of disorderly conduct. That offence arose when his partner at the time called the police, and the appellant was observed being verbally abusive and threatening to his partner and throwing a rock at her car. In 2014, the appellant was convicted of aggravated assault occasioning bodily harm, for which he was sentenced to an intensive supervision order. The victim of the assault was his partner at the time. In 2019, the appellant was convicted of criminal damage for using a hammer to damage his ex‑partner's car and was placed on a community‑based order.[17]
[17] ts 84 - 86; pre-sentence report, dated 9 November 2023, 2.
Prior to sentencing, the appellant was referred to the Desert Blue Men's Community Intervention Service, a service that runs programs for men who perpetrate family violence. He attended three sessions, two others being cancelled because he failed to attend. The progress notes indicate that the appellant lacked motivation and that his main reason for attending was to avoid gaol. At the time the appellant attended sessions in January 2024, he was in a new relationship but reported that he and his new partner had been fighting a lot. He was assessed as being at the 'pre‑contemplative' stage and was beginning to recognise cycles of behaviour that he would like to change but was still 'stuck between taking responsibility for his actions and justifying his actions based on the behaviour of others'.
Sentencing remarks
The sentencing judge identified the following factors as being relevant to an assessment of the seriousness of the offence:[18]
1.That the complainant was vulnerable in that she was the former intimate partner of the appellant. He still occupied a position of trust in her life. She was entitled to expect that the appellant would respect her privacy and would not be violent to her.
2.The appellant attended without warning and in a jealous rage. His intention was to take the complainant and whoever she may have had at the house by surprise, thereby making them less able to defend themselves.
3.The appellant kicked open a laundry door to enter the house. That conduct must have heightened the complainant's sense of fear, making her more likely to comply with the appellant's demands on entry.
4.The appellant remained at the house 'assaulting and arguing with the victim until her parents arrived'.
5.The complainant was more vulnerable by reason of the fact that she had recently cancelled the family violence restraining order.
[18] ts 80 - 81.
Later in her remarks the sentencing judge listed the following features of the offending:[19]
[19] ts 90 - 91.
1.It was premeditated. The appellant went to the house to find the man that the complainant was supposedly with. The appellant went to the house with a purpose, which he then put into violent action.
2.The victim was the appellant's ex‑partner and that placed him into a position of trust, which he then abused. He knew how to gain access to the property without her consent.
3.The appellant was seeking to exercise control over his ex‑partner when the relationship with her was over. He failed to respect her right not to continue a relationship with him by breaking into her home and seriously assaulting her.
4.The offending occurred in a context where the appellant had been messaging and calling the complainant, and taking issue with her seeing other people. The appellant had a perceived entitlement to control the complainant and resorted to using violence in this respect.
5.The assault that was perpetrated involved 'actual violence that was gratuitous, prolonged and persistent and inflicted significant pain on her … this was not a one‑off momentary slap of the victim … it was a series of assaults in a variety of ways'.
6.The appellant had shown complete disregard for the fact that the complainant had tried to protect herself from the appellant on a previous occasion by taking a family violence restraining order against him.
7.The force with which the appellant kicked in the door was evident from photographs and a significant repair bill.
8.The appellant 'only desisted in the violence and arguing when the victim's parents arrived at the house'.
9.The appellant breached his bail undertaking for this offence by contacting the complainant. Her Honour said that whilst this did not aggravate the offence, it did show that the appellant had 'learnt nothing'.
10.The impact of the offending was, and would continue to be, considerable. Her Honour noted in this regard that the attack occurred in the complainant's own home, a place where the appellant had no right to be and that this sort of behaviour was not new for the appellant.
In regard to the duration of the offending, her Honour also said that after entering the house, the appellant[20]
then embarked on a protracted series of violence which must have been so frightening for the victim knowing that you were in a rage, jealous rage, but not knowing when or where or how it would stop. You only desisted from the violence and the arguing when her parents arrived at the house.
[20] ts 81.
As regards the appellant's plea of guilty, the sentencing judge noted that the plea was entered on the second appearance in the District Court. Whilst that plea facilitated the course of justice by saving the State the costs of preparing the matter for trial and saving the witnesses from giving evidence at trial, her Honour noted that because there was a dispute as to the facts, the complainant was prepared to give evidence at a trial of issues and that had only been resolved the day prior to the sentencing. Her Honour considered that the plea that was entered was made at an early stage but not at the earliest reasonable opportunity. She concluded that the appropriate discount under s 9AA of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) was 12%.[21]
[21] ts 87 - 88.
The sentencing judge said that apart from the plea of guilty, there was little to demonstrate that the appellant was remorseful. He had initially denied the offences when interviewed by the police and entered a plea of not guilty. Her Honour said that the appellant had shown limited insight into his offending and had a tendency to place blame on his partner for his relationship problems, whilst not addressing his own significant contribution. His lack of remorse was also compounded by the subsequent breach of bail by contacting the complainant.[22]
[22] ts 88 - 89.
The sentencing judge acknowledged that the appellant told the author of the pre‑sentence report that he felt very bad about the offending and recognised that the complainant would have been frightened at the time. Her Honour said that this demonstrated that the appellant had accepted some limited responsibility for his actions, but he had done little to change his behaviour or the factors that contributed to it, such as his attitude towards his domestic partners and his tendency to resort to violence. In these circumstances, there would remain a risk of reoffending.[23]
[23] ts 88 - 89.
The sentencing judge concluded that only a sentence of immediate imprisonment could properly reflect the seriousness of the offence. Her Honour imposed a sentence of 4 years' immediate imprisonment, with an order that the appellant be eligible for parole.[24]
[24] ts 92.
Grounds of appeal
There are two grounds of appeal. They are as follows:[25]
1.The learned sentencing judge made an error of fact in finding that the appellant was guilty [of] a prolonged, persistent series of assaults from which the appellant only desisted with the arrival of the victim's parents.
2.The sentence of 4 years' imprisonment was manifestly excessive.
[25] Appellant's case, filed 17 June 2024, 2.
Merits of the appeal
Ground 1 alleges an express error. The appellant submits that the sentencing judge was wrong to find that the assault was prolonged and persistent in nature. In particular, the appellant submits that the assault did not continue up until the time that the complainant's parents arrived at the house. In this regard, the appellant points to the complainant's statement in which she states that 'it all happened very quickly' and that the appellant calmed down 'a bit' and that they kept talking until her parents arrived. The appellant submits that by finding that the assault continued for a longer period than it did, her Honour erred in her assessment of the seriousness of the offence.
On the agreed facts the assault was comprised of three parts. The first part was when the appellant first entered the house, grabbed the complainant by the jaw and held her against a door. The second part was when the appellant punched the complainant to the torso, arm and shoulder whilst she was on the floor in the lounge room. The third part was when the appellant threw his car keys at the complainant and hit her on the head. Whilst those events may have occurred close in time, on any view, this was a persistent assault and not one constituted by a single violent act.
The sentencing judge referred to the 'prolonged' nature of the appellant's violence in the following passage:[26]
[The complainant] locked the doors to keep you out, but when you entered the house by bashing through the laundry door, her fear must have elevated significantly. As you made your way through the house, demanding to see the man who you thought was in the house, you then embarked on a protracted series of violence which must have been so frightening for the victim knowing that you were in a rage, jealous rage, but not knowing when or where or how it would stop. You only desisted from the violence and the arguing when her parents arrived at the house.
[26] ts 81.
In that passage her Honour distinguished between the appellant's violence towards the complainant, on the one hand, and the arguing between the appellant and the complainant, on the other. Her Honour referred to the appellant having embarked on 'a protracted series of violence'. Her Honour did not use the word 'protracted' in relation to the arguing that occurred after the violence.
Later in her sentencing remarks, her Honour referred to the appellant's assault on the complainant as involving 'actual violence that was gratuitous, prolonged and persistent'. Her Honour then contrasted the gratuitous, prolonged and persistent nature of the actual violence with 'a one-off momentary slap' of a victim.[27]
[27] ts 91.
In our opinion, it is apparent, on a fair reading of the sentencing judge's sentencing remarks as a whole, that her Honour characterised the appellant's actual violence against the complainant as 'prolonged'. The word 'prolonged', in the context of her Honour's use of the word, connoted that the actual violence was relatively drawn out and continued for a relatively lengthy period compared to 'a one-off momentary slap'. The alleged error by her Honour involved a characterisation of the relative duration of the appellant's course of violent conduct as recorded in the agreed facts. We are not persuaded that it is reasonably arguable that her Honour made the alleged error.
In any event, even if the sentencing judge made the alleged error, we would not grant leave to appeal. In Abraham v The State of Western Australia,[28] this court held that s 27(2) of the Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) (the Act) embodies a negative proposition, namely, that this court must not give leave to appeal on a ground of appeal unless it is satisfied the ground has a reasonable prospect of succeeding. Neither s 27 nor any other provision of the Act requires this court to grant leave to appeal on a ground of appeal in an appeal against sentence which alleges an express error by the sentencing judge, if this court is satisfied the ground has a reasonable prospect of succeeding. Even if the express error is made out, this court retains a discretion to refuse a grant of leave if it is satisfied that it is not reasonably arguable that a different sentence should have been imposed. In our opinion, even if the error alleged by the appellant in ground 1 was made out, and this court was called upon to re‑exercise the sentencing discretion, it is not reasonably arguable that a different sentence should have been imposed.
[28] Abraham v The State of Western Australia [2014] WASCA 151 [81].
As regards ground 2, the relevant principles relating to appeals against sentence where there is a claim that a sentence is manifestly excessive are well established. Those principles have been stated many times and have been conveniently summarised in Kabambi v The State of Western Australia.[29] It is not necessary to repeat them.
[29] Kabambi v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 44 [21].
The maximum penalty for an offence of aggravated home burglary is 20 years' imprisonment.[30]
[30] Code, s 401(2)(a).
As to the seriousness of the offence, an aggravated home burglary committed with intent to intimidate the occupants of a house and in the course of which a serious assault is committed is inherently serious. Where the occupant is a former partner of the offender the offence is a form of domestic violence. Penalties for such behaviour must reflect the seriousness of the conduct, the likely impact on the victim or victims and the importance of discouraging such conduct, both by the offender and by others.
In the present case, the appellant was a mature man with a history of similar violence towards his domestic partners. There was nothing in his personal history that mitigated the offending. There was no finding of remorse and the appellant's prospects of rehabilitation were guarded. The only mitigating factor of any consequence was the plea of guilty, which did not come at the first reasonable opportunity.
The only comparable case referred to by the appellant is The State of Western Australia v Chungarai.[31] That was a case in which the offender was convicted of four offences, being unlawful detention, a threat to kill, aggravated assault occasioning bodily harm and unlawful wounding. On a State appeal the total sentence was increased to 6 years' imprisonment. The appellant submits that the offending in that case was significantly more serious than his offence and that the outcome supports a conclusion that his sentence is manifestly excessive.
[31] The State of Western Australia v Chungarai [2021] WASCA 147.
The offending in Chungarai was certainly serious but it is not an apt comparator given that it is not a case in which the offender was convicted of aggravated home burglary. There are many cases that do deal with offences of the type committed by the appellant, and it is to those cases that regard should be had. It is those cases that provide a yardstick for sentencing for aggravated home burglary.
In Brindley v The State of Western Australia,[32] this court observed:
The circumstances of burglary offences can vary widely and attract a wide range of sentences. Home burglaries are viewed as being particularly serious offences, and are generally seen as requiring substantial penalties in order to recognise considerations of personal and general deterrence, and reflect the prevalence of the offence. Home invasions, which involve forcible entry into residential premises known or suspected to be occupied at the time, accompanied by threatened or actual violence, are generally significantly more serious than home burglaries which lack those characteristics. A home invasion which is committed with intent to intimidate the occupants is generally more serious than a burglary which involves simply an intention to steal.
[32] Brindley v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 153 [39].
In Brindley, the offender forced entry into a house occupied by a mother and her children in search of a person he suspected of breaking into cars. He punched one of the older children in the house. The appellant in that case had a historical record of drug offences but had since turned his life around. He pleaded guilty to charges of aggravated home burglary and assault occasioning bodily harm and received a 20% discount under s 9AA of the Sentencing Act. He was sentenced to 3 years 6 months' immediate imprisonment on the first count and 6 months' immediate imprisonment cumulative on the second count. Leave to appeal against the individual sentence on count 1 and the total effective sentence of 4 years' immediate imprisonment was refused.
There are many other recent cases dealing with sentences for aggravated burglary. We have had regard to The State of Western Australia v Billett;[33] The State of Western Australia v Krakouer;[34] Creusot v The State of Western Australia;[35] The State of Western Australia v McDonagh;[36] Miller v The State of Western Australia;[37] The State of Western Australia v Quartermaine;[38] Panicciari v The State of Western Australia;[39] Robson v The State of Western Australia;[40] The State of Western Australia v Richards;[41] Kickett v The State of Western Australia;[42] Winmar v The State of Western Australia;[43] Page v The State of Western Australia;[44] Serukai v The State of Western Australia;[45] NOI v The State of Western Australia;[46] Jolly v The State of Western Australia;[47] Drage v The State of Western Australia;[48] Beins v The State of Western Australia;[49] and Kelly v The State of Western Australia.[50] It is unnecessary to set out the facts of each of these cases. It is sufficient to note that they do not support a conclusion that a sentence of 4 years' immediate imprisonment for the offence committed in this case is unreasonable or plainly unjust. Furthermore, in many of those cases it has been recognised that sentences for aggravated home burglaries need to be firmed up.[51]
[33] The State of Western Australia v Billett [2022] WASCA 158.
[34] The State of Western Australia v Krakouer [2022] WASCA 118.
[35] Creusot v The State of Western Australia [2022] WASCA 117.
[36] The State of Western Australia v McDonagh [2022] WASCA 108.
[37] Miller v The State of Western Australia [2022] WASCA 50.
[38] The State of Western Australia v Quartermaine [2021] WASCA 145.
[39] Panicciari v The State of Western Australia [2020] WASCA 154.
[40] Robson v The State of Western Australia [2020] WASCA 153.
[41] The State of Western Australia v Richards [2020] WASCA 129.
[42] Kickett v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 147.
[43] Winmar v The State of Western Australia [2018] WASCA 155.
[44] Page v The State of Western Australia [2018] WASCA 76.
[45] Serukai v The State of Western Australia [2020] WASCA 159.
[46] NOI v The State of Western Australia [2020] WASCA 84.
[47] Jolly v The State of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 181.
[48] Drage v The State of Western Australia [2021] WASCA 6.
[49] Beins v The State of Western Australia [No 2] [2014] WASCA 54.
[50] Kelly v The State of Western Australia [2020] WASCA 29 [44] ‑ [45].
[51] See Serukai [43] - [44].
Having regard to the maximum penalty, the seriousness of the offence, the personal circumstances of the appellant and sentences imposed in comparable cases, it is not reasonably arguable that the sentence of 4 years' immediate imprisonment imposed in this case was plainly unreasonable or unjust.
Neither of the grounds of appeal has a reasonable prospect of succeeding. Leave to appeal should be refused and the appeal dismissed.
Orders
1.Leave to appeal refused.
2.Appeal dismissed.
I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
ID
Associate to the Honourable Justice Hall
31 JULY 2024
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