Cliftleigh Haulage Pty Ltd v Byron Shire Council

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NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL

CITATION:      Cliftleigh Haulage Pty. Ltd. v. Byron Shire Council [2007]  NSWCCA 13

FILE NUMBER(S):
2006/1854

HEARING DATE(S):               15 December 2006

JUDGMENT DATE: 7 February 2007

PARTIES:
Cliftleigh Haulage Pty. Limited - applicant
Byron Shire Council - opponent

JUDGMENT OF:       Hodgson JA Howie J Price J   

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: Land & Environment Court of NSW

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):          LEP 60004/05

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER:     Talbot J

LOWER COURT DATE OF DECISION:    9 August 2006

LOWER COURT MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:
Not applicable

COUNSEL:
Mr. P. Hamill with E. Ozen for applicant
Mr. M. Wright for opponent

SOLICITORS:
Stacks, Forster for applicant
Marsdens Law Group, Sydney for opponent

CATCHWORDS:
CRIMINAL LAW
PRACTICE
COSTS - Prosecution in local court - Appeal from conviction - Conviction set aside - Circumstances in which costs awarded to appellant - Investigation into the alleged offence conducted in an unreasonable manner - Unreasonable failure to investigate relevant matter - Whether necessary to prove what an absent witness would have said.

LEGISLATION CITED:
Crimes (Local Courts and Appeal Review) Act 2001 (NSW) s.70
Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW) s.5BA

CASES CITED:
Killick v. The Queen (1981) 147 CLR 565
Latoudis v. Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534

DECISION:
(1)Time limit extended to the date of filing of the stated case. (2) The questions in the stated case answered:
1. Yes. 2. Yes. 3. No error of law. (3) Matter remitted to Talbot J. (4) The Council to pay the appellant’s costs of the stated case.

JUDGMENT:

IN THE COURT OF
CRIMINAL APPEAL

CCAP 2006/1854
LEP 60004/05

HODGSON JA
HOWIE J
PRICE J

Wednesday 7 February 2007

CLIFTLEIGH HAULAGE PTY. LTD. V. BYRON SHIRE COUNCIL

Judgment

  1. HODGSON JA:  This a stated case pursuant to s.5BA of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912, which section provides as follows:

    5BA       Case stated from Land and Environment Court

    (1)          A Judge of the Land and Environment Court may submit any question of law arising on any appeal to the Land and Environment Court in its environmental offences appeals jurisdiction coming before the Judge to the Court of Criminal Appeal for determination, and the Court of Criminal Appeal may make any such order or give any such direction to the Land and Environment Court as it thinks fit.

    (2)          At the request of a person who was the appellant in an appeal referred to in subsection (1), a question of law may be submitted under that subsection to the Court of Criminal Appeal for determination even though the appeal proceedings during which the question arose have been disposed of. The question of law must be submitted not later than 28 days after the end of the appeal proceedings, or within such longer period as the Court of Criminal Appeal may allow.

  2. Since the time limit in s.5BA(2) was exceeded in this case, the applicant also applies for an extension of time.

  3. Talbot J of the Land & Environment Court has stated the case as follows:

    1. DETERMINATION:
    On 26…

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Details
Case
[2007] NSWCCA 13
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Cliftleigh Haulage Pty Ltd v Byron Shire Council, the respondent appealed against a decision by Talbot J to order the respondent to pay costs to the appellant. The appellant had been convicted of an offence under the Environmental Protection Act 1997 (NSW) but the conviction was later set aside. The appellant sought costs under section 70 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW). The primary issue was whether the respondent had unreasonably failed to investigate or investigate properly any relevant matter, and whether the appellant was entitled to costs. The appellant argued that the failure to call a witness, Mr. Harrop, was unreasonable and that the respondent should have been aware of the potential evidence he could provide.

The court examined whether the investigation was conducted in an unreasonable manner and whether the respondent unreasonably failed to investigate any relevant matter. The court held that the failure to call Mr. Harrop was not relevant to the investigation but rather to the manner in which the proceedings were conducted. The court found that the respondent should have questioned Mr. Harrop about his observations regarding the crushing of cars and the presence of employees at the site, particularly after the appellant had denied any presence of authorized personnel. The court noted that while it was arguable that it was unreasonable to rely solely on circumstantial evidence after the appellant's assertion, it was not sufficient to suggest that the appellant might not be guilty or that the proceedings should not have been brought.

The court held that under section 70(1)(a), it was not necessary for the appellant to prove what an absent witness would have said if it was clear that the investigation was conducted unreasonably. The court reasoned that if a prosecutor knows of multiple witnesses but interviews only one, and the prosecution fails, the section may apply even without proof of what the other witnesses would have said. Similarly, if the prosecutor knows of a potential witness but does not interview them, and relies solely on circumstantial evidence, section 70(1)(a) may still be satisfied.

The court found no error in the primary judge's decision regarding section 70(1)(c) but held that the appellant was entitled to costs under section 70(1)(a) due to the unreasonable failure to investigate. The court ordered the respondent to pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

He submitted that, even in relation to s.70(1)(a), the requirements were not satisfied unless the unreasonable manner of investigation was material to the bringing of the prosecution; so that the person seeking costs had to show that it led to a prosecution being brought which otherwise would or should have been brought. Accordingly, it was sufficient for Talbot J not to be satisfied what the outcome would have been if Mr. Harrop had been called. DECISION The relevant questions were whether the investigation into the alleged offence was conducted in an unreasonable manner, or whether the prosecutor unreasonably failed to investigate (or investigate properly) any relevant matter. No question was raised as to whether the proceedings were conducted by the prosecutor in an improper manner, under par.(b) of s.70(1). In my opinion, the submissions based on the failure to call Mr. Harrop at the hearing are therefore misconceived. That failure relates to the manner in which the proceedings were conducted, not to the investigation. In any event, the finding of Talbot J did not amount to a finding that the proceedings were conducted in an improper manner. However, in my opinion there is force in the submission that, in investigating the matter, Council officers should have asked Mr. Harrop what he observed between the nominated dates in relation to the crushing of cars and the presence on site of the employees of the appellant, particularly after the appellant had asserted to the Council that Mr. Irvine was not at the site, and that no other person authorised by the appellant was at the site, at relevant times. Whether or not it would have been reasonable to rely on a circumstantial case before that assertion was made, it is certainly arguable that it was no longer reasonable after the assertion was made, in circumstances where there was a witness who may have been able to give direct evidence of what occurred. As regards s.70(1)(c), it could be said that a person seeking costs must identify a matter that the prosecution was or ought to have been aware of and that suggested that the appellant might not be guilty or that the proceedings should not have been brought. If the “matter” in question here is that there was a possible eye-witness, then it was not shown that this matter suggested that the appellant might not be guilty. If the “matter” in question is the evidence that that witness could give, although it could be said that the Council should have been aware of it, it was not shown that this evidence suggested that the appellant might not be guilty. Accordingly, in relation to s.70(1)(c), I do not think error by the primary judge was shown. However, in relation to s.70(1)(a), I do not think it is necessary for the person seeking costs in every case to show that an investigation conducted in a reasonable manner would have suggested that the appellant might not be guilty or that the proceedings ought not to be brought. If a prosecutor knows there are five eye-witnesses to an event, and interviews and calls only one of them, and the prosecution then fails, I think s.70(1)(a) may apply even if the person seeking costs does not prove what the other four witnesses would have said. Similarly, closer to this case, if the prosecutor knows there is an eye-witness to what happened, but does not interview this witness, and instead relies wholly on a circumstantial case, in my opinion s.70(1)(a) may be satisfied even if the person seeking costs does not prove what the eye-witness would have said.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established