Clifford v The Queen
[2004] TASSC 16
•10 March 2004
[2004] TASSC 16
CITATION: Clifford v R [2004] TASSC 16
PARTIES: CLIFFORD, Ricky Guy
v
R
TITLE OF COURT: COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL (TAS)
JURISDICTION: APPELLATE
FILE NO/S: CCA 119/2003
DELIVERED ON: 10 March 2004
DELIVERED AT: Hobart
HEARING DATES: 1 March 2004
JUDGMENT OF: Underwood, Crawford and Slicer JJ
CATCHWORDS:
Criminal Law – Evidence – Evidentiary matters relating to witnesses and accused persons – Identification evidence – Direction to jury – Whether warning required or advisable – What amounts to "identification evidence".
Evidence Act 2001 (Tas), ss3(1), 116.
R v Smith [2000] NSWCCA 468; Dhanhoa v R (2003) 77 ALJR 1433; 199 ALR 547, applied.
Aust Dig Criminal Law [613]
REPRESENTATION:
Counsel:
Appellant: G A Richardson
Respondent: J N Perks
Solicitors:
Appellant: G A Richardson
Respondent: Director of Public Prosecutions
Judgment Number: [2004] TASSC 16
Number of Paragraphs: 40
Serial No 16/2004
File No CCA 119/2003
RICKY GUY CLIFFORD v THE QUEEN
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL
UNDERWOOD J
CRAWFORD J
SLICER J
10 March 2004
Orders of the Court
Appeal dismissed.
Application for leave to appeal dismissed.
Serial No 16/2004
File No CCA 119/2003
RICKY GUY CLIFFORD v THE QUEEN
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL
UNDERWOOD J
10 March 2004
I agree with Crawford J's reasons for judgment and the orders that he proposes be made in this appeal.
File No CCA 119/2003
RICKY GUY CLIFFORD v THE QUEEN
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL
CRAWFORD J
10 March 2004
The appellant was found guilty by a jury of one count of assault. Particulars of the charge were that on 17 February 2002, he punched Matthew James Grice in the face. He was sentenced to three months' imprisonment.
He appealed and sought leave to appeal against the jury's verdict and he appealed against the sentence, but abandoned the appeal against sentence. The grounds of the appeal and the application for leave to appeal against the verdict, that were maintained, were collectively the following:
1That the learned trial judge erred in law by failing to direct the jury of the need for caution before accepting identification evidence, as required by the Evidence Act 2001 ("the Act"), s116.
2That the learned trial judge erred by failing to comply with a request by the jury for a break in their deliberations.
Ground 1 ¾ identification evidence
It was not disputed at the trial, and the evidence established, that the appellant was present at or near the place where the alleged offence was committed. See the definition of "identification evidence" in the Act, s3(1). It was not an issue at the trial that Mr Grice was struck in the jaw and that he suffered fractures as a result. The only major issue was whether it was the appellant who struck him. There was a considerable body of evidence from four witnesses that led to a conclusion that he was the assailant. The evidence of his employee and companion that night, Mr Bayles, and his own statements to the police, supported his defence that he was not the assailant. He admitted that he was present at the scene, at a time when he was arguing with a Mr Mading, but he denied that he struck Mr Grice immediately after that argument ceased, as alleged by the Crown.
At the conclusion of the summing up of the learned trial judge, counsel for the appellant sought a direction pursuant to s116. His Honour refused to give one. At the hearing of the appeal, it was submitted that the identity of Mr Grice's assailant was critical, that evidence of witnesses that it was the appellant was identification evidence for the purposes of the Act, and that it followed that the learned trial judge, in his directions to the jury, was obliged to conform with s116, that is in these terms:
"116 ¾ (1) If identification evidence has been admitted, the judge is to inform the jury ¾
(a)that there is a special need for caution before accepting identification evidence; and
(b)of the reasons for that need for caution, both generally and in the circumstances of the case.
(2) It is not necessary that a particular form of words be used in informing the jury."
Counsel for the Crown submitted that s116 did not apply, either because the evidence in question was not identification evidence for the purposes of the Act or because it was not disputed. Identification evidence is defined in s3(1) as follows:
"'identification evidence' means evidence that is ¾
(a) an assertion by a person to the effect that a defendant was, or resembles, visually, aurally or otherwise, a person who was, present at or near a place where ¾
(i)the offence for which the defendant is being prosecuted was committed; or
(ii)an act connected to that offence was done ¾
at or about the time at which the offence was committed or the act was done, being an assertion that is based wholly or partly on what the person making the assertion saw, heard or otherwise perceived at that place and time; or
(b) a report, whether oral or in writing, of such an assertion."
It was submitted for the Crown that as there was no issue at the trial that the appellant "was … a person who was present at or near [the] place where … the offence for which the [appellant was] being prosecuted was committed … or … an act connected to that offence was done" at the relevant time, a s116 direction was not required.
The following facts were not in dispute. Mr Grice was employed as a casual barman at the Insomnia Nightclub ("the club") in Watchorn Street, Hobart. Mr Manjing Mading was employed there as a crowd controller. He was easily identifiable because he was a black African, over 7 feet tall. The appellant managed a security business and with an employee, Peter Bayles, went to the club for a drink some time before 6am on Sunday, 17 February 2002. Some time after they arrived, a fight developed between patrons inside the club. Mr Mading moved to break the fight up. He was struck in the face by an unknown person who was not the appellant. The people involved in the incident moved outside the club, along with others. At some point in time outside the club, an argument developed between Mr Mading and the appellant, during which the appellant either punched or knocked Mr Mading to the ground. Not long after that, someone struck Mr Grice, fracturing his mandible in two places.
The Crown case was that at the time of the argument between the appellant and Mr Mading, Mr Grice was standing nearby watching what was going on. It was also the Crown case that shortly after Mr Mading fell to the ground, it was the appellant who administered the blow to the jaw of Mr Grice. It was the appellant's case that after his altercation with Mr Mading, he left the scene and that he was not the person who struck Mr Grice.
Mr Grice gave evidence that at about 6am he went outside the club for some fresh air. He said that he saw Mr Mading and the appellant shouting and arguing with each other, probably 10 feet up the street from the front door. Mr Mading was well known to him. He did not know the appellant at the time. He described the man with whom Mr Mading was arguing as "a large man, about six two, six three, solid, wearing jeans and a shirt, trim hair … it was either like brown with little blond tips or blond with brown tips". The man's shirt was "a greeney aqua blue". When first seen, the man did not appear to be in the company of anyone, but after the incident, he left with another man who Mr Grice did not know either, but who he described as "about five nine to six feet tall perhaps, very white coloured, pale coloured skin, short blond spiky hair, dressed in all black". At the time of the argument between the appellant and Mr Mading, there were not very many men present, Mr Grice said. He recalled only the appellant, Mr Mading, the man in black and himself, but accepted that there might have been another person out of sight in the nearby car park.
Mr Grice described the appellant and Mr Mading as screaming and shouting at each other and the appellant pushing Mr Mading backwards to the ground. He continued:
"Immediately after Mr Clifford turned his attention to me, said 'who the fuck are you' and instantaneously I felt a fist on the right side of my jaw".
It was the blow that fractured his mandible. He accepted that he did not see the blow coming, but he was adamant that it came from the appellant because there was no one else who was close to him at the time who could have administered it. After that the appellant and the man dressed in black wandered off up the street. Mr Grice said that he asked "who was that" and Mr Mading told him it was Ricky Clifford. Throughout his evidence, Mr Grice referred to the man who argued with Mr Mading and Mr Grice's assailant as Mr Clifford, without objection from counsel for the defence.
Mr Mading knew the appellant well. He had been employed by him. He gave evidence that at about 5.30am there was a fight inside the club involving three men against one. In the course of his employment as a crowd controller, he went to break the fight up. Eventually everyone was moved outside, where the fight continued. Once again Mr Mading tried to break it up and the appellant intervened, telling him not to get involved. An argument developed between them, with the appellant insisting that Mr Mading should not get involved and Mr Mading insisting that it was his job to stop the fighting. Mr Mading said that the appellant started to become physical and was trying to hit him, and a friend of the appellant was grabbing hold of the appellant, trying to stop him. Mr Mading said that he moved back and fell over onto his back. By this time, Mr Grice had come outside. Mr Mading's English was by no means perfect. With reference to Mr Grice, he continued:
"He came out, he was standing behind me, and I think he get hurt, get hit in that time."
Mr Mading described the appellant as wanting to continue fighting and of being dragged away up Watchorn Street towards Bathurst Street by his friend.
In his examination-in-chief and the first part of his cross-examination, Mr Mading did not claim to have seen the appellant punch Mr Grice, although he was not asked whether he did so. Eventually in the course of cross-examination, it was put several times to him that he did not see the appellant hit Mr Grice. Each time he was adamant that he did in fact do so, and he described the appellant's actions in the following way:
"I seen him hit. He was hitting, throwing, punching around in the head. It was really angry, out of control. So was punching. Hitting him around."
Two women gave evidence. The first was Mr Grice's girlfriend, Emily Devine. She did not know the appellant. When inside the club she heard there was a fight outside and she went to the foyer. She could see on the footpath outside that Mr Mading was fighting with a man she did not know, but whom she described as broad across the shoulders, shorter than Mr Mading and Mr Grice and with brownish hair. She said "that man hit Mr Mading, who fell onto his back on the footpath". She said that Mr Grice, who was also out on the footpath, "walked into the car park bit" and Mr Mading's assailant walked towards him. Her evidence continued:
"I just saw him walk towards him. I think they might have had a few words to say on both behalves, I'm not really sure. I saw ¾ I couldn't see [Mr Grice] at the time but I think I saw a punch being thrown but I didn't see it connect or anything."
She confirmed that she saw a punch thrown by Mr Mading's assailant but that Mr Grice was out of sight at that time. She said that the assailant had a friend with him and they walked away up the street. Not long after, Mr Grice walked back into sight holding his jaw, saying "he hit me".
Lauren Harvey was a bar attendant at the club. She gave evidence that at about 6am she went outside for some fresh air. Once outside she saw her fellow employee, Mr Mading, and two other men she did not know. She described them as "one that was about, approximately, between six foot three, dark spiky dyed blond hair, quite solid build, and another guy who was a bit shorter, I think, and he had short blond hair as well". She observed a heated altercation between Mr Mading and "the person I know as Ricky", being "the one with the short dyed spiky hair … the taller one". The next thing she knew was that Mr Mading "was arms and legs in the air, all seven foot sort of splayed all over the footpath". She said that he had obviously been pushed or hit, but she was not sure which. She said that throughout it all, before and after Mr Mading fell, the third man was trying to get the second one to back off, saying "come on, enough's enough". After Mr Mading had fallen, she became aware of Mr Grice being present. The man who had been arguing with Mr Mading broke away from the man who was trying to get him away and "the next thing I know he's lunched [sic] across and [Mr Grice's] head has snapped back and he's going 'ouch'". She said that she saw the arm of the man who had been arguing with Mr Mading "come flying across" but because Mr Grice was hit on the other side of his face, "I didn't actually see his hand connect with his face but I saw [Mr Grice] take a step back and grab his face". All she could say she saw of a blow was of it going towards Mr Grice's face, his head snapped back and he took a step backwards and grabbed his face.
The Crown also called Matthew Bayles to give evidence, which favoured the appellant. He was an employee of the appellant and a crowd controller. After work, the two of them had gone to the club for a drink. He said that he was wearing black pants and a shirt that may have been blue, but he could not remember. He said that he had a number of drinks with the appellant. He described a fight breaking out between eight or ten people inside the club. Later, he and the appellant decided to leave. As they left, they came across Mr Mading in the car park. He said that the appellant and Mr Mading commenced to have "just a normal discussion", which became heated and louder. He could not understand what was being said, partly because of noise coming from the club and Mr Mading's accent. Mr Mading started waving his arms about. Mr Bayles described Mr Mading as lunging towards the appellant with something in his hand, and the appellant knocked Mr Mading's arm away and struck him in the face, causing him to fall backwards to the ground, at the edge of the car park towards the front door of the club. He heard something metal bouncing on the ground and a short time later he noticed the blade of a knife on the ground that he picked up and retained.
Mr Bayles said that Mr Mading got back up. The two men continued to argue. Mr Bayles said that he could remember the appellant saying "I can't believe you did that". It was possible that Mr Mading fell to the ground a second time, he said. "There was a bit of pushing and shoving between them", he said. He was watching the appellant most of the time and did not see him hit anyone other than Mr Mading. He was telling the appellant to come up the street with him and started to push and shove him in that direction. With difficulty, he succeeded. He said that at one point a crowd controller from the club was egging the appellant to come back and fight, but he did not think that the appellant got within striking distance of him. The appellant was drunk at that time, he said.
The only other evidence that is relevant to the issues on appeal was the appellant's video recorded interview with the police over three weeks later. He said that he went to the club, wearing a green shirt, in the company of Mr Bayles, who was wearing black clothing and who was about five foot ten or five foot eleven inches high and about 26 or 27 years old. He had two drinks and was in the company of Mr Bayles and two others. He described a fight inside the club between a number of persons, which he said he and Mr Mading both worked at stopping. (Mr Mading's evidence was that the appellant tried to stop him doing so.) Later he decided to leave. He went outside and found Mr Mading, who was applying ice to his jaw. He "wanted to see if [Mr Mading] was okay and I also wanted to clear up our dispute that we had", he said. He spoke to Mr Mading about the fact that he was unreliable and would never be employed by him again. He told the police that Mr Mading then lunged in an upward arc towards his face with a knife. He deflected it and hit Mr Mading in defence. The blade of the knife landed in the middle of the car park and Mr Mading "rolled down", got up and wanted to come back at him. The appellant said a few words to him and they had "a bit of a wrestle" for probably three or four minutes. It came to an end and he and Mr Bayles then walked away up Watchorn Street. Mr Bayles had picked up the blade of the knife. There were no punches thrown involving any other person and he certainly did not punch Mr Grice, who he did not know.
The first task for the Court is to identify those parts of the evidence that fell within the definition of "identification evidence" in the Act, s3(1). It is not all evidence tending to establish that an accused person was the offender that falls within the description. Further, evidence of a mere description of an offender does not fall within the definition, unless it contains an assertion that it was or resembled the accused. R v Taufua, unreported NSWCCA 11 November 1996.
It is sufficient to say for the purposes of this case that the definition of identification evidence in s3(1) means an assertion by a witness to the events that the accused person was, or resembles, a person present at or near where, and at or about the time that the crime (or an act connected with it) was committed, or hearsay evidence of such an assertion.
The evidence of Mr Mading that it was the appellant with whom he had an argument outside the club and who became physical and was trying to hit him, fell within the definition insofar as it amounted to an assertion that the appellant was present at or near the place where, and at about the time at which, the assault on Mr Grice was committed. Indeed, all of Mr Mading's evidence that amounted to assertions that the appellant was so present fell within the definition of the expression. His evidence that he saw the accused strike Mr Grice also fell within the definition, not because of what he claimed he saw the appellant do, but because in its context, it amounted to an assertion that the appellant was present at the place where, and at the time when, the crime was committed. In other words, his assertions to that effect amounted to identification evidence. His evidence of the conduct of the person he so identified did not amount to identification evidence, however.
The evidence of Mr Grice of what he saw of the altercation between the appellant and Mr Mading was identification evidence insofar as it contained an assertion that the appellant was at or near where, and at or about the time, that Mr Grice was struck. Of course, his evidence without that assertion, did not fall within the definition. His mere description of the man with whom Mr Mading was arguing did not alone fall within the definition, for it contained no assertion that the person he described was or resembled the appellant, but Mr Grice's evidence that it was the appellant was identification evidence. His evidence that it was the appellant who turned his attention to him immediately before he was struck also amounted to an assertion that fell within the definition, but not his evidence of what the man did, divorced from that assertion. Further, the hearsay evidence given by Mr Grice that Mr Mading told him that the man (who struck him) was Ricky Clifford, fell within par(b) of the definition.
There was nothing in the evidence of Ms Devine that amounted to identification evidence, for she made no assertion that the appellant was or resembled the person she saw fighting with Mr Mading and throw a punch towards Mr Grice. The only part of Ms Harvey's evidence that contained the assertion and therefore amounted to identification evidence, was a brief passage when she referred to the heated altercation between Mr Mading and "the person I now know as Ricky".
Strange as it may seem, much of the evidence of Mr Bayles and of what the appellant said to the police in his interview also fell within the definition, because that evidence contained many assertions that the appellant was present at or near the place where, and at or about the time when, the crime was allegedly committed.
Having identified the "identification evidence", the remaining question for consideration is whether the learned trial judge was obliged by s116 to inform the jury that there was a special need for caution before accepting the identification evidence and of the reasons for that need, both generally and in the circumstances of the case. Viewed literally, the section required such a warning to be given, but in a case where the accused accepted that he was present at or near the place where, and at or about the time when, the offence was allegedly committed, it would be pointless, for it would amount to a warning to the jury to be cautious about finding a fact that was admitted by the accused. In that circumstance the direction is not usually required.
Two authorities are particularly in point. The first in time is R v Smith [2000] NSWCCA 468, in which the accused man admitted that he was talking to the complainant on a street corner, but denied that he then walked with her to some soccer fields where it was alleged by her that he sexually assaulted her. Subsequent photographic identification of him by her was admitted into evidence. Wood CJ at CL, with whom the other members of the Court of Criminal Appeal agreed, said, at pars83 – 89:
"83 Viewed literally, every criminal trial involves identification evidence within the wide meaning given to that phrase in the dictionary to the Evidence Act. The evidence of any eyewitness who gives evidence, based upon his or her own observations, that the accused was present at the place where the offence charged occurred, falls literally within that definition. Yet common sense would suggest, in such a case, where such evidence was not in issue, that there would little [sic] if any point served in giving the S 116(1) direction.
84 Whether the observations in Clarke (1997) 97 A Crim R 414 at 424 to 425, concerning the apparent universal and mandatory application of S 116(1) require reconsideration, need not, however, be decided here.
85 If there were error by his Honour in not giving the directions suggested, then the case would be one where an application of the proviso would be appropriate. The reasons for this are straightforward.
86 This was a case where the appellant was known to the complainant as Rob, where it was common ground that they were conversing on the corner, and where it was the complainant's evidence that they walked together from that position directly to the place where, within moments, the assault occurred. It is impossible in those circumstances to see what relevant or helpful direction could have been given to the jury concerning her identification of the man she already knew as Rob.
87 It needs to be firmly borne in mind that juries need those directions that are relevant to the case that they are to decide and only those directions. To embark upon some general excursus concerning substantive or procedural law, unrelated to a live issue, is more likely to confuse than to assist, and should always be avoided.
88 The real issue for the jury was not one of identification, but whether they could be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt as to the truth of the complainant's account of what occurred after she began to talk to the appellant. Her sobriety, her state of consciousness and her general reliability as a witness were relevant to that issue. They were dealt with expansively in relation to that issue in the summing up. They were not, however, relevant to her photographic identification of the man who she knew as Rob, the sole purpose of which was to confirm that he was the appellant.
89 In those circumstances, no risk of a miscarriage of justice arose by reason of the absence of any directions in relation to the photographic identification that was conducted at the police station. This ground of appeal is not made good."
More recently, the High Court considered the matter in Dhanhoa v R (2003) 77 ALJR 1433; 199 ALR 547. The facts in that case bear comparison with the facts in this case. The complainant invited four men back to his flat from a hotel. He claimed that after a brief interval, all four set upon him and took him from the flat and the crimes of robbery in company with wounding and kidnapping were committed by them against him. At the close of the Crown case, evidence identifying the appellant as one of the four men consisted of evidence that fingerprints matching his were found in the flat and evidence that 15 months after the incident, the complainant selected a photograph of the appellant out of photographs of 11 people, saying that it was very similar to one of the offenders and that he believed that he was the one who had grabbed him by the neck and pinned him to a wall at the commencement of the attack. It was clear that without evidence from the defence suggesting the contrary, a caution would have been required pursuant to the New South Wales equivalent of s116. However, the appellant did give evidence, in the course of which he admitted that he was one of the four men who went to the flat, but he maintained that he left the flat before the attack on the complainant commenced. By a majority of four to one, it was held that the s116 caution was not required.
It was pointed out by Gleeson CJ and Hayne J at 1436; 551, that it was the assertion that the accused was, or resembled, a man who was present at or about when the victim was attacked and then taken from his flat that constituted the identification evidence; not the detail of his alleged conduct. On any view of the evidence, the appellant was present at or about the time when the offences were committed. Having referred to the common law principle stated by the court in Domican v R (1992) 173 CLR 555 at 561, their Honours said at 1436 – 1437; 551 – 552:
"If read literally, and apart from its statutory context, s 116 could be taken to mean that a judge is always required to inform the jury that there is a special need for caution before accepting identification evidence whenever identification evidence has been admitted, even if the reliability of the evidence is not in dispute. That would be absurd. If a witness claims to have seen an accused at a particular place on a particular occasion, and the truth of that assertion is not questioned or in any way put in issue, then ordinarily there is no special need for caution before accepting the evidence. The common law principle, expressed in the passage from Domican quoted above, contains the obvious qualification that the warning is to be given where the reliability of the evidence of identification is disputed. The same qualification is implied in s 116; if it were otherwise the provision would offend common sense."
It was pointed out at 1437; 553, that "it was not the reliability of the identification that was in dispute; it was the reliability of the account of the conduct of the person identified, and, in particular, of the evidence that such person remained with his three companions at all material times".
McHugh and Gummow JJ essentially agreed. At 1441; 557 – 558 they said:
"The obligation imposed by s 116 must be read in the context of the adversarial system of criminal justice. It is not to be supposed that, in enacting that section, the legislature intended that juries be given directions concerning identification evidence when identification was not an issue. It is not to be supposed that the legislature intended a trial judge to give a direction that was not relevant to the issues in the case. Not only would it be a waste of curial time and effort but the giving of an irrelevant direction would be likely to confuse the jury who understandably would be puzzled as to what significance the direction had."
Those two cases should be applied in this State. The relevant provisions of the respective Evidence Acts are identical. At the conclusion of the evidence, there was no issue that the appellant was present at or about the time at which, and at or near the place where the offence was committed. The reliability of the identification evidence was not in dispute; it was the reliability of the accounts of the conduct of the person who had been identified, that remained in dispute.
The first ground has not been made out.
I mention that the learned trial judge did refer the jury in the course of his summing up to aspects of the evidence, including inconsistencies between eye witness accounts, upon which the appellant relied as establishing that the evidence of the witnesses upon which the Crown relied was in fact unreliable. For the purposes of determining this ground of appeal, it is unnecessary to detail what his Honour said to the jury about those matters.
Ground 2 ¾ the jury's request for a break
The evidence was relatively brief. With the exception of Mr Bayles, the evidence of all witnesses was completed by the end of the first day of the trial. On the second day, Mr Bayles gave evidence and he was followed by the closing addresses of counsel and the summing up.
The jury commenced deliberating at 2.52pm on the second day. At 3.55pm they communicated that they had a question. The Court was reassembled and at 4.03pm the jury were brought in and asked the question. The learned judge responded. The jury returned to their deliberations at about 4.12pm. Between 4.55 and 5pm, the jury buzzed and communicated a request that they be allowed to have a break. They were informed that the Court would be reassembled in order for them to make their request to the learned judge. At that time, his Honour was about to sentence another person and decided to complete that process before bringing the jury back. At 5.07pm, his Honour commenced to sentence the other person. At the completion of that hearing, counsel for the Crown asked if he could briefly mention another case and in the course of doing so, at 5.15pm, the jury against buzzed. Having disposed of the matter that was being mentioned, the learned judge had the jury brought back into the Court two minutes later, at which time they announced that they had reached their verdict. It was a majority verdict that the accused was guilty.
In summary, between 4.55 and 5pm, the jury asked if they could have a break and were told that the Court would be reassembled in order for them to ask the learned judge if they could do so. Before the Court was reassembled for that purpose, the jury buzzed again at 5.15pm having reached their verdict.
No error of law by the learned judge arose out of the delay of 15 minutes, or possibly a little more, before bringing the jury before the Court to make their request for a break. No miscarriage of justice has been shown to have arisen as a result of the delay. There is no reason to think that the jury did not properly arrive at their verdict in obedience to their oaths. No request was made of the learned judge by counsel for the appellant that he should refuse to receive the verdict and instead invite the jury to have the break they originally intended to request. Further, the jury had only been deliberating for a little over two hours and it is unlikely that at the time they reached their verdict they were exhausted. Counsel for the appellant raised no legal basis upon which the ground of the application for leave to appeal should succeed. It must fail.
Conclusion
For the reasons I have given, I am of the opinion that the appeal that is based on the first ground should be dismissed and the application for leave to appeal that is based on the second ground should be refused.
File No CCA 119/2003
RICKY GUY CLIFFORD v THE QUEEN
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL
SLICER J
10 March 2004
I have had the opportunity of reading in draft form the reasons for judgment prepared by Crawford J. I agree with his analysis of the appeal and his conclusion.
In my opinion, the appeal ought be dismissed.
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