CLF15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CLF15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 306

Appeal from: Application for extension of time and leave to appeal: CLF15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and Anor [2016] FCCA 1992
File number(s): NSD 1432 of 2016
Judge(s): PERRY J
Date of judgment: 23 March 2017
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for extension of time within which to seek leave to appeal dismissed
Legislation:

Federal Circuit Court Act 1999 (Cth), s 17A

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 24

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 36, 417, 424AA

Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001, r 44.12

Federal Court Rules 2011, r 35.13

Cases cited:

BOA15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 214

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI (2009) 83 ALJR 1123 at 1127

NAHI v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10

SZGIZ v Minister for Immigration (2013) 212 FCR 235

Date of hearing: 16 February 2017, 23 March 2017
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 35
Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant appeared in person.
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr T Liu, Clayton Utz
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting appearance

ORDERS

NSD 1432 of 2016
BETWEEN:

CLF15

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

PERRY J

DATE OF ORDER:    

23 MARCH 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for an extension of time within which to seek leave to appeal is dismissed.

2.The applicant is pay the first respondent’s costs fixed in the sum of $2,000.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Revised from transcript)

PERRY J:

1.               INTRODUCTION

  1. This is an application for an extension of time and leave to appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court (Court below) dismissing the applicant’s application for judicial review on a show cause hearing under r 44.12(1)(a) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (FCCR).  By an application made on 20 November 2015, the applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (formerly the Refugee Review Tribunal) (the Tribunal) made on 21 December 2015.  By that decision, the Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (the Minister), not to grant the applicant a protection visa.

  2. The draft notice of appeal was attached to the affidavit of the applicant affirmed (and filed) on 25 August 2016.  The draft notice of appeal does not identify any specific error but pleads simply that:

    The Federal Circuit Court Judge erred in dismissing the case under section 17A of the Federal Circuit Court Act.

  3. Nor are any grounds identified in the applicant’s affidavit.  However, the applicant deposed that he is an…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 306
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of CLF15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the applicant, a citizen of Mongolia, sought an extension of time and leave to appeal the decision of the Court below which dismissed his application for special leave to appeal. The Court below had dismissed the applicant’s appeal from the Tribunal’s decision to refuse his second application for a protection visa. The applicant’s first application for a protection visa was made using a false name and false nationality and was refused. The Tribunal found that the applicant’s evidence was “contradictory, implausible and unconvincing” and that he had fabricated his claims. The Court below upheld the Tribunal’s decision. The primary issue for the Court was whether the application for an extension of time and leave to appeal should be granted. The applicant argued that he was unable to obtain pro bono legal assistance in time. The Minister submitted that the application for leave to appeal would have no reasonable prospects of success and that there was no substantial injustice if the application were dismissed. The Court found that while the applicant had provided a reasonable explanation for the delay, the appeal would have no reasonable prospects of success and there was no substantial injustice if the application were dismissed. The Court dismissed the application for an extension of time and leave to appeal and ordered the applicant to pay the first respondent’s costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for an extension of time within which to seek leave to appeal is dismissed.

2. The applicant is pay the first respondent’s costs fixed in the sum of $2,000.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For these reasons I will not receive the medical reports into evidence on the applications for leave to appeal and extension of time. 4. BACKGROUND4.1 The first application for a protection visa and applications for Ministerial intervention The applicant is a citizen of Mongolia. He arrived in Australia on 22 January 2008 as the holder of a tourist visa. On 21 February 2008, he applied for a protection visa (the first protection visa application) using a false name and claimed that he was a citizen of China. On 22 August 2008, the Tribunal affirmed a delegate's decision to refuse to grant the applicant the visa. On 27 October 2008, the applicant applied unsuccessfully for Ministerial intervention under s 417 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act). The applicant made a further two applications for Ministerial intervention on 23 September 2011 and on 24 May 2013 which were also unsuccessful.4.2 The current protection visa application On 17 October 2013, the applicant lodged a second protection visa application which was valid on the basis of the decision in SZGIZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2013) 212 FCR 235 (SZGIZ) (the current protection visa application). In the current protection visa application, the applicant uses a different name and states that he is a citizen of Mongolia. On 30 April 2014, the delegate refused the protection visa application. The applicant applied on 30 May 2014 to the Tribunal for review of the delegate's decision. He appeared before the Tribunal on 23 April 2015 (first Tribunal hearing). The member constituting the Tribunal was, however, unable to finish the review before his appointment expired. Accordingly, on 11 August 2015, the Tribunal invited the applicant to attend a further hearing before it to give evidence and present arguments. The applicant appeared on 20 October 2015 before the newly constituted Tribunal (second Tribunal hearing). On 21 October 2015, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate's decision to refuse to grant the applicant a protection visa. 4.3 The applicant’s claims The applicant’s claims on his current protection visa application were summarised in the Court below as follows: 9. In the current protection visa application, the applicant claims to face significant harm from a dangerous group of criminals who: a) he encountered in the course of running his second hand car business. They demanded his money, took his cars, subjected him to beatings and threatened his family, causing him to have to flee Mongolia to England for four years, where he unsuccessfully sought recognition as a refugee; b) he again encountered, some years after returning from England to Mongolia, this time in the Mongolian taxation office. They constantly contacted him. Sometimes they "demanded [him] to the face contract under [the] company name which [he] was working". When he refused their demands, they beat him and threatened to kill him, causing him to go into hiding. 4.4 The Tribunal’s decision The Tribunal found that the applicant was a citizen of Mongolia and assessed his claims against Mongolia. It accepted that the applicant had assumed a false name and false Chinese nationality for the purposes of the first protection visa application.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The applicant appeared at the hearing on 23 March 2017 without legal representation and was assisted by an interpreter in the Mongolian and English languages. He made brief oral submissions. 3. FURTHER EVIDENCE The applicant sought to rely upon three medical reports on the basis that they were the latest reports. While the applicant said that his treatment for psychological issues began after he arrived in Australia in 2008, he said that unfortunately he did not have the medical documents going back to that time. He said that he had not given any of the reports to the Tribunal. However, as the Minister submitted, two of the reports on which the applicant sought to rely post-dated the Tribunal’s decision, that is, they were not in existence when the Tribunal made its decision. As such, they could not be relevant to the review of the legality of that decision in the Federal Circuit Court. The third report was dated 17 October 2015 and therefore predated the Tribunal’s decision (and, of course, the decision of the Court below). However there is no evidence that the report was before the Tribunal and indeed the applicant conceded that none of the reports were before the Tribunal. The Tribunal’s decision cannot be challenged (and could not have been challenged in the Court below) on the basis that the Tribunal failed to have regard to reports not in evidence before it or that in some other way they pointed to error in the Tribunal’s decision. As I later explain it is not open to this Court or the Court below to reconsider the merits of the Tribunal’s decision. The jurisdiction of this Court is limited to a consideration of whether the Court below erred in its decision that the Tribunal made a lawful decision. For these reasons I will not receive the medical reports into evidence on the applications for leave to appeal and extension of time. 4. BACKGROUND4.1 The first application for a protection visa and applications for Ministerial intervention The applicant is a citizen of Mongolia. He arrived in Australia on 22 January 2008 as the holder of a tourist visa. On 21 February 2008, he applied for a protection visa (the first protection visa application) using a false name and claimed that he was a citizen of China. On 22 August 2008, the Tribunal affirmed a delegate's decision to refuse to grant the applicant the visa. On 27 October 2008, the applicant applied unsuccessfully for Ministerial intervention under s 417 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act). The applicant made a further two applications for Ministerial intervention on 23 September 2011 and on 24 May 2013 which were also unsuccessful.4.2 The current protection visa application On 17 October 2013, the applicant lodged a second protection visa application which was valid on the basis of the decision in SZGIZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2013) 212 FCR 235 (SZGIZ) (the current protection visa application). In the current protection visa application, the applicant uses a different name and states that he is a citizen of Mongolia.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The applicant’s claims on his current protection visa application were summarised in the Court below as follows: 9. In the current protection visa application, the applicant claims to face significant harm from a dangerous group of criminals who: a) he encountered in the course of running his second hand car business. They demanded his money, took his cars, subjected him to beatings and threatened his family, causing him to have to flee Mongolia to England for four years, where he unsuccessfully sought recognition as a refugee; b) he again encountered, some years after returning from England to Mongolia, this time in the Mongolian taxation office. They constantly contacted him. Sometimes they "demanded [him] to the face contract under [the] company name which [he] was working". When he refused their demands, they beat him and threatened to kill him, causing him to go into hiding. 4.4 The Tribunal’s decision The Tribunal found that the applicant was a citizen of Mongolia and assessed his claims against Mongolia. It accepted that the applicant had assumed a false name and false Chinese nationality for the purposes of the first protection visa application. Applying the decision in SZGIZ, the Tribunal found that it did not have power to consider the applicant's claims under s 36(2)(a) of the Act because the applicant's first protection visa application was refused because the Tribunal was not satisfied that he was a refugee for the purposes of the Refugees’ Convention. The Tribunal therefore considered his claims as against the alternative criterion in s.36(2)(aa) of the Act for the grant of a protection visa on the ground that he was a person to whom Australia owes complementary protection obligations. Specifically, under s 36(2)(aa) the Minister may grant a protection visa to a non-citizen on the ground that the Minister is satisfied that Australia has protection obligations “because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm”. The Tribunal rejected the entirety of the applicant’s material claims to fear significant harm based on its findings as to the applicant’s credibility (Tribunal reasons at [64]). In this regard, the Tribunal found that his evidence was “contradictory, implausible and unconvincing” and that he had “fabricated” his claims in the current protection visa application and some of his evidence as he was giving it (Tribunal reasons at [29]). It found that the applicant “was prepared to say anything to obtain a Protection visa without any regard for the truth” and was not a credible witness (Tribunal reasons at [58]). Those findings were based upon a detailed consideration of the applicant’s evidence on a number of matters. The Tribunal’s reasons record that it put the inconsistencies in the applicant’s evidence on which it relied directly to the applicant at the second Tribunal hearing pursuant to s 424AA of the Act and record the applicant’s responses.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Court below also rejected the second ground, holding that it was “factually incorrect”. Specifically, the Court below held that:23, …At [51]-[52] of the decision record, the Tribunal explicitly considered the applicant's claim that he was mentally stressed and "under "mental treatment"", asked the applicant about this treatment and noted the documentary medical evidence provided by the applicant. As the applicant had "not provided the Tribunal with any current evidence in relation to his mental state or him undergoing counselling" and appeared "articulate, composed and alert" throughout the hearing, the Tribunal found that the applicant was not prevented from giving evidence or presenting arguments due to mental issues. This was a conclusion open to the Tribunal on the evidence before it. 24. Further, the Tribunal's adverse credibility finding largely relied on false and inconsistent evidence provided by the applicant prior to the Tribunal hearings. 5. CONSIDERATION5.1 Principles governing the application Rule r 44.12(2) of the FCCR expressly provides that a dismissal under paragraph (1)(a) is interlocutory. This means that the applicant requires a grant of leave in order to prosecute an appeal in this Court: see s 24(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). In addition, as the Minister submits, under r 35.13 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 the applicant had 14 days after judgment was given below to apply for leave to appeal. As there was no other order fixing a date within which that application could be made, the application to this Court filed on 26 August 2016 was 10 days out of time. The relevant principles were outlined in BOA15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 214, as relied upon by the Minister. Specifically at [19], the Court explained that:The considerations relevant to determining whether to grant an extension of time include the length of the delay, the applicant’s explanation for the delay, any prejudice to the respondent and the substantive merits of the proposed appeal: SZSPR v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection and Another [2013] FCA 1210; (2013) 139 ALD 109 at 113 [16]; Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344 at 348-349. Relevant considerations to deciding whether to grant leave to appeal include whether an appeal would have any reasonable prospects of success and whether the applicant would suffer substantial injustice if leave were refused, assuming the decision subject to appeal is wrong: Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 at 398-399. Accordingly, as the Minister submitted, an assessment of the merits of the applicant’s appeal is relevant both to determining the application to grant an extension of time and, if an extension were granted, to the application for leave to appeal.5.2 Should an extension of time be granted? The explanation for the delay given by the applicant is that he was unable to obtain pro bono legal assistance in time. He was not cross-examined on that evidence and I accept, as did the Minister, that the applicant has given a reasonable explanation for the delay. The delay is also short. Nor did the Minister contend that he would suffer any prejudice by reason of the delay. The only issue is, as the Minister submits, whether the appeal would have any merit if an extension of time and leave to appeal were granted and whether there would be a substantial injustice if the extension of time and leave to appeal were refused.