Clearview AI Inc and Australian Information Commissioner

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Clearview AI Inc and Australian Information Commissioner [2023] AATA 1069 (8 May 2023)

Division:GENERAL DIVISION

File Number(s):      2021/8354

Re:Clearview AI Inc

APPLICANT

AndAustralian Information Commissioner

RESPONDENT

Appeal from:          [2021] AICmr54 (14 October 2021)

DECISION

Tribunal:Senior Member O'Donovan

Date:8 May 2023

Date of written reasons:        8 May 2023

Place:Canberra

The applicant is bound by the Privacy Act 1988 because it has an Australian link, and has had an Australian link since at least February 2020. Since that date the applicant has engaged in a practice that breaches Australian Privacy Principle (APP) 3.3. That practice is the collection of data which includes sensitive information about individuals, without the individual’s consent, from servers geographically located in Australia. The applicant has also breached APP 1.2.

The matter will be listed for further hearing to determine the terms of the decision which the Tribunal should make in light of the conclusions set out in the Tribunal’s reasons for decision.

………………………[sgd]…………………….

Senior Member O’Donovan

CATCHWORDS

PRIVACY ACT 1988 - biometric Information - extra-territorial operation - whether a foreign corporation which collects images of Australians from Australian servers is carrying on business in Australia - whether requesting and receiving data hosted on Australian servers amounts to information collection in Australia - whether an image of a person’s face is personal information - whether an image of a face is biometric information - whether collecting images of faces without consent is a breach of APP 3.3 or APP 1.2

LEGISLATION

Acts Interpretation Act 1901, s 2B

Privacy Act 1988, Schedule 1, s 5B, 6, 6C, 6D, 13, 15, 52
Privacy Legislation Amendment (Enforcement and Other Measures) Act 2022, Schedule 4

Privacy Amendment (Enhancing Privacy Protection) Act 2012, Schedule 1

CASES

Campbell v Gebo Investments (Labuan) Ltd (2005) 190 FLR 209

Facebook Inc v Australian Information Commissioner & Anor [2022] FCAFC 9
Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1988) 194 CLR 355
Smith v Victoria Police [2005] VCAT 654

Taylor v The Owners - Strata Plan No 11564 & Ors [2014] HCA 9

Valve Corporation v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2017) 258 FCR 190

SECONDARY MATERIALS

Explanatory Memorandum, Privacy Amendment (Enhancing Privacy Protection) Bill 2012

For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice (ALRC Report 108)

REASONS FOR DECISION

Senior Member O'Donovan

8 May 2023

  1. Clearview AI, Inc. (Clearview) is a body corporate incorporated in Delaware in the United States of America. In broad terms, Clearview provides a service to law enforcement agencies in certain countries which assists them to identify and locate victims and suspects in criminal investigations. The key to the service Clearview offers is its facial recognition software. Clearview has used a computer program known as a web crawler to build a database of images of faces drawn from the public internet. When the web crawler collects images, it also collects the meta-data associated with those images (in particular the website address that the image was found on).[1] Law enforcement agencies which have a relationship with…

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Details
Case
[2023] AATA 1069
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned a complaint brought by the Australian Information Commissioner (the Commissioner) against Clearview AI Inc. (Clearview), a Delaware-incorporated company. The dispute arose from Clearview's collection of facial images of Australians from publicly available websites and its subsequent creation of a facial recognition database. The Commissioner alleged that Clearview's actions constituted interferences with the privacy of individuals, in breach of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth). The proceedings were heard by O'Donovan SM in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.

The central legal issues before the Tribunal were whether Clearview had an "Australian link" for the purposes of the extra-territorial operation of the Privacy Act, and if so, whether its collection and handling of biometric information constituted breaches of Australian Privacy Principles (APPs). Specifically, the Tribunal had to determine if Clearview was carrying on business in Australia, if requesting and receiving data hosted on Australian servers amounted to information collection in Australia, whether an image of a person's face constituted personal information, and if it was biometric information. The Tribunal also considered whether Clearview's collection of images without consent breached APP 3.3 or APP 1.2.

The Tribunal found that Clearview's web crawlers, operating from servers outside Australia, sent requests to Australian servers to collect publicly available images and their URLs. This process, the Tribunal reasoned, constituted Clearview carrying on business in Australia and collecting personal information in Australia, thereby establishing an "Australian link" under s 5B(3) of the Privacy Act. The Tribunal accepted that images of faces, and particularly the "vectors" derived from them by Clearview's algorithms, constituted biometric information and personal information under the Act. The Tribunal concluded that Clearview's collection of these images without consent and without meeting the requirements of APP 3.3, and its failure to take reasonable steps to protect personal information as required by APP 11.1 (though APP 1.2 was also cited in the catchwords, the reasoning focused on collection and security), constituted interferences with privacy.

Consequently, the Tribunal found that Clearview had breached the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth). The specific orders or further directions regarding remedies were not detailed in the provided text.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

In relation to other issues, I generally regard the contemporaneous primary documents as providing an accurate picture of what took place at any given time. On specific matters, I consider that such documents provide evidence that in most cases is more accurate than what might be recalled by Mr Ton-That. There was no suggestion that any of the documents relied upon by the respondent were fabricated in any way, although how they were interpreted did on occasion become a question of contest – where necessary I have noted any controversy in the course of my fact finding.FACTS I find the following facts have been established. To the extent that any of the findings are controversial I identify the evidence on which the conclusions are based. My findings are structured in three sections:(a)Findings about the operation of the Clearview system generally;(b)Findings about the Clearview free trials offered to Australian law enforcement agencies; and(c)Findings about Clearview’s connection with Australia following the termination of its free trials and the closure of its opt-out system.The Clearview system Clearview is a privately owned company incorporated in the state of Delaware. None of its staff are located in Australia. Clearview is the owner and controller of the website located at . Clearview was founded by Mr Ton-That and he is currently CEO of the company. Mr Ton-That wrote the original code for the “Crawler Program” (described further below as a web-crawler) which is a significant component of the Clearview system. The Clearview System is a tool that analyses images published on the internet in common formats such as TIFF, JPEG, GIF, PNG. Clearview’s founder describes the Clearview System in the following terms and I accept that this description is accurate.Clearview maintains software programs called “crawlers”, which automatically visit public web pages and catalogue information from those pages. Clearview’s “open web crawler” automatically visits sites based on whether a website adopts a “robots.txt” setting which allow a site to be crawled by search engines. All search engines use crawlers, and many other services, such as price comparison sites and internet archival services, also use crawlers to help render the Internet searchable.Clearview’s “crawlers” run on servers operated by Clearview outside Australia. Clearview’s “crawlers” use the standard internet communication protocol, HTTP to communicate with servers connected to the public internet. In accordance with HTTP, Clearview’s “crawlers” send requests to servers containing public internet pages; and the servers containing those pages send responses back to the crawler fulfilling each such request. This means that any information obtained by use of the Clearview “crawlers” is sent by the server on which the information is published on the internet to a Clearview server outside of Australia. Neither Clearview’s “crawlers”, nor any other applications operated by the Applicant, causes any executable code to be installed or executed on those servers on which photos are published.The Clearview System, uses a machine learning algorithm to detect a human face in an image, such that it will detect published images of human persons, and of non-human yet human-like faces (such as the Luna Park entrance and Mickey Mouse) but will not typically detect a dog, for example. The algorithm will also detect faces in pieces of art or cartoons, but relevantly, it will not detect a road sign, street sign, block of text or non-facial aspect of an image in which it detects a face.When Clearview’s crawlers collect an image from the internet, that image is saved on an image database (Image Library). This process does not leave or embed any form of “cookie” or tracker on the site or server which published the image. The only information collected by Clearview’s crawlers is the publicly available image and the internet location of each saved image (being a Uniform Resource Locator or URL) [colloquially called a web address].For clarity, the URL information is stored separately from the Image Library. It is stored in a metadata database, which does not include the actual images that comprise the Image Library. The metadata database contains only records of the URL for each saved image in the Image Library. Accordingly, the Image Library is an accumulation of images published on public websites limited to those images accessible by all ordinary users of the Internet. No image in the Image Library was collected from a website that required a password to be provided, nor from a website requiring any security or firewall to be passed. Images identified and saved to the Image Library are hosted on Clearview’s servers.Once an image is deposited into the Image Library, the Clearview System draws a “vector”, derived from that part of the image that contains facial features. This vector is not a “map” in the sense of being a blueprint, or other graphic representation capable of being recognized by a human as depicting a face, or even the relationship between facial features. The vector is more accurately described as a “digital array” – being a collection of data values decipherable…only by a computer. Specifically, they are numerical values representing coordinate sets in a 512-axes coordinate plane. …all vectors created by the Clearview System are “digital arrays” incapable of being used by humans in the form in which they are created. …The vector associated with the facial features in an image is then deposited into a separate database of vectors (Vector Database). The Vector Database is, in essence, an unstructured “data pool” that cannot, itself, be searched by an individual. That is, the Vector Database is not a collection of accessible images. It is a digital facility in which data (incapable of being deciphered by humans) is stored. More specifically, unique identifiers are assigned to each vector within the Vector Database. These unique identifiers are a string of approximately 32 characters. Each of the Image Library and the Vector Database are hosted on Clearview’s servers. The creation of a vector also takes place within the Clearview System, likewise on Clearview’s servers. Relevantly, these servers are not located within Australia. The Clearview System “functions” when it receives a “search request” from a user. That is, a user who has been granted access to the Clearview System uploads an image [Probe Image] that they wish to compare against images in the Image Library…The Probe Image is transmitted to Clearview’s servers and retained on those servers only as part of the search history of the user who uploaded it. The Probe Image is not loaded into the Image Library. No ‘cookie’ or tracker is embedded onto a user’s system in the process of uploading a Probe Image.A vector is created from the probe image in the same way as from images in the Image Library. The Clearview System then uses a neural-net, machine learning algorithm to compare the data comprising the Probe image vector to the data stored in the Vector Database. This algorithm has been programmed and “trained “to analyse the sets of data that comprise the digital arrays we refer to as vectors, and to identify “nearby” or similar vectors within the data. That is, the comparison is not between one image and another, or between any identifiable facial features, it is between sets of computerized data. For a search request to be successful, a vector stored in the Vector Database must be identified by the algorithm as being sufficiently similar to the vector of the Probe Image (Matching Vector). If a Matching Vector is identified, the Clearview System returns a list of the unique identifiers in the Vector Database which correspond to the Matching Vector. The unique identifier allows the Clearview System to access the image in the Image Library from which that Matching Vector was derived (Matching Image). The Matching Image is then provided to the user who issued the original search request. It is possible that more than one Matching Image is identified and provided. The user is also provided with the metadata that was collected by the crawlers at the time the matching Image was deposited into the Image Library, being the URL of the website from which the image was collected. …Once the Matching Image is provided to the user, any further action is taken by the user outside of the Clearview System. To the extent that a user then undertakes to identify a person depicted in the Matching Image, that can only be achieved if a user visits the URL associated with the matching Image and exercises their own judgment as to what, if any, additional information on that website may be used to identify the person in question.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

As the facts concerning Clearview’s activities and the requirements of the legal framework differ across these time periods, it is appropriate to consider them separately.EVIDENCE The evidence before me consists of the following:·Section 37 Documents dated 19 April 2022·Supplementary section 37 documents dated 22 November 2022·Witness Statement of Mr Ton-That dated 7 July 2022 (Exhibit A1)·Witness Statement of Mr Ton-That dated 8 December 2022 (Exhibit A2)·The cover, title pages and Chapters 1 and 3 of HTTP: The Definitive Guide (Exhibit A3)[9]·A short video prepared by the applicant (Exhibit A4)·Clearview AI Pty Ltd License Agreement dated 9 January 2020 (Exhibit A5)·An affidavit of Laura Rose Butler dated 2 September 2022 (Exhibit R1)·A bundle of material referred to in the respondents determination (Exhibit R2)·Chapter 9 of HTTP: The Definitive Guide (Exhibit R3)[10]·Email from Alerts@Crimedex.com dated 13 November 2019 (Exhibit R4)·Report of the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada entitled ‘Police use of Facial Recognition Technology in Canada and the Way Forward (Exhibit R5)[9] David Gourley et al, HTTP: The Definitive Guide, (O’Reilly Media, Inc., 2002).[10] Ibid. Oral evidence was given at the hearing of this matter by Cam-Hoan Ton-That. The respondent had an opportunity to cross examine him. FACT FINDING PRINCIPLES The facts concerning how the Clearview facial recognition system operates are largely uncontentious. Clearview provided two statements from its founder and CEO Mr Ton-That which describe in reasonably clear terms how the system works and how it interacts with computers and servers based in Australia. These statements provide the foundation for my findings about the workings of the system. The basic operation of the system was not a matter of any significant dispute at the hearing. Some of Mr Ton-That’s evidence was more controversial. In particular his evidence about the processes in place before access was given to the Clearview system. I was satisfied that in some of that evidence, Mr Ton-That exaggerated the level of formality in the company’s processes – for example he claimed to personally authorise each customer’s access to the system when that was clearly not the case –but I was unable to identify in his evidence any significant departures from the truth about the company’s systems. Mr Ton-That also gave evidence about Clearview’s turnover. He did so with a view to establishing that the company was a small business operator. The evidence was unconvincing. It initially consisted of a single answer to a leading question about the turnover of the company in US dollars.[11] It became clear on further questioning by the Tribunal that Mr Ton-That was relying on company accounts which had a fiscal year from 31 January 2021 to 31 January 2022 which is not the same as a financial year in the Privacy Act.[12] In relation to the company’s performance since January 2022 it was clear that the company prepared quarterly revenue accounts, but when queried about what these might disclose Mr Ton-That said ‘I wouldn’t know’.[13] There was clearly better evidence available in the form of financial statements available to the applicant to establish what its turnover was and that it met the threshold requirements. In those circumstances, I am not prepared to accept that the company stayed below the turnover thresholds and thus met the requirements to be a small business operator. [11] Transcript p 59.[12] See section 2B of the Acts Interpretation Act.[13] Transcript p 142.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Accordingly, I am satisfied that:(a)up until at least February 2020 the applicant was actively marketing its product to law enforcement agencies in Australia;(b)by around March 2020 all marketing and trialling of the Clearview system in Australia ceased;(c)from mid-2020 Clearview’s only interactions with Australia were:(i)to collect images from Australian servers by sending out GET commands from its servers outside Australia and receiving the data communicated by Australian servers in response, and (ii)potentially receiving opt-out images from Australians; and(d)by the end of 2021 Clearview ceased offering any opt out service to Australians but to this day it continues to collect images from servers in Australia. CONSIDERATION As noted above, when considering whether the applicant has breached the Privacy Act it is necessary to consider three different points in time. The first is the period in which the Clearview system was being trialled for free by various Australian law enforcement agencies. The second period is the period after the termination of these trials when Clearview’s principal Australian related activity consisted of continuing to acquire images off the public internet using its web crawler. In this period there were no measures in place to prevent Clearview from acquiring images of Australians or acquiring images from servers located in Australia. The third period to consider is the period after the 2022 Amendments became law and lowered the threshold for establishing an ‘Australian link’. The applicant contends that at no point in time did it have the necessary Australian link such that it was bound by the Privacy Act. If that contention is accepted, then the application must be resolved in favour of the applicant. If it is not, then consideration must be given to its contention that it is a small business operator and the other bases on which it contends it did not breach the APPs.Relevant legislation and privacy principles Section 5B of the Privacy Act describes the extra-territorial operation of the Act. Until 13 December 2022, the relevant provision read as follows:Organisations and small business operators(1A) This Act, a registered APP code and the registered CR code extend to an act done, or practice engaged in, outside Australia and the external Territories by an organisation, or small business operator, that has an Australian link.Australian link(2) An organisation or small business operator has an Australian link if the organisation or operator is:(a) an Australian citizen; or(b) a person whose continued presence in Australia is not subject to a limitation as to time imposed by law; or(c) a partnership formed in Australia or an external Territory; or (d) a trust created in Australia or an external Territory; or(e) a body corporate incorporated in Australia or an external Territory; or(f) an unincorporated association that has its central management and control in Australia or an external Territory.(3) An organisation or small business operator also has an Australian link if all of the following apply:(a) the organisation or operator is not described in subsection (2);(b) the organisation or operator carries on business in Australia or an external Territory;(c) the personal information was collected or held by the organisation or operator in Australia or an external Territory, either before or at the time of the act or practice.Power to deal with complaints about overseas acts and practices(4) Part V of this Act has extra-territorial operation so far as that Part relates to complaints and investigation concerning acts and practices to which this Act extends because of subsection (1) or (1A). Australian Link