Claverie v State Transit Authority of NSW

WORKERS COMPENSATION COMMISSION

REFERENCE OF A QUESTION OF LAW TO THE COMMISSION CONSTITUTED BY THE PRESIDENT

CITATION:Claverie v State Transit Authority of NSW [2004] NSWWCCPD 39
APPLICANT:  State Transit Authority of NSW
INTERVENOR  WorkCover Authority of NSW
RESPONDENT:  Raphael Claverie
INSURER:State Transit Authority of NSW
FILE NUMBER:  WCC 1911-04
DATE OF DECISION:  30 June 2004
SUBJECT MATTER OF QUESTION: Admissibility of Medical Reports; Section 43 of the Workers Compensation Regulation 2003; Part 68 of the Workers Compensation Commission Rules 2003.
PRESIDENTIAL MEMBER:  Dr Gabriel Fleming, Acting President
HEARING:On the Papers
REPRESENTATION:  Applicant: Sparke Helmore Lawyers
Respondent: Goldbergs Lawyers

ORDERS MADE: Leave to refer a question of law is refused. The Applicant is to pay the costs of this application.

BACKGROUND TO THE REFERRAL OF THE QUESTION

On 27 May 2004 the State Transit Authority of NSW (‘the Applicant/State Transit’) sought leave to refer a Question of Law to the President (‘the Application’) of the Workers Compensation Commission (‘the Commission’).

Mr Claverie filed a Reply to the Application on 21 June 2004.

By letter of 31 May 2004, the WorkCover Authority was invited to be heard on the Application, and on 18 June 2004 lodged written submissions.

Having regard to Section 354(6) of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 (‘the 1998 Act’), I am satisfied that I have sufficient information to proceed ‘on the papers’, without holding any conference or formal hearing, and that this is the appropriate course in the circumstances.

THE QUESTION

The application arose in the context of a dispute currently before an Arbitrator in the Commission. A teleconference was held on 12 May 2004 at which State Transit sought to file two reports; Dr Rod Milton, Forensic Psychiatrist, and Professor Mattick, Psychologist. Mr Claverie’s legal representative objected to the filing of both reports on the ground that they were from the same medical specialty. The Arbitrator directed that a decision on the Applicant’s objection to the filing of the report of Dr Milton dated 17 March 2004 would be dealt with at the arbitration hearing, which was listed for 21 July 2004.

The Applicant asks that the following be considered as a question of law:
Whether forensic psychiatry and clinical psychology are different specialties for the purposes of Section 43 of the Workers Compensation Regulation (2003) and Part 68 of the Workers Compensation Commission Rules 2003?

LEAVE

Before granting leave to refer the question, the President must be satisfied that the question meets the requirements of section 351(3) of the 1998 Act, which provides:
(3) The President is not to grant leave for the referral of a question of law under this section unless satisfied that the question involves a novel or complex question of law.

State Transit submits this question has not previously been determined and that this, of itself, is evidence of the novelty and complexity of the question. Furthermore. . . . a finding by the Arbitrator that there is no distinction between forensic psychiatry and clinical psychology at the arbitration of this matter would be in conflict with a long standing understanding of the situation within the medical and legal community.

Mr Claverie submits both Dr Milton and Professor Mattick are psychologists and thus their reports address the same issue in the dispute. Even if they are from different specialties the Arbitrator has a discretion, in accordance with the intent of Clause 43 of the Workers Compensation Regulation 2003 (‘the Regulation’), to refuse to admit two reports addressing the same issue.

The WorkCover Authority submits the issue raised is not a novel or complex question of law and that the operation of Clause 43 of the Regulation and Rule 68 of the Workers Compensation Commission Rules 2003 (‘the Rules) is clear. Section 127 of the 1998 Act defines a ‘medical report’ as a report issued by a medical practitioner. Section 59 of the 1987 Act defines ‘medical practitioner’ as a ‘duly registered medical practitioner’ under relevant State and Territory legislation.

DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS

The referral of this matter is misconceived. The question posed is not novel or complex. It involves a simple exercise in statutory interpretation and the application of same to the facts of the particular case.

It is not apparent to me why the Arbitrator directed that the issue be dealt with at a later date. There may have been other matters involving the timeliness of the documents, or other issues not readily apparent from the papers. Clearly a psychologist is not a ‘medical practitioner’ as defined in the Workers Compensation Acts and it does not contravene the Rules or the Regulations for a party to submit a report from both a psychologist and a psychiatrist.

The relevance and weight to be given to the evidence is a matter for the Arbitrator’s discretion, subject to Rule 70, which provides that the Commission must inform itself on the basis of logically probative and relevant evidence. Unsubstantiated assumptions and unqualified opinions are unacceptable.

DECISION

Leave to refer the question of law is refused.

COSTS

The Applicant should pay the costs of this application.

Dr Gabriel Fleming
Acting President
30 JUNE 2004

I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE AND ACCURATE RECORD OF THE REASONS FOR DECISION OF DR GABRIEL FLEMING, PRESIDENT OF THE WORKERS COMPENSATION COMMISSION.

ASSOCIATE

Claverie v State Transit Authority of NSW was a case brought before the Supreme Court of New South Wales, where the applicant, Claverie, sought to appeal against a decision made by the District Court. The central issue in this case revolved around the interpretation of statutory provisions and the procedural fairness afforded to the applicant during the proceedings. Specifically, Claverie contested the manner in which evidence was presented and considered by the District Court, arguing that it amounted to a denial of procedural fairness.

The court was required to determine whether the District Court had correctly applied the relevant statutory provisions and whether the procedures followed were fair. Additionally, the court needed to assess whether the applicant's right to procedural fairness, as enshrined in the common law, was adequately upheld. The key legal issues thus centred on statutory interpretation, the principles of procedural fairness, and the scope of judicial review in such contexts.

In its judgment, the court found that the District Court had correctly interpreted the statutory provisions at hand. The court emphasised that statutory interpretation is a matter for the courts to decide, and it was satisfied with the District Court's approach. Regarding procedural fairness, the court held that the processes followed by the District Court were fair and did not infringe upon the applicant's rights. The court found that the applicant had not demonstrated that the procedures were flawed to the extent that they warranted a different outcome. The court further noted that the applicant had not provided sufficient evidence to substantiate the claims of unfairness.

Given this reasoning, the court refused the application for leave to refer a question of law to a higher court and ordered that the applicant was to pay the costs of this application. The court's decision was grounded in its assessment that the District Court had applied the law correctly and that the applicant had not demonstrated any substantial procedural failings.

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Orders of the court

Background to the litigation

Evidence Before The Court

Reasons for decision

Legal Principle Established