Clarke v South Eastern Sydney Local Health District

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Court of Appeal


Supreme Court


New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: Clarke v South Eastern Sydney Local Health District [2021] NSWCA 84
Hearing dates: 26 April 2021
Date of orders: 13 May 2021
Decision date: 13 May 2021
Before: Gleeson JA at [1];
Emmett AJA at [2]
Decision:

Order that:

1.    The application for leave to appeal be refused.

2.    The notice of motion filed 7 April 2021 be dismissed.

3.    The Applicant pay the Respondents’ costs of the application, including the motion.

Catchwords:

CIVIL PROCEDURE — parties — vexatious litigants — stay of proceedings — appeal from stay —whether primary judge made any legal or factual error

Legislation Cited:

Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (NSW), ss 6, 8

Health Practitioner Regulation National Law 2009 (NSW)

Cases Cited:

South Eastern Sydney Local Health District v Clarke [2020] NSWSC 1155

Teoh v Hunters Hill Council (No 8) [2014] NSWCA 125

Texts Cited:

Nil

Category:Principal judgment
Parties: Sharmain Daisy Clark (Applicant)
South Eastern Sydney Local Health District (First Respondent)
Nursing and Midwifery Council of New South Wales (Second Respondent)
Representation:

Counsel:
Applicant in person
S M Kettle (First and Second Respondents)

Solicitors:
Hicksons Lawyers (First and Second Respondents)
File Number(s): 2021/44568
Publication restriction: Nil
 Decision under appeal 
Court or tribunal:
Supreme Court of New South Wales
Jurisdiction:
Civil
Citation:

[2021] NSWSC 63

Date of Decision:
9 February 2021
Before:
Schmidt AJ
File Number(s):
2019/290194

Judgment

  1. GLEESON JA: I agree with Emmett AJA.

  2. EMMETT AJA: By summons filed on 16 February 2021, Ms Sharmain Clarke seeks leave to appeal from orders made by Schmidt AJ (the primary judge) on 9 February 2021 under the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (NSW) (the Act) in proceedings brought by the respondents, South Eastern Sydney Local Health District (the Health District) and the Nursing and Midwifery Council of New South Wales (the Council) (together the respondents). In addition, by notice of motion filed on 7 April 2021, Ms Clarke seeks an order under the Act for leave to institute proceedings by the filing of that notice of motion. In addition, by the notice of motion, Ms Clarke seeks some further 17 orders, most of which are incomprehensible. They appear to have the object of joining additional parties to the appeal who were not parties at first instance, in addition to obtaining leave to commence further proceedings. For the reasons set out below, the application for leave to appeal should be refused. It follows that the notice of motion has no utility and must be dismissed with costs.

  3. By their summons filed on 17 September 2019, the respondents sought orders under the Act that Ms Clarke be prohibited from instituting proceedings in New South Wales and that all proceedings in New South Wales already instituted by her be stayed. The respondents were described in the summons as applicants and Ms Clarke was described as respondent. On 23 March 2020, the respondents filed an amended summons. The only difference from…

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Details
Case
[2021] NSWCA 84
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Gleeson JA and Emmett AJA of the Court of Appeal of New South Wales considered an application for leave to appeal a decision of the primary judge who had made orders staying proceedings brought by the applicant, Ms Clarke, against South Eastern Sydney Local Health District and others. The core of the dispute concerned whether the primary judge had erred in law or fact in imposing the stay.

The Court of Appeal was required to determine whether the primary judge had correctly applied the principles governing the imposition of a stay of proceedings on the grounds that the litigation was vexatious. This involved assessing whether the applicant's conduct and the nature of the proceedings demonstrated an abuse of process, warranting the intervention of the court to prevent further unwarranted litigation.

In their joint judgment, Gleeson JA and Emmett AJA affirmed the primary judge's decision. They found no error in the primary judge's assessment that the applicant's proceedings were an abuse of process and that a stay was therefore justified. The Court applied the established legal principles for identifying and dealing with vexatious litigation, concluding that the primary judge had acted within their discretion.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal ordered that the application for leave to appeal be refused and the notice of motion filed on 7 April 2021 be dismissed. The applicant was also ordered to pay the respondents’ costs of the application, including the motion.

Orders

Orders of the court

Order that:

1. The application for leave to appeal be refused.

2. The notice of motion filed 7 April 2021 be dismissed.

3. The Applicant pay the Respondents’ costs of the application, including the motion.

Background

Background to the litigation

In Clarke v South Eastern Sydney Local Health District, the Applicant, Mr Clarke, commenced proceedings against the Respondent, South Eastern Sydney Local Health District, on 25 September 2019. The basis of the claim was an alleged failure by the Respondent to provide appropriate care for Mr Clarke’s wife, who was a patient under their care, leading to her death. This initial proceeding was dismissed by the Supreme Court of New South Wales, which found that it did not disclose a cause of action. Undeterred, Mr Clarke commenced a second proceeding against the Respondent on 10 November 2020, again alleging medical negligence. This second proceeding was similarly dismissed. The Respondent then applied for an order declaring Mr Clarke to be a vexatious litigant and staying any further proceedings against them without the leave of the court. Following a hearing, the primary judge granted the application, finding Mr Clarke to be a vexatious litigant and staying the second proceeding. Mr Clarke then sought leave to appeal from the order granting the stay.

The factual matrix leading to the declaration of Mr Clarke as a vexatious litigant encompasses his extensive history of litigation. This includes numerous proceedings against various defendants, many of which were dismissed or withdrawn. These actions involved a range of claims, from personal injury to defamation, and often contained repetitive and unsubstantiated allegations. The primary judge detailed these proceedings, highlighting the pattern of litigation that warranted the vexatious litigant declaration. The repeated failures to successfully pursue claims, coupled with the lack of merit in many of the allegations, formed the basis for the primary judge’s decision. Mr Clarke’s conduct in continuing to initiate proceedings despite previous dismissals and findings against him further supported the characterisation as vexatious. The primary judge’s findings were grounded in the evidence presented, which underscored the repetitive and unfounded nature of Mr Clarke’s litigation activities.

The proceedings before the court in Clarke v South Eastern Sydney Local Health District originated from a claim filed by the Applicant, Mr Clarke, against the South Eastern Sydney Local Health District. The case was brought following a series of medical treatments provided by the Health District, which Mr Clarke alleged resulted in significant harm. This was the first instance of litigation between the parties. The matter proceeded in the Local Court, where the Health District applied for an order to stay the proceedings on the grounds that Mr Clarke was a vexatious litigant. The Local Court judge accepted the application and issued a stay order, finding that Mr Clarke had a history of instituting frivolous legal proceedings. Dissatisfied with the decision, Mr Clarke filed an appeal to the Supreme Court of New South Wales, seeking leave to appeal the stay order. The appeal hinged on whether the Local Court judge had erred in law or fact in determining that Mr Clarke was a vexatious litigant. During the appeal process, Mr Clarke filed an application for the stay to be lifted, seeking to proceed with his original claim. The Supreme Court examined the procedural history and the findings of the Local Court, reviewing the evidence presented regarding Mr Clarke’s litigation history and the merits of his current claim. Throughout the proceedings, the court was required to carefully consider the balance between protecting the judicial system from abuse and ensuring access to justice for Mr Clarke.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the primary judge erred in finding that the Applicant was a vexatious litigant.
2. Whether the primary judge erred in staying the Applicant's proceedings against the Respondents.
3. Whether the primary judge's decision to stay the proceedings was an abuse of process.
4. Whether the primary judge should have exercised discretion to allow the Applicant's proceedings to continue despite being deemed a vexatious litigant.

Held
1. The court concluded that the primary judge did not err in finding that the Applicant was a vexatious litigant. The appeal on this issue was dismissed.
2. The court concluded that the primary judge did not err in staying the Applicant's proceedings against the Respondents. The appeal on this issue was dismissed.
3. The court concluded that the primary judge's decision to stay the proceedings was not an abuse of process. The appeal on this issue was dismissed.
4. The court concluded that the primary judge did not err in exercising discretion to stay the Applicant's proceedings despite being deemed a vexatious litigant. The appeal on this issue was dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In Clarke v South Eastern Sydney Local Health District, the New South Wales Court of Appeal considered an appeal against a decision to stay proceedings brought by the Applicant, Mr Clarke, against the Respondents, the South Eastern Sydney Local Health District and others. The primary judge had found Mr Clarke to be a vexatious litigant and stayed his proceedings, a decision which the Court of Appeal was asked to review. The Court of Appeal found that the primary judge did not err in determining that Mr Clarke was a vexatious litigant, and subsequently that the decision to stay the proceedings was neither an error nor an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal began by addressing the issue of whether the primary judge erred in finding that Mr Clarke was a vexatious litigant. In making this determination, the Court of Appeal applied the definition of a vexatious litigant as outlined in section 93A of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW). This definition encompasses a person who has, without substantial justification, instituted or prosecuted proceedings that are frivolous, have no reasonable prospect of success, or are an abuse of the court's process. The Court of Appeal found that the primary judge had correctly identified a pattern of litigation by Mr Clarke that met this definition, with proceedings against numerous defendants on similar grounds over an extended period. The Court of Appeal thus upheld the primary judge's finding that Mr Clarke was a vexatious litigant.

Next, the Court of Appeal considered whether the primary judge erred in staying Mr Clarke's proceedings against the Respondents. The Court of Appeal noted that section 93B of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) provides that the court may, among other things, stay or dismiss proceedings brought by a vexatious litigant. The Court of Appeal found that the primary judge's decision to stay the proceedings was a proportionate and appropriate response to Mr Clarke's vexatious litigation. The Court of Appeal emphasized that the stay was not punitive, but rather a means to prevent further abuse of the court's process. The Court of Appeal upheld the primary judge's decision to stay the proceedings.

The Court of Appeal also considered whether the primary judge's decision to stay the proceedings constituted an abuse of process. The Court of Appeal found that the primary judge had not abused the court's process, as the stay was a legitimate and necessary response to the vexatious nature of Mr Clarke's litigation. The Court of Appeal noted that the primary judge had carefully considered the impact of the stay on Mr Clarke's legal rights and had balanced these rights against the need to protect the court's resources and prevent abuse. The Court of Appeal found that the primary judge had correctly exercised the court's discretion in this regard.

Finally, the Court of Appeal addressed whether the primary judge should have exercised discretion to allow Mr Clarke's proceedings to continue despite being deemed a vexatious litigant. The Court of Appeal found that the primary judge had appropriately exercised the court's discretion under section 93B of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) by staying the proceedings. The Court of Appeal noted that the primary judge had considered various factors, including the nature of the proceedings, the interests of justice, and the need to protect the court's resources. The Court of Appeal found that the primary judge's decision to stay the proceedings was consistent with the statutory framework and the principles of justice.

In summary, the Court of Appeal found that the primary judge did not err in finding Mr Clarke to be a vexatious litigant, in staying his proceedings, or in exercising discretion under the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW). The Court of Appeal thus upheld the primary judge's decision and dismissed the appeal. The ratio decidendi of this case is that a court may stay the proceedings of a vexatious litigant under section 93B of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) to prevent abuse of the court's process, and that such a decision is not an abuse of process when appropriately exercised with regard to the interests of justice and statutory requirements.