FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Clarke v Premier Youthworks Pty Limited [2019] FCA 551
ORDERS
ACD 87 of 2018 BETWEEN: RYAN CLARKE
Applicant
AND: PREMIER YOUTHWORKS PTY LTD
Respondent
JUDGE:
ROBERTSON J
DATE OF ORDER:
24 APRIL 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The applicant’s application for leave to appeal is refused.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
ROBERTSON J:
Introduction
This is an application for leave to appeal under s 24(1)(d) and s 24(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) from an interlocutory decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia.
By orders made on 1 November 2018, a judge of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissed Mr Clarke’s application in a case that the primary judge recuse himself.
The primary proceedings concern an application for relief under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) against the respondent arising out of Mr Clarke’s dismissal as a casual youth worker. The primary hearing took place between 13 and 15 June 2018. Those proceedings are part heard, in that submissions have not yet been made.
The primary judge…
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 551
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the primary judge erred in concluding that Mr Clarke had waived his right to raise bias, and whether the factual circumstances presented met the threshold for apprehended bias. The court needed to assess if the primary judge had adequately reasoned his decision and if there was any error in the application of legal principles regarding bias. The court also considered whether the primary judge had properly considered all relevant submissions and factual circumstances presented by Mr Clarke.
The court found that the primary judge did not err in his conclusions. It held that Mr Clarke had effectively waived his right to raise bias by not challenging the primary judge's initial refusal to recuse himself. The court also determined that the factual circumstances did not meet the threshold for apprehended bias, as a fair-minded lay observer would not reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the case. The court further found no merit in the other proposed grounds of appeal, including allegations about the manner in which the primary judge made certain comments during the proceedings.
The court refused the application for leave to appeal, concluding that the primary judge's decision was correct and that there was no substantial injustice that would result from not granting leave to appeal. The refusal of leave to appeal meant that the primary judge's decision stood, and the case would proceed without the need for a new judge to be appointed. The court also noted that no order for costs should be made, as both parties agreed on this point.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The applicant’s application for leave to appeal is refused.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
The procedural history of this case begins with Mr Clarke's application for the recusal of the judge in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, which was dismissed. Following this decision, Mr Clarke filed an application for leave to appeal the dismissal of his recusal application. The application for leave to appeal was heard by a different judge, who ultimately refused the application for leave to appeal. The applicant's grounds for appeal included allegations of procedural errors and misinterpretations of the law by the original judge. The appeal focused on the judge's handling of the recusal application and the reasons provided for dismissing it.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
As to costs, the respondent accepted that the application was one to which s 570, in particular s 570(2), of the Fair Work Act applied.Consideration I have read the pages of the transcript relied on by the applicant. The relevant part of the official transcript is reproduced at [13] of the reasons of the primary judge. I have listened to the audio recording relied on by the applicant, which was also played in open court at the hearing of this application. I have read the reasons of the primary judge, bearing in mind that the application before him was one for recusal for both actual bias and apprehended bias. For the reasons I set out more fully below, I do not accept Mr Clarke’s evidence, or submission, that the primary judge “indicated that he had formed the view that there was a difference in the oral evidence”. I also do not accept that the primary judge laughed at Mr Clarke’s request that the primary judge provide the basis for his view. The tone of the very short laugh was, as I perceived it, in spontaneous reaction to the peremptory and unusual, if not inappropriate, question that Mr Clarke directed to the primary judge: “How so?”; when the primary judge had said “Well, these were questions that Mr Darams put to you yesterday, and I thought your evidence was a little bit different.” There is no substance in the other proposed grounds, 3(f)-(h), with reference to the manner of what was said by the primary judge, set out at [13] above. The primary judge declined to answer Mr Clarke’s question and said that he was “going to end up having to rule on certain things in the light of your evidence…”. I take this to mean that the rulings would be at the end of the trial, once submissions had been made and evaluated. The test for apprehended bias is whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide: Michael Wilson & Partners Limited v Nicholls [2011] HCA 48; 244 CLR 427 at [31]. The test is an objective one and does not require consideration of the actual state of mind of the decision-maker. I would not proceed on the basis, put by the respondent, that the decision of the primary judge was a discretionary judgment or was on a matter of practice and procedure. As to the first proposition, the point of the submission was to invoke the principles in House v The King [1936] HCA 40; 55 CLR 499 at 504-5. But it seems to me that application of the relevant principles by the primary judge required no relevant value judgment where there was room for reasonable differences of opinion as explained in Norbis v Norbis [1986] HCA 17; 161 CLR 513 and, more recently, in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; 357 ALR 408, particularly at [18] (per Kiefel CJ), [43]-[49] (per Gageler J), [85]-[87] (per Nettle and Gordon JJ) and [144]-[147] (per Edelman J). In my opinion, the construct of the hypothetical fair-minded lay observer does not mean that a recusal decision is relevantly discretionary, in the sense that it calls for a value judgment in respect of which there is room for reasonable differences of opinion, no particular opinion being uniquely right. Instead, the test in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; 205 CLR 337 at [6], the governing and fundamentally important principle, results in an order the making of which is dictated by the application of a fixed rule to the facts on which its operation depends: see Norbis v Norbis at [4].