Clarke v Premier Youthworks Pty Limited

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Clarke v Premier Youthworks Pty Limited [2019] FCA 551

Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal: Clarke v Premier Youthworks Pty Ltd [2018] FCCA 2938
File number: ACD 87 of 2018
Judge: ROBERTSON J
Date of judgment: 24 April 2019
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to appeal from interlocutory decision of a judge of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissing an application for recusal
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 24(1)(d), 24(1A)

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s 570

Cases cited:

Concrete Pty Ltd v Parramatta Design & Developments Pty Ltd [2006] HCA 55; 229 CLR 577

Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc [1991] FCA 655; 33 FCR 397

Duncan v Ipp [2013] NSWCA 189; 304 ALR 359

1           Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; 205 CLR 337

GlaxoSmithKline Australia Pty Ltd v Reckitt Benckiser HealthCare (UK) Limited [2013] FCAFC 150

Helow v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] UKHL 62; [2008] 1 WLR 2416

2           House v The King [1936] HCA 40; 55 CLR 499

Johnson v Johnson [2000] HCA 48; 201 CLR 488

Melbourne City Investments Pty Ltd v UGL Ltd [2017] VSCA 128

Michael Wilson & Partners Limited v Nicholls [2011] HCA 48; 244 CLR 427

3           Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; 357 ALR 408

4           Norbis v Norbis [1986] HCA 17; 161 CLR 513

5           Oswal v Carson [2013] VSC 355

Re JRL; ex parte CJL [1986] HCA 39; 161 CLR 342

Date of hearing: 24 April 2019
Registry: Australian Capital Territory
Division: Fair Work Division
National Practice Area: Employment & Industrial Relations
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 66
Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr J Darams
Solicitor for the Respondent: Cantle Carmichael Lawyers

ORDERS

ACD 87 of 2018
BETWEEN:

RYAN CLARKE

Applicant

AND:

PREMIER YOUTHWORKS PTY LTD

Respondent

JUDGE:

ROBERTSON J

DATE OF ORDER:

24 APRIL 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The applicant’s application for leave to appeal is refused.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

ROBERTSON J:

Introduction

  1. This is an application for leave to appeal under s 24(1)(d) and s 24(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) from an interlocutory decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia.

  2. By orders made on 1 November 2018, a judge of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissed Mr Clarke’s application in a case that the primary judge recuse himself.

  3. The primary proceedings concern an application for relief under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) against the respondent arising out of Mr Clarke’s dismissal as a casual youth worker. The primary hearing took place between 13 and 15 June 2018. Those proceedings are part heard, in that submissions have not yet been made.

  4. The primary judge…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 551
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Clarke v Premier Youthworks Pty Limited, Mr Clarke applied to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia for leave to appeal from an interlocutory decision dismissing his application for the recusal of a judge. The application for recusal was based on allegations of bias by the judge. The primary judge dismissed the application for recusal, and Mr Clarke sought to appeal this decision. The appeal hinged on whether the primary judge had erred in his conclusions regarding the waiver of the right to raise bias and the threshold for apprehended bias. Additionally, Mr Clarke argued that the primary judge failed to consider several specific submissions and factual circumstances that he claimed supported his application for recusal.

The legal issues before the court were whether the primary judge erred in concluding that Mr Clarke had waived his right to raise bias, and whether the factual circumstances presented met the threshold for apprehended bias. The court needed to assess if the primary judge had adequately reasoned his decision and if there was any error in the application of legal principles regarding bias. The court also considered whether the primary judge had properly considered all relevant submissions and factual circumstances presented by Mr Clarke.

The court found that the primary judge did not err in his conclusions. It held that Mr Clarke had effectively waived his right to raise bias by not challenging the primary judge's initial refusal to recuse himself. The court also determined that the factual circumstances did not meet the threshold for apprehended bias, as a fair-minded lay observer would not reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the case. The court further found no merit in the other proposed grounds of appeal, including allegations about the manner in which the primary judge made certain comments during the proceedings.

The court refused the application for leave to appeal, concluding that the primary judge's decision was correct and that there was no substantial injustice that would result from not granting leave to appeal. The refusal of leave to appeal meant that the primary judge's decision stood, and the case would proceed without the need for a new judge to be appointed. The court also noted that no order for costs should be made, as both parties agreed on this point.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant’s application for leave to appeal is refused.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of Clarke v Premier Youthworks Pty Limited involves an application for leave to appeal from an interlocutory decision of a judge of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. The original application was for the recusal of the judge, alleging both actual bias and apprehended bias. The applicant, Mr Clarke, sought to appeal the dismissal of his application for recusal. The dismissal was based on the judge's determination that Mr Clarke had waived his right to raise bias and that the factual circumstances did not meet the threshold for a finding of apprehended bias. The applicant proposed several grounds for the appeal, primarily focusing on alleged errors by the judge in handling the recusal application, including perceived failures to provide adequate reasons for his conclusions and alleged improper conduct during the proceedings.

The procedural history of this case begins with Mr Clarke's application for the recusal of the judge in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, which was dismissed. Following this decision, Mr Clarke filed an application for leave to appeal the dismissal of his recusal application. The application for leave to appeal was heard by a different judge, who ultimately refused the application for leave to appeal. The applicant's grounds for appeal included allegations of procedural errors and misinterpretations of the law by the original judge. The appeal focused on the judge's handling of the recusal application and the reasons provided for dismissing it.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

By his amended draft notice of appeal, Mr Clarke raises the following proposed grounds:1.The learned Judge at first instance (‘His Honour’) erred in concluding that the Applicant had waived his right to raise bias, and by failing to provide adequate reasons for this conclusion.2.His Honour erred in concluding that the factual circumstances raised in the application do not meet the threshold to satisfy a finding of apprehended bias, and by failing to provide adequate reasons for this conclusion.3.His Honour erred in failing to consider or give any weight to the following submissions made by the Applicant and factual circumstances:(a)That His Honour refused to provide the basis for the view that he expressed, being that the Applicant’s evidence of 14 June 2018 was ‘different’ to that of 13 June 2018, despite the Applicant requesting that the basis for this view be made clear;(b)That without His Honour having provided his basis for this view the Applicant was not able to adduce further evidence in direct response to this view, nor was he able to directly address this view in argument and submissions;(c)That His Honour was not, by the relevant comment, seeking to test, explore or clarify the Applicant’s evidence, as he did not reveal the basis for his view or allow a response to be made directly against it;(d)That written submissions had been limited in total to 12 pages of size 12, double spaced font;(e)That His Honour’s conduct was such that he was audibly laughing as he refused to provide the basis for this view;(f)That His Honour preceded the comment that the Applicant’s evidence was different by making a distinct ‘ah’ sound, which served to emphasise a view that something has been learned or found at that point by His Honour, and made this sound subsequently to making these comments;(g)That His Honour, after making reference to ‘having to rule on certain things ... in the light of your evidence’, stated ‘but still’;(h)That His Honour paused in a noticeable manner before saying the word ‘different’, which served to give this word greater emphasis;(i)That the Applicant was seeking access to the record of the hearing at the earliest possibility, being on 18 June 2018, in order to determine the factual background and circumstances in relation to his Honour’s comments that he thought the evidence of the applicant was different;(j)That the delay in accessing the record of hearing was not attributable to the Applicant, but rather rests overwhelmingly with the transcript provider;(k)That the Applicant filed the recusal application at the earliest opportunity, after having been able to consider the relevant factual background (being the record of his evidence on 13 and 14 June 2018) and while orders of the court were on foot;(l)That the Applicant possessed a negligible level of experience of legal practice at the time of hearing;(m)That the questioning of the Applicant leading into the relevant comments was in essence a re-opening of examination of the Applicant after the conclusion of cross­examination by counsel for the Respondent on matters that had not been touched or raised by counsel;(n)That submissions by the Applicant in relation to the cases of Vakauta v Kelly [1989] HCA 44 and R v Watson: Ex parte Armstrong [1976] HCA 39, and the principles applicable to these cases, were not considered;(o)That His Honour has referred to the fact that the matter of whether there was a difference or not in the Applicant's evidence, a matter that goes to the heart of credibility, is still a standing matter for determination by His Honour (paragraph 16 of the Reasons for Judgment);(p)That the Applicant clearly was concerned by the relevant comments made by His Honour that His Honour was of the view that the Applicant's evidence was different.4.His Honour has erred in the application of the legal principles as set out in paragraphs of the Reasons for Judgment including paragraph 25, 31 and 33 in that this case law repeatedly refers to the need for a judge to make his or her views, if tentative, known to the parties so that they are afforded a full opportunity to be heard on and respond to them in the aversion of an appearance of bias.5.His Honour has erred in wrongly framing the Applicant's submissions in relation to the central aspects of the claim of bias (paragraph 49 of the Reasons for Judgement).6.His Honour has erred in reasoning that because the principles relating to bias appear in a textbook that all lawyers should have an immediately applicable working knowledge of these principles that can be effectively and sensitively applied mid-trial (paragraph 59(b) of the Reasons for Judgment).The evidence

Decision

Reasons for decision

I place no weight on the second limb of Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc at 398-9, concerning the need to show substantial injustice if leave were refused. I place no weight on it in light of the statement in Michael Wilson & Partners at [79] and [86]. These statements are to the effect that an applicant who does not seek to challenge the refusal of a recusal application by seeking leave to appeal may be held to have given up the point.Conclusion and orders The application for leave to appeal is refused. Both parties accepted that no order for costs should be made.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

As to costs, the respondent accepted that the application was one to which s 570, in particular s 570(2), of the Fair Work Act applied.Consideration I have read the pages of the transcript relied on by the applicant. The relevant part of the official transcript is reproduced at [13] of the reasons of the primary judge. I have listened to the audio recording relied on by the applicant, which was also played in open court at the hearing of this application. I have read the reasons of the primary judge, bearing in mind that the application before him was one for recusal for both actual bias and apprehended bias. For the reasons I set out more fully below, I do not accept Mr Clarke’s evidence, or submission, that the primary judge “indicated that he had formed the view that there was a difference in the oral evidence”. I also do not accept that the primary judge laughed at Mr Clarke’s request that the primary judge provide the basis for his view. The tone of the very short laugh was, as I perceived it, in spontaneous reaction to the peremptory and unusual, if not inappropriate, question that Mr Clarke directed to the primary judge: “How so?”; when the primary judge had said “Well, these were questions that Mr Darams put to you yesterday, and I thought your evidence was a little bit different.” There is no substance in the other proposed grounds, 3(f)-(h), with reference to the manner of what was said by the primary judge, set out at [13] above. The primary judge declined to answer Mr Clarke’s question and said that he was “going to end up having to rule on certain things in the light of your evidence…”. I take this to mean that the rulings would be at the end of the trial, once submissions had been made and evaluated. The test for apprehended bias is whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide: Michael Wilson & Partners Limited v Nicholls [2011] HCA 48; 244 CLR 427 at [31]. The test is an objective one and does not require consideration of the actual state of mind of the decision-maker. I would not proceed on the basis, put by the respondent, that the decision of the primary judge was a discretionary judgment or was on a matter of practice and procedure. As to the first proposition, the point of the submission was to invoke the principles in House v The King [1936] HCA 40; 55 CLR 499 at 504-5. But it seems to me that application of the relevant principles by the primary judge required no relevant value judgment where there was room for reasonable differences of opinion as explained in Norbis v Norbis [1986] HCA 17; 161 CLR 513 and, more recently, in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; 357 ALR 408, particularly at [18] (per Kiefel CJ), [43]-[49] (per Gageler J), [85]-[87] (per Nettle and Gordon JJ) and [144]-[147] (per Edelman J). In my opinion, the construct of the hypothetical fair-minded lay observer does not mean that a recusal decision is relevantly discretionary, in the sense that it calls for a value judgment in respect of which there is room for reasonable differences of opinion, no particular opinion being uniquely right. Instead, the test in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; 205 CLR 337 at [6], the governing and fundamentally important principle, results in an order the making of which is dictated by the application of a fixed rule to the facts on which its operation depends: see Norbis v Norbis at [4].