Clarke v NSW Land and Housing Corporation

[2023] NSWCATEN 6

Civil and Administrative Tribunal

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation:

Clarke v NSW Land and Housing Corporation [2023] NSWCATEN 6

Hearing dates:

On the papers

Date of orders:

25 July 2023

Decision date:

25 July 2023

Jurisdiction:

Enforcement

Before:

Coleman SC ADCJ, Principal Member

Decision:

(1) That pursuant to s 50(2) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 a hearing is dispensed with.

(2) That the Applicant pay the Respondent’s costs of and incidental to the proceedings agreed or assessed on a party and party basis.

Catchwords:

COSTS - whether Tribunal has jurisdiction to award costs of unsuccessful application for referral to Supreme Court for contempt - whether respondent establishes special circumstances pursuant to s 60(2) of Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 - whether applicant should be ordered to pay respondent’s costs

Legislation Cited:

Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013

Cases Cited:

Bott v NSW Land and Housing Corporation (No 2) [2018] NSWCATCD 2

Brunsprop Pty Limited v Joanne Hay & Wes Davies [2015] NSWCATAP 152

Chalker v Murrays Australia Pty Limited [2016] NSWCATAD 282

CPD Holdings Pty Limited t/as The Bathroom Exchange v Baguley [2015] NSWCATAP 21

Dodge v Hacienda Caravan Park Pty Limited (No 2) [2021] NSWCATEN 5

eMove Pty Limited v Naomi Dickinson [2015] NSWCATAP 94

EMI Records Ltd v Ian Wallace Ltd [1983] Ch 59

Gizah Pty Limited v AXA Trustees Limited (No 2) [2001] NSWADT 164

Ingate v Andrews [2018] NSWCATAP 170

Killen v Lane [1983] 1 NSWLR 171

Langley v Niland & Anor [1981] 2 NSWLR 104

MSP Consulting and Building Constructions Pty Limited v Karkoulas (No 2) [2016] NSWCATAP 183

Wallace v GWH Build Pty Limited; GWH Build Pty Limited v Wallace & Ors (No 2) [2016] NSWDC 128

Westbury v The Owners- Strata Plan No 64061 [2021] NSWCATEN 3

Yelda v Sydney Water Corporation; Yelda v Vitality Works Australia Pty Limited [2021] NSWCATAD 177

Category:

Principal judgment

Parties:

Sharmain Daisy Clarke (Applicant)
NSW Land and Housing Corporation (Respondent)

Representation:

Applicant (Self represented)
Respondent (NSW Crown Solicitor)

File Number(s):

PC22/32844

Publication restriction:

Nil

REASONS FOR DECISION

Introduction

1. On 4 May 2023 the Tribunal dismissed the Applicant’s application for referral of the Respondent to the Supreme Court to be dealt with for contempt and for other relief (referral application). The Tribunal reserved the costs of the referral application and made orders for the filing of submissions with respect to costs.

2. On 1 June 2023 the Respondent filed submissions in support of its application that the Applicant pay its costs of the referral proceedings on a party and party basis as agreed or assessed.

3. On 30 June 2023 the Applicant filed submissions in opposition to the making of any order for costs against her.

4. Neither party opposed the costs dispute being determined “on the papers” and without a hearing pursuant to s 50(2) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (CAT Act).

5. Having regard to the adequacy of the material which is before it, the Tribunal is satisfied that it is appropriate to determine the costs dispute “on the papers” and will make an order dispensing with a hearing pursuant to s 50(2) of the CAT Act. In view of the written submissions of both parties, making an order pursuant to s 50(2) of the CAT Act could not disadvantage either party, and avoids the incurring of unnecessary costs. Dispensing with a hearing does not mean that the parties’ cases will not be given the same degree of proper, genuine and realistic consideration that they would at a hearing.

The Respondent’s submissions

6. The Respondent relied upon written submissions filed on 23 December 2022 and supplementary submissions in support of its application. The Respondent identified s 60 of the CAT Act as the source of the Tribunal’s power to award costs. Section 60 of the CAT Act provides:

1. Each party to proceedings in the Tribunal is to pay the party’s own costs.

2. The Tribunal may award costs in relation to proceedings before it only if it is satisfied that there are special circumstances warranting an award of costs.”

   7. Section 60(3) of the CAT Act provides that in “determining whether there are special circumstances warranting an award of costs”, the Tribunal may have regard to six specific matters, and (s 60(3)(g)) “any other matter that the Tribunal considers relevant”.

   8. The Respondent relied on s 60(3)(b) of the CAT Act, which involves consideration of “whether a party has been responsible for prolonging unreasonably the time taken to complete the proceedings”. The Respondent also relied on s 60(3)(c) of the CAT Act, which involves consideration of “the relative strengths of the claims made by each of the parties, including whether a party has made a claim that has no tenable basis in fact or law”. The Respondent also relied on the provisions of s 60(3)(e) of the CAT Act, which involves consideration of “whether the proceedings were frivolous or vexatious or otherwise misconceived or lacking in substance”.

   9. The Respondent submitted that there was “no decisive authority holding that costs cannot be awarded against a person who unsuccessfully initiates proceedings in the enforcement jurisdiction of the Tribunal”. The Respondent referred to Killen v Lane [1983] 1 NSWLR 171, in which it was said to be recognised that contempt proceedings in the Supreme Court do not necessarily expose a complainant to a costs order on the basis that they are not strictly inter partes proceedings.

   10. The Respondent also referred to the decision of the Tribunal in Bott v NSW Land and Housing Corporation (No 2) [2018] NSWCATCD 2, at [23], in which it was said to have been accepted that contempt referral proceedings did not involve “inter partes proceedings in the strict sense”.

   11. The Respondent submitted that the terms of s 60 of the CAT Act were sufficiently broad to empower the Tribunal to make a costs order in these proceedings, and that s 60 does not “specifically exclude matters within the enforcement jurisdiction”. The Respondent referred to decisions of the Tribunal in which costs were awarded in the enforcement jurisdiction of the Tribunal, where the primary issue was whether a party should be referred to the Supreme Court pursuant to s 73 of the CAT Act.

   12. Dodge v Hacienda Caravan Park Pty Limited (No 2) [2021] NSWCATEN 5 was a case in which the Tribunal referred a party to the Supreme Court pursuant to the provisions of s 73 of the CAT Act, in circumstances where there was evidence capable of establishing that the party had failed to comply with orders of the Tribunal. The costs decision arose from an application for costs by the successful applicant in the referral proceedings. In the course of its consideration of the costs application, the Tribunal referred to the decision in Westbury v The Owners-Strata Plan No 64061 [2021] NSWCATEN 3, which was an application for civil pecuniary penalty pursuant to s 77 of the CAT Act, in which the Tribunal referred to the applicant having a “personal interest in enforcing the Tribunal’s orders” and also being “seen as acting in the public interest in prosecuting these proceedings”, to the end that orders of the Tribunal are complied with, and the public can have confidence that the Tribunal will enforce its orders.

   13. The Tribunal in Dodge referred, at [8] to the decision in EMI Records Ltd v Ian Wallace Ltd [1983] Ch 59 at [76] in which it was held that “special costs orders” were appropriate in cases of contempt, because “nothing should be done to deter a person from bringing a contempt to the notice of the court; and the risk of having to bear any of the costs will often be a real deterrent”. The Tribunal accepted that there was “a public interest in facilitating contempt proceedings to ensure that orders made by a competent court were complied with”.

   14. Unlike the present case, in Dodge, the Tribunal found that the respondent had “demonstrated a contumacious disregard for the clear terms of the orders made by this Tribunal and had consistently declined to comply with them”. The Tribunal also reiterated that “the public interest in the administration of justice requires compliance with orders whether or not compliance also served individual or private purposes”. Compliance with the orders of the Tribunal formed no part of the present Applicant’s referral application.

   15. The Respondent also relied upon the decision of the District Court in Wallace v GWH Build Pty Limited; GWH Build Pty Limited & Anor v Wallace & Ors (No 2) [2016] NSWDC 128 in which the Court awarded costs against the applicant in a referral application.

   16. In support of its reliance upon s 60(3)(c) of the CAT Act, the Respondent referred to the Tribunal’s finding that the Applicant had not adduced any admissible evidence capable of establishing that the Respondent could be found in contempt of the Tribunal, or in breach of Tribunal orders at [60]. The Respondent also relied upon the Tribunal’s findings, at [59], [62], [65], [69], [74], [76], [78], [81], [82] and [83], that a number of claims unrelated to the Respondent’s alleged contempt did not fall within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal pursuant to s 33 of the CAT Act.

   17. The Respondent submitted with respect to s 60(3)(e) of the CAT Act, that the referral proceedings were misconceived, or lacking in substance. The Respondent relied on the Tribunal’s finding at [66] that the distinction between dismissing the referral application pursuant to s 55 of the CAT Act, as the Respondent urged the Tribunal to, or hearing and determining the proceedings on the merits, as the Tribunal elected to in fairness to the Applicant, involved a “distinction without a difference” in the circumstances of this case. On any event, agitating the two issues conjointly saved hearing time, and did not prejudice the Applicant.

   18. The Respondent further submitted, in reliance upon s 60(3)(b) of the CAT Act, that the Applicant had been responsible for prolonging unreasonably the time taken to complete the proceedings by filing multiple applications seeking different orders in reliance upon different legislative provisions, accompanied by lengthy documentation.

   19. The Respondent particularised, accurately, the history of the proceedings, which revealed that:

   1. the Applicant’s originating application was filed 13 July 2022;

   2. on 12 August 2022 the Tribunal made directions for the filing of evidence and submissions;

   3. on 31 August 2022 the Applicant sent an email to the Tribunal indicating that she intended to withdraw her application of 13 July 2022;

   4. on 6 September 2022 the Applicant purported to file a further application, as a result of which the directions of 12 August 2022 were rendered inutile, necessitating a further Directions Hearing being scheduled for 29 September 2022;

   5. at the Directions Hearing on 29 September 2022 the Applicant advised the Tribunal that she withdrew her application of 13 July 2022, and sought leave to prosecute an application in the terms of the pleading filed by her on 6 September 2022;

   6. on 18 October 2022 the Applicant filed a further amended application in which she sought to join the Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice, in reliance upon different legislative provisions to those outlined in the 6 September 2022 application;

   7. at a further Directions Hearing on 29 November 2022, necessitated by the Applicant’s further amended application, directions were made for the determination of the referral application.

   20. The Respondent submitted that the Applicant’s filing of further applications “generated confusion and resulted in the suspension of the original timetable delaying the proceedings a number of months”.

   21. In the circumstances identified by it, the Respondent submitted that, individually or cumulatively, the Tribunal would find special circumstances pursuant to s 60(2) of the CAT Act, and award it the costs of the proceedings.

Applicant’s submissions

22. The Applicant filed submissions on 30 June 2023. The opening paragraphs of the Applicant’s submissions appeared to seek an extension of time for the filing of her submissions. To the extent that the Applicant was out of time with her submissions, her delay was minimal, potentially one day, and could not possibly prejudice the Respondent. In those circumstances the Tribunal has considered the Applicant’s submissions.

23. The Applicant made clear her position that the Respondent’s application for costs should be rejected. In support of that contention, the Applicant referred to the asserted obligations of the landlord to “comply with its obligations under the Residential Tenancies Act 2010”, and asserted that “claims are owed (sic) by NSW Land and Housing Corporation which was not transparent from the actions, from the outset, whereby, Family and Community Services NSW was the respondent, and NSW Land and Housing Corporation intended to respond on behalf of FACS”. If any of those allegations has substance, and provided that the Applicant is not precluded from agitating them, they are matters which can and will be dealt with by the court or tribunal in which those matters are pending, or can properly be commenced. As the Tribunal’s decision of 4 May 2023 confirms, the Applicant’s application to join Family and Community Services of NSW in these proceedings was rejected.

24. The Applicant referred to a decision of the Court of Appeal in support of her contention that only in an “exceptional case” would a successful party be deprived of an entitlement to costs because of “disentitling conduct” and ordered to pay the costs of an unsuccessful party. Although, as will be seen, these proceedings are governed by s 60 of the CAT Act, the Tribunal accepts that, if the Respondent established “special circumstances” pursuant to s 60(2) of the CAT Act, but was found to have engaged in “disentitling conduct”, the discretion to award costs would not be exercised in its favour. That disentitling conduct could result in the unsuccessful party being awarded costs. Although the Applicant appears not to recognise it, unless “special circumstances” are established, the Respondent would not be entitled to costs because it was wholly successful in the proceedings.

25. In a Statutory Declaration sworn 30 June 2023 the Applicant set out in further detail the basis upon which she opposed the Respondent’s application for costs.

26. The Applicant asserted that she was “owed” claims against Family and Community Services (FACS) “for the actions of non-compliances to safety and security of a lease agreement taken up by me commencing 28/18/2016” at premises in metropolitan Sydney, which included “my personal information disclosed corruptly and redacted materials on a national database”.

27. The Applicant made a number of allegations with respect to the circumstances surrounding her occupancy of residential premises owned by the Respondent (3-9), and referred (10-12) to asserted rulings with respect to them which were made by the Tribunal in April and May 2022.

28. The Applicant referred (13) to her claims being “always directed to the landlord (FACS Housing)” and asserted that the present Respondent “had decided to represent FACS Housing”. What the Applicant intended there to convey is unclear to the Tribunal, but what is clear is that, whatever her grievances, they cannot, directly or indirectly advance her resistance to the Respondent’s costs claim.

29. The Applicant complained about “offences” of FACS Housing pursuant to the “GIPA Act” and “PIPP breaches”. Again, whatever the Applicant intended to convey by those assertions, they do not assist her resistance against the Respondent’s costs claim.

30. The Applicant made a series of complaints (15-18) with respect to alleged privacy breaches, and other matters involving FACS and New South Wales Police, none of which, if established, would be relevant for present purposes.

31. The Applicant submitted that the Respondent’s costs application should be “determined with caution, because (of) the 443 pages of GIPA databases before Her Honour Justice Obradovic in the Federal Jurisdictions, subject to the cancellation of my professional licence” which was submitted to have two “broad areas”, which appear to relate to proceedings with respect to the Applicant’s ability to practice her profession. Whatever the reality with respect to them might be, those matters do not assist the Applicant in the present proceedings.

32. The Applicant made further submissions (20-26), apparently with respect to her occupancy of premises leased to her by FACS Housing and/or the present Respondent. Whatever the merits, if any, of any of those claims, they do not assume significance in the context of a determination of the Respondent’s costs application.

33. The Applicant stated (27-28) that she had not “entertained any prostitution, alcoholism, and drug addiction in and on these premises”, and asserted that she was not a prostitute or “ever known to child protection specialists” or participated in any “drug or drug addiction actions/activities”. The Respondent has made no allegations of that kind in the referral proceedings, or in support of its costs application.

34. The Applicant submitted (30) that the Tribunal should order that each party bear its own costs “because the evidence is likely to emulate in the next few months before other jurisdictions”. What the Applicant intended to convey by that submission is unclear, but, whatever may be happening, or happen in unidentified “other jurisdictions” are not matters which are relevant for present purposes. These are discrete proceedings which the Applicant commenced. Nothing to which the Applicant has referred suggests that the costs of the referral application should, or could be influenced by anything which might happen in “Federal Jurisdictions”.

35. The Applicant submitted (31-36) that the Respondent was guilty of disentitling conduct by reason of the “pattern of conduct” which she alleged. That conduct included asserted “corrupt disclosure of information … about my family as a unit at a time in myself”, refuting any “domestic violence”, “dissolution from a cluster of government organisations that are now required to be answerable for their actions across NSW” and false representations against the Applicant “by attempting to make my case a medical case”. The Applicant has not established any of the alleged disentitling conduct.

36. The Applicant annexed a number of emails to her Statutory Declaration. As the first email was the last in the sequence, and the last the first, in the interests of clarity it is preferable to refer to them in the order in which they were sent.

37. On 5 June 2023 the Applicant emailed the Crown Solicitor acknowledging that she had received the Respondent’s submissions in support of its costs application. The Applicant referred to a number of matters involving complaints against “FACS” and, to a lesser extent, the present Respondent, none of which impacts upon the latter’s costs application.

38. On 13 June 2023 the Crown Solicitor’s Office responded to the Applicant’s email, suggesting, correctly in the Tribunal’s view, that the matters raised by the Applicant did not require a response, and reminding the Applicant of the Tribunal’s directions with respect to costs. Later the same day the Applicant sent an email to the Crown Solicitor’s Office, reiterating a number of her earlier complaints and suggesting what actions the Crown Solicitor should take, and referring to proceedings in the Supreme Court which she asserted that the Crown Solicitor was defending.

39. On 19 June 2023 the Crown Solicitor replied to the Applicant’s earlier email, again directing her attention to the directions of the Tribunal with respect to the Respondent’s costs application.

40. On 23 June 2023 the Applicant emailed the Crown Solicitor’s Office and made a number of complaints with respect to a number of public sector entities and the Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency (AHPRA). The Applicant stated that any costs “matters will be contested in the highest” if awarded. The Applicant referred to “unwarranted allegation(s) of fraud”, none of which has been the subject of admissible evidence in the referral proceedings, and reiterated her opposition to the making of any order for costs. Later the same day the Crown Solicitor’s Office responded to the Applicant’s earlier email reiterating, correctly, that the only issue outstanding between the parties in the present proceedings related to costs and inviting the Applicant to file any submissions which she wished to file.

Consideration

41. Although the Applicant did not appear to challenge the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to award the Respondent its costs of the referral application, the Tribunal has not assumed that it has jurisdiction to do so on that basis.

42. The Tribunal is satisfied that it has jurisdiction to award the Respondent costs pursuant to s 60(2) of the CAT Act if the Respondent can establish “special circumstances”. The CAT Act does not in the Tribunal’s view, expressly or impliedly preclude making an order for costs of proceedings before it if such an order is warranted. The referral application constituted “proceedings” in the Tribunal. It remains to consider whether the Respondent establishes special circumstances, and, if so, whether the discretion to award costs should be exercised in its favour.

43. In Killen & Ors v Lane & Anor [1983] 1 NSWLR 171 (‘Killen’) the Registrar of the Equity Division of the Supreme Court commenced proceedings for criminal contempt pursuant to a direction from a judge of the Court. Some of the charges brought by the Registrar were found proved, whilst others were not. The decision of the Court of Appeal with respect to costs turned materially on the provisions of the then applicable Supreme Court Rules. Relevantly for present purposes, the Court recorded, at 177 that:

“The initiation by the Crown or other constituted authority of criminal proceedings generally, or the initiation of proceedings by the Court or Attorney General to punish for criminal contempt, involves different considerations to proceedings by a person for the exercise by the Court of a power to make an order which will enforce private rights. A person may allege to the Crown or authority having the power to commence criminal proceedings that a criminal offence has been committed or may allege facts which constitute such an offence, but has no right to compel the Crown or such authority or, in the case of criminal contempt, the Court or the Attorney General to commence proceedings or to seek a court order having this consequence.”

44. The Court also referred, at 177, to the significance in those proceedings of the Judge “acting on his own motion, to decide what he will do” in the face of a complaint by a juror, a witness, a party, a court or police officer or some other person with respect to criminal proceedings, and said that:

“The exercise of the contempt power of the Court where there is no accuser except the Court or its officer has always been recognised as exceptional, and to be undertaken on the Court’s own responsibility and then rarely and only in clear cases. The departure from ordinary safeguards necessarily involved in such cases, by the Court being both accuser and adjudicator, has been regarded as only justified, because of the overriding public interest in the safeguarding of the administration of justice from interference by swift deterrent action by the Court itself. To engraft on this power, so jealously limited, a right of any person to interrupt proceedings then current to commence other proceedings (required to be determined judicially) for an order that a third set of proceedings be commenced by the Court itself for contempt, would enlarge the narrow jurisdiction and expose those safeguards which reside in the jealous limitation of the power to the risk of erosion.”

45. The Court of Appeal held that the proceedings before the primary judge in which the costs order was made were not a “judicial proceeding between the parties who are to be made subject to the order for costs”. Nor was the order for costs made as incidental to judicial proceedings.

46. The Tribunal does not consider that the decision in Killen creates any impediment to making an award of costs to the Respondent if one is justified. Unlike the referral application, which alleged civil contempts, the case involved alleged criminal contempts. There is, as the Court of Appeal observed in Killen, a material distinction between proceedings which, albeit arising out of a private complaint, are instigated by an entity other than a party to proceedings or an individual person or entity, and the present proceedings, which were brought by the Applicant in her own right, and, as is clear from the terms of her complaints, were brought to pursue private interests. There may be referral applications which are unsuccessful but, by reference to the matters raised in support of them, reveal or assert a public interest which would militate against awarding costs if an entitlement to them was otherwise established. This is not such a case.

47. The Tribunal is satisfied that the Applicant has been responsible for prolonging unreasonably the time taken to complete the proceedings. It is unnecessary to find special circumstances on that basis. If special circumstances are established, and costs awarded, the Applicant’s unreasonable prolonging of the proceedings is likely to have relevance to the assessment of any costs payable by her.

48. The relative strengths of the claims made by each party, including whether the Applicant made a claim which had no tenable basis in fact or law (s 60(3)(c)), require consideration.

49. In Yelda v Sydney Water Corporation; Yelda v Vitality Works Australia Pty Limited [2021] NSWCATAD 177 the Tribunal recorded [27] that the “contention that a party has made a claim that has no tenable basis in fact or law is a high threshold to reach”. The Tribunal further recorded that a complaint would be “lacking in substance when it can be demonstrated that there exists no factual basis for the allegation”. Support for that proposition is gained from the decisions in Langley v Niland & Anor (1981) 2 NSWLR 104 and Chalker v Murrays Australia Pty Limited [2016] NSWCATAD 282. The Applicant has failed to adduce an admissible factual basis for the contempts alleged by her.

50. The mere fact that the Tribunal decided against the Applicant in favour of the Respondent does not necessarily mean that the Applicant’s arguments had no tenable basis in fact or law, or involved circumstances which were otherwise “special” (MSP Consulting & Building Constructions Pty Limited v Karkoulas (No 2) [2016] NSWCATAP 183).

51. As is not in doubt, to establish special circumstances the Respondent need not demonstrate extraordinary or exceptional circumstances, it being sufficient to demonstrate circumstances that are “out of the ordinary” (CPD Holdings Pty Limited t/as The Bathroom Exchange v Baguley [2015] NSWCATAP 21; Ingate v Andrews [2018] NSWCATAP 170).

52. Each case turns on its own particular facts (Gizah Pty Limited v AXA Trustees Limited (No 2) [2001] NSWADT 164) and considering whether special circumstances have been established is by reference to the circumstances of the individual case (Brunsprop Pty Limited v Joanne Hay & Wes Davies [2015] NSWCATAP 152). The discretion to award costs must be exercised judicially and having regard to the underlying principle that parties to proceedings in the Tribunal are ordinarily to bear their own costs (eMove Pty Limited v Naomi Dickinson [2015] NSWCATAP 94).

53. Whether the Applicant made a claim which had no tenable basis in fact or law is an evaluative determination which is made by reference to the claims made by her, the disposition of each of those claims and the basis upon which they were determined. It is readily apparent that the Respondent was wholly successful in the proceedings and that the Applicant was wholly unsuccessful. That is not determinative of the issue. There is force in the submission of the Respondent that the Applicant’s claims were found to lack “strength”, either on the facts or, having regard to the absence of jurisdiction to entertain some of the Applicant’s claims, on the law.

54. The Tribunal’s reasons of 4 May 2023 reveal that the Applicant’s case was so weak as to be virtually unarguable. The disparity between the relative strengths of the claims made by each of the parties, the absence of an admissible basis in fact, and the absence of any apparent legal basis for them, as the Tribunal found, establish special circumstances pursuant to s 60(2) of the CAT Act. As the Tribunal’s reasons of 4 May 2023 confirm, the Applicant’s claims were misconceived, or lacking in substance within the meaning of those expressions in s 60(3)(e) of the CAT Act.

55. The Tribunal is satisfied that the Respondent has demonstrated circumstances which are “out of the ordinary”. The discretion to award costs is thus enlivened. Contrary to the contentions of the Applicant, there has been no conduct on the part of the Respondent which would disentitle the Respondent to an award of costs. To the extent that the Applicant complains about, or makes grave allegations with respect to the conduct of the Respondent in these proceedings, and entities who are not parties to these proceedings, if there is substance in any of those claims, and none has been demonstrated by the Applicant in these proceedings, that is a matter for the Applicant to pursue in such other proceedings as she may permissibly institute, and not a matter which militates against making an order for the costs of these proceedings.

Orders

1. That pursuant to s 50(2) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 a hearing is dispensed with.

2. That the Applicant pay the Respondent’s costs of and incidental to the proceedings agreed or assessed on a party and party basis.

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I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales.

Registrar

Decision last updated: 25 July 2023