Clarke v Fenn

The plaintiff, Clarke, filed an application seeking an extension of time to commence defamation proceedings against the defendant, Fenn. The basis of the defamation claim was an alleged defamatory publication made by Fenn on social media. The application was brought before the court for determination under the provisions of the Limitation Act 2010. The primary issue for the court was whether the alleged defamatory publication was protected by absolute privilege, which would have implications for the limitation period applicable to Clarke's claim.

The court considered the nature of the alleged defamatory publication and whether it was made in circumstances that qualified for absolute privilege. Absolute privilege protects certain communications from defamation claims if they were made in a judicial or legislative setting, or in the course of a fair and accurate report of a judicial proceeding. The court examined the evidence presented and concluded that the communication did not fall within any of the recognised categories of absolute privilege. The court found that the alleged defamatory publication was made on social media and did not meet the criteria for absolute privilege. As a result, the court dismissed the application for an extension of time.

Consequently, the court dismissed the notice of motion filed by Clarke on 30 September 2018. The defamation proceedings were struck out and dismissed, and Clarke was ordered to pay Fenn's costs. Clarke was granted liberty to apply in relation to the costs, and the exhibits were to be retained for 28 days. The court's decision hinged on the interpretation of the absolute privilege doctrine and the applicability of the limitation period under the Limitation Act 2010.