Clarke and Vargas

[2013] FamCA 679

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CLARKE & VARGAS [2013] FamCA 679

FAMILY LAW – CONTRAVENTION – where mother seeks order for the return of the child to her care – where current interim orders provide for the child to live with mother and spend time with father – where father has retained the child contrary to the current parenting orders – where earlier return order was also made in circumstances where the father failed to return the child to the mother’s care following contact – Order made for the child to be returned to the mother’s care.
FAMILY LAW – CHILDREN – best interests – with whom a child lives – with whom a child spends time – parental responsibility – where father seeks orders for the child to live with him and spend supervised time with the mother – where mother seeks orders for the child to live with her – where interim parenting orders in place for child to live in the primary care of the mother and spend time with the father – where history of the father repeatedly presenting the child to medical professionals and child protection authorities for suspected physical abuse by the mother – where child is at risk of emotional harm due to the father’s actions – best interests of the child – s 60CC factors – finding that presumption of equal shared parental responsibility is overcome – finding that it is in the best interests of the child for the mother to have sole parental responsibility for the child – finding that it is in the best interests of the child for the child to live with mother – father to have supervised time with the child at a contact centre.

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)

Goode & Goode (2006) FLC 93-286

APPLICANT: Ms Clarke

RESPONDENT: Mr Vargas

INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: Patricia Keyworth

FILE NUMBER: BRC 10951 of 2011

DATE DELIVERED: 31 July 2013

PLACE DELIVERED: Brisbane

PLACE HEARD: Brisbane

JUDGMENT OF: Forrest J

HEARING DATE: 31 July 2013

REPRESENTATION

SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: Ms Byrne
Whitehead Payne

FOR THE RESPONDENT: Mr Vargas

SOLICITOR FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S REPRESENTATIVE Ms Keyworth
Keyworth Harris & Lowe Family Lawyers

Orders

IT IS ORDERED THAT

1. All previous parenting orders are discharged.

IT IS ORDERED UNTIL FURTHER ORDER THAT

1. The mother have sole parental responsibility for the child C born … March 2011, but she shall keep the father advised in writing as to any decisions she makes in relation to major long term issues in the child’s life.

2. The child shall live with the mother.

3. The child shall spend time with the father at a supervised contact centre, preferably B Contact  Centre that offers supervision operated by D Organisation, for a period of two (2) hours each week, if that can be accommodated, but at least for two (2) hours each alternate week if that is all that can be accommodated by B Contact Centre.

4. The parents shall do all things necessary to register with B Contact Centre forthwith and to participate in all necessary intake sessions so that the time that the child spends with the father in the supervision of the Centre can commence as soon as possible. 

5. The parents are to share equally in the costs charged by the contact centre for such supervision.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT

1. The father shall ensure that he participates in a post separation parenting orders program and completes same by the commencement of the trial on 10 February 2014.

2. Both the mother and the father shall ensure that they participate in a Triple P parenting course and complete same by 10 February 2014.

3. Each of the mother and the father shall either continue to, or commence, engaging with a suitable mental health professional as recommended by Ms E in her report dated 19 July 2013 and each parent shall provide that mental health professional who they receive such treatment from, copies of both reports of Ms E and the report of Dr F and each of the parents shall provide to the Independent Children’s Lawyer, at her request, evidence of their compliance with this order.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Clarke & Vargas has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BRISBANE

FILE NUMBER: BRC 10951 of 2011

Ms Clarke

Applicant

And

Mr Vargas

Respondent

EX TEMPORE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT 

1. Before me for determination today is a parenting dispute between the parents of the child C, born in March 2011, (“the child”).  He is now two years and four months of age.  His parents separated in late 2011, and have apparently been in dispute and significant conflict in respect of his parenting since that time.  That means that two year old C has experienced very little life to this point in time without being the subject of serious dispute and conflict between his parents. 

2. The matter has been before the Courts now on a number of occasions.  It initially came before Judge Lapthorn of the Federal Circuit Court on 2 August 2012.  That date, significantly, was close in time to many of the factual circumstances that the father has referred to in his submissions to me today in support of his application for an order that the child live with him and spend supervised time with his mother.  The father made submissions to me that the evidence of factual things that happened in April, May, June of last year, 2012, would influence me and assist in persuading me that the best interests of this little boy required orders to be made in the form that he seeks today.  However, I note that Federal Magistrate Lapthorn (as he then was), on 2 August 2012, made orders that the child live with the mother and that he spend alternate weekends and Wednesdays with his father, with handovers to occur at one of the contact centres, either at Town G, Suburb H or Suburb J.  Judge Lapthorn also ordered the appointment of an Independent Children’s Lawyer and that occurred with Ms Keyworth being appointed as that lawyer.

3. On 25 October 2012, a hearing date that was listed for 22 November 2012 was vacated by Judge Lapthorn, noting that the parties were to attend upon Dr F for a report based on Dr F’s psychiatric expertise to be prepared for the assistance of the Court.  In addition, a family consultant, Ms E, was engaged, presumably by the Independent Children’s Lawyer, and prepared a family report in December of 2012. 

4. The recommendations at the conclusion of Ms E’s report were that until the mental health assessments of both parties were completed, the child continue to live with the mother and spend time with the father, as per the interim orders made by his Honour Judge Lapthorn that I have already referred to.  Ms E recommended that both parties complete a Parenting Orders Program and that they complete a Triple P Parenting Program.  She recommended at that time that parental responsibility remain shared. 

5. Now, as I understand the facts, sometime in February of this year, on one of the weekends when the child was spending time with his father pursuant to the existing interim orders, the father determined to hold on to the child and not return him to his mother.  The matter then came before Principal Registrar Fillipello for determination.  On 6 March 2013, Principal Registrar Fillipello, having heard a barrister, Mr Catt, who appeared on behalf of the father, and hearing the mother representing herself, as well as hearing Ms Keyworth, ordered that the father return the child to the care of the mother forthwith by delivering the child to the mother at the Town G Police Station that same day. 

6. She ordered, no doubt after having heard submissions for the father that she should order something different to this, that the child continue to live with the mother and that the child spend time with the father on alternate weekends and on Wednesdays; similar orders to those that were previously made by Federal Magistrate Lapthorn.  The father then, on 22 March 2013, filed a Contravention Application.  That was ultimately listed by Registrar Coutts for hearing today.  The father did not proceed with that application today and withdrew it. 

7. On 8 May 2013, the matter was again before Principal Registrar Fillipello.  That day, the father appeared on his own behalf. Ms Byrne, solicitor, appeared on behalf of the mother and Ms Keyworth as the Independent Children’s Lawyer.  That day, Principal Registrar Fillipello made orders that neither parent denigrate the other parent or a member of their family during the presence of hearing of the child; orders restraining each parent from consuming alcohol to excess during the time that the child was with them;  and particularly, an order that the father be restrained from presenting the child to any medical practitioners or counsellor without first consulting the mother and obtaining the consent of the Independent Children’s Lawyer, unless in the case of a medical emergency.

8. Principal Registrar Fillipello also ordered that each parent attend and complete a Triple P Parenting Program and a Post-separation Parenting Orders Program within six months of the date of the making of these orders.  I have been informed by Ms Byrne that her client has already attended a parenting orders program.  I have not heard from the father whether he has done so.

9. Now, the evidence that is before me today is that three days after Registrar Fillipello made the orders that I have just referred to and, in particular, the order restraining the father from presenting the child to any medical practitioners, unless in the case of a medical emergency, he again presented the child to K Hospital, taking the child to the hospital emergency department that Saturday, alleging that the child had been physically abused and wanting the child to be examined. 

10. However, during the course of discussion today, the father has conceded without hesitation that he did not consider the circumstances that presented that day factually to him, in respect of the child, actually presented as a medical emergency.  He says, despite that, he took the child to the hospital because he saw bruising again on the child that he believed represented the same pattern of bruising that the child had been, he says, experiencing before.  Notwithstanding the fact that he was ordered not to take the child to a medical practitioner unless it was a medical emergency and he concedes that there was no such medical emergency, he still took the child to the hospital. 

11. The father has put into evidence before me today a document that was prepared and signed by a doctor at the hospital that day that is described as a Report of a Reasonable Suspicion of Child Abuse and Neglect.  That is one of the exhibits that is before me today. 

12. In the detail of that document, where it says, “are you aware of any harm to the child,” the box “yes” is ticked.  Under that box, in handwriting, is written:

    Old bruises noted to back x 3 however newly noted by dad when he picked [the child] up from mum’s care today.  No explanation given to dad.

13. Under the next part of the document, with the question, “are you aware of any risk of harm to the child,” the box is ticked “yes”.  The detail underneath that answer is simply “at risk of further physical harm”.  Under the heading “are you aware of any protective factors and/or family/child strengths?” the box “yes” is ticked and the detail is given:

    Dad is seeking medical attention & DOCS input in response to [the child’s] injuries.

14. There is no suggestion that the doctor who saw the child on that day had seen the child before on the many occasions that the child had been presented for medical examination.  There is no further explanation given in the document by the doctor as to why the doctor considers the child is at risk of further physical harm.  There is no suggestion in the documentation that the doctor considered that the bruises were consistent with physical harm being perpetrated to the child by the mother.

15. I note at this point in time that it is the father’s case, quite categorically, that the mother has been, over the last 18 months or so, deliberately, and quite maliciously, inflicting physical injury to this child, her own baby.  The father does not countenance the prospect or possibility that the child has had any bruises simply by course of normal childhood behaviour, such as bumps, accidents, falls or scratches that occur in the normal life of a toddler.  He does not countenance even the possibility that these bruises may occur simply through the mother not looking, perhaps even neglecting the child a little bit.  His entire case is based around a belief, fervently asserted to me today, that the mother is maliciously inflicting physical harm to this child. 

16. Notwithstanding the visit to the hospital on 11 May, the father concedes that the child was returned to the mother’s care at the end of that weekend. 

17. On 14 June 2013, the matter was set down for a 10 day hearing in this Court before Justice Bell, beginning on 10 February 2014.  On 6 July this year the father again, on a weekend that the child was in his care, that is, soon after he picked him up, again contacted child welfare departmental authorities by telephone, asserting that the child had bruises.

18. He says that he was told to take the child to the hospital; not to K Hospital this time, but to Town L Hospital, which was closer to where he and the child were at the time, given the father lives on the Sunshine Coast.  He did that, and he relies again, in evidence, on a document that has been put into evidence as an exhibit, which is another document called a Report of a Reasonable Suspicion of Child Abuse and Neglect.  It is the same type of pro forma form as I previously referred to.  It has been completed in handwriting by a doctor at the Sunshine Coast, namely, a Dr M, a paediatric PHO.  I do not know what PHO stands for.  It says, “are you aware of any harm to the child,” “yes”.  The detail is written:

    Brought in by Father after finding bruises when changing nappy, after taking custody today.  I - Noted 2 x circular 1cm diameter bruises, 2cm apart, Right lumbosacral region. 2 x circular 0.5cm  diameter bruises – 1cm apart on the upper right calf; photographs consented and taken.

19. I have seen the photographs.  They are in black and white and they do not assist the father’s case here today.  The doctor does not say that it is his view that the bruises are consistent with malicious physical injury.  He does not say anything about how he considers those bruises may have been obtained.  Under the heading, “Are you aware of any risk of harm to the child,” the doctor says this where he ticks the box “yes”:

    - Since February 2013, there have been 10 (this is the 11^th) notifications to DOCS with reasonable suspicion of child abuse - as told by DOCS worker [Ms N].

20. I interpret that to mean that the doctor has spoken to a DoCS officer, who told him that is the case in this particular matter. 

21. Again, I do not understand the father to be asserting that there was a medical emergency presenting on that occasion.  Again, I am satisfied he ignored Principal Registrar Filippello’s order.  Notwithstanding that happening on Saturday the 6^th, again, he returned the child to the mother at the end of the weekend.  He tells me today that the facts are that, on the weekend of 20 and 21 July 2013, he decided to hang on to the child, although he gives no evidence of any presenting factual matters that weekend, that caused him to determine that he had to hang on to the child.

22. Indeed, instead of that, he relies upon the assertion that he had gone to seek legal advice from Mr Gavin Lai, solicitor at Hartley Healy, that week, who he says told him that he should hang on to the child and not return the child to the mother notwithstanding the clear orders that were in place.  Of course, in fairness to Mr Lai, he is not here and not in a position to confirm or deny that he did, in fact, give the father that advice.  Since that day, 21 July 2013, the child has been in the care of the father.

23. The mother has had to bring another application for an order that the child be returned to her.  That was listed, at my behest, for hearing today at the same time as the contravention proceedings, and in the last day or two the father also put in an application that I am now determining, for the child to live with him and to spend supervised time with the mother.  It is his case, clearly, that the child is at an unacceptable risk of physical harm, deliberately inflicted upon him by the mother, in the mother’s care, and such unacceptable risk requires the child to continue to live with him and only spend time with the mother on a supervised basis.

24. There are a number of other pieces of very critical evidence before me in this particular case; namely, a report prepared by Dr F, psychiatrist, who examined the parties and provided a copy of his report, which has been attached to an affidavit that was filed on 19 April 2013.  In particular, I note one of the recommendations, in dot point form on page 20 of his report, says this:

    It should be noted, however, that it is not my view that the mother’s mental health condition would place the child at significant risk of physical or emotional harm.

    He begins his recommendations with this reference:

    Given the above formulations, I could see no reason why either parent would be a significant risk to the child in their care, and that both parents have the capacity to make long‑term decisions with respect to the child.

    He goes on to say that he:

    …would suggest, though, that the father would benefit from a referral to a suitably qualified mental health practitioner to assist him in managing his anxiety about the welfare of the child whilst in the care of the mother.

    He says that:

    The father may also need considerable assistance so as not to undermine the child’s relationship with the mother or his brother.

    If he is not able to do that, says Dr F:

    …then this would indicate to the court that he has a long‑term incapacity to prioritise the needs of the child above his own.

    In the doctor’s view, in those circumstances, contact should then be undertaken only on a supervised basis. 

25. It seems that, notwithstanding what the doctor says therein, the father, subsequent to the filing of that affidavit, nevertheless continued to take the child to medical appointments, even though no immediate medical emergency was presenting, with a view to somehow establishing that the mother was, indeed, in accordance with his belief, maliciously and deliberately inflicting physical harm upon the child.

26. The other significant piece of evidence upon which I place a great deal of weight today, notwithstanding the unavailability of the person who has done the report to be here for cross‑examination, is an updated report prepared by Ms E at the behest of the Independent Children’s Lawyer, dated 19 July 2007.  It is only a little over a week old.  Ms E has prepared a detailed and considered report, some of the most important parts of which I consider to be her report of her discussions with Ms O, an officer in the Queensland department charged with the responsibility for the wellbeing of children. 

27. I am going to read into my decision those paragraphs from Ms E’s report where she refers to her communication with Ms O; paragraph 9.1 onwards:

    Ms [O] reported that the current investigation and assessment in relation to [the child] has been open since January 2013.  She reported that, throughout the investigation period, there has been more than one visit to [the mother’s] home, and no concerns have been assessed for [the child] in [the mother’s] care.  [Ms O] reported that [the child] demonstrates a positive and strong relationship with [the mother].

28. I digress here to say that is also what Ms E reported, by way of her observation when she saw the child in the mother’s company during the interview process for the first report.  Those observations of Ms E and of Ms O report positively of the child’s relationship with the mother. They are inconsistent with that which the father wants the Court to accept is what, he says, was observed in respect of the relations or the behaviour of the child in the care of the mother in the middle of last year.  I have already indicated I do not accept and agree with the father’s interpretation, or his submission in respect of the interpretation, of the particular piece of evidence that he has been referring to. 

1. I go back to the report of Ms E:

   She reported that [the child] has been sighted to be “very happy” when he’s with his mother.  Ms [O] reported that [the child] also seeks his mother for comfort, exampling that he stubbed his toe while she was visiting and [the child] immediately ran to [the mother] for comfort. 

2. Ms E observes that Ms O reported that on the weekend of 6/7 July 2013 the father again attempted to take the child to K Hospital regarding alleged injuries.  She reported that the police and child safety after hours allowed him to take the child to Town L Hospital so that the child did not have to travel back to Brisbane again.  The child had two circular bruises one centimetre apart and Ms O reported that the bruises were not significant.  Ms O reported that she has spoken with the contact centre where changeover took place and they advised that they did not see any bruises on the child. 

3. Ms E further observes that Ms O reported that on Monday 8 July 2013 the hospital notes recorded:

   Two circular one centimetre diameter bruises two centimetres apart in the right lumbar sacral region.  Two circular 0.5 centimetre bruises one centimetre apart on the right calf.

   Accordingly, four bruises were noted as opposed to the two that Ms O reported to Ms E.  However, as I said before, there is nothing in the notice that the doctor signed on that occasion that causes me to accept that the doctor was very concerned or worried that those bruises were consistent with malicious infliction of harm on the child.  I have very little doubt that the department carried out an investigation in respect of the medical examination of the child that took place on 6 July 2013, in any event.

4. Ms O reported that on Monday 8 July 2013 she attended the mother’s home to sight the child in relation to the injuries that he was taken to Town L Hospital in respect of.  She reported that the mother took off all of the child’s clothes and the child’s whole body was viewed.  Ms O reported that she sighted one bruise located on the child’s shin.  No other bruises or injuries were observed over the child’s body.  Ms O reported that police advised her that they were not accompanying her on the most recent home visit to assess the new allegations as “they’re not putting [the mother] or [the child] through it”.

5. Ms O reported that she is aware that almost every visit the child spends with the father is characterised by attending the ICL’s office, a doctor or a hospital.  Ms O reported that there is no substantiation of abuse to the child in the mother’s care on any occasion by police or the department.  Importantly, Ms O reported that the most significant risk of harm to the child is as a result of emotional harm by the father.  This is now the department’s current focus.  

6. On 16 July 2013 the department, by way of a letter signed by Ms O, the child safety officer that I have just spoken about, sent a letter to the mother that is in evidence before the Court today, attached to the mother’s affidavit of evidence filed 26 July 2013, in which they advised the mother that the outcome of the current child protection notification for the child is “unsubstantiated”.  It also recorded that the child is not in need of protection.  There was no evidence to suggest that the child has suffered harm or is at risk of future harm whilst in the mother’s care and he had been deemed to be not a child in need of protection.  The departmental officer thanked the mother for her cooperation in the matter.

7. Ms E undertakes and sets out a detailed evaluation of the situation on pages 25 through to 29 of her latest report.  Without going through that or reading out that evaluation in its totality, it is clear that she considers that the father has escalated his focus on the child being at physical risk of abuse and harm in the mother’s care whilst all extraneous evidence points in the other direction.  She refers to the fact that all of the listed subpoenaed information that she considered suggests that the child has not been assessed to have suffered abuse or harm in the mother’s care. 

8. It seems that there is evidence that the father has taken me to that might point towards a finding of fact that at some point in the past the mother has indeed hit the child.  I refer particularly to notes of a conversation recorded by a departmental officer with the child’s elder half sibling, S, that appear to reflect that.  But that, on the father’s own admission, was in the middle of last year and no doubt clearly the subject of investigation by the department at the time and no doubt taken into account by the department in the course of its entire investigation and assessment in this particular case. 

9. Ms E is concerned that notwithstanding all the evidence pointing in the other direction, the father has persisted with his reports of injuries occurring to the child. Still today the father maintains the fervent belief that the mother is deliberately and maliciously inflicting physical harm on the child; an extraordinary assertion, in my view.  Ms E has described the father’s behaviour in respect to this issue as obsessive and compulsive and having resulted in the child being subjected to multiple physical examinations, having countless photographs taken of him, being removed and retained from his mother’s care and spending high amounts of time in medical settings.  All of this has happened without any substantiation of the child sustaining any real injuries at the hands of his mother.

10. Ms E opines that the father’s actions in respect of the child are progressing towards a trajectory of detrimental and cumulative harm and are likely to result in not only a high risk of the child experiencing issues with medical facilities and examinations as he ages, but are also likely to diminish the relationship between the child and his father as it currently exists.  In paragraph 11.9 of her evaluation, Ms E says:

    Should the Court agree that the pattern of behaviour exhibited by [the father] has not desisted and has indeed escalated, it is my professional recommendation that [the child’s] time with him now occurs under supervision at a contact centre would best achieve this.

    And she recommends that this supervision occur forthwith, not after a trial in February next year, but forthwith.  She says:

    [The child’s] best interests are only likely to be further compromised the longer he is exposed to these circumstances.

    She says that:

    In addition to [the child’s] emotional wellbeing being compromised, his ability to maintain a meaningful relationship with [the father] could be significantly compromised should the current experiences continue for him.

    Ultimately also, Ms E opines and expresses the view that:

    In light of the high level of dysfunctional and destructive dynamics between these parties, [the child’s] parental responsibility remaining shared would not allow his best interests to be paramount. 

    She says:

    It’s most likely that decision making would be used as another platform to highlight the lack of shared confidence these parents share with each other and that [the child’s] needs, rights and best interests would be largely diminished in this context.

    She says that if the Court finds that the issues identified in this assessment remain ongoing, then she considers that parental responsibility should be solely held by the mother.

11. She recommends, ultimately, that the child continue to live with the mother, or that an order be made to that effect.  She recommends that the child’s time with the father be immediately reconsidered and it begin to commence in a supervised contact centre.  She recommends that both parties engage with a mental health professional and that the child’s parental responsibility be solely held by the mother. 

12. Ultimately, parenting orders have to be made having regard to the paramountcy of the child’s best interests.  Several years ago, before the amendments in 2006 to the parenting provisions of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”), it was most uncommon for a Court to make substantial changes to arrangements that existed and had been in place for some time, on an interim basis, particularly when a trial was slated to take place only six or seven months from the time at which the Court was considering the matter. However, as was clearly acknowledged by the Full Court of this Court in decisions that have taken place since the amending legislation (see for example Goode & Goode (2006) FLC 93-286), the notion that status quo should prevail in most interim determinations has been relegated. What is now required, even at the interim stage, is a deeper consideration of all of those matters that are required to be considered pursuant to section 60CC of the Act in order to determine what parenting orders should be made, having regard to the best interests of the child.

13. I am quite satisfied on the evidence that I have seen today, particularly that which I have referred to, that the best interests of this child, on an immediate basis, require a change to the existing parenting orders regime that has now proven itself, through the actions of the father, as not being in this child’s best interests in the lead-up to the trial that is scheduled to take place before Bell J next year in February. 

14. I am quite satisfied that the presumption that it is in a child’s best interests for his parents to have equal shared parental responsibility is overcome in this particular case.  The evidence, particularly the professional opinions of Ms E and the reasons that she gives for those opinions, which I am at this stage prepared to accept, persuade me that it is not in this little boy’s interests, at least until this trial, for the parents to have equal shared parental responsibility for him.  I do not intend to make such an order and indeed, will be making an order that the parental responsibility, on an interim basis at least, rests solely with the mother.

15. Having determined that, I am not required to go on and give any consideration to whether or not it is in his best interests to spend equal time with his parents and I note that no one previously, such as Principal Registrar Filippello or Judge Lapthorn, had even considered that as in his best interests.  I do not have to go on and consider the practicability issue, even though a consideration of that would quickly determine that it is not practicable for him to spend equal time with each of his parents.

16. I can, I am satisfied, make such orders as the evidence before me convinces me is in this little baby’s best interests at this particular point in the process.  I add, at this stage, that I did all I could today to try and encourage the father to reach a position whereby it might be possible to begin to consider that leaving the existing orders in place will be in the child’s best interests.  I quickly became satisfied, not only when the mother, through her solicitors, indicated that she pressed for an order in terms of those sought by the mother, but in respect of my discussions with the father from bench to bar, that it would not be in the best interests of the child to continue the existing orders and to simply require the father to give the child back to the mother and to leave the existing orders in place that allow for the child to spend each alternative weekend with him.

17. It became clear that I could not be satisfied that the child would not be subject on a regular basis to more of the same, that is, being taken to medical practitioners with a view to try and prove that which the father believes, which I find is without reasonable basis in the circumstances, namely, that the mother is deliberately and maliciously inflicting physical injury and harm to the child.  In the circumstances, I determine it is in the child’s best interests to immediately return to his mother’s care from the moment the mother leaves the Court, and for the child to continue to live with the mother with her having sole parental responsibility for the child on an interim basis, and for the child to spend time with the father as recommended by Ms E on a supervised basis at a contact centre that can provide such service.

18. I am satisfied that it is in the child’s best interests for that supervision to be provided at K Contact Centre that is operated by D Organisation.  I am even more satisfied at that, having heard the father’s submission that he would prefer it to be at Town G simply because that would mean he would have to travel less distance, without much regard at all being expressed by him for the fact that having it there would mean that the baby would have to travel a greater distance.  In the circumstances, we are talking about six months before the next trial, and I consider it appropriate and in the child’s best interests that he not have to travel, at his age, a great deal of distance to have the supervised contact with his father that is going to take place at a contact centre.

I certify that the preceding forty-six (46) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Forrest delivered on 31 July 2013.

Associate: 

Date:  11 September 2013